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ABSTRACT
AMERICAN VOTING: THE LOCAL CHARACTER OF SUFFRAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 2005
ALEC C. EWALD, B.A., TUFTS UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA - CHAPEL HILL
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John Brigham
This dissertation examines the local dimension of suffrage in the United States.
The U.S. has a hyper-federalized system of election administration, in which county and
municipal officials and institutions continue to play important roles, and I demonstrate
that a systematic analysis and appreciation of these suffrage practices enhances our
understanding of voting rights and American political development. The dissertation
makes theoretical, historical, and normative contributions to our ideas about American
voting. First, I argue that conceiving suffrage as a practice, rather than merely a formal
right or an instrumental behavior, produces a more rich understanding of what Americans
actually do at the polls. Historically, I show that prominent roles for local officials and a
great deal of variation in voting practices at the county or municipal level have always
been components of American suffrage. Such variation - which is today often treated as
a scandal or, at best, an historical accident to be rectified - is in important ways a product
of purposeful state action, and is closely connected to American ideas about popular
sovereignty and the state. Normatively, I emphasize the redemptive aspects of the local
character of American suffrage, challenging what seems to be the prevailing bias today
IX
against things local. I contend not only that local administration of elections is deeply
rooted in U.S. history and thought, but also that local administration has at times been an
important engine of inclusion, expanding the bounds of suffrage before state and federal
law did so. Americans have always voted together in our communities, and have done so
for reasons rooted in our fundamental political traditions.
x
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CHAPTER 1
VOTING RIGHTS AS SUFFRAGE PRACTICES: THE REDISCOVERY OF
PSEPHOLOGY
In this opening chapter, I explain the purposes of the dissertation and establish
important foundational points. First, I outline the facts on the ground regarding the
unusually-important roles county and municipal officials play in putting American voting
rights into practice today. Next I describe what I call the ongoing “rediscovery of
psephology,” the science of ballots and votes, prompted in part by Election 2000, and
point to some of the questions that election forces us to consider. The recent proliferation
of literature on the mechanics of suffrage highlights the relative lack of such work
previously. I contend that while political science and related fields have produced superb
scholarship on voting rights and suffrage, we have erred in conceiving voting rights in
overly formalistic and binary terms, and limited ourselves by focusing only on the kinds
of variation that most clearly shape election outcomes. Finally, I describe the
dissertation’s major theoretical purpose, which is to supplement our understanding of
voting as a right with a conception of suffrage as practice, and explain the scholarly
provenance of that approach.
In the United States, voting has always been a local practice. To say this is not to
deny the considerable importance of national and state constitutions and statutes in
shaping American suffrage. I do contend, however, that scholars have erred by focusing
too much on the formal, symbolic, and constitutional aspects of “the right to vote.” As
powerful and as controversial as it has been — the story of voting rights is itself The
1
Contested History of Democracy in The United States”
1
- the idea of a “right to vote” is
incomplete if it does not understand suffrage as a practice. Across both time and space,
American voting has displayed a remarkably rich texture, a diversity of practices which
invites and demands greater understanding. The administration of suffrage in the United
States is not only federalized, but /typer-federalized, with an unusual amount of
responsibility and even authority in the hands of county, city, and town employees.
My central objective is to make the case that we need to understand American
suffrage as a practice, and describe what is gained by doing so. I put together four main
pieces. First, I describe the important roles played by local officials in U.S. elections
today. Second, I sketch what I call the “rediscovery of psephology” - the study and the
science of ballots and voting - clearly taking place in political science, and review what
the Presidential election of 2000 illustrated about the importance of local variation.
Third, I contrast the terms of the post-2000 rediscovery with the more symbolic,
nationalized understandings of voters and voting rights which has held sway. Finally, I
explain the power and appeal of an approach to suffrage which understands voting rights
as a practice.
Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin begin Rude Republic, their brilliant
revisionist study of nineteenth-century electoral behavior, with an image from
Hawthorne’s 1851 novel House ofthe Seven Gables
1 The protagonist, Clifford
Pyncheon, watches a political parade from afar and feels inspired. But seeing the sweaty,
dirty, agitated visages of the marchers more closely, Pyncheon becomes disappointed.
1 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History ofDemocracy in the United States (2000).
2 Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the
Nineteenth Century’ (2000).
2
One should view politics, he opines, “not in its atoms, but in its aggregate,
-as a mighty
river of life, massive in its tide, and black with mystery, and, out of its depths, calling to
the kindred depth within him .” 3 Altschuler and Blumin use this story to make a point
about how scholars have understood political activity in the nineteenth century: by
looking at its aggregate, and failing to see its atoms
.
4 We’ve believed, they argue, that
high levels of voting and spectacular campaigns meant high levels of meaningful political
engagement. They try to show that this consensus is wrong, and they do so by looking
much more closely at what people were actually doing when they participated in politics,
by investigating “the nature and depth of popular political engagement .”5 Local
institutions and local contexts are key, and it is no accident that the unit of measurement
historians Altschuler and Blumin choose for their “sample” is the town. I hope to offer
something analogous to what Altschuler and Blumin have given us: I am less interested
in explaining election outcomes than in understanding the nature of the voting activity
itself.
6
3
Id., at 3.
4
There is a “nearly consensual view,” they argue, that post-Jacksonian American politics was “a genuinely
massive activity in which the vast majority of ordinary Americans—white, voting males, most evidently
—
participated with an effectiveness bom of enthusiasm for and deep commitment to their political party, to
specific programs and leaders, and to the idea and practice of democracy itself.” Id., at 3.
5
Id., at 5. The testimonies of actual voters - in court, correspondence, diaries, and particularly in disputed
election cases - demonstrates that the act of voting was much more “qualified,” “hesitant,” and “casual”
than we have assumed. Many votes were literally purchased; some were coerced by force, others by drink;
and a great many voters cast their ballots in utter ignorance of what and whom they were voting for.
Americans’ relations to their politics were in fact highly variable, characterized by “detachment as well as
commitment, skepticism as well as belief, disgust as well as enthusiasm
—
’ Id., 272. Ample evidence of
spectacular campaigns and high turnout have led us into an overly simplistic, ‘ Golden Age picture of
nineteenth-century politics—a picture which neglects the complexity and institutional variation that
necessarily characterizes all electoral activity, and neglects “the cultural dimension of political
engagement.” Id., 6.
6
I do not put forth new empirical voting-behavior analysis here, offering instead “a work of synthetic
interpretation that owes a great deal to the labor of other scholars,” as Gary Gerstle described one ot his
3
Speaking a century after Hawthorne’s Pyncheon, historian Chilton Williamson
opened his history of American suffrage with a similar idea. Explaining his emphasis on
contingency and variation in state laws rather than national developments — on “the
particular as much as the general — Williamson offered a metaphor: “Perhaps he who has
studied the atom knows as much which is fundamental as he who peers at the stars.”7 In
the election of 2000, citizens and scholars were reminded that fundamental truths about
American suffrage still lie in the local - in the “atoms” of national elections. The
contested election in Florida and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore8 have
spawned a great deal of scholarship—on federalism, the Electoral College and
democracy, and the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in national politics. 9 Yet one of the
simplest facts which the election, the recount, and Bush v. Gore itself make most
books. See Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (2001), at 1 1. As
Kim Ezra Shienbaum writes in introducing her Beyond the Electoral Connection,
“Others have seen to it that those fields [that is, empirical study of elections] have been well tilled,
and we intend to make full use of the fruits of their labors. Instead, this book attempts to
reconceptualize and reinterpret an important aspect of American political behavior whose
contradictions have long puzzled informed observers both here and abroad.”
See Kim Ezra Shienbaum, Beyond the Electoral Connection: A Reassessment ofthe Role of Voting
in Contemporaiy American Politics (1984), at vii.
1
Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage: From Property to Democracy, 1 760-1860 (1960), at viii. In
1960 the atom was perhaps more fraught with meaning than it had been a century before, but Williamson
here does not appear to use the term in any kind of threatening or foreboding way.
8 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
9
I discuss some of this scholarship below, in the last section of this chapter. Of many excellent books, one
offering a broad sample of citations to the literature - albeit only in the first year after the election - is
Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, When Elections Go Bad: The Law of
Democracy and the Presidential Election of2000, Rev d Ed (2001).
4
abundantly clear is that localities and local officials play unusually important roles in
American national elections. 10
I. The Local Role in Contemporary American Elections.
The local role in American voting is almost certainly greater than in any other
developed democracy. It is true that the amount of outright power, authority, and legal
discretion which county, city and town officials exercise in implementing suffrage law is
probably lower now than at any point in American history. That fact makes the scope of
the surviving local role all the more impressive, because in comparative context it is still
substantial.
1
1
While such a pointed view may not be widely shared, it is still possible for
critics of the United States’ current, fragmented system of election administration to
describe it as “thousands of fiefdoms,” and to believe that working for a unifomi voting
system “amounts to a battle against the warlords.” 12
Whether or not it is best described as a “battle,” there is no question that
American election practices are undergoing great scrutiny, and some reform. And most,
if not all, of the topics and controversies at the “frontier” of voting rights today concern
the work of local officials and the immediate context of voting. In his 2003 book You
Call This An Election? America ’s Peculiar Democracy, political scientist Steven Schier
10 The opening paragraph of Bush v. Gore is about counties: votes, disputes, and recounts in Leon County,
Miami-Dade County, Palm Beach County, and manual vote tabulation in other counties. Bush v. Gore , 531
U.S. 98 (2000).
11
See infra, note 28 and accompanying text.
12
Alan Dechert, e-mail to the author, July 1, 2003. Dechert probably had in mind not only state, local and
party officials, but also the various vendors who prosper under the current system by selling and servicing
various kinds of electoral technology. Dechert works with a young organization called the Open V oting
Consortium, which seeks to develop an “Election Rules Database” covering all U.S. election precincts and
practices for the use of election lawyers in challenging discrimination. See
<http://www.openvotingconsortium.org> (accessed March 18, 2004).
5
offers a long list of such controversies, beginning with our “patchwork system of
registration” and continuing through questions about ballot technology, early, absentee,
all-mail, and internet voting, and ballot-counting and election-contestation rules . 13 Other
fights center on better instructions and assistance for voters; help for those with poor
literacy or English-language skills; and clear and consistent procedures for the re-
enfranchisement of former felons . 14 Advocacy and voter-education groups increasingly
understand that how local officials interpret and enforce state and federal law is as
important as the content of the laws themselves
.
15 And a prominent recent study’s central
descriptive map of American election machinery depicts the U.S. not by state, but by
county
In most states, local and county officials carry the burden of enabling voters to
register and of maintaining official registration rolls, and, therefore, of deciding who may
13
Steven E. Schier, You Call This an Election? America 's Peculiar Democracy (2003), at 108-115.
14
The importance of local officials in these areas is clear. But many such issues are now also governed by
federal law. Professor Pamela S. Karlan makes this point in a recent study on reforming American
electoral practices produced by The Constitution Project. Karlan endorses proposed reforms to ballots,
access, and registration rules, but notes that “many of the problems described in this Report are the product
of a failure to comply with existing federal law....” Karlan urges additional attorneys’ fees and resources to
enforcement agencies, doubting that new legislation alone will “produce full compliance.” See
Supplemental Views, Recommendationsfor Congressional Action
,
Forum on Election Reform of The
Constitution Project, at 9. Professor Karlan’s point strengthens rather than weakens the need for a better
understanding of the local component of American suffrage. Without such an understanding, one is hard
pressed to appreciate how local and national governing bodies can find themselves fighting this way over
the franchise in the twenty- first century.
For comprehensive explanation of the modem law of municipalities—emphasizing that cities
“have only those powers delegated to them by state government”—see Gerald E. Frug, “The City as a
Legal Concept,” 93 Harvard Law Review 1057 (1980), 1062.
15
See generally Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Why Americans Still Don ’t Vote And Why
Politicians Want It That Way (2000), one of the most prominent combinations of scholarship and reform
advocacy.
16
See CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project, “Voting: What Is, What Could Be,” (2001), at 19.
6
cast valid ballots on election day.
17
Registering to vote has gotten easier in recent
decades, but records are still “maintained in the separate files of the nearly 13,000 local
election jurisdictions of the United States,” as the 2002 report of the National
Commission on Federal Election Reform observed. 18 The U.S. may be unique among
democracies in this regard, since most countries take registering citizens to vote to be a
governmental responsibility, and compile lists automatically. One recent scholarly
assessment of comparative electoral administration found that only the U.S., France, and
some Latin American countries require would-be voters to register themselves; 19 an
earlier study concluded that only the U.S. has a system so heavily dependent on voters
themselves. 20 More than 100 countries have some form of national voter registration
system.
21
17
As a generation of scholarship has demonstrated - a “truly enormous” literature, in Walter Dean
Burnham’s words - registration rules are a key cause of low turnout. See Walter Dean Burnham, “The
Turnout Problem,” in A. James Reichley, ed., Elections American Style (1987), at 108. Burnham writes
that “first-rate empirical work has demonstrated that personal registration systematically reduces turnout.”
Id.
18 Jimmy Carter et al., To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process: Report of the National
Commission on Federal Election Reform (2002), 27. There is no national list which can even approximate
a voter list: tax and Social Security records are shielded by law from state and local officials, and only a
relative handful of citizens have passports. Among the many results of this fragmented system is the
startling number of inactive voters still registered in many localities
—
people who may still live in the area,
but who may have moved away, died, or be in prison. According to firms used by politicians to contact
eligible voters, the amount of “deadwood” on the typical voter list is as high as 16%. Carter et ah, 78 n.13.
This has obvious impact on political scientists’ ability to measure turnout, among other things. Four
decades ago, Warren E. Miller found strong associations between variation in voting rates and such
practical factors as residence requirements, registration procedures, closing dates for registration, poll tax
requirements, and the ballot itself. See Warren E. Miller, “Assessment of the Significance of State Laws
Governing Citizen Participation in Elections.” Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, 1963. Summarized in Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Why Americans Still Don 't Vote
(2000), 25.
19 Mark N. Franklin, “The Dynamics of Electoral Participation,” in Lawrence LeDuc et ah, eds.,
Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study ofElections and Voting (2002), 157.
20
See Kevin P. Phillips and Paul H. Blackman, Electoral Reform and Voter Participation (1975), at 5.
Phillips and Blackman conclude that
7
Cities and towns alone pay for elections in most states. Indeed, prior to
implementation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) - implementation which
has proceeded more slowly than many had expected - Congress had never provided
funds to state or local governments to help them administer elections, and many states
have left the entire burden of election financing to localities. 22 For this reason - and
because individual counties and towns’ individual election-related expenditures are too
low to meet mandatory Census reporting requirements - we do not know how much the
U.S. spends on elections. 23 In some states, local officials still design ballots for national
elections, virtually everywhere, local officials, party staff, and volunteers supervise the
casting and counting of ballots. “Local” means different things in different places. For
example, in Alabama, the county Board of Registrars, Judge of Probate, Circuit Clerk,
and Sheriff all have specific election responsibilities; in Massachusetts, however,
elections are administered not by county staff but by town officials. 24 Most Americans
vote in local institutions—schools, town halls, and fire stations. There is a great diversity
in these facilities, since local officials may choose almost any place they believe will be
convenient for voters: in sixty Massachusetts towns, elections take place in churches,
“[t]he United States is alone in putting the responsibility for registering to vote on the potential voter
rather than on the state. All Anglo-European nations oblige the state to list eligible voters, and those
nations have voting turnouts ranging from five to forty percentage points higher than America’s.”
21
See Jamin Raskin, “Suffrage Suffers in the Land of Rights,” Los Angeles Times, March 15, 2004 (page
number unknown).
22
See Recommendationsfor Congressional Action, Forum on Election Reform of The Constitution Project
(2001), at 1.
23
See CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project, “Voting: What Is, What Could Be,” (2001), at 48. The
report notes that “the most basic questions remain unanswered” about American election administration,
and provides some national cost estimates. Id., 48-53.
24
See, for Alabama, http://www.sos.state.al.us/cf7election/borjopl .cfrn; for Massachusetts, see
<http://www.state.ma.us/sec/ele/eleidx.htm>. For links to descriptions of procedures in all states, see the
National Association of State Elections Directors, at <http://www.nased.org/statelinks.htm>.
8
while voters in at least one California city have voted on the beach. 25 The day after
California’s special recall election in October of 2003, the New York Times devoted most
of its front page to photos of three California polling places, including a mortuary and a
deli.
26
The American practice of allowing local officials to control and administer
elections often while acting simultaneously as an agent of one of the major parties —
is very unusual.
27
Even in other former British colonies such as Canada, Australia, and
India, local officials administer elections only under the oversight of impartial
bureaucrats in national independent bodies; in most Western European democracies the
role of local officials is much narrower. National governments there include departments
specializing in electoral administration, and “tenured civil servants specializing in
electoral questions” manage elections and arbitrate disputes.28
25
See Peter Schworm, “Activist Challenges the Use of Churches as Polling Places,” Boston Globe, March
31, 2003, at Bl. In the town of Weston, all polling places are in churches. Voting in houses of worship,
the story notes, is “a cornerstone ofNew England democracy.” In many towns, the church was for
centuries the official and unofficial meeting place, and the only building large enough for major public
functions. But new polling stations are also placed in churches: such a decision prompted the Globe story,
which details the complaints of a Jewish citizen who felt he had to “bow before the cross” to vote in a new
polling place in a Framingham church. Meanwhile, the city of Venice, California, recently stationed a
polling place at a lifeguard station on the beach. Posting to the election-law listserv by Craig Holman of
the Public Citizen organization, Apr. 2, 2003.
26
See N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2003, at 1.
27
See Paul Gronke, “Electing to Change in How We Vote,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 16, 2003, at 17.
Gronke writes that “states and localities, rather than the federal government, control and pay for election
administration in the U.S., unlike in other nations.”
28
See Bengt Save-Soderbergh, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Broader Lessons of the
U.S. Election Drama.” Available at <http:www.idea.int/press/op_ed_08.htm>. See also Dennis F.
Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States (2002), at 177.
Thompson writes, “[fjoreign observers are astonished to leam that the political parties operate the polling
stations in most elections in the United States.” Indeed, American parties play significant roles in
everything from ballot design to staffing the polling stations and overseeing counts and recounts. Most
European democracies, he writes, put independent, non-partisan government officials in charge of
elections.
9
If international variation suggests that the local dimension of American elections
is worthy of study, the great shifts which U.S. history has seen in this area only
strengthen the case. As I explain in a subsequent chapter, the local component of the
“medley” that is American suffrage29 has undergone a great deal of change—and it has
been neither a linear story nor a simple one. The most recent changes in the history of
American voting rights law, however, indicates that American lawmakers may now be
paying much greater attention to the practice of suffrage. Following over a decade of
advocacy and legislative battles, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). Christened the “motor-voter” law
because of its requirement that states make registration available in driver’s license
agencies, the NVRA also required other public agencies to assist registration, including
those distributing welfare benefits, food stamps, and Medicaid. Implementation was slow
and contentious, but between 1995 and 1998 more people registered to vote than during
any similar period in American history. 30
The election of 2000, of course, provoked tremendous interest in election
administration, both among citizens and legislators. In 2002, President Bush signed into
law the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which tries to tackle some of the problems
As Soderbergh writes, the Florida recount highlighted “the problems inherent in the existence of
diverse laws and their varied, devolved implementation.” These problems include confusion, disparate
counting standards, and lack of public confidence when openly partisan officials attempt to resolve
disputes. By contrast, when other democracies vote for common offices such as the chief executive and the
national legislature, they do so by means of uniform procedures, administered by non-partisan, professional
election officials. For an excellent overview of comparative election structures and their implementation,
see the webpages of the Administration and Cost of Elections Project, at
<http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/eslO.htm>.
29
See Dudley O. McGovney, The American Suffrage Medley: The Needfor a National Uniform Suffrage
( 1949 ).
30
Fox Piven and Cloward, at vii-viii.
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created by local vanation in election administration. HAVA makes available federal
money to states which pass enabling legislation and request funds; the large, complex law
requires each state to create computerized voter registration lists, make polling places
accessible, improve voting machines, allow for provisional voting by those of uncertain
registration status, and provide new penalties for fraud. 31
As the 2004 elections approach, however, change has been uneven. Some states
have improved old systems and moved toward compliance with HAVA, but others have
not, as described in a comprehensive report published in 2004 by the research group
Electionline.org. In explaining the slow and unsteady rate of reform, the report points a
finger at “delays in Washington,” both in appropriations and in appointments to the new
Election Assistance Commission, as well as reluctance among some state legislators and
a lack of sustained public pressure. 32 As political scientist Steven Schier writes, even
after HAVA “a large battle remains to be fought over the future role of the national
government in election administration.”33
31
See Robert Pear, “Congress Passes Bill to Clean Up Election System,” N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 2002, at Al;
Robert Pear, “Bush Signs Legislation Intended to End Voting Disputes,” N. Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2002, at A22.
HAVA may mark a major expansion in federal regulation of registration, election administration, and
funding. Whether it will bring new levels of consistency and clarity to American federal elections is yet
unclear, however, since states must pass their own legislation in order to win federal funds, and proposed
state legislation is remarkably varied. Advocacy groups’ materials provide the best evidence of the
incomplete and uncertain nature of the changes HAVA will bring. See the webpages ofElectionline.org,
(www.electionline.org), Demos (www.demos-usa.org/HAVA); the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
(www.civilrights.org); the League ofWomen Voters (www.lwv.org); and the American Association of
People with Disabilities (www.aapd.com).
32
See “What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why,” (January 2004), at 3. The report is available at
<http://www.electionline.org>.
33
Schier, You Call This An Election? (2003), at 1 14.
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II. The Rediscovery of Psephology and the Lessons of 2000.
In the summer of 2003, a fascinating article appeared in the prominent new
journal Perspectives on Politics. In the essay - titled “Beyond the Butterfly: The
C omplexity of U.S. Ballots”
- political scientists Richard Niemi and Paul Hermson
document and examine some of the variation in American ballots. 34 Acquiring sample
tickets from all fifty states, Niemi and Hermson find great diversity in “[bjallot
instructions, candidate and party listings, party symbols” and other attributes, variations
which “result from a complex and highly decentralized election system”. 35 That
“system” (multiple systems, really) the authors argue, provides “ample opportunity for all
but the most sophisticated voters to misunderstand, mismark, or spoil their ballots and for
all voters to feel confused and frustrated.”36 The authors acknowledge that they’ve
focused on state-level variation and “made no attempt to examine ballot variations within
states, but acknowledge that “doing so would only reinforce our point about the
diversity of ballot styles nationwide.”37
As Niemi and Hermson note, attention to ballots’ impact on elections is not new
in political science.
38
But for my purposes here, what is most striking about “Beyond the
Butterfly” is its tone - which, by the standards of most political science scholarship
today, exudes genuine excitement and a palpable sense of discovery. In a way, the
34
Richard Niemi and Paul Hermson, “Beyond the Butterfly: The Complexity of U.S. Ballots.” 1
Perspectives on Politics 317 (2003).
35
Niemi and Hermson, 317.
36
Id.
37
Id., 326 n.7.
38
In the “early days” of the discipline, they write, ballot design was a prime topic of study, and in the
middle of the twentieth century, there was “a flurry of studies” on ballot formats and split-ticket voting.
Id., 317.
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article’s prime findings are quite straightforward, even mundane - for example, one table
shows that while some ballots described the Democratic candidate as “Vice President A1
Gore,” others called him “Albert Gore,” “A1 Gore,” and “Gore.’.’39 Yet these two eminent
political scientists clearly believe they have an extremely important set of results to share.
And indeed they do, for “Beyond the Butterfly” is a prime document in what amounts to
an ongoing rediscovery of the science of ballots - once called “psephology”40 - among
political scientists and researchers in cognate fields. In “Beyond the Butterfly,” we see
prominent displays of the names, symbols, instructions, phrases and arrangements used
on ballots. Here senior scholars, writing in a very high-status journal, have based an
article on illustrations of the actual words, images, and practices employed in American
national elections.
41
Like most of their colleagues, Niemi and Hermson conclude that ballot variation
has negative consequences, and argue for “[djoing away with the curiosities,
conundrums, and complications” that characterize American ballots in the twenty-first
century. They write that this will not be easy, for these variations “have their origin in
39
Id., 319.
I first encountered this term in L.E. Fredman’s The Australian Ballot: The Story ofan American Reform
(1968), at 119. Fredman refers to “psephology” not as the study of ballots themselves, but of voter
behavior. As Fredman writes,“[t]he conduct of elections now attracts little attention from political
scientists. It is assumed that they are fair and orderly, and an accurate expression of the popular will. It is
otherwise with psephology, the study of the electors’ behavior.” Id., at 119. Etymologically, however, the
word refers more specifically to ballots than to behavior. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
defines psephology as “the scientific study of elections,” but notes that it is derived from the Greek term for
“pebble,” which also came to mean “ballot” or “vote,” since some elections were decided by that means.
See Merriam-Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988), at 949. An old edition of the two-volume
Oxford English Dictionary
,
meanwhile, defines a “psephism” as a “decree enacted by a vote of a public
assembly,” and notes that a verb form of the Greek word for “pebble” meant “to vote.” See The Shorter
Oxford English Dictionaiy, vol. II, (Oxford, 1933), at 1611.
41
See Niemi and Hermson, passim.
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the very nature of our political system.”42 The journal’s editor, Jennifer Hochschild,
takes a firmer normative position on our hyper-federalized system, writing that “states
and even localities fiercely protect their autonomy in running the mechanics of elections,
with consequences ranging from amusing to appalling.”43
Something like a new consensus on the crucial role of election administration in
American democracy is emerging, together with an acknowledgment that that
significance has not been well understood — outside a small community of political
practitioners and election-law specialists. Steven Schier has articulated this well. Schier
observes that the beehive of controversies following the 2000 election “underscores the
previously unremarked importance of election administration in American politics.”44
The topic “may at first blush seem dull,” he writes,
“but it shapes the stability, accountability, and turnout of America’s
electoral system. Its operations also indirectly affect governmental deliberation
by influencing who is elected to direct the government’s course.”45
A rich and vast body of work continues to prove Schier right. It would be
difficult, to say the least, to write a comprehensive review of the literature on American
election law and voting practices in the last three years. The arrival of an important new
article, book, court decision, legislative proposal, advocacy study, or journalistic report
has literally become a daily event. Indeed, two weblogs - one administered by Loyola
42
Id., at 325. Three aspects of that political system are most relevant, they write: federalism; the great
number of elected positions at all levels of American government; the proliferation of propositions,
constitutional amendments, bond issues, and other state-specific ballot questions; and the current
decentralization of election administration. Id.
43
Jennifer Hochschild, “Introduction and Comments,” 1 Perspectives on Politics 247 (2003), 247.
44
Schier, You Call This An Election?, at 108.
45
Schier, 115.
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Law Professor Rick Hasen, the other by veteran voting-rights lawyer Edward Still - offer
daily summaries of developments, with links to pieces in the media, advocacy reports,
and scholarly articles. 6 These sources devote time to questions concerning “passive”
voting rights (the right to be elected), such as ballot access, primary rules, and campaign
finance, as well as active ’ voting rights problems, those concerned with casting votes
(or, the right to elect).
What follows, then, does not claim to be a comprehensive summary, but a few
exemplars of the ongoing “rediscovery.” Rather than engage with the substance of each
piece, I offer these materials as evidence of the quality of attention now being paid to the
nuts and bolts of elections in the United States, and as evidence of the need for an
understanding of American suffrage which merges practices with constitutional and
philosophical ideals. Eve selected a few important and representative books, scholarly
articles, and policy reports; while many of these studies were sparked or inspired by
Election 2000, they do not take that event as their central focus. I discuss examples of
that work in a subsequent section.
Three books stand out. One is political philosopher Dennis F. Thompson’s Just
Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States A1 Thompson builds his
examination of American elections around principles ofjustice, equality, free choice,
popular sovereignty, and deliberation, arguing that “[t]he rights that individuals claim
have different meanings and different effects depending on the nature of the institutions
46
See http://electionlawblog.org/>, Hasen’s “blog,” and <http://www.votelaw.coni/blog/>, Ed Still’s
“blog.”
47
Dennis F. Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States (2002).
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in which they are to be exercised .”48 Thompson casts a broad net, but topics connected to
local control and variation appear everywhere in the book. Steven Schier’s You Call This
An Election?, noted above, shares some ground with Thompson’s book. Electoral
administration is not his primary focus; Schier, like Thompson, tries to raise “broader
questions about America’s system of elections,”40 from redistricting and campaign
finance to the electoral college and direct democracy. But like Thompson, Schier devotes
close attention to the connection or lack thereof- between practices and ideals. Both
books are expertly researched and synthesize the work of legislators, judges, scholars,
and journalists.
One of the most important new works in the rediscovery is a collection of essays
by political scientists and legal scholars, many ofwhom have been writing about related
topics for some time. In Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and Prospects ofAmerican
Election Reform
,
Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just, and Edward J. McCaffery assemble
chapters examining a range of topics - the Electoral College, the news media’s eagerness
to “call” contests before they’re over, the difference between “free speech” in campaigns
and inside corporations, and the profound paradoxes posed by elections in modem
democracies . 50 Several entries confront directly the peculiarities and perils of the hyper-
federalized American system of election administration. R. Michael Alvarez and his co-
authors examine ballot-counting; Jon A. Krosnick and two colleagues write about the
effects of name order on election outcomes; and throughout, the authors consider what
48 Thompson, Just Elections, at 5.
49
Schier, at ix.
50 Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just, and Edward J. McCaffery, eds., Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and
Prospects ofAmerican Election Reform (2004).
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should change and why. Though many of the authors have tilled these fields before, they
also understand that there is a new urgency to their work today. As Crigler and her co-
authors put it in one essay, before the election of 2000 the “more mundane, technical
issues of balloting such as ballot formats and types of voting machines—had not made
it onto the public radar screen since the first decades of the twentieth century”. 51
Scholars whose critiques reach beneath the ballot and local variation have also
capitalized on the new attention given to electoral forms. Lisa Jane Disch published The
Tyranny ofthe Two-Party> System, 52 which focuses on the benefits obtainable from fusion
balloting and critiques the role of political science in constructing the ideology of the
two-party system. (Disch began work on the book in the mid-1990s, but she notes the
renewed interest in voting and elections since 2000.) And Douglas J. Amy published a
new edition of his argument for proportional representation, Real Choices/New Voices,
acknowledging that the 2000 election had alerted Americans to the importance of “the
workings of the electoral system itself.”53
In addition to the Niemi and Hermson article described above, three others merit
mention here as important “rediscovery” documents. One comes from Richard Bensel, a
leading scholar of American state-building. Writing in Studies in American Political
Development, Bensel reinterprets voting practices in the nineteenth-century U.S.
54
Bensel examines three “aspects of the context within which the polling place is located”:
51
Crigler et al., “Cleavage and Consensus,” in Crigler et al., Rethinking the Vote, at 152
52
Lisa Jane Disch, The Tyranny ofthe Two-Party System (2002).
53
Douglas J. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Representation Elections Could
Revitalize American Democracy, Second Ed. (2002), at 2.
54
Richard Bensel, “The American Ballot Box: Law, Identity, and the Polling Place in the Mid-Nineteenth
Century.” 17 Studies in American Political Development 1 (Spring 2003).
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the physical setting of the polling place itself; the sociological composition of the
community, in terms of race, ethnicity, wealth, and literacy; and laws governing
elections.
55 What is crucial for my purposes is that Bensel aims in his article to construct
a theoretical framework resting on the actual practice of elections”. 56 In a footnote,
Bensel wntes that the essay therefore attempts “to fill a void in both American political
historiography and general democratic theory, where the latter merges into material
practice.”
57
We can see the breadth and richness of the rediscovery by juxtaposing Bensel’s
article and a short piece by Jennifer Stromer-Galley on internet voting. 58 Employing
Habermas’ conception of the “public sphere,” Stromer-Galley - like Bensel - discusses
what it means to vote in terms of the “physical, public space” people enter to cast a
ballot. Stromer-Galley summarizes the results of about 60 discussion groups, finding
that most participants were enthusiastic about voting on-line. These respondents
understood voting primarily in terms of the private sphere, rather than the public; they
didn’t seem wedded the idea of what Stromer-Galley calls “physical polling.”60
55
Bensel, “The American Ballot Box,” at 5.
56
Id., at 5; emphasis in original.
57
Id., at 5, n. 10. Bensel quotes approvingly from David Grimsted’s book about violence in the pre-Civil
War U.S., American Mobbing, in which Grimsted argues that historians - like many behavioral political
scientists - have “largely counted votes rather than paying attention to the complicated realities of casting
them....” See id., quoting Grimsted, American Mobbing, 1828-1861: Toward Civil War (1998) at 183.
58
Jennifer Stromer-Galley, “Voting and the Public Sphere: Conversations on Internet Voting.” PS:
Political Science and Politics, Oct. 2003, 727-731.
59
Id., at 727.
60
Id., at 731.
Interestingly, another article in the same edition of the journal examines the growing importance
of overseas voters in U.S. elections, analyzing the “globalized electorate” in terms of electoral impact,
absentee ballot rules, and other issues. See Taylor E. Dark III, Americans Abroad: The Challenge of a
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Is something lost when significant numbers of Americans vote early, or absentee,
or by mail, or on-line? Dennis F. Thompson believes the answer is yes, and develops the
argument in a thoughtful new article in the American Political Science Review. To some
extent, the essay - “Election Time: Normative Implications of Temporal Properties of the
Election Process in the United States”61 - represents a continuation of Thompson’s 2002
book Just Elections. Thompson examines three central characteristics of elections -
periodicity, simultaneity, and finality - and argues that they require reforms in American
suffrage practices. These temporal properties” of elections, he writes, “are so familiar
that they are usually taken for granted, but the way they structure the electoral process
has significant theoretical and practical implications that have not been sufficiently
appreciated.”62 Specifically, Thompson argues that important philosophical principles
should lead us to take legislatures out of redistricting fights, oppose exit polls and early
voting, and limit campaign advertising, among other reforms.63
Thompson brings a political philosopher’s eye to the rediscovery. But out in the
“public sphere” of American political discourse, something like a cottage industry in the
study of election administration has sprung up virtually overnight, and there people are
quite interested in the immediate future. One of the best post-2000 studies merging
scholarship with policy advocacy was also one of the first: the CalTech/MIT Voting
Globalized Electorate, PS, Oct. 2003, 733. While his article does not delve into such questions, the author
notes that expanding overseas voting “raises profound questions about the relationship of territoriality and
citizenship in a rapidly globalizing world.” Id.
61
Dennis F. Thompson, “Election Time: Normative Implications of Temporal Properties of the Election
Process in the United States.” 98 American Political Science Review 51 (February 2004), 51-64.
62
Id., at 51.
63
Id.
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Technology Project’s July 2001 report “Voting: What Is, What Could Be.”64 The report,
which runs to almost one hundred pages, places itself “at the intersection of technology
with democracy,” and laments that American self-government’s “’can-do’ spirit has
‘make-do’ technology as its central element.”65 The study’s core recommendations -
more optical-scan machines and better registration rolls66 - soon became HAVA’s central
objectives.
Voting technology has become perhaps the most controversial topic, particularly
the use of electronic devices which do not yield a voter-verifiable “paper trail.”67 The
Congressional Research Service published a comprehensive analysis of security problems
with new technology late in 2003,68 following a similar paper by Johns Hopkins and Rice
University computer scientists. 69 Other studies — published by organizations such as
Electionline.org and Demos - have wrestled with problems linked to our hyper-
federalized system. Meanwhile, in the high temples of the legal academy, a new non-
partisan student group called “Just Democracy” is forming which will endeavor to supply
64 CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project, “Voting: What Is, What Could Be.” July, 2001.
65
Id., at 2.
66
Id., at 82. After these and other specific recommendations, the conclusion ends with a softer, almost
wistful “someday...” list of characteristics the authors wish our electoral system has. Id.
67
See, among many, many journalistic examples, the editorial in the New York Times titled “Making Votes
Count: Fixing Democracy,” Jan. 18, 2004, at sec. 4, p.10. The editorial launched the “Making Votes
Count” series of editorials, available at http://www.nytimes.com/makingvotescount>. The most recent,
“When the Umpires Take Sides,” urged states to de-politicize the office of Secretary of State as much as
possible, so that “no state official who helps run elections should continue to be involved in political
campaigns or other partisan activity.” See “When the Umpire Takes Sides,” N. Y. Times, March 29, 2004,
A24.
68
See Eric A. Fischer, “Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security
Issues.” Nov. 4, 2003, by the Congressional Research Service.
69
See Tadayashi Kohno et al., “Analysis of an Electronic Voting System,” July 23, 2003.
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election monitors to “high-risk polling places around the nation,” according to the
group’s press release. 70
In publicizing that law-student group’s formation, a prominent election-law
scholar recently observed that many of her students had been “shocked by some of the
problems encountered during the 2000 election.”71 Of course, much of the best critical
and scholarly work on American voting rights in the last few years has been framed as a
direct response to the election of 2000, and I describe some of that work here as a way of
demonstrating the need for a new understanding of the suffrage.
Each of the studies noted above asks, in some way, what our hyper-decentralized
suffrage system tells us about American democracy in some theoretical or substantive
way - about how we understand equality, or the depth of American federalism, or the
operation of popular sovereignty. Election 2000 - offering as it did what one voting-
rights lawyer recently called “a vivid glimpse behind the scenes of a fragmented and
politically compromised system”72—made clear that such questions must be asked. But
the reason the election drew the attention of political scientists to our fragmented
electoral system is that it did the one thing guaranteed to catch the eye of behavioral
scholars: it showed that local variation in suffrage practices can affect outcomes.
After all, “The Butterfly Did It,” as one prominent article concluded: Palm Beach
County’s confusingly-designed “butterfly” ballot gave Patrick Buchanan thousands of
70
See ‘“Just Democracy’ Project Seeks to Provide Clear Path to the Ballot,” press release, distributed to the
election-law listserv (election-law@majordomo.lls.edu) by Harvard Law Professor Heather Gerken, March
17, 2004.
71
See e-mail to the election-law listserv (election-law@majordomo.lls.edu) by Heather Gerken, March 17,
2004.
72
See Jamin Raskin, “Suffrage Suffers in the Land of Rights,” Los Angeles Times, March 15, 2004 (page
number unknown).
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votes he should not have received, depriving Vice President Gore of more than enough
votes to defeat George W. Bush
.
73
More broadly, the difficulties encountered by
Florida s slapdash system of election administration” revealed that “America’s
decentralized system of election administration can produce unreliable results that make
the outcome of any close election suspect .”74 Of course, in an election so exceptionally
close, any number of random factors could have “decided” the outcome, and we still do
not know just how random many of Florida’s problems were. But the election still
“provides a signal opportunity to think critically about the complex interaction between
democratic politics and the formal institutions of the state.”75
In her polemic against the institutional American parties, political theorist Lisa
Jane Disch interprets Florida to mean that “we have many party systems” rather than two
- because in the election aftermath “the process stood with its several ballots, voting
technologies, and ways of counting revealed ....”76 But beyond the question of parties
themselves, she writes, lay problems with “[o]ur voting process” - linked not necessarily
to overt partisan motives, but “a more insidious trouble with aging voting machines and
insufficiently staffed polling places that need not be intentionally partisan in order to
have partisan effects.” This problem is particularly hard to solve in a federalized system
73
“The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida,” Jonathan N.
Wand et al., 95 American Political Science Review 793 (2001). The story of how these social scientists met
law and politics in the turmoil of the Florida recount is in Henry E. Brady et al., “Law and Data: The
Butterfly Ballot Episode,” 34 PS: Political Science and Politics 59 (2001).
74
Schier, You Call This An Election?, at 1.
75
Issacharoff et al., When Elections Go Bad (2001), at Hi. These authors are most interested in exploring
“the judicial and political remedial structures, state and federal, for resolving election disputes.” Id., iv.
76
Disch, The Tyranny of the Two-Party System (2002), at 129; emphasis in original.
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that leaves the value of the vote to be determined by whatever tax dollars a given county
can afford to invest in it.”77
Perhaps the hottest charge leveled at the U.S.’s fragmented system after 2000
focused on those dollars, alleging that poor - and predominantly minority-population,
and Democratic-voting - counties in Florida and other states were more likely to have the
worst error-prone technology. But using county-level demographic data from the Census
bureau and county-level data on voting equipment, Stephen Knack and Martha Kropf
find remarkably little support for the view that resource constraints cause poorer
counties with large minority populations to retain antiquated or inferior voting
equipment. The authors note limitations in their methodology, and other studies have
produced different results. 7
;
Here, what is most important is simply that this major
analysis of equitable voting rights in U.S. national elections takes as its crucial object of
study not the rulings of federal courts or the language of state constitutions, but the
decisions of counties. And even county-level analysis was not sufficient to capture all
variation among the six different voting methods used in the U.S. In five states - Maine,
77
Id., at 13 1 . Later, however, Disch makes clear that her ultimate target is the parties, not the machinery.
Fixing mechanical problems, she writes, would not remedy “an unfairness that has nothing to do with
counting ballots [and] everything to do with wasting them.” Id., 134; emphasis in original.
78
Stephen Knack and Martha Kropf. “Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?” PS, September 2002, 541-
548.
79
Notably, they focus on use of each technology, not the number of invalidated ballots produced by
different kinds of machines in different locales. Other studies have shown a relationship between error
rates in predominantly African-American communities and the use of punch-card technology. Id., at 547;
see also 541 (listing other studies which produced different results).
Explaining why some counties retain old machines while others adopt new technology is a
complicated task, and beyond the scope of their paper. But the authors suggest that volume, desire for
quick results, and availability of managerial staff and expertise have historically been at least as important
as minimizing error. Id., at 543.
23
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin - voting equipment is selected
at the municipal level, so some counties in these states use a mix of technologies. 80
Another post-2000 study employs statistical methods to explore county-level
variation in election technology, its causes, and its effect on outcomes. Political scientists
Brian L. Fife and Geralyn M. Miller’s Political Culture and Voting Systems in the United
States: An Examination ofthe 2000 Presidential Election81 tries to ascertain whether
political culture affects the voting systems Americans use, applying Daniel Elazar’s well-
known typology of cultures in the United States. While their regression results are
dogged by statistical insignificance in numerous places, Fife and Miller document some
connections between cultural type and election technology. 82 Unfortunately, the authors
do not offer much theoretical support for any explanation of these connections, and
ultimately, they suggest that population size and income are as likely to explain voting
technology as is political culture. 8 Nevertheless, as a document in the rediscovery of
psephology, the book vividly illustrates that the 2000 election “charts the course for a
new way of looking at voting rights in America,” as Fife and Miller write. 84
These counties contain about 8% of the U.S. population. Id., 542. Knack and Kropf analyze how
differences in ethnicity, poverty status, partisanship, personal income, and property taxes paid align with
use of each technology. Id., 544-546.
8 ] .
Brian L. Fife and Geralyn M. Miller, Political Culture and Voting Systems in the United States: An
Examination of the 2000 Presidential Election (2002).
8
" The authors conclude that voters in “moralistic” states use paper more than their counterparts elsewhere;
that “traditionalistic” states use DRE systems more heavily than “moralistic” states; that lever machines are
found more often in “individualistic” than moralistic states; and that optical scan technology is used more
often in moralistic states than in individualistic states. Id., at 55.
83
Id., 78-79. This is stylistically a somewhat odd book. For example, it includes not only the kind of
detailed explanations of regression equations one usually finds in conference papers, not books, but also
explanations of the regression method itself, sometimes running to several pages. See, for example, id. at
45-49.
84
Id. at 87.
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New ideas about how to understand voting rights after Bush v. Gore have also
come from the legal academy, of course. The number of articles, books, and symposia on
the decision and its aftermath runs into the hundreds. 8 - For not only was the decision
controversial and momentous, but in the crisis “[fjorms of law became exposed to an
intense nationwide scrutiny,” as law professor Abner Greene writes . 86 Greene’s analysis
is particularly important here, because he integrates the power of local officials in
American elections into a framework of Constitutional legal “forms.” Greene contends
that the Court could have used a First Amendment approach to reach the same result,
without raising as many potential problems as the equal-protection rationale. As Greene
writes,
“[i]n many freedom-of-speech and freedom-of-the-press cases, the Court has
insisted that, when law gives discretion to public officials, that discretion must be
bounded by clear, objective criteria. For example, if city law gives a city official
power to grant or deny parade permits, or power to grant or deny requests to use
loudspeakers at a city hall gathering, that law will be upheld only if it sets forth
detailed, neutral, objective standards for granting or denying the requests.... Although
the Court has never applied this line of cases in the voting rights setting, voting rights
share with speech and press rights a core political nature—they are all part of our
essential citizenship; they are what allow us, rather than officials, to remain in control
of government .”87
The idea of defining voting as an act of political expression protected by the First
Amendment is not itself new. But Greene’s argument shows that beyond behavioral
85 An up-to-date summary is in Richard L. Hasen, “A Critical Guide to Bush v. Gore Scholarship,” Social
Science Research Network (SSRN) Research Paper No. 2004-2, January, 2004.
86
Abner Greene, Understanding the 2000 Election: A Guide to the Legal Battles That Decided the
Presidency {2001), at 180.
87
Greene, at 132.
88
See, for example, Adam Winkler, Note: Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 330 (1993).
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political science, scholars of voting rights now understand that variation in local practices
must, one way or another, be reconciled with American constitutional principles.
Surprisingly, some of the best books on Bush v. Gore do not devote much
attention to this problem. For example, Howard Gillman’s The Votes That Counted: How
the Court Decided the 2000 Presidential Election89 is a terrific analysis of Bush v. Gore
in legal and partisan political context, but beyond explaining their importance for equal-
protection analysis, it does not take up questions of localism. Bruce Ackerman’s edited
collection, Bush v. Gore: The Question ofLegitimacy?" discusses county canvassing
boards only in the context ofjudicial disputes over equal protection. 91 And Ronald
Dworkin’s A Badly Flawed Election 92 also focuses on the Court’s decision itself, with
slightly more attention paid to elements of the election outside those considered by the
Court, such as the electoral college.
The Bush v. Gore book which devotes the most sustained attention to the local
dimension of American suffrage may be Richard A. Posner’s Breaking the Deadlock ,93
The best-known aspect of Posner’s book is his account of the Court’s decision as
“pragmatically,” rather than doctrinally, “defensible.”
94
Posner, meanwhile, is eager to
frame his argument in partisan and iconoclastic terms. But he actually devotes more
89
Howard Gillman, The Votes That Counted: How the Court Decided the 2000 Presidential Election
(2001 ).
90
Bruce Ackerman, Bush v. Gore: The Question ofLegitimacy (2002).
91
The central questions concerning Ackerman’s contributors are whether the decision has a “foundation in
legal principle,” what if anything needs be done to reestablish the country’s belief in the rule of law, and
what the political implications are of having judges effectively decide a national election. Ackerman, at x-
xi.
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space to detailing reforms that would help prevent “another Presidential election fiasco”
than do many critics of the decision. Moreover, he faces squarely the fact of local
control over the American national electoral process. In addition to calling for the
abolition of punchcards, Posner urges that ballots be “counted at the precinct level to
enable as many spoiled ballots as possible to be revoted.”96 (Posner’s regression analysis
of the sources of spoiled ballots identifies “county-counted” as one of the leading
indicators of increased ballot spoilage.)97 And though he elsewhere treats the lack of
voter assistance quite cavalierly, Posner’s conclusion argues that people who are “very
poorly educated” should not
be prevented from voting by a de facto literacy test, which is what punchcard voting
technology amounts to, and, to a lesser extent, marksense technology as well when
the votes are counted at the county rather than the precinct level.”98
This is a striking claim. Here Posner not only calls a given ballot type a “de facto literacy
test, but does the same for the place where the ballots are counted. For all Posner’s
“conservative” endorsement of the outcome in Bush v. Gore
,
this is one of the more
radical critiques of American electoral administration to be found in the literature
surrounding the case.
Even among election lawyers, relatively few understood just how important and
controversial election administration could be prior to 2000. As Posner points out, “the
acquaintance of the professional commentators with the actual administration of
95
Id. at 260.
96
Id. at 259; emphasis added.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 259.
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elections” was limited." This was largely because of their reliance on Supreme Court
decisions as the “texts” of constitutional law, Posner argues. In the huge body of
Supreme Court case law on elections, he writes, “virtually none” deals with election
administration
.
100
III. How We Got Here: Dominant Approaches to Suffrage Before Bush v. Gore.
Posner s criticism of the legal academy’s blinders is somewhat overstated,
probably because his larger purpose is to discredit the legal professoriat, which was so
critical of Bush v. Gore. ]0] Nevertheless, he’s generally right
,
102
and this brings us to an
important point. Within the range of academic fields studying elections, it was probably
voting-rights scholars who had the best chance at perceiving how important the local
dimension is in American suffrage. (To be sure, many did, since the renewed and revised
99
Id. at 204. Posner writes,
“That the systematic though not deliberate disenfranchisement of black voters, poor voters, voters with
limited experience, new or occasional voters, and voters with reading difficulties might be due to the
choice of voting systems had not occurred even to those academics who teach their students, and write
for their colleagues, about the constitutional issues created by racial gerrymandering, poll taxes, and
literacy tests.”
Id. at 204-205. For a book on the courts and the Constitutional law of elections which supports
Posner’s point, see Christopher P. Banks and John C. Green, eds., Superintending Democracy: The Courts
and the Political Process (2001). The volume deals with issues such as gerrymandering, campaign finance,
and parties; there is very little on administration or localism.
100
Id. at 207.
101 One particularly sharp passage attributes the law professoriat’s horrified response to the decision in part
to
“a dawning recognition that activist decisions (and, right or wrong, Bush v. Gore is
undoubtedly activist, in adopting a bold, novel, and expansionary interpretation of federal judicial
authority over the electoral process) are as much a weapon of the right as of the left, and that the left’s
uncritical approbation of liberal activist decisions such as Roe v. Wade has disarmed the academic left
against the activism of a conservative Supreme Court.” Id. at 258.
102
See, for example, Lowenstein and Hasen, Election Law, Second £V7.(2001), at 65, acknowledging that
“[u]ntil the controversy surrounding the results in Florida in the 2000 presidential elections, few people
probably ever thought about how election administrators counted (or failed to count) ballots.”
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Voting Rights Act uses federal bureaucracies and courts to tackle problems rooted in
systemic discrimination at the local level, such as restnctive registration practices and the
lack of bilingual ballots.) Election law - a field standing at the intersection of
constitutional law and political science 103 - has blossomed as a specialization in recent
years, as two substantial casebooks make abundantly clear . 104 Yet even here, there is an
acknowledgment that scholars have not paid enough attention to these phenomena before
now.
The legal academy is not alone in this regard, to be sure. The purpose of this
section is to show what different approaches to suffrage have been missing, and to
demonstrate that the ongoing rediscovery is something of a corrective to our discipline’s
past approaches. I sample work in three broad literatures: what we might call the “public
law” approach; the rational-choice method; and the behavioral study of voting behavior.
While each field has produced terrific insights, each has also helped construct a kind of
“rights talk
” 105
concerned too much with an abstracted, nationalized creature called “the
American voter, and too little focused on the rich, diverse, locally-textured practices of
American suffrage.
103
See Richard L. Hasen, “Election Law At Puberty: Optimism and Words of Caution,” 32 Loyola Law
Review 1095 (1999), at 1095. Hasen writes that “no one can seriously question whether election law is a
subject in its own right, related to but apart from its very different parents, constitutional law and political
science.” A fascinating essay in the same journal is Bruce E. Cain, “Election Law As Its Own Field of
Study,” 32 Loyola Law Review 1095 (1999).
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See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law ofDemocracy: Legal
Structure ofthe Political Process, Rev’d Second Ed. (2002); Daniel Hays Lowenstein and Richard L.
Hasen, Election Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. (2001).
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a. Public Law.
Within the “public-law” approach, I mean to refer to scholars from various
disciplines who’ve been interested in how American constitutions and statutes define the
franchise, and in the meaning of such definitions. Perhaps because there has in fact been
so much change in explicit suffrage qualifications in American law, 106 scholars have
focused on those changes, and have been misled before. In 1928, Harvard historian
William B. Munro wrote that the history of American suffrage was “a long and not a very
interesting story. He considered that story to have ended. As perceptive a political
scientist as E.E. Schattschneider wrote in 1960 that “the struggle for the ballot,” which
had been “completely peaceful and astonishingly easy,” was over. Both Munro and
Schattschneider had a good deal of company. 107 Part of why scholars like Munro and
Schattschneider got it wrong is that they defined the suffrage solely in terms of
constitutional and statutory rights—what we might call the “formal” dimension. From
this perspective, asking whether urban Southern blacks had a “right to vote” in 1960, it
was possible to answer affirmatively - before the formal demise of the poll tax, with
literacy tests still common, rural white districts wielding disproportionate influence in
106
See generally Keyssar, The Right to Vote (2000).
107
Keyssar, at xviii-xx. One fascinating source reveals that criticism of the formalistic, constitutionally-
focused approach is generations old, as well. In his 1930 book The Growth and Decadence of
Constitutional Government (1930), J. Allen Smith writes that “the older and more conservative school of
writers in political science” have
“almost without exception made their discussion of American institutions and problems hinge on
the legal theory of the Constitution, which has supplied the norm by which not only laws and policies
but even the literature of politics has been evaluated. No writer could hope to win recognition in this
field who did not pay homage to our constitutional system by making it the criterion by which
controverted questions were to be finally decided.”
Smith, at 59-60. Smith’s criticism here of the “purely formal and, for the most part, barren
character of our later contribution to the literature” focuses on the failure to explore the ideas and principles
“back of the Constitution,” rather than on practices. Id.
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national and state legislatures, and registration rules much more cumbersome than they
are today.
Political scientists and legal scholars have long viewed suffrage as an essential
component of citizenship. But emphasis has tended to fall on the formal possession of
the right to vote, with its attendant symbolic message of inclusion
,
108
rather than on the
practice of voting itself
.
109
That limitation is evident in some of the most insightful and
critical work on the suffrage and citizenship. Judith Shklar, for example, essentially
argues in American Citizenship that the most important thing about the right to vote is its
possession, whether or not it’s ever employed as a means to any end - or, by extension, in
any particular context or fashion . 1 10 And even some of the best “institutional political
theory, such as Dennis F. Thompson’s The Democratic Citizen
,
tends to abstract
suffrage from the distinctive, hyper-federalized American context
.
1 1
1
Such analyses are
not “wrong” - far from it. We now understand far better than we did a generation ago
108
See Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Questfor Inclusion (1991). Shklar writes, “The struggle
for citizenship in America has, therefore, been overwhelmingly a demand for inclusion in the polity, an
effort to break down excluding barriers to recognition, rather than an aspiration to civic participation as a
deeply involving activity.” Id. at 3. See also id. at 45: “citizenship and voting had become inseparable.”
109
See Brigham, The Constitution ofInterests. Brigham refers to “a mutually constitutive process by which
groups seeking to influence the law are themselves influenced by the way they understand it,” and writes
that excessive emphasis on a certain view of rights “distracts us from the forms that constitute” rights and
interests. Pages x, 130.
1 10
Shklar writes, “[t]he deepest impulse for demanding the suffrage arises from the recognition that it is the
characteristic, the identifying, feature of democratic citizenship in America, not a means to other ends.”
Shklar, American Citizenship
,
at 56.
111
See Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen (1970), at 120-148. This excellent discussion of
voting focuses almost entirely on questions of rationality and collective decision-making in democratic
elections.
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just how important suffrage restrictions have been in American political history and
development
.
112
As Keith Bybee has demonstrated, courts and legal disputation have played an
essential role in “constructing” the political identity of the American voter, particularly in
relation to race, community and the meaning of “the people.” 113 Similarly, scholars’
attention to legally-enforced voting rights may have both constructed and constricted our
understanding of the meaning of suffrage. Numerous vital problems in American
ideology, politics and law concern constitutional and statutory limits on the right to vote,
and generations of scholars have attacked them with zeal and skill. But in so doing, we
have mistakenly considered suffrage to be a “settled” subject before, and have failed to
perceive essential attributes of the electoral process—in particular, the power of local
officials
.
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~ One of the best examples of this correction is J. Morgan Kousser’s The Shaping ofSouthern Politics:
Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment ofthe One-Party South, 1880-1910 (1974). Kousser wrote in
1974 that V.O. Key’s analysis of Southern politics “reflected a more general belief shared by many other
political scientists that electoral laws play a minimal role in shaping the political system.” Kousser, at 3.
One of Kousser’s central objectives in The Shaping ofSouthern Politics is to respond to Key’s claim that
suffrage restrictions merely formalized changes in Southern politics already brought about by other means.
Specifically, the question is how the Democratic Party came to dominate the South; Kousser claims that is
rise was “directly connected with suffrage restriction,” whereas Key focuses on other reasons. Id.
113
See Keith Bybee, Mistaken Identity: The Supreme Court and the Politics ofMinority Representation
(1998).
114 Some recent scholarship has paid close attention to this issue. See Keyssar, The Right To Vote, passing
Dennis Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States (2002), at 55-61,
examining “Equality versus Locality” in the law of elections. An intriguing earlier exploration of the
importance of local phenomena and local culture surrounding elections is Frank O’Gorman, “The Culture
of Elections in England: From the Glorious Revolution to the First World War, 1688-1914,” in Eduardo
Posada-Carbo, ed., Elections before Democracy: The History ofElections in Europe and Latin America
(1996), 17-31. O’Gorman writes that it is “obvious” that “the necessary vehicle for the ‘performance’ of
electoral culture is a party system operating at the local level.” Id., 29.
Close documenting of the power of local officials in the American context has mostly been
confined to its most severe exclusionary dimension, particularly in the Jim Crow South. See Louisiana v.
U.S., 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965), in which the Supreme Court struck down Louisiana’s “understanding” test
and observed that it depended on the “whim or impulse” of local registrars.
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The irony in this focus on formal rights is that under the U.S. Constitution, as
recently interpreted by the Bush v. Gore Court, the “individual citizen has no federal
constitutional nght to vote for electors for the president of the United States .” 115 None of
the many voting-rights amendments contains a positive statement, or affirmative
entitlement, of a right to vote, particularly for President or U.S. Senator; if a state chooses
to hold such an election, however, it cannot exclude citizens from the franchise without a
compelling reason to do so . 116
Of course, the “right to vote” has been an immensely powerful legal and political
concept nonetheless, and it may have achieved something like the status of a
“catchphrase.” Lisa Jane Disch revives this term, borrowed from party historian Ronald
P. Formisano, as a way to attack not only the two-party system, but political science.
Some phrases, she writes, become “more than a name for a thing” - they begin to “form[]
the very fields to which [they] only seem to refer.” 117 Eventually, she contends, the idea
of the two-party system has “disciplined voting,” by “positing major party voting as
legitimate, rational, and calculable behavior,” and marginalizing other forms of
behavior . 118
115
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
116
Citizens convicted of crime are, of course, the last great exception to this standard. See Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24(1974).
117
Disch, The Tyranny ofthe Two-Party’ System (2002), at 59-61.
118
Disch, at 81. Disch is punning with “discipline” here, criticizing the field of political science while
using the term “discipline” as Foucault employed it. As Disch writes, this kind of discipline “forms objects
of knowledge, designates canons of relevance, institutionalizes techniques and methods of investigation,
and recognizes those who may speak, know, and act with authority.” Id., at 81.
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Catchphrases can become obstacles, as Disch writes, when “the very terms in
which we have come to speak about this system render us less likely to question it.” 1 19
The analogy to the phrase “the right to vote” here is only partial, of course: Disch’s
normative agenda is to attack the duopolistic power of the dominant parties, while mine
is to enrich and strengthen our conception of voting and voting rights by defining
suffrage as a practice.
But it seems clear that the current rediscovery of psephology springs partly from a
sense among scholars that something kept us from looking closely enough at the
particularities and practices of suffrage. Part of the explanation is that the American
“nght to vote” has been understood by most public-law scholars in fonnal, binary,
Constitutional and symbolic ways, rather than as a complex and locally-contingent
practice .
120
b. Rational Choice
A second approach to voting which has produced powerful insights but which
now appears seriously limited is the public-choice or rational-choice method. In the
study of voting, the founding work in this field is probably Anthony Downs’ An
Economic Theory ofDemocracy . 121 Downs’ explanation of why voting may be irrational,
from the perspective of costs and benefits, remains useful and provocative. But rational-
1 19
Disch, 82.
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While the field of comparative election study has boomed in the last two decades, even some of the best
recent synthetic work does not devote much space to election administration and suffrage practices as those
terms are considered here. See, e.g., David M. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction
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choice approaches to politics tend to achieve their greatest insights precisely by
abstracting away from particular practices and toward general theories, and that has come
at a cost. Others have been pointing out those limitations for some time, particularly in
terms of turnout. “Unfortunately for [rational choice] theory,” wrote one scholar, “people
do vote.” 122 Another leading public-choice scholar lamented, “[o]ur specialty has
developed clear models of first and second derivatives but cannot answer such simple
questions as ‘Why do people vote?’” 123 After all, it’s been clear to theorists for some
time that, as Hanna Pitkin put it, the typical voter “is not, of course, the rational,
informed, interested, politically active citizen our formula seems to require.” 124
Public-choice theory has raised crucial questions in the study of elections and
voting behavior. It is a broad and flexible approach, and has important contributions to
make to a practice-based understanding of suffrage — for example, in developing ideas
about how fragmented and obscure procedures may increase information costs to voters,
decrease turnout, and increase the number of blank or mis-marked ballots. However, on
balance this approach has not asked the kinds of questions that bring the distinctive
nature of American voting into more clear focus.
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Carole Uhlaner, quoted in Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies ofRational Choice Theory
(1994), at 50. Chapter Four of Green and Shapiro’s volume, “The Paradox of Voter Turnout,” at 47-71, is
an excellent summary of criticisms of the rational choice approach to voting.
1-3
William Niskanen, quoted in Jeffrey Friedman, “Introduction: Economic Approaches to Politics,” in
Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy (1996), at 13. An excellent survey of literature on the
decision to vote as “rational” is in Daniel Hays Lowenstein and Richard L. Hasen, Election Law: Cases and
Materials
,
2
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ed. (2001), at 46-57.
1-4 Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept ofRepresentation (1967), at 219. Voting decisions, wrote Pitkin, are
determined far more by “habit, sentiment, and disposition” than by calculations of self-interest. Id.
Another authority concluded after a lengthy study of political activity in one city that “there is very little
evidence of the intellectual processes in voting behavior—that is, open-minded, unprejudiced examination
of each case in itself...and the coming to a cognitive decision on the merits of the matter.” David Wallace,
First Tuesday: A Study ofRationality in Voting (1964), at 272.
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c. Voting Behavior
A truly massive literature - now in its second or third full generation - endeavors
to explain election outcomes, demonstrating with empirical evidence why Americans
vote as they do. 125 This dissertation is not about voting behavior; I’ve described some
post-Bush v. Gore behavioral research on American suffrage practices above, and others
with appropriate methodological interests are hard at work investigating such questions.
Meanwhile, I draw throughout this project from many authors concerned with election
outcomes and the effects suffrage rules and practices have on them. Still, it is important
to note here that voting-behavior scholars by and large joined their public-law and
rational-choice colleagues in failing to grapple with the local dimension of American
voting rights. Rather than reviewing fifty years of behavioral literature in order to
demonstrate that such work has largely ignored local variation, perhaps it is useful to
examine two of the sources that have done most to help construct the nationalized
creature known as “the American voter.”
Of course, The American Voter is the title of the volume Angus Campbell and his
colleagues published in I960. 126 The book brilliantly synthesizes reams of research on
electoral behavior, with a focus on turnout and voter choice in Presidential elections.
Parties, ideologies, election law, and social status are among the many variables the
authors arrange into the famous “funnel of causality” leading to electoral choice. 127
'~ 5
See Thompson, Just Elections (2002), at 199 n.2, listing seminal works in empirical election analysis
and noting that “they focus on outcomes (and procedures mainly as they relate to outcomes).”
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Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter
(1960).
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Id., at 24.
36
For all the complexity of its analysis, however, The American Voter tends to treat
its subject on a national level. Of course, many variables are studied, including
differences in regions (particularly North and South) and races (particularly whites and
blacks). There is also occasional attention to state-level variation. But by and large, the
unit of analysis is the individual voter, set in a national frame: “an interplay between
remote events of national politics and individual constructions of political reality that
result,” as the authors put it .
128
The “American” voter, Bruce E. Cain wntes, is here
understood “in a highly aggregated sense.” 129
One section deviates from this course, and offers insightful analysis of county-
level variation. The American political system,” the authors acknowledge, while
“bound together by many nationwide features, embraces a variety of political
subcommunities.” Each community is a “medium within which [voting] behavior must
occur;” individuals interpret events in their local settings, and so each medium “leaves
some characteristic impress on that behavior.” The most specifically relevant
characteristics of the local medium, in their analysis, are election administration, ballot
design, and partisanship at the county level. Maintaining the work’s focus on election
outcomes, the authors write that election laws and procedures may “have some real
consequences on the day of elections.” The rules governing elections “constitute an
important aspect of the individual’s political environment that bears directly upon our
analysis of electoral behavior.” 130
128
Id., at 266.
129
Bruce E. Cain, “Election Law As Its Own Field of Study,” 32 Loyola Law Review 1095 (1999).
130
Id., at 266-267.
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Much of the discussion that follows is concerned with partisanship interacting
with state-level electoral variations. However, in analyzing racial differences in turnout,
the authors conclude that it is the county that is most important. Racial composition of
counties, they discover, appeared to contribute to turnout: where blacks were more than
30% of a county’s population, they were less likely to vote than in counties which were
less than 30% black. Campbell and his colleagues interpreted these results to mean that
[w]here white dominance is numerically more extreme, there is apparently less
community resistance to Negro voting.” In other words, it was not variation in state
legislation, but rather “informal, extralegal barriers” that “account for much of the
variability in the turnout of the Southern Negro.” 131
A generation later, the successor to The American Voter appeared, titled The New
American Voter and authored by Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks. 132 The new
book offers methodological sophistication and new data, but maintains the focus on key
questions of turnout and choice - “should I vote, and (if so) for whom?” 133 The
nationalized voter remains the star of The New American Voter, hi fact, the original’s
short, meaningful glance at local conditions’ effect on turnout and partisanship has fallen
away. There seems to be no significant discussion of county-level variation, differing
131
Id., at 279-281. Later in the chapter, Campbell and his colleagues also show that partisanship within the
county affected whites, as well. The “partisan climate of the community,” they write, may influence
individual voting behavior, particular that of weak partisans, and particularly where ballot laws do not
facilitate partisanship (such as by allowing straight-ticket voting). Id., 288. Meanwhile, their survey data
show that the impact of ballot form on partisanship in voting “varies with the motivation of the voter.” Id.,
284. Registration requirements, meanwhile, affect the politically “uninvolved,” but not the “intense
partisan.” Id., 286.
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Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (1996).
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Miller and Shanks, at ix. With a bit more modesty than warranted, Miller and Shanks describe their long
and complex compendium of the antecedent and proximate causes of voting as offering merely “the
skeleton of a complex causal structure.” Id.
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ballol forms or technologies, or any other part ofwhat Campbell and his co-authors
called the “local medium.”'" The absence is unfortunate and ironic, stnce so much had
changed in American election law and practice between 1960 - the year Schattschneider
prematurely declared the “struggle for the ballot” to be over - and 1996.
A second important source is the data generated by the American National
Election Survey, or ANES. No data set has done more to help us understand modem
American election behavior. But despite the large and ever-changing question set
employed by ANES researchers - a question set developed through “fads and fancies,”
rather than anything more systematic 135 - the survey has not helped us see the importance
of the local dimension of U.S. elections. I searched the codebooks employed at four-year
intervals from 1948-2000, looking for terms relating to local administration. 136 “Town,”
“city,” and “county” appeared frequently, of course, in respondent-identification sections,
but only rarely and sporadically elsewhere. Since the 1950s, registration questions have
appeared regularly in the survey, suggested as reasons for non-participation, but not
enquiring about which officials one encountered in the registration process. In 1988, an
interesting question related to voting rights — one which was quite prominent in
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century suffrage development - appears for the first time:
134
In about thirty pages of bibliography, the authors do not mention Peter Argersinger, J. Morgan Kousser,
or other prominent scholars of voting rights and administration; the Index does not mention registration at
all, and the book makes only a few brief references to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
135
Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter, at x.
136
I acquired the codebooks in portable document format (pdf), and searched using the “find” function.
These searches work well, but are not perfectly reliable. I also searched the 1948-2000 cumulative file.
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“We’re interested in how far people have to go to vote. Where did you go to vote in the
November election?” 137
Aside from these questions, the only specific questions about American suffrage
practices one encounters in five decades ofANES codebooks is a specialized Election
Administration Survey - directed to election staff rather than voters, and employed from
the mid-1980s at least into the 1990s. 138 Like The American Voter
,
the ANES has been
invaluable in helping us understand trends and predictors of voting behavior. But over a
half century when the American experience of elections has seen dramatic change - in
ballots and ballot technology, registration rules, and the balance between national, state,
and local authority under successive VRA statutes, to name a few areas - the ANES does
not appear to have directly addressed the local dimension of suffrage.
IV. Suffrage as a Practice.
The limitations of each approach should not be overstated. I draw throughout this
work on the insights of scholars classifiable under each of the schools criticized above.
Indeed, one way of describing this project is that as it tries to build a new framework for
understanding American voting, it cuts a new axis through the voluminous literature on
suffrage and elections in the United States, identifying and connecting previous work.
The fundamental premise of the new framework is this: as scholars think about voting,
rights, and the law, we need to look more carefully at the practice of voting. American
137
This appears in the 1988 ANES, section 14A, questions D3b. and D4. After encountering this question,
I re-examined all previous codebooks, looking for “how far.” 1988 was the first survey in which I found
anything like this question; previous “how far” questions asked about topics such as population mobility
generally. The codebook alone does not make clear how this data was checked or, for that matter, entered,
since it appears to be a request for an address rather than a distance.
138
1 first found the EAS survey in the 1984 ANES codebook; I do not yet have the results of these surveys.
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voting practices, in turn, direct our attention to “the places where law matters,” as John
Brigham has put it
.
139
Responsibility for the administration and enforcement of rights
rests with public employees 140
—particularly electoral rights, which depend in so many
ways on the performances of public officials. In the United States, those practices,
places, and officials are local, in distinctive and important ways. What Frank O’Gorman
wrote about eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England is no less true of the U.S.:
[electoral history must, of course, be rooted in local history.” 14 ' The Constitution is
obviously essential to understanding American suffrage. But so are the civil servants
who “run the Constitution,” in John A. Rohr’s words
.
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This is an institutional, rather than individualist, approach to voting. The
individualist approach to suffrage emphasizes things like constitutional rights, the
rationality of voters, and the expressive content of the ballot, all of which are indisputably
important. But the individualist method still leaves us with an incomplete picture. An
approach which focuses only on “the independent actions and discrete claims of
individual voters,” as Dennis Thompson argues, “neglects the interactive effects and
structural patterns of the institutions in which elections take place.” 143 The rights we
139
John Brigham, The Constitution ofInterests: Beyond the Politics ofRights (1996), at x.
See Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost ofRights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (1999),
at 101. Holmes and Sunstein argue here that the enforcement of rights “depends on the timely delivery of
limited public money to the agents charged with enforcing them.” See also 1 19: rights “are implemented
by public officials who, drawing on the public purse, have a good deal of discretion in construing and
protecting them.”
1
Frank O’Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties: the Unreformed Electorate ofHanoverian England
1734-1832 ( 1989), at 7.
John A. Rohr, Civil Servants and Their Constitutions (2002), 141. Rohr writes, “[T]he examples of how
civil servants play their roles as constitutional actors are quite disparate
. . . but they all reinforce the point
that civil servants ‘run the Constitution,’ i.e., they reduce its grand principles to practice by their actions
both routine and extraordinary.”
143
Thompson, Just Elections (2002), at 5.
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claim, writes Thompson, “have different meanings and different effects depending on the
nature of the institutions in which they are to be exercised.” 144 Thompson counsels us to
deliberate over electoral rules and arrangements “between abstract theory and concrete
practice, where principles and institutions meet.” 145
In his study of American citizenship, Kenneth L. Karst writes that voting is not
just a tool for gaining power or expressing political preferences, but is “an assertion of
belonging to a political community.” 146 Karst here emphasizes the need for substantial
equality in the national political community, 147 but many authors identify the local
community as the essential context of suffrage. For example, in a 2002 essay
appropriately titled “More Than A Vote,” David M. Shribman of the Boston Globe sang
the praises of the "shared, community experience” offered by “local polling places.” 148
Shribman lamented that since he is always working on Election Day, he misses “the best
Id. Later, framing his examination of how electoral institutions define our principles of democratic
equality, Thompson writes that “we need to consider not merely what the institutions do, but what they
express. We need to give attention to the public meanings of electoral institutions.” Id. at 21.
145
Id. at 192. Thompson defines this approach as “institutional political theory.” He writes that
institutional political theory should have three central characteristics: it should examine principles in
institutional context, consider the “incompletely theoretical” ideas of lawmakers and citizens, and interpret
“midrange principles.” Thompson, Just Elections, viii-ix.
Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging To America : Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (1989), at 93. Karst
quotes Judge Learned Hand: I know how illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything;
but nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a
common venture.” Id. at 94.
Karst writes that the principle of equal citizenship “is also a principle of substance; the principle goes
unfulfilled when substantive inequalities effectively bar people from full membership.” Karst, at 9.
For a similar critique, see Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy
:
How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public (2002). In a chapter entitled “The Rise and
Fall of the Citizen, Crenson and Ginsberg write that Americans “do not seem to be in immediate danger of
losing the formal rights they won in an earlier political epoch. The vestigial organs of citizenship can
survive long after their original purposes have evaporated.” Crenson and Ginsberg, at 46.
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David M. Shribman, “More than a vote,” The Boston Globe, Oct. 29, 2002, at FI.
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part of politics," which is going to “my neighborhood polling place.” 145 Political scientist
Paul Gronke, making the case against early and mail-in voting, asks “[d]o we really want
to end that most essential act of public participation: going to the polling place and
casting a ballot?” 150 Dennis Thompson agrees, emphasizing the “public affirmation”
involved in the process of “[wjalking to the polling station and standing in line with one's
neighbors .” 151
As I have argued above, part of why we have not looked closely enough at the
importance of American suffrage practices is that we have focused so much on the right
to vote, with its formalistic and binary connotations
.
152
Such connotations are not
necessarily linked to the term, but anyone reading the citizenship, suffrage and elections
literature will find them hard to miss. The “right to vote” is far from being an “obsolete
u,
Id. Shribman writes,
“let me tell you about the joys I am missing by not voting on the day when everybody else does, on
Election Day. I miss standing in line with my neighbors talking about the weather and whether we
stayed up late to watch Monday Night Football. I miss the ritual of giving my name to the clerk who
knows very well who I am because I have lived here for years. I miss being ushered into the polling
booth. I miss being given one of those I Voted stickers.
. .. I miss the people standing outside with the
placards and their cups of coffee and the most tempting piece of American food there is—the jelly
doughnut.”
Id., at F12. Similarly, Michael Schudson describes his participation in the 1996 elections as “a small
ritual of neighborly cheer. Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History ofAmerican Civic Life
(The Free Press, 1998), at 3.
150
Paul Gronke, “Electing to Change in How We Vote,” Los Angeles Times
,
Oct. 16, 2003, at 17.
151
Thompson, Just Elections (2002), at 34-35.
1 52 Schudson argues that the rise of the “rights-bearing citizen” in American political discourse has come at
a direct cost to the importance of voting. He writes,
“The ‘rights-bearing citizen’ has not displaced the ‘informed citizen’ at the ballot box, but the
expansion of rights-consciousness has made the polling place less clearly the central act of political
participation than it once was. The ‘political,’ carried on the wings of rights, has now diffused into
everyday life.”
Schudson, The Good Citizen (1998), at 8.
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verbal ritual,"
1
' 3
but it must be enriched by a better understanding of suffrage as a
practice - the “how" of voting, not just the “who ”' 54 Some leading voting-nghts lawyers
have grasped the limitations of the “right” idea, conceptualizing suffrage as a serial
process or even as a “nested constellation of concepts,” in Pamela S. Karlan’s elegant
phrase. 155 Meanwhile, the important 2001 CalTech/MIT report begins an important
chapter with the words “[vjoting is a system.” 156
The concept which I find most helpful in directing our attention towards the vital
local dimension of American suffrage is to define voting as a practice. In addition to
sources discussed above, this draws on Richard Flathman’s 1976 book The Practice of
Rights} 51 At a general level, Flathman’s ideas about bringing scholars’ concepts into
more close contact with realities on the ground aligns well with the goals of this project.
S
f,
e
..f:
OU1S Menand
>
The Metaphysical Club: A Story ofIdeas in America (2001), at 88. Menand writes
that William James intended pragmatism as an argument for “discarding obsolete verbal ritual.”
1 4
See Daniel Wirls, “Regionalism, Rotten Boroughs, Race, and Realignment: The Seventeenth
Amendment and the Politics of Representation.” 13 Studies in American Political Development 1 (1999),
1-30. As Wirls paraphrases Harold Lasswell’s famous definition of politics, electoral structures determine
who gets to vote for what, when, and how. Wirls, at 1. The “who” has long gotten the lion’s share of
scholarly attention. But as Wirls points out in his analysis of the origins of the Seventeenth Amendment,
the ‘“how’ and ‘for what’ of voting have also played crucial, though perhaps less understood, roles in the
politics of democratization.” Id., at 1 . American history, Wirls notes, “is replete with struggles, large and
small, over characteristics of electoral systems.” Id., 2. Wirls is interested in “how” people chose their
Senators; his focus is on how regional and partisan differences interacted to bring about the Seventeenth
Amendment. For an example of a rich and provocative study of a “rights-based” topic in American politics
which shines new light on the topic by attending more closely to specific practices, see Mark A. Graber,
Rethinking Abortion: Equal Choice, the Constitution, and Reproductive Politics (Princeton University
Press, 1996). Graber focuses particularly on a woman’s ability to pay for an abortion.
155
See Pamela S. Karlan, “Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon
Disenfranchisement.” Social Science Research Network Research Paper No. 75, Stanford Public Law and
Legal Theory Working Paper Series (2004), at 1 1. Karlan here identifies Karlan identifies participation,
a8Sre8aOon, and governance as the most important elements of the constellation; her primary purpose is to
explain why there is inevitably a group dimension to voting rights: “courts, legislatures, and the public have
come to see that any right to genuinely meaningful political participation implicates groups of voters, rather
than atomistic individuals.” Id. See also Karlan, “The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism,”
71 Tex. Law Review 1705, 1709-19(1993).
156 CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project, “Voting: What Is, What Could Be” (2001), at 14.
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Richard E. Flathman, The Practice ofRights (1976).
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As Flathman puts it in a cnticism of much political theory, “substantive coherence of the
sort sought by political philosophy can be forced only at the cost of losing contact with
the political realities putatively under analysis .’’ 158 Meanwhile, at a more specific level,
his conception of rights as social practices illuminates American voting. Flathman does
not talk about voting rights, and his main purpose seems to be to strike a new balance in
the conflict between what we might call the philosophical account and the social account
of rights
.
159
Yet his core theoretical frame is remarkably apt. When Flathman says that
“the practice of rights is a social practice,” 160 he means to reconcile “both the individual
and social dimensions of rights .” 161 Drawing on Wittgenstein, Flathman points out that
language, as a practice, is used according to rules, but is also put to “distinctive,
unprecedented use” by individuals
.
162
Rights too fit this description:
“they presuppose, encourage, and in fact instantiate both an elaborate skein of
concepts, norms, rules, institutions, and arrangements that must be called social
. and self-directed individual actions that cannot be completely conceptualized as
social.”
I(l., at v. Elsewhere, Flathman writes that political philosophy “attempts to render the world
comprehensible in a sense going beyond that which is involved in day-to-day conduct. It does so (among
other ways) by evolving concepts and conceptual sets by which to identify and chart the relationship among
the elements of the world as understood and acted in by participants in the practice it studies.” Id., at 26.
Flathman describes this as a dispute over whether the individualism of the eighteenth-century natural-
rights philosophers is accurate and tenable or is “a meaningless abstraction unknown in the real world of
human affairs, ’ as authors from Edmund Burke to Emile Durkheim have argued. The latter instead
describe rights in terms of “statuses, roles, and other intrinsically social positions and relationships.” Id., at
5. By describing the practice of rights as “a social practice,” Flathman hoped to bridge this divide.
160
Id., at 219.
Id., at 6. Practice is a common word, he writes, but “the notion of the practice of rights is not
established in ordinary language. We have adopted it here because its properties as a unit of analysis
concept are promising as a way of recognizing and reconciling both the individual and the social
dimensions of rights. Rights arise out of and are accorded within a rule-governed social practice.” Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 5-6. Elsewhere Flathman writes “by treating rights as forming a practice, we try to capture the
ways in which they can be devices for warranting highly diverse and individuated action and, at the same
time, one of the means through which individuals have been incorporated in sociopolitical orders marked
by patterned coherence and considerable stability and even predictability.” Id., 15. The understandings
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The parallel to American suffrage is not perfect, but it works well. Voting rights
- and note that Flathman is not trying to replace the term “rights,” but to improve our
understanding of rights - are certainly defined and bounded by rules. But there is a great
flexibility in their use and implementation. Obviously, individuals can put voting rights
to distinctive use,” but in the United States, local, state, and party officials have always
had opportunities to shape the suffrage process, as well.
By extension and analogy, this idea also forces us to reconsider voting and voting
rights across time in the United States. For example, when men discussed or exercised
“the right to vote” in the U.S. around 1800, they did a thing remarkably different from
what their peers did in the year 2000. (The first man’s vote not only was not secret, but
may not even have been written down
;
neither parties nor campaigning existed as we
know them; neither the female members of his household, nor his poorer fellow freemen,
nor his black neighbors joined him in line at the polls; and in national elections, the
man was not voting for Senator at all, and was almost certainly voting for Presidential
electors, not for President.) On one hand, in terms of some political principles and legal
concepts, it makes sense to say that both men exercised a “right to vote” in an American
election. This is the rule-bound or social half of the definition. At the same time, the
tremendous variation between the two experiences tells us that each era has put that
practice to “distinctive use”—the “self-directed,” individualized component of rights.
and activities of participants is essential to this approach: “The enterprise of analyzing a practice is in large
measure dependent upon, one might say responsible to, the understandings and activities of the participants
in it.” Id., 17.
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The
-right to vote” in the U.S. is a practice governed by rules, but also
characterized by immense and important variation. Attend,ng to the importance of local
officials and local contexts will deliver a more complete understanding of the meaning of
Amencan suffrage. In subsequent chapters, I try to color in some of what we have
missed by not perceiving the local dimension of suffrage in the U.S., and in examining
why our unusual, locally-administered electoral systems have survived, I try to shed new
light on Amencan ideas about popular sovereignty, citizenship, centralized power, and
how to include and exclude certain people from the polity.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN VOTING: A BRIEF HISTORY
This chapter offers a synthetic, chronological account of the evolution of what I
call the “local dimension” of American suffrage: the control exerted by county and
municipal officials over voting qualifications and election administration, as well as the
immediate context of the voting act. I demonstrate that a prominent role for local
officials - and a great deal of variation at the county or municipal level - has survived
through great changes in formal and informal U.S. suffrage law and practice. In fact, a
significant amount of local control emerges as one of the most consistent features of
American suffrage. Histories of American suffrage which emphasize the steady
nationalization of voting rights, I conclude, are inadequate to the extent that they do not
recognize the depth and importance of local control and local variation in election
practices. Meanwhile, this history has important implications for contemporary reforms.
We should not fear change in election administration, since virtually everything about
American voting has been altered before, usually many times. But reformers aiming to
nationalize American voting procedures should understand that one constant in the story
of American suffrage is a great deal of local responsibility for running elections.
“In the long parade from colonial Virginia or colonial New England to a secret ballot
in a California garage, American citizenship has changed dramatically.” 1
Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History’ ofAmerican Civic Life (1998), at 5. In linking
citizenship with specific “experiences of politics,” Schudson writes that “[political education
“comes to most people not only from history textbooks or recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance
in school but from the presence and practice of political institutions themselves. Elections educate us.
The ballot educates us.... The product of this education is our citizenship, the political expectations
and aspirations people inherit and internalize.” Id., at 6.
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In the roiled wake of the 2000 election, many scholars are paying a great deal of
attention to topics which had been almost the exclusive domain of political practitioners,
advocates, and specialized voting-rights lawyers: election administration, ballot
technology, and the mechanics of suffrage. The local dimension of American voting -
consisting of the control exerted by county and municipal officials, as well as the
immediate context of the voting act - is under increasingly close focus. The right to
participate in elections acquired new national protections a generation ago in the United
States, from both federal legislation and Supreme Court rulings; state governments and
political parties retain a great deal of control over many aspects of the process, from
ballot access to the voting rights of people convicted of crime. But county, city, and
town officials have always played prominent roles in determining the conditions under
which American votes are cast and counted, and they continue to do so today. The result
is that the U.S. has a hyper-federalized suffrage system, virtually unique among
democracies. Numerous reforms have been proposed, and what may become the most
substantial overhaul American election administration has ever received is under way as
states begin to implement changes required and endorsed by the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA) of 2002.
This research, advocacy, and action proceeds without much understanding of how
we got here, however. As Richard Bensel writes in an important new article, there is a
“void in both American political historiography and general democratic theory” regarding
the “actual practice of elections.”2 This chapter begins to fill that void by synthesizing,
2
Richard Bensel, “The American Ballot Box: Law, Identity, and the Polling Place in the Mid-Nineteenth
Century,” 17 Studies in American Political Development 1 (Spring 2003), at 5, 5 n.10.
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in a way that has not been done before, the history of the “local dimension” of American
suffrage. After 2000, there is a widespread assumption that the kind of variation laid bare
in Florida is at best an historical accident, at worst an un-democratic scandal and
disgrace. What we have not fully appreciated, however, is that this is how Americans
have always performed the central constitutive act of our national citizenship.
I show here that a prominent role for local officials - and a great deal of variation
at the county or municipal level - has survived through great changes in formal and
informal U.S. suffrage law. A close look at the activities Americans have engaged in at
the polls reveals an immense and fascinating diversity, across both time and space.
Beyond its intrinsic interest, this material provides vital context for ongoing discussions
of reform. Scholars and advocates are right to regard today’s level of local control and
diversity of practices to be significant phenomena. But ifwe think this level of variation
is significant, the far greater levels of variation which obtained in previous generations
must be at least as important. Meanwhile, because there is merit in comparing the
election of 2000 with those of, say, 1800 and 1876, we must understand that what
Americans actually did at the polls in those earlier years was profoundly different from
what we do now.
We now understand that suffrage practices can shape voting behavior at both the
micro and macro levels. At the individual level, for example, registration procedures can
affect a person’s decision about whether to participate, as can voting-place proximity and
polling hours; name order determines some vote choices, and different ballot
technologies lead to different rates of wasted and spoiled ballots. In statewide and
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national contests, differences of fractions of a percent can easily be traced to vanous
mechanisms, and such swings regularly decide state-wide elections.
This chapter applies that understanding to American suffrage. I survey the history
of American voting practices, particularly prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, from
the perspective of town, city, and county control. We know a great deal about American
voting behavior past and present, and historians and political scientists have done terrific
work in recent decades analyzing formal suffrage qualifications. 3 I’m interested in a set
of questions treated in different places in our substantial literatures on voting, voting
rights, and elections: informal and formal suffrage qualifications, registration procedures,
balloting mechanisms, and electoral practices. I draw together branches of suffrage
scholarship which have often been separated in order to develop a framework for
discussing voting as a practice4 set in local contexts and institutions, a framework which
enables us to merge theoretical and practical aspects of suffrage. This history of
American voting offers a supplement or corrective - “antidote” is too strong a word - for
the heavy emphasis on formal voting rights and mass outcomes which dominate most
accounts of American voting. By focusing closely on the phenomenology; of suffrage, I
draw attention to those important aspects of American voting which not only were not
nationalized long ago, but also are still not completely subject to state control.
See, for example, Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History ofDemocracy in the
United States (2000); Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Questfor Inclusion (1991); Albert O.
Hirschman, The Rhetoric o/Reaction (1991); J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping ofSouthern Politics:
Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment ofthe One-Party South, 1880-1910 (1974); Marchette Chute,
The First Liberty: A History ofthe Right to Vote in America, 1619-1850 (1969); and Chilton Williamson,
American Suffrage: From Property to Democracy, 1760-1860 (1960).
4
This draws on the work of Richard Flathman, among others. See Richard E. Flathman, The Practice of
Rights (1976).
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In a later chapter, I engage in a more sustained analysis of important causal and
conceptual quest,ons this h,story raises. Specifically, I analyze how core strands in
American political thought
- particularly ideas about popular sovereignty, centralization
and state-building, and exclusive citizensh.p principles - help explain the endurance of
local control. While I raise those questions in places here, the purpose of this chapter is
to provide a synthetic narrative describing important changes and continuities in U.S.
suffrage practices, particularly where local administration is concerned. The hyper-
federalized nature of American election administration today results from a
developmental path that placed responsibtlity for overseeing the casting and counting of
votes tn the hands of local officials. That history begins in the long colonial period.
In the beginning, all suffrage was local. During the colonial period and, more
than we might expect, into the early decades of the U.S. itself, virtually every substantive
aspect of voting was either under local control or varied considerably at the local level.
Obviously, the broader nature of citizenship - and the meaning of those votes - changed
enormously between the early seventeenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth.
But in terms of local control, the creation of the national state may have brought less
change than we would assume.
I. Colonial America.
Colonial elections were radically different affairs than Americans are used to
today. As Robert J. Dinkin shows in Voting in Provincial America
,
there was virtually no
media, parties, or campaigns, and no “national” electoral system of any type; elections
were held at widely varying and uncertain intervals; many were essentially uncontested;
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and voting itself was entirely public, usually conducted viva voce . 5 The voter declared
his choice loudly, and probably then enjoyed a glass of rum punch at the expense orthe
man he voted for. Even where it was contested, the election was no place for serious
conflict: instead, it served to reaffirm the social hierarchy of the community. This was
rule by gentlemen,” and “the politics of assent,” as Michael Schudson puts it ;
6
as a way
of choosing lawmakers, it was much closer to what Mark Kishlansky calls “parliamentary
selection” than to our idea of a contested election
.
7 Many voters lived some distance
from the polls - several miles to outlying villages in New England, twenty-five miles
across a county in middle colonies like New Jersey, over one hundred miles in some parts
of the Carolinas, where the parish was the political unit . 8 Chilton Williamson agrees with
Dinkin and Schudson that elections tended to be occasions “for eating, drinking, and
Robert J. Dinkin, Voting in Provincial America: A Study ofElections in the Thirteen Colonies, 1689-1776
(1977), at 3, and passim.
6
Schudson, The Good Citizen
,
at 4-5, 7.
7
See Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique ofConsent Theory (1989). In his Parliamentary Selection:
Social and Political Choice in Early Modern England (1986) Kishlansky, writes Herzog,
“distinguishes what he calls parliamentary selection from contested elections. In selection, the
franchised community is presented with a slate of candidates running unopposed. They are selected as
the natural leaders of the community: not those of Aristotelian eminence in virtue, but those leading in
social status and honor. The techniques for counting the votes are the view and the cry, respectively
grouping the voters together and gauging the volume of their voice vote. These techniques aren’t
particularly well suited for precise calculations of the vote, but such calculations aren’t needed. For
voting here isn t the resolution of a dispute. It’s rather a ritual of acclamation, a public act that
recognizes (and reconstitutes) the superior status of the candidate. And the lavish entertainment that
surrounds the meetings, with candidates providing meat, drink, and revelries, isn’t electoral corruption,
a base attempt to bribe voters. It couldn’t be, since there is no other candidate. It’s officially a
moment of celebration, where communal unity is publicly demonstrated.”
Herzog, 197-198. Emphasis added.
8
Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage: From Property to Democracy, 1 760-1860 (1960), 43-44.
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being merry at the expense of the candidates;” he notes that in England, merriment was
so general that rum prices often rose sharply at election-time. 9
American ideas and practices alike emerged from seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century English electoral politics, and local variation was part of that colonial continuity.
As Dudley O. McGovney notes, the four hundred members of Commons were chosen in
over two hundred localities, “in each of which the qualifications of voters were fixed by
local customs varying one from another, and differing also from the requirement for
voting in counties.” Two central features of the English franchise were class limits and
“lack of uniformity of voting qualifications in the various localities - a medley of voting
qualifications in electing members of a single legislature. Both of these features were
imitated in America.” 10
In fifteenth-century England, ownership of a church pew was one way to satisfy
the property qualification for shire elections." In the English colonies, churches
continued to play an important role in seventeenth-century suffrage. Perry Miller calls
our attention to the fact that by a Massachusetts law of 1631, the franchise was limited to
9
Id., at 55-56.
10
Dudley O. McGovney, The American Suffrage Medley: The Needfor a National Uniform Suffrage
(1949), at 2. See also Frank O Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties: the Unreformed Electorate of
Hanoverian England, 1734-1832 (1989). O’Gorman describes Hanoverian England’s electoral system as
controlled by local families and connections.” Id., at 8-9. O’Gorman writes, “[ejvery election contest
took place in a highly specific social situation, its proceedings fuelled by ideas of reciprocal obligation.”
Id. Most scholars who trace the connection between English and American suffrage law emphasize
theories and principles rather than practices. For a good corrective, see James S. Fishkin, The Voice ofthe
People: Public Opinion and Democracy (1995), at 98. Fishkin here discusses Trollope’s Phineas Finn as a
study in how England’s “rotten boroughs” exemplified total corruption long after English suffrage law had
been reformed and the franchise expanded.
1
1
Id., 68. Churches were less prominent in Southern than Northern elections, both in qualification and as
polling places. Williamson notes that only South Carolina limited voting for vestrymen—who fulfilled
ecclesiastical as well as secular functions, including poor relief—to members of the Church of England
Id., 37.
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full members of the churches, so that about one in five adult males were enfranchised. 12
The best way to provide notice of an upcoming election was by postings on the church
door - a particularly appropriate site, because there “men would discuss the shortcomings
of the present government along with those of the minister.” 13 The first use of a written
ballot in English North America may have been in Salem church’s choice of a minister,
on July 20, 1629.
14
Indeed, Spencer Albright links the relatively early American use of
ballots with the “democratic and elective principles of the Congregational form of the
Christian Church,” among other intellectual precursors. 15 The dignity of paper, however,
did not arrive immediately. Paper was used to choose the governor and deputy of the
Massachusetts Bay colony in 1634, but a Massachusetts Bay statute of 1648 ordered that
‘that for the yearly choosing of Assistants
... the freemen shall use Indian Com and
Beans, the Indian Com to manifest Election, the Beanes contrary.’” 16 (Systems derived
from James Harrington’s Oceana often required voters to cast ballots not just for one
candidate, but against others.) Beans were also used in Pennsylvania in 1689, when
black and white legumes were placed into a hat; balls made of some substance were used
in 1676 in West Jersey. 17 Massachusetts was using paper ballots regularly as early as the
12 Pen7 Miller, ed., The American Puritans: Their Prose and Poetry (1982) (1956), at 108.
Charles Seymour and Donald Paige Frary, How the World Votes: The Story ofDemocratic Development
in Elections, vols. I and II, (1918), at 208.
14
Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (1942), at 14.
Id. Albright writes that the written ballot came into use in the Americas because of precedents in
England, Holland, Harrington’s Oceana,
... and the Christian Church,” as well as dissatisfaction with the
viva voce method. Id.
16
Dinkin, at 133; see also Albright, at 15.
17
Dinkin, at 133.
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1680s, and a secret ballot of one type or another generally prevailed in colonial New
England. Nevertheless, colonial areas employing written ballots used widely varying
practices concerning confidentiality, counting measures, and responding to fraud. 19 In
the South, elections were almost all viva voce 20
Even regional generalizations are hard to make, however, for the most striking
features of the history of balloting in late colonial America - and later, the young United
States - are its variation and its non-linear development. Dinkin concludes that electoral
mechanisms differed not only from one colony to another, but also from one election to
the next m the same place: North Carolina, for example, changed its methods four times
in the eighteenth century. 21 South Carolina voters used secret ballots until 1766, when
they apparently reverted to viva voce methods. At least six mid-Atlantic and Southern
colonies used some form of viva voce selection at some time in the provincial period. 22
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Massachusetts all permitted, but did not require the use
of ballots, meaning that one town might vote aloud while others did so privately in
writing. Meanwhile, written ballots were not at all necessarily secret. In Rhode Island,
This is illustrated by a wonderful piece of evidence in an Appendix to Cortlandt F. Bishop’s History of
Elections in the American Colonies (Columbia College, 1893), at 268. This is the vote-counter’s oath, the
“Oath to be administered to those that sort and number the votes,” in 1 679-80:
“Whereas yow ABC are appomted and betrusted ffor the opening the Proxies sent in by the Freemen,
and receiving sorting and numbering the Votes for the choice of Gou’nor Deputy Gou’nor, Assistants
and other public Officers of this Jurisdiction to be Chosen on the ellection Day yow doe now sweare
by the Name of Almighty God that yow will deale truely and uprightly therein as also that you will not
either directly or indirectly discouer either persons or number of Votes until the Election is ended. So
help you God.”
|y
See Dinkin, at 136-143.
Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise ofPopular Sovereignty> in England and America
(1988), at 183. See also Dinkin, at 136-137.
21
Dinkin, 133.
Id. These were New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia.
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ballots for county elections had to be signed by the voter, though votes for town offices
could be secret; New Jersey required lists of voters and their choices to be compiled and
occasionally published. 23
New York was apparently the only colony where the use of ballots became a full-
blown partisan controversy. Following almost thirty years of dispute, an intense struggle
over the question culminated with the narrow defeat of a secret-ballot bill in the New
York Assembly in 1 769- 1 770. Critics of open voting called for the secret ballot in the
interest of minimizing voter coercion - to no avail. Opponents of reform argued
successfully that ballots allowed more coercion and corruption than viva voce selection,
because ballots allowed some electors—including the infamous Germans of Pennsylvania
— to cast already-prepared tickets in complete ignorance. 24
From a modem perspective, voice voting seems to place the elector under
intolerable public pressure and invite manipulation. But in the eighteenth century, Dinkin
writes, many people “thought this style respectable and insisted that it encouraged rather
than discouraged honesty.” Nothing could be concealed: the ballot box could not be
stuffed, and individual votes could not be disputed, so deception and corruption were all
but impossible. By contrast, the secret ballot would “destroy that noble generous openess
that is characteristick [sic] of an Englishman, and. ..introduce a Vile Venetian Juggle and
Cunning,” as South Carolina governor James Glen argued in 1748. 25 (Apparently, Glen
knew that James Harrington and others had taken an interest in the secret ballot after
* 3
Williamson, at 41. See also 86, noting that there was some advocacy of “a return to the use of ballots in
elections” in North Carolina in 1775.
24
Williamson, 77-78 and 41-42.
25
Id., at 135.
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learning of its use in Venice.) Some pointed to the arguments of authorities like
Montesquieu and Blackstone, both ofwhom argued that the secret ballot had failed the
ancient world. 26 Montesquieu - who would later be cited more than any other authority
in the debate over the Constitution27 - contended that after the basic question of who was
qualified to vote, “the manner ofvoting was the most important decision facing practical
statesmen.” Noting that some American politicians pushed for a change from “the
customary oral voting” to ballots in the 1770s, Gordon Wood argues that such efforts
enlarged the political arena and limited the power of those who clung to the traditional
ways of private arrangements and personal influence”29 There is some disagreement
among modem scholars, meanwhile, as to how much social pressure would have affected
electoral behavior. 30 At any rate, New England colonists seemed to feel that the secret
ballot was an important means of heading off public dissension and preserving
communal solidarity,” as Dinkin puts it. 31
Id., at 136. Montesquieu held that the public pressure of open voting was needed to help the “lower
classes comport themselves correctly in elections, since they would feel “the gravity of eminent
personages.” Montesquieu, The Spirit ofthe Laws ( 1 949) vol. 1
,
155, quoted in Dinkin, at 1 35- 1 36.
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Gordon S. Wood, The American Revolution (2002), at 5 1 . Ballots were only part of a set of proposed
reforms such leaders advocated. Wood writes that in “some colonies politicians called for an expanded
suffrage, the use of ballot rather than the customary oral voting, the opening of legislative meetings to the
public, the printing of legislative minutes, and the recording of votes taken in the legislatures.” Id.
30 As Morgan writes in Inventing the People
,
we can glean important ideas about what “the consent of the
governed” meant in early America by studying “the way in which the voters were bullied or bought or
simply talked into choosing their betters to govern them.” Morgan, at 175. But recent studies, he cautions,
have shown that those of lower status may have had more power than we assume in this bargain. Id., at
175 n.l, citing John B. Kirby, “Early American Politics—The Search for Ideology: An Historical Analysis
and Critique of the Concept of ‘Deference,’” 32 Journal ofPolitics 808-838 (1970).
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Local conditions in the colonies quickly strained some inherited ideas about
voting, such as the English notion of “virtual representation.” Almost immediately,
Americans wanted a closer fit, even in selecting colonial assemblies. Massachusetts
established a system of assembly delegates for every hundred voters, but residents of
small towns protested: “might as well share a soul with other individuals,” as James
Morone imagines their response
.
32
Meanwhile, Chilton Williamson shows that
eighteenth-century Americans essentially lived with several different franchises, since the
qualifications for voting in colony elections “were seldom if ever the same as those for
voting in local elections in town, borough, city, or county.”33 In the mid-Atlantic and
Southern colonies, many localities allowed a broader franchise for local elections than
colony elections, and some expanded the franchise for all elections: one North Carolina
borough simply allowed any man to vote in any election who was within two miles of the
borough on election day. On the eve of the Revolution, residents of some cities and
towns may have enjoyed a broader suffrage than rural voters
.
34
Many colonies did not put in place formal age, sex, or residency restrictions,
leaving a good deal of discretion in the hands of local officials. Only three confined the
vote explicitly to males; six required that voters be twenty-one; and four set no residency
standard at all. Some, but not all, disenfranchised Catholics before the Revolution
.
35
Naturalization - toward English citizenship, of course - was in local hands in some
32
' James A. Morone, The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits ofAmerican
Government, Revised Ed. (1998), at 41.
33
Williamson, From Property to Democracy, at 16. Only Rhode Island drew no distinction between town
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places: James Kettner finds that South Carolina put just,ces of the peace in charge of
administering the required oaths after 1 704 * Williamson concludes that for a full
generation before the Revolution, Pennsylvania Germans “evidently voted and held local
office, with or without benefit of either private [or provincial] acts of naturalization.”37
At least a few Pennsylvania communities printed electoral material in Dutch as early as
1 742. Property tests, meanwhile, were usually based on towns’ lists of assessable
•JO
property.
All this variation helps explain why scholars struggle to derive firm estimates of
the percentage of American adults enfranchised at the Founding. 39 It is not just the
absence of firm population data that stands in our way, but suffrage’s local variation,
based on local rules, property ownership, officials’ discretion, and the type of election
being held. “Enfranchisement,” writes Alexander Keyssar, “varied greatly by location,”
with some newly-settled, cheap-land communities allowing four- fifths of white men to
vote, but others restricting the franchise to only about half. 40 Some colonies did attempt
to bring a measure of regularity to franchise rules, even before independence. For
36
James H. Kettner, The Development ofAmerican Citizenship, 1608-1870 (1978), at 100, 100 n.31.
Colonial citizenship policies generally were more inclusive than their English predecessors: “[t]he need to
attract settlers produced generous naturalization policies that promised aliens virtually the same rights as
Englishmen. Despite some resistance from imperial authorities, the distinctions between the various
categories of subjects—still quite real in the mother country—began to soften and blur.” Id., at 9.
Williamson, at 52. This practice continued after independence, including in Maryland, where foreigners
were frequently “naturalized just before elections in illegal fashion and allowed to vote.” Id. at 140.
38
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example, in 1 742, Massachusetts “limited the suffrage to owners of real estate valued at
twenty pounds or more,” and required town assessors to provide the town clerk with a
copy of land records “for use in connection with elections.”41 Overall, however, colonial
voting practices were characterized by a considerable “lack of uniformity.”42 And out of
that “wide range of experience,” concludes Robert j. Dinkin, emerged modem election
systems.
43
II. The Early National Period.
In its 2002 report, the National Commission on Federal Election Reform offers a
very brief history of suffrage law and administration. One key development in the first
half of the nineteenth century, the authors conclude, was that state governments
“established that they, not municipal governments, were the final arbiters of who could
vote in the state.”
44
This is an accurate statement, and a quite revealing one. Despite
the presence of new state constitutions and statutes regulating the franchise, local control
As Joseph Harris writes, this was not a true voter-registration roll, but was “probably the earliest
forerunner in this country of an official registration system.” Joseph Harris, Registration of Voters in The
United States (1929), 66-67.
42
Dinkin, at 143.
43
Dinkin, at 143.
44 Jimmy Carter et al., To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process: Report ofthe National
Commission on Federal Election Reform (2002), at 26-27. As Alexander Keyssar points out, some of the
sharpest conflicts between state and municipal governments during this period dealt with voting in
municipal elections, where the suffrage was often much more restricted than for state elections. See
Keyssar, The Right to Vote (2000), at 3 1 . Such battles continued into the twentieth century, with particular
controversy over the election of local officials, and over whether cities could control qualifications,
procedures, and candidates for such elections. Generally, state laws prevailed, but a great deal of variation
and uncertainty remained. See Howard Lee McBain, The Law and the Practice ofMunicipal Home Rule
(1916), at 182. In Missouri, state courts had to decide in 1884 whether the “home rule” powers of St. Louis
to elect and appoint city officials outweighed the state’s interest in effective local elections
—
particularly
those in which state as well as city officers were chosen. McBain, at 141-144. The state’s authority was
held to be greater in this case. In 1896, the same court defined the city’s power over elections broadly in
considering a Kansas City tax on men over twenty-one who had not voted in the city election: in practice, a
compulsory-voting law. McBain, 183-186.
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remained considerable a full generation after independence. Tremendous variation in
voting practices survived as well. This can be easy to overlook: after all, the formal
institutions of American national government were in place, and enfranchised men in a
few states were indeed voting for their state legislators, U.S. Representatives, and
Electoral College delegates by the early 1790s. Meanwhile, the amval of political parties
on the national scene - despite the Philadelphia Founders’ clear intentions - transformed
electoral politics. Indeed, the great gap between party politics in the U.S.’s first decades
and today probably obscures the gulf between the nature of voting as an activity then and
now.
As early as 1800, some Americans were describing “the right of suffrage” in
universal terms not unfamiliar to modem ears.45 States wielded formal control over
suffrage qualifications, but they still do today, at least for people convicted of crime.
(And, according to thq per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore
,
states still retain final control
over whether to hold Presidential elections at all, since the “individual citizen has no
federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the president of the United States.”46)
But despite the familiarity of debates over the “right to vote,” and despite the nation-wide
scope of conflicts over that right’s reach in the young United States, the truth is that
voting itself was a far cry from what we experience today. I focus here on three
45
See Keyssar, at 44. Keyssar quotes New Yorker James Cheetham, who quoted from the Declaration and
wrote that “the right of suffrage cannot belong to one man without belonging to another; it cannot belong to
a part without belonging to a whole.” It was not until mid-century that more radical democrats started
calling for the inclusion of blacks, women, and the poor in the franchise.
46
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,
531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). The full sentence reads, “[t]he individual citizen has no federal
constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the
Electoral College.” This was one of many surprises in the per curiam opinion.
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important dimensions of voting in the early republic: formal suffrage qualifications and
their local implementation; how and where people voted; and for whom they voted.
Between the Revolution and the Constitutional Convention, James Fishkin points
out, no state democratized the property qualification for voting.47 The new Constitution
left both qualifications and questions of “time, place, and manner” in state hands - as
Hamilton explained in Federalist 59, those governments would regulate elections in a
way “both more convenient and more satisfactory.”48 In practice, while some formal
standards were set at the state level, the implementation of suffrage law was still almost
entirely a local affair.
Property qualifications were all but universal in the first decades of American
national suffrage. 49 These restrictions were gradually abandoned in the early 1800s;
Maryland did so in 1802, South Carolina in 1810. (Vermont had abolished property-
holding or taxpaying requirements in 1777, but retained religious restrictions. 50) Even in
the first years of party politics - well before the mass parties of the Jacksonian era -
partisan interests played a role in suffrage expansion, as Crenson and Ginsberg note. 51
By the end of the 1820s, Daniel T. Rodgers shows, only Rhode Island, Louisiana,
47
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Virginia, and North Carolina retained significant property restrictions on the suffrage. 52
But restricted suffrage in municipal voting persisted, partly because “individual locales
wanted to control the entry portals into their political communities,” as Keyssar puts it. 53
For other residents - those who were not citizens - local control often led to
expanded access to voting. Well into the nineteenth century, citizenship status generally
did not determine one’s eligibility to vote. New Hampshire was first to require voters to
be citizens, in 1814; Connecticut and Virginia followed a few years later, and half a
dozen other states excluded non-citizens in the next two decades. Some new states
required that voters be citizens, but Vermont, Tennessee, and Ohio did not; these states
did not exclude non-citizens from suffrage until 1828, 1834, and 1852, respectively. 54
Most states permitted aliens to vote deep into the nineteenth century—at least twenty-two
did so in 1 875. Meanwhile, many other states were withdrawing those rights, beginning
with Illinois in 1848 - but it was not until 1926 that no states permitted aliens to vote. 55
The survival of alien voting in many states for a full century demonstrates at least a tacit
confidence in the ability of local officials to control the suffrage.
52
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As with the Revolutionary period, so much variation occurred at the local level
that it is hard for scholars to estimate turnout and the size of the electorate. Much
remains opaque, for the simple reasons that state laws and documents do not suffice:
town records, particularly of property ownership and taxation, are the necessary sources.
It is likely that many policies continued from the late colonial period, such as
Pennsylvania’s practice of providing town tax books listing real and personal property at
the polls to check qualifications of challenged electors. 56 Other localities also used tax
lists to help the selectmen, sheriff, or other authorities decide who could vote.
Williamson finds a good deal of evidence that state law regarding taxpayer and property
qualifications offered only a rough approximation of the real franchise, which was
probably larger. In South Carolina, numerous observers reported that enforcement was
lax all over, and that citizens who did not qualify were being allowed to vote, “rather
from want of information of the Constitution and Existing Law of the State, than from
audacity, or intentionally violating the same,” as one author put it in 1796. When
Pennsylvania abolished the freehold qualification in 1788, the diversity of electoral
practices and the resulting difficulty of enforcement were important reasons. The same
thing happened in Connecticut, where some argued that property tests should be
abolished “because they were already meaningless in many towns.” Well into the
nineteenth century, authorities in eastern Virginia worked to break “the pre-
Revolutionary habit of ignoring the suffrage laws,” as Williamson puts it, but violations
of the laws were legion throughout the state. 57
56
Williamson, at 32.
57
Id., at 152-153, 134, 171,230.
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To be sure, most qualifications in this period were formally set at the state level.
But even where those requirements were followed, they were locally adjudicated and
administered. Property records, for example, were kept by county, c.ty, or town officials,
and most taxes were assessed at that level, as well. Some states did have statewide
taxation as early as the 1 790s - since payment of a “state tax" met their suffrage
qualification - but at least as many declared that payment of any “county tax" met the
standard. 58 Clearly, though, some real estate holding was the modal early qualification,
and those records would have been kept locally. (Meanwhile, in states where the
property-holding qualification could be satisfied by wealth instead of real estate,
depreciation in the value of paper money broadened the franchise - what Fishkin calls
“reform by inflation.”59)
In Pennsylvania, no direct state tax was collected until 1832; voters met the state’s
taxpayer qualification by paying a county tax, levied six months before the election.
Specifically local economic activity determined voting qualifications elsewhere. In 1825,
the New York state senate wrestled with one of the difficulties created by the taxpaying
requirement for lessors and lessees: where the tenant paid the taxes, the landlord could
lose his right to vote, and vice versa. Similar phenomena extended to non-economic
qualifications: two years earlier, hundreds of men apparently lost their suffrage rights
because instead of doing militia duty, they served on volunteer fire departments instead.60
When Massachusetts’ constitutional convention revised its qualification in 1820 to allow
all taxpayers - rather than property owners - to vote, a kind of press release published
58
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after the convention declared that the new test would “relieve Selectmen from much
perplexity, and will enable them easily to distinguish between those who have a right to
vote and those who do not ”6 ' This means not only that Selectman had previously
determined who was qualified, but that the new suffrage rule intended for them to
continue to do so. State officials were not making decisions as to who was qualified to
vote: local officials were.
HoW and Where pe°P le voted - as well as who voted - remained matters of great
diversity. First, while independence brought many changes, it did not alter the character
of Southern elections, which retained their carnival air - “barbecued oxen, kegs of rum,
and everybody roaring drunk,” writes Edmund Morgan. 62 As one participant described
an election for a U.S. House seat in 1790s South Carolina, the Greenville courthouse
became “a scene of noise, blab, and confusion,” with “much drinking, swearing, cursing,
and threatening.. .clamor and confusion and disgrace.”63 The “disgrace” here was
probably the intimidation and physical force sometimes used to keep one’s opponents
from the polls, sometimes with official acquiescence. 64 Voice voting would dominate
Id., at 193.
62
See Morgan, Inventing the People
,
at 184, 185.
63
Id., quoting from the diary of Edward Hooker.
At least once, the U.S. House closely examined such violence in deciding whether the extremely close
election of 1794 in one Virginia district - decided by ten votes, amidst undisputed allegations of massive
intimidation and beatings of would-be voters - meant that the result should be overturned. In allowing the
winner to keep his seat, most Representatives agreed with Rep. Samuel Smith of Maryland, who stated that
he “had never known an election in the Southern States where there was so little mischief.” Another
member expressed mystification that “there should be such a noise about this election...when others were
just as bad, or worse. Morgan, 186-188. One colorful point of contention involved a Justice of the Peace
who had been beaten in a brawl at the polls. It’s true he was knocked down, respondents said, but he was
drunk himself, and threw the first punch. Id., 188. Morgan quotes from the Annals of Congress 1 789-
1824, vol. Ill, 598-600, 608-613.
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most of the South until after the Civil War.65 As in the colonial period, voting itself
sometimes took place not just out loud, but literally on a stage. In Virginia, a platform
was often erected in front of the courthouse; the candidates sat there, and each voter
ascended the platform, announced his vote, and was personally thanked by the candidate
Inconsistencies in voting mechanisms continued throughout the young U.S. There had
been a shift to paper in the 1770s, but Virginia and Maryland retained viva voce, and at
least half a dozen states adopted voice voting after that time, as Peter Argersinger shows
in his indispensable essay “Electoral Processes in American Politics.”66 Kentucky went
back to viva voce in 1 799, and did not formally adopt paper again for almost a century. 67
Conflicts over paper and voice voting were often sharp, as the implications of
methodology became clear in various areas. Connecticut in 1801 passed the “Stand Up
Law” abolishing the ballot, a change explicitly designed to intimidate would-be
Republican voters. And decades later, several Southern and border states would
temporarily discontinue viva voce polling during the Civil War and Reconstruction, out
of fear that traditional elites would re-assert control if voters had to vote out loud.68
We do not have a firm count, but most states did convert to paper ballots in the
early nineteenth century. 69 Paper voting, however, was vastly different from what we
65
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know today. One difference was that in the early national period - before the
development of mass parties and their election infrastructure - voters often had to write
down the name of their preferred candidates. An increase in the number of candidates
and offices led some voters to accept party-printed tickets as a labor-saving device, and
parties quickly saw the potential. In Massachusetts, it was not until 1829 - when the
state’s supreme court sided with a voter whose ticket had been rejected because it was
pre-pnnted - that voters officially won the right to use printed ballots. Maine, Vermont,
and Connecticut would officially authorize the use of printed ballots in the 1 830s and
1840s, either by statute or constitutional amendment. 70
At any rate, the written ballot was not at all necessarily a secret ballot, and it
appears that for at least the first several decades of U.S. elections, relatively few voters
cast written votes in secrecy. In 1782, New Jersey abolished the secret ballot in a brazen
effort “to intimidate the Tory vote,” Williamson concludes, then restored it in 1783 - but
only in some counties. In 1 788, the state would increase the number of counties
employing the ballot. 71 In 1794, states as diverse as Maryland and New York held viva
voce elections, and some observers identified them as a source of coercion and
corruption. Wealthy New York Federalist Stephen Van Rensselaer, for example, openly
offered his tenants significant reductions in their fees if they would vote as directed, and
sent colleagues to make sure they did so. New York established a secret ballot for city
70
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elections in 1 804, and for town elections in 1 809. 72 Indiana used written ballots after
1811, and Illinois did so after 1813 - but then returned to voice voting in 1829, after
decades of controversy over ballots. However, Illinois was apparently unusual, as most
new states employed the ballot. Rhode Island's new constitution of 1842 - following the
Don- Rebellion - included a new registration requirement, but no secret ballot. In 1851,
when Virginia changed its suffrage laws to allow all white male citizens to vote, it still
did not require a secret ballot. And the secret ballot remained a controversial partisan
issue in Massachusetts politics as late as 1853. 73
Once mass political parties developed an electoral infrastructure, of course, the
lack of secrecy could be exploited in earnest. Argersinger writes that the fact which
enabled mid-nineteenth-century American political parties “to exercise the most
influence in shaping politics and political culture” was the total absence of secrecy in
voting. Voters carried their tickets to a window or table, often on the street, courthouse
steps, or public porch, announced their identity, and passed their ballot to an official. The
ballots were produced by parties, who had every incentive to design tickets distinctive in
color, size, and design. 74 Others were deceptive, listing one party’s names but featuring
the image of another party’s standard-bearer to trick illiterates. 75
72
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See Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the
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Some commentators on the state of American elections at the beginning of the
twenty-first century believe it’s particularly important that we vote in physical polling
places, alongside our neighbors. 76 That local dimension had a very different meaning
when votes were cast either out loud in front of those neighbors, or on partisan tickets
which any interested observer could easily identify. As I explain below, the amval of the
Australian ballot” after 1888 brought secrecy to almost all American voters. But for
over a century - indeed, for almost half of the country’s post-independence history -
many, and perhaps most, American voters did not make their choices in secret.
A second crucial change in the early national period involved the location of
polling places. The long distances colonial voters had had to travel to the polls became
unacceptable in the new republic, and across the country, electoral districts became
smaller, making it easier for rural voters to get to the polls. 77 As early as the 1 790s,
voters in states as diverse as New York, Maryland, and New Jersey were calling for an
increase in polling places.
78
“[T]rue principles of Republicanism and of genuine
Liberty,” one advocate of township polling in New Jersey argued in 1793, “requires [sic]
that elections should be brought as near to every Man’s Door as possible so that the
genuine voice of the People may be taken.”79 Commenting on New Jersey’s election-
reform law of 1788, which provided for polls to move from town to town, Williamson
writes that the “bringing of the poll closer to the voters was, possibly, as important an
76
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event as the prior abandonment of the freehold qualification for voting." A generation
later, the introduction of township polling in the new west (instead of in only one town
per county) “was possibly a greater factor in enfranch,sing the population of Indiana than
the abandonment of the freehold qualification.”80 Such reforms came unevenly,
however: as late as 1825, some Virginia voters asked the assembly for a new polling
place, since they had to travel thirty miles to the county seat to vote, losing two days of
farmwork. The cihzens argued that the legal entitlement to participate was not worth
much if the right was so costly to exercise. 81 It was state governments which multiplied
the number of polling places, adding more “taverns, mills, and churches” to go with the
county courthouses. 82 This means that paradoxically, the hyper-federalized American
suffrage system of today - in which local jurisdictions play such a prominent role - was
initially created by state governments.
A final element of suffrage in the early republic which is easily overlooked today
concems/or whom people voted. Variation on these matters was a state and not a local
matter, so I do not discuss this here as part of the story of local control, but rather as an
example ofjust how greatly the nature and content of American voters’ participation in
elections has been transformed across time. The size and reach of the federal government
has grown and the American voter’s political consciousness has become “nationalized” in
the twentieth century, and it is easy to lose sight ofjust how limited voters’ direct
80
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connections to the national government actually were in the first generation of U.S.
suffrage. Of course, the Constitution directed state legislatures to choose U.S. Senators,
and that method survived into the twentieth century. The Presidential Electoral College,
meanwhile, lost almost immediately the genuinely deliberative function it was intended
to have. However, the selection of electors did no, change nearly as rapidly. Into the
1820s, several states had no popular balloting at all for the Presidency. 83 Only in 1824 did
a substantial majority of the states use popular election to determine who their
President, al electors would be; only beginning in that year did it seem useful to record
popular votes generally. 84 A comprehensive statistical history of Presidential elections
does not present popular vote totals for elections before 1824; in that year, no popular-
vote numbers are available for a quarter of the states.85 Change came rapidly after that
point, however, as within a decade almost all states allowed voters, rather than state
legislators, to choose electors. By 1845, popular election of Presidential electors was
general enough that Congress saw fit to establish Tuesday after the first Monday in
November as the day on which electors should be chosen. (The same date was applied to
the selection of U.S. Representatives in 1875, and to U.S. Senate races in 1914.)86 The
fact of widespread popular choice of electors early in the nineteenth century does not tell
the whole story, however. As Leon Aylsworth has shown,87 and as I explain below, it
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was not until the twentieth century that most states either eliminated electors' names
altogether, or at least grouped them to make voters’ Presidential choices more clear.
Some states did begin to do so in the 1820s, however, putting in place winner-take-all
popular selection - the “general ticket” - in order to increase the state’s influence on
Presidential elections. 88 Argersinger identifies that change as key to the growth of
parties, as well: “[t]he adoption of the general ticket,” he writes, “stimulated far more
than did the district system [of elections] the development of statewide political
organizations.”89
Those political organizations were at the heart of American voting through the
balance of the nineteenth century. Local officials continued to supervise elections: town
selectmen, local judges or election inspectors in New England, sheriffs or parish church
wardens in the South. But increasingly, these officials were members of the locally-
dominant political party, and their impartiality was often called into question. 90 This
marked the beginning of a new period in American suffrage practices - beginning in the
middle third of the century - in which parties, rather than state or local government
officials, must be seen as the dominant actors. As Keyssar argues, by 1840 parties and an
increasingly-competitive competitive political arena had made American suffrage a very
different beast, and elections became a kind of “public theater.” In the 1820s, Keyssar
writes, popular participation in electoral politics was limited: turnout levels were low
and many offices were filled either by appointment or by legislative, rather than popular,
88
See Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party
,
at 36-37.
89
Id., at 37.
90
Id., at 45, 46.
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vote.” The formation and mobiliza.ton of mass patties, the growth of the eiec,orate, the
multiplication of polling places, increasing use of popular election in Presidential races,
and new ballot forms
- particularly the party-printed ballot - together changed that.
William Gienapp agrees, writing that by 1 840, the “structure and ideology” of American
politics “had been democratized” by new forms of campaigning and higher turnout. 92
Parties were national in scope, and closely connected to state governments, but
they were built on local foundations. The Jacksonian party system, Gienapp writes,
“derived considerable strength from the capability of parties to emphasize national, state,
or local issues as their situation dictated.” Parties were able to take issue positions - and
avoid taking positions - strategically. “The extent of these local variations remains
impressive,” Gienapp writes. 93
In sharp contrast with modem practice, the federal courts played virtually no role
in regulating suffrage or elections during this period. The most high-profile example of
the Supreme Court’s pre-Civil War reluctance to involve itself in elections came in
Luther K Borden
>
the 1 849 decision holding that even the most momentous matters of
elections and representation were “political questions” unfit for judicial resolution. The
twentieth-century Court would famously refer to apportionment as a “political thicket,”94
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Keyssar, The Right to Vote
,
at 40.
William E. Gienapp, “Politics Seem to Enter into Everything,” in Stephen E. Maizlish and John J
Kushma, eds., Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840-1860 (1982), at 15. Gienapp writes,
for the first time politics assumed a central role in American life. Previously deference to social
elites and mass indifference characterized the nation’s politics; despite suffrage laws sufficiently
liberal to allow mass participation, few men were interested in politics, and fewer still actively
participated in political affairs.”
Id.
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Gienapp, at 49, 50.
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bu, that metaphor is too mild for the problems encountered by the Court in Luther. The
case emerged out of the “Dorr War” or “Dorr Rebellion” in Rhode Island, which had long
lived under an anachronistic constitution and severe malaportionment. Here, the “Dorr
Rebellion” deserves note for two reasons. First, it was sparked by suffrage law,
particularly eligibility and apportionment; second, it led to a signature Court decision of
the era, in which the Court stated its intention of staying out of election law.
Rhode Island’s ancient constitution, derived from the 1663 charter,
disenfranchised about half the adult males and gave disproportionate power to rural
landholders at the expense of urban workers. Unable to bring about change within the
existing state government, Thomas Dorr and his colleagues invoked the Declaration of
Independence and organized an extralegal constitutional convention; the resulting
document was ratified overwhelmingly by an extralegal election. Dorr was elected
governor, and during 1842, Rhode Island effectively had two constitutions and two
governments fighting for legitimacy. Covertly encouraged by President John Tyler,
Rhode Island’s pre-Dorr governor called up the state militia, which soon defeated the
“Dorrites.”95
Luther v. Borden - argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1848 and decided in
1849 - got its start in 1842, and was first argued in federal court in 1843. It was a
trespass suit, filed by Dorr sympathizer Martin Luther against Luther Borden and eight
other men who had searched Martin Luther’s home during a period of martial law. The
case asked a simple question about the lawful use of force, with potentially large
Harold M. Hyman, Luther v. Borden,” in Kerrrut L. Hall, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Supreme
Court (1992), 515-516. See also George M. Dennison, The Dorr War: Republicanism on Trial 1831-1861
(1976).
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implications for the definition of state power and republicanism. The Supreme Court
would eventually dodge these larger questions with the “political questions” doctrine,
despite the fact that some federal judges had been willing and eager to intervene in the
Rhode Island crisis early on. Federal District Judge John Pitman wrote a pamphlet
denouncing the rebels in 1842, and no less an authonty than Joseph Story wrote
approvingly to Pitman that “[.]f ever there was a case that called upon ajudge to wnte
and speak openly and publicly, it was the very case then before you.”96 (By “case” Story
meant “problem;” there was then no case in the courts.) In the same year, Story wrote to
Secretary of State Daniel Webster, urging President Tyler to be ready to take action
against the Dorrites, who he called “without law and against law."97 Chief Justice Taney
wrote for the Court in Luther v. Borden
,
and his opinion tacitly imbued the political status
quo with a new aura of legitimacy and accepted “a new definition of the emergency
powers available to government”98 Ironically, Abraham Lincoln would use Taney’s
decision to justify the restriction ofhabeas corpus and other Civil War restrictions.99
III. Reconstruction and the Late Nineteenth Century.
After the Civil War, the national Constitution for the first time began to define the
American franchise. In 1868, radical Republicans were reluctant to assert federal control
over the suffrage - and to confront Northern racism - and decided not to use the
See Gettleman, The Dorr Rebellion
,
at 175. Chapter Seven of Gettleman’s book, titled “The Judiciary
vs. the Rebels, 1842 to 1849,” emphasizes “judicial hostility” to the efforts of the Dorrites. Id.
97
Gettleman, at 176. Joseph Story was presiding judge in the circuit court which heard the case; not
surprisingly given the views noted here, he acted “more like an additional lawyer against Luther than an
impartial judge.” Gettleman, at 179.
98
George M. Dennison, “The Dorr War and the Triumph of Institutionalism,” 15 Social Science Journal
39, 49(1978).
99
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Fourteenth Amendment to explicitly bar racial discriminatton in voting. Instead, they
wrote into Section Two of that Amendment a formula designed to allow resurgent
Southern whites to bar black men from voting, but to firmly penalize states that did so by
reducing their representation in the national government proportionally “ The “original
understanding” of Sect,on Two, one authority wntes, was to confront southern states
"with a choice between enfranchising the blacks and losing almost half their votes in the
House of Representatives and the electoral college.” 10 ' Another writes that Section Two
was meant to help Southern blacks indirectly, without antagonizing Northern whites
,
102
many ofwhom were unwilling to confront racial discrimination directly at the national
level. Abolitionist Wendell Phillips denounced the entire amendment as a “fatal and total
surrender” because “it implicitly acknowledged the nght of states to limit voting because
of race.” 103
100
See U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV, §2.
Elliott, The Rise ofGuardian Democracy, at 57. Eric Foner writes that because compelling all states to
en ranchise blacks did not command majority support, the search began for alternatives.” Foner,
Reconstruction, at 252. Section two emerged from that search as a way to leave voting requirements to the
states, 'while indirectly promoting black suffrage.” Id.
Michael Perman, Strugglefor Mastery, at 1 16. Perman argues that the second section of the fourteenth
amendment “offered greater representation if the states acted with foresight and opted to enfranchise all or
a large part of their male African American population.” In U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), the Supreme
Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment did not confer a right to suffrage, but merely prohibited exclusion
on racial grounds. In dissent, Justice Hunt argued that the second section of the fourteenth amendment did
not guarantee the franchise to “the colored race”—“its exclusion was permitted.” See Reese, 92 U.S. at 247
(Hunt, J., dissenting).
Foner, Reconsti uction, at 255. Charles Sumner called section two a “compromise with wrong” for
permitting racial limits on the suffrage. Id. at 253. The radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens, however,
argued hopefully that “the representation clause
. . . would either compel the South to enfranchise blacks or
‘keep [it] forever in a hopeless minority in the national Government.”’ Id. at 254. Indeed, one Southern
newspaper “calculated [that] the region would sacrifice one third of its House membership.” Id. at 259.
White southerners, however, quickly saw that section two was not a difficult obstacle to overcome. As a
Virginia legislator told Congress, southern whites would simply employ the “obvious policy” of using
nonracial literacy or property qualifications, under which states would get “the benefit of the negro race in
counting our population, and under which white people would do all the voting.” Id. at 252. Meanwhile,
leaders of the women’s suffrage movement felt “betrayed” by the amendment, because for the first time the
word “male” was introduced into the Constitution. Id., at 255.
78
Th.s purpose of Seclion Two was never realized, and the courts have regarded its
disenfranchisement-endorsing aspect as a dead letter. (The great exception is criminal
disenfranchisement, which the Court held in 1974 is explicitly endorsed by the presence
of the phrase “except for rebellion, or other crime” in Section Two. IM ) While the Equal
Protection Clause in Sect,on One of the Fourteenth Amendment is essential to voting-
nghts law today, that development is a creature of twentieth-century political thought and
jurisprudence. 105
The Fifteenth Amendment - added in 1 870, two years after the Fourteenth - did
bar discrimination “on account of race” in voting, aiming to protect the rights of newly-
freed blacks. Of course, the purpose and spirit of the Amendment was quickly and
flagrantly violated, particularly in the South, by targeted criminal disenfranchisement
laws, poll taxes, literacy tests, the grandfather (or “fighting grandfather”) clause, and the
white primary, as well as extra-legal intimidation and violence. For my purposes, it is
important to emphasize that even as they were written into state constitutions or statutes,
virtually all of these restrictions on voting by free blacks (and some poor whites) were
designed to be effected by discriminatory enforcement at the local level. “I do not expect
an impartial administration of this clause,” as one author of the Virginia’s 1902 literacy
test famously said. 106
104
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
Some scholars and judges still contest whether this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is
warranted by the Amendment s authors purposes. For a summary of recent literature on this question, see
Michael J. Perry, We The People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court (1999), at 217 n.69.
106
Kirk Harold Porter, A History ofSuffrage in the United States ( 1 97 1 ), at 2 1 8.
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Beyond the initial extension of voting rights to African Americans, the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments had surprisingly little practical effect on nineteenth-century
American suffrage. The national government, including the courts, lacked the political
will to implement them forcefully. But prevailing American ideas about suffrage and the
language of the Amendments themselves were also responsible. As James Kettner argues
in his history of American citizenship, “[t]he crucial right of eligibility for the suffrage
remained ‘in a fringe area,’ frequently linked with citizenship, but not yet ‘nationalized’
and guaranteed by the government as an automatic corollary of the status.” 107 Even as a
formal matter, then, American law did not identify an affirmative “right to vote,” despite
the presence of that phrase in both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 108 Among
national political elites, meanwhile, belief in universal suffrage declined sharply in the
late nineteenth century. In the event, resurgent white elites had little difficulty in
virtually eliminating blacks from Southern political life in the decades after
Reconstruction.
After this expansion and contraction of the franchise following the Civil War, a
second great change in American suffrage during the latter part of the nineteenth century
was the implementation of Australian-ballot procedures in most states in the 1880s and
1890s. I discuss these two phenomena - the post-Reconstruction backlash, and the
spread of the Australian ballot — at some length in later chapters. Scholars disagree over
107
Kettner, The Development ofAmerican Citizenship, 1608-1870, at 344, quoting Alexander Bickel, “The
Original Understanding,” 69 Harvard Law Review 7, 46 (1955-56). Kettner observes that Section Two of
the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth both included the phrase “right to vote,” but “in both clauses, the language
was indirect and negative, open to interpretations that left states with wide powers to curtail access to the
suffrage.” Kettner, 344.
108 As Kettner puts it, “in both clauses, the language was indirect and negative, open to interpretations that
left states with wide powers to curtail access to the suffrage.” Kettner, at 344.
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their causes and consequences - more so, to be sure, in the case of the Australian ballot -
but both developments are integral parts of the story of American voting's local
dimension.
This is also true of a third important development, the spread of compulsory
voter-registration laws in the late nineteenth century. As I’ve explained above, in the first
half of the nineteenth century state governments asserted their authority to define the
franchise. But the adoption of mandatory voter registration in most states in the latter
half of the century- initially in cities, as a “good government” reform aimed at
minimizing fraud - would change that. Registration brought about “a new
decentralization of power to determine the eligibility of voters, devolving from state
governments down to the local and county governments that managed this process and
maintained the rolls,” as the 2002 report of the National Commission on Federal Election
Reform concludes. 10 ^ In other words, the nineteenth century may have begun with states
taking some control of election qualifications away from localities, but the registration
reforms of the century s latter half effectively returned a good deal of that power.
Mandatory registration spread quite slowly after Massachusetts in 1800 became the first
state to enact a compulsory-registration law; few states outside New England adopted
compulsory registration prior to the Civil War, and from 1860 to 1880, older northern
states enacted requirements applying only to large cities. Western and southern states
followed between 1880 and 1900.' 10
109 Jimmy Carter et al., To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process: Report ofthe National
Commission on Federal Election Reform (2002), at 27.
110
Joseph Harris, Registration of Voters in The United States (1929), at 65.
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Three facts about this history are most important. First is the strength oflocal
officials’ control of the suffrage under early registration law. Under the 1 800
Massachusetts law, for example, town assessors prepared lists of qualified electors; the
lists were submitted to selectmen, posted and revised; and selectmen or assessors met on
election day to hear applications for registration'" Deep into 1800s, then - even where
state governments had acted to harmonize the franchise a. the state level - voter
qualification was as a practical matter almost entirely at the discretion of local
officials." 2 A second remarkable aspect of registration’s spread across the U.S. is simply
how slowly it occurred and how little of the population it affected. At the time of the
Civil War, there were no registration rules at all in most states, and only in cities long
thereafter. (In fact, this was the case well into the twentieth century." 3) Finally, it seems
that partisan fraud - the cessation ofwhich was the key objective of many registration
rules - easily survived the new laws. In-person registration was not generally required,
and local officials were authorized to ’’prepare lists of qualified electors from their
knowledge,” so party machines had little trouble corrupting the new system. Typically,
pIlt^Ia^Zaz?'
7J
egiStIa,i0n WaS challenSed and “Ph' ld Massachusetts in Capen v. Foster, 12rickermg 485 (1832). However, some courts later struck down compulsory registration, particularlybetween 1868 and 1886, holding that the elector has an absolute right to cast a ballot. Under these
ec isions, local officials had to allow the voter to “swear in his vote at the polls.” See Harris 305-310 for
an excellent summary of this and other legal controversies.
" 2 AS Tocqueville observed, registration was “compulsory” for local officials as well as for voters, since
assachusetts selectmen who failed to draw up a list of township voters “were guilty of a misdemeanor.”
ut there is little evidence that this law was enforced, much less that state officials checked the accuracy oftown lists. See Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. /. (1990) (1835), at 63.
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As Harris observed in 1929, “[pjractically every state with one or more large cities has registration
provisions which apply only to such cities....” Federal courts held such distinctions to be constitutional, as
there was no requirement of uniformity in registration laws. Harris, 312-313. Another source, however,
reports that most states had some form of registration requirement as of 1894. See Thos E Hill Hill's'
Political History ofthe United States ( 1 894), at 122. Hill finds that only Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky,
Oregon, and Tennessee had no registration law; he does not explain, however, whether some of the states
that did have such laws applied the requirement only to cities.
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party precinct captains would simply hand in long lists of names, including those of
people who had moved away, died, or were altogether fictional
.
1 14
The decades prior to the advent of the secret, state-produced ballot probably
marked the high point of American parties’ control of American suffrage practices.
Many scholars have also regarded the nineteenth century as a golden age for enlightened,
committed political participation generally, though recent work such as Altschuler and
Blumm’s Rude Republic challenges that interrelation, demonstrating that a great deal of
nineteenth-century political activity was casual or very uninformed
.
115
(It is worth noting
here that Altschuler and Blumin study nineteenth-century partisan political practices
through a local lens, following events in a few representative towns.) Meanwhile, some
of the best scholarship on nineteenth-century American elections does not devote much
attention to specific suffrage practices, or to variation at the local level .
116
Certainly, election days themselves were much more like the festivals of colonial
times than the quiet, private affairs of today. As Robert Wiebe writes in Self-Rule: A
114
Harris, 66.
Id. There is a “nearly consensual view,” Altschuler and Blumin argue, that post-Jacksoman American
politics was “a genuinely massive activity in which the vast majority of ordinary Americans—white, votmg
males, most evidently participated with an effectiveness bom of enthusiasm for and deep commitment to
their political party, to specific programs and leaders, and to the idea and practice of democracy itself.” Id.,
at 3. Altschuler and Blumin show that that the act of voting was much more “qualified,” “hesitant,” and
“casual” than we have assumed. Many votes were literally purchased; some were coerced by force, others
by drink; and a great many voters cast their ballots in utter ignorance of what and whom they were voting
for. Americans relations to their politics were in fact highly variable, characterized by “detachment as
well as commitment, skepticism as well as belief, disgust as well as enthusiasm. ...” Id., at 272. The
authors urge us to stop using the nineteenth century “as a club with which to beat subsequent generations of
declining voter turnout.”
116 See
>
for example, Paul Kleppner, The Third Electoral System, 1853-1892: Parties, Voters, and Political
Cultures (1979). Kleppner’s weighty, deeply-researched book examines “the social bases of American
mass political behavior,” specifically “the social bases of mass partisan support.” Id., atxv, xvi. In
studying election outcomes, Kleppner examines voting data at the county level - and even subcounty in
some places - but appears not to have found evidence that different voting mechanisms affected outcomes.
See id., passim.
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CUltUral HiSt0ty
°fAmerican Democracy, “[t]he short, funereal lines outs.de a modem
vo^ng b°0th WOuld have ala^ed a 19th eentury democrat at least as much as the thought
of the 19 th century’s boisterous, partisan crowds seems to distress commentators
today. Michael Schudson labels nineteenth-century voting “the politics of
affiliation. Nineteenth-century voters might march together to the polls, fighting
opponents along the way; the polling place was full of boisterous partisans, waving
banners and torches. Ballots were produced and distributed by parties, and listed the
party’s candidates for each office; as noted above, the ticket was usually distinctive in
color, size, and shape, so everyone at the polls could easily observe any vote.
The kinds of “affiliations” made real through the lack of privacy were often
supplemented by parties’ habit of rewarding their supporters financially. Outright
payments and other activities now condemned as fraud were general in the middle third
of the century; they were clearly understood differently then, by many Americans, as
simply legitimate “patronage” or “spoils.” New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago saw
serious fraud during elections in the 1840s; after the Civil War, the Tweed Ring
specialized in registering and pressuring new Irish immigrants in droves just before
elections, sometimes swelling the rolls by thirty percent in a matter of weeks. 119 The
Robert Wiebe, Self-Rule: A Cultural History ofAmerican Democracy (1995), at 7.
118
Schudson, The Good Citizen, at 5-6.
Robert Goldberg, Election Fraud: An American Vice,” in A. James Reichley, ed., Elections American
Style (1987), at 1 82. Well into the twentieth century, Goldberg writes, massive fraud was clearly practiced
in a wide variety of states. Id., at 1 83. Fraud today is almost certainly on a smaller scale than in the past,
but fraudulent registration, use of absentee ballots, vote buying, and actual falsification of returns are not
uncommon. Id., at 184-188.
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social norms enabling such behavior were probably localized; this is Elazar’s theory. and
holds that some types of “local culture” are more likely to tolerate fraud. 120
It is well-known that state-level Australian-ballot reforms were aimed at reducing
such behavior. What is less well understood is that the federal government tackled the
problem as well, two decades before state ballot refotm began in earnest. In one of the
first significant national regulations of suffrage practices,' 21 the Federal Elections Law of
1 87 1 required secrecy of some sort, whether by envelopes, folding, or some other
method. 122 The law’s story is an excellent indicator of the era: it was a national statute,
but its implementation rested both formally and informally on local conditions.
The law appears to have been primarily a response to fraud in northern cities. The
1871 law, Argersinger writes, “constituted the largest federal attempt to regulate
elections” up to that time, and was necessary simply because “state and local [election
administration] laws were inadequate and poorly enforced.” 123 The law barred
impersonation, repeat voting, intimidation, or bribery of voters in congressional elections,
or in registration for those elections; it applied only to large cities, and only under certain
important conditions. Two different types of federal officials oversaw elections under the
law - supervisors, appointed by federal district courts, and deputy U.S. marshals,
12
°As Goldberg puts it, Elazar’s essential argument is that “election fraud should be harshly condemned in
areas characterized by moralistic subcultures, generally tolerated by traditionalistic subcultures, and almost
expected under mdividualistic subcultures.” Goldberg, id., 190. But as Goldberg pomts out, many areas of
the U.S . do not fit the theory. Id., 190-191.
Congress in 1 842 had required that members of Congress be elected from single-member districts, rather
than at-large. See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law ofDemocracy:
Legal Structure ofthe Political Process, Rev 'd Second Ed. (2002), at 239.
122
See Albright, The American Ballot, at 21-22. See also “Before the Voting Rights Act,” U.S. Dept, of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro_a.htm>. As
this source notes, the 1 87 1 law “provided for federal election oversight,” which distinguished it from the
more widely-known “Force Act” of 1870, which criminalized interference with the right to vote.
1 23
Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party, at 50.
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appointed by the federal executive branch. The two had very different connections to
partisan politics. First, the federal circuit court appointed two supervisors per district,
and the supervisors had to be of different parties. Supervisors could challenge
registration, “inspect the voting process, count the ballots, and issue election
certificates.” 124 Minority parties—Republicans in most Northern cities, Democrats in
Philadelphia—usually requested supervisors. The other officials authorized by the 1871
law were deputy U.S. marshals. The marshals did not have to be of different parties;
since the U.S. marshal was a federal appointee of the (usually Republican) President, that
meant that multiple deputy U.S. marshals gave a distinctly Republican cast to election
administration and law enforcement in the 1880s and 1890s. As Argersinger writes, the
presence of numerous Republican deputy marshals “suggested] to some that the
presence of armed federal election officials was intended to intimidate Democratic voters,
particularly in certain ethnic neighborhoods....” Hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of
such deputies were authorized over the life of the law. There is a great deal of evidence
that Republican deputies aided corruption, sometimes flagrantly; the marshals sometimes
arrested Democratic elections officials and ran the polls themselves. 125 In 1894, the law
was repealed on a straight party vote, after Democrats made big gains in the 1892
elections. It may be that the effect of the 1871 ’s law’s enforcement was to give national
involvement in election administration a bad name - at least an utterly partisan one.
Still, the most important change in late-nineteenth-century American election
practices was the introduction of a set of reforms that became known as “the Australian
124
Id., at 50-51.
U5
Id., at 51-52. At least once, the marshals arrested the federally-appointed Democratic supervisor
himself. Id.
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ballot ” In 1872, Bntain did away with oral voting and adopted a method pioneered i„
her Australian eolonies in the ,850s: the government designed, pnnted, and disputed
paper ballots, and stipulated seerecy in voting. (The French had apparently
expenmented with secrecy as early as 1 789, but the practice had not stuck. > 22) The idea
caught on Amencan “Mugwumps” in the 1880s, but was not enacted into state law until
Kentucky (in Louisville only) and Massachusetts (statewide) tried it in 1888. While there
was some variation in the laws that followed, a state-produced, relatively unifomr ballot,
voted in secret under official supervision were the most common provisions; importantly,
reform groups usually emphasized not only enactment of new laws, but also their
enforcement. 128 The course of Australian-ballot reform suggests that localities were the
laboratories of change: most states initially applied the Australian ballot only to certain
municipalities and parts of the state. Among other “early adopters,” this was the case in
Minnesota, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, as well as Kentucky. North Carolina
adopted the Australian ballot in one county in 1909, extending it to the entire state two
decades later; in 1922, Georgia authorized counties to adopt reform on their own if they
wished. Meanwhile, as of 1 889, many states set the characteristics of ballot boxes
See L.E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story ofan American Reform (1968), at ix.
The 1789 law establishing the States General called for secret ballots in the selection of some delegates-
the law of 1791 setting up the country’s first legislative assembly called for secrecy m all elections, but it
was apparently not well enforced, and a subsequent law allowed voters to choose whether to vote openly or
in secret. See Stem Rokkan et ah, Citizens, Elections, and Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study
ofthe Processes o/Development (1970), at 152-153.
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Albright, The American Ballot
,
at 26, 25.
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Id., at 27.
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themselves in state law, but it was up to towns, cites, counties, and school districts
for and furnish them
.
130
to pay
The publicly-funded, state-produced, secret ballot, distributed only at polling
places, was designed to cut down on corruption and reduce the influence of parties.
Some states added to the diminishment of parties’ power by arranging names by office -
the office-bloc” format - rather than by party, making it more difficult for voters to
simply choose a party slate. Indeed, Argersinger concludes that this era of ballot reform
was noteworthy because unlike virtually all other changes in American voting law and
practice, it was not pnmanly driven by the major parties. Instead, “patrician Mugwumps,
labor organizations, and radical parties” motivated reform
.
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However, the changes did
not go nearly as far in weakening American parties as it could have: in Australia itself,
the Australian ballot” omitted party designations altogether from general-election
ballots, but that did not happen in the U.S . 132
At least for small parties, the results provided a hard lesson in unintended
consequences. Politicians understood full well that electoral structures “had significant
practical consequences for voters, parties, and public policy,” 133 and the major parties did
all they could to consolidate their control. As Lisa Jane Disch points out, the Australian
130
James H. Blodgett, “Suffrage and Its Mechanism in Great Britain and the United States,” The American
Anthropologist
,
Jan. 1889, at 70. Blodgett offers some fascinating details about state requirements for the
boxes themselves, of which the most intriguing is that “Colorado calls for a circular box of glass enclosed
in a wooden frame, with a lid fastened with three unlike locks, a key in the custody of each judge of
election.” Id., at 71.
131
Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party’, at 53.
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See Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (University of Wisconsin, 1986), at 163.
Id., at 122. With the advent of the Australian ballot, a slew of crucial administrative decisions
previously left to parties — the structure of the ballot, registering candidates, and administering the balloting
itself in new ways - were placed before state lawmakers. Not surprisingly, as Argersinger’s work on
preventing fusion candidacies shows, “politicians often responded to political conditions and manipulated
the rules to achieve partisan ends.” Id., at 54.
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ballot - along with other tum-of-the-cenlury changes -
-‘installed unprecedented
Obstacles to third-party parhcipa.ion in elections.- Prevtously, as Disc,, wntes, “(,]o
act as a party was to qualify as one.” (A. the time, one scholar concluded that the
American way of doing elections led to a great “waste of ballots,” because
“unorganized
voters beyond the reach of sympathizing committees” were effectively unable to vote as
they wtshed. ) But now “party fitness [became] a matter for the states to decide,” and
major-party-dominated state legislatures made life hard for smaller parties in ballot
access and design, including erecting new barriers to “fusion” voting. In addition to
fundamentally changing how Americans voted, then, ballot reform also helped transform
parties themselves: having begun the nineteenth century as essentially private
associations with an extremely uncertain status in American constitutional thought, the
major parties ended it as quasi-public utilities, with great power to restrict electoral
choice. 136 Party scholar Leon Epstein writes that the Australian ballot “may well have
been a necessary condition” for the modem American belief in “treating our parties as
public utilities.” 137
Not all the action was in state legislatures, however. We do not know enough
about the implementation of Australian-ballot laws, but two intriguing pieces by
Argersinger show that county-level decisions remained crucial. In Maryland in 1890,
conflict over state and county control was an intense partisan controversy. Dominant
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Democrats wrote into the secret-ballot law a provision allowing the governor to appoint
county election supervisors - a power previously held by county commissioners -
enabling the Democrats to gam a foothold even in Republican counties. Moreover, the
governor could now appoint “state election police” to staff each polling place. One
Republican denounced these measures as “flagrant act[s] of centralization and
partisanship,” which "cheated the people by robbing the counties of their right of self-
government” 138 This language might sound a bit strong to modem ears, but nineteenth-
century Americans were accustomed to having important aspects of the suffrage closely
linked to local experiences: in several places, a man’s residence for voting purposes was
determined by “where he had his washing done.” 139
Two years later in Oregon, changed rules and partisan maneuvering led to
important county-level variation in ballot design. The Presidential election of 1892 was
the first held under Oregon’s new Australian-ballot law, and Republicans sought to use
statewide control to quash Democrat-Populist fusion hopes that year with a ballot-access
rule requiring that each name be listed only once. 140 Democrats protested; there was no
time for the courts to weigh in, so county clerks turned to party officials for advice on
138
Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party, at 140-141, 142. The supervisors may have gained
importance because of another feature of the law, which allowed foreign-bom residents to vote as long as
they were accompanied by a registered friend. Id.
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Jan. 1889, at 73. Here three different scholars attest either to experiencing this rale
themselves, or hearing of its use elsewhere. One man was trying to vote in Nashville when “he was asked
where he had his washing done, and found, when about to resent the inquiry as impertinent, that it was the
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Review 287 (April 1980), at 293. The Republicans enacted a law barring any candidate’s name from
appearing more than once on the ballot. At the time, this may have been “a logical corollary to the ballot
type,” which was the office-bloc format, as Argersinger writes. When Democrats realized the devastating
implications for their fusionist hopes in 1892, however, they scrambled to adjust, attempting to get fusionist
Presidential elector Nathan Pierce listed twice. Republicans countered that Democrats and Populists would
have to either list Pierce once or create a new category for him, such as “Populist-Democrat.”
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how to list the elector. The result was predictable partisan variation at the county level:
Democratic county clerks listed the key fusionist elector, Nathan Pierce, twice, while
clerks who took direction from Republican party leaders listed him only with other
Populists - but labeled him with the names of both part.es. The inconsistencies made “a
very pretty jungle,” commented one satisfied Republican
.
141
The outcome was what
Republicans hoped for: lower percentages of both Democrats and Populists voted for
Pierce in counties with Republican-designed ballots than in Democratic-controlled
counties
.
142
The Australian ballot changed American voting in a final simple but dramatic
way. Previously, the ballot was designed, produced, and distributed by parties; usually,
all a voter had to do was acquire a pre-printed ticket and place it in a box. In some states,
it was illegal for the voter to mark the ticket at all, lest doing so cause confusion. But
now, voters would be required not only to read their ballots and choose among candidates
listed there, but to indicate a choice either by checking a box, circling a name or set of
names, or scratching off disfavored candidates’ names. The parties quickly saw that
massive voter confusion could be one result, and embarked on voter-education drives to
head off trouble. They taught voters about the need to write on the ballot, and showed
voters with poor literacy skills how to recognize the vignette or symbol of their party. In
Minnesota, one Republican argued that rather than offering “profound dissertations on
the tariff and the currency, the best way to secure votes was to instruct partisans in “the
141
Id., at 293-294. Republicans hoped that the “Populist-Democrat” label would destroy fusion’s delicate
balance - since many Populists did not consider themselves Democrats, and vice-versa - and cost Pierce
votes. Id.
I4
~ Id., at 294. Pierce still qualified as an elector, but sonly narrowly, and probably with about nine percent
fewer votes than he would have had with a dual listing. Id.
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art and science of casting a ballot under the Australian system And in a wonderful
detail from Maryland in 1890, “both major parties constructed voting booths and earned
them around the state to illustrate the new system of voting at each political rally” 144 (A
similar phenomenon is taking place in 2004. In at least one Flonda county, the elections
supervisor lugs an optical-scan voting machine around the county, visiting parties and
barbeques and showing voters how to use the new equipment. 145)
By the turn of the century, the American experience of voting had been
transformed for most participants. But despite the advent of registration rules, the state-
designed ballot and private voting, and despite significant expansions in both federal and
state roles in supervising elections before the end of the nineteenth century, local
variation remained the rule. As anthropologist James H. Blodgett concluded his
nationwide survey in 1889,
[g]reat diversity of provision will continue in different parts of the United
States upon the leading features of representation and the conduct of elections, as no
uniform legislation is practicable. Only for national elections and in the Territories or
by restrictions in enabling acts for new States can the General Government properly
legislate as to local adjustments. The inevitable diversity will serve to keep on trial a
great variety of plans that find local favor, and may help toward a better solution of
the problems of representative government.” 146
IV. The Early Twentieth Century.
No bright line separates the reforms of the late nineteenth century from those of
the twentieth. Local responsibility for election administration remained almost total,
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even as state legislation continued and the national constitution was amended to require
direct election of U.S. Senators and extend the franchise to women. The typical
American experience of voting, meanwhile, continued its generation-long transformation.
As Michael Schudson argues, developments like the secret ballot and registration rules
combined with Progressive projects such as civil-service reform and prohibitions on
campaigning in polling places to “celebrate[] the private, rational ‘informed citizen’ that
remains the most cherished ideal in the American voting experience.” 147 Indeed, together
such reforms really created that sober, private voting creature, which had been rarely
seen in the public, party-dominated, festive voting environment of the nineteenth century.
Today, some critics of the Progressives argue that electoral reforms and changes in
voting day practices” during the period played a crucial role in further separating
modem citizens from their own government and from public life generally
.
148
Crenson
and Ginsberg contend that at least some of that separation was purposeful, since many
Progressives wanted to reduce government’s “receptivity to popular activism,” because
they “regarded mass mobilization as an impediment to effective government.” 149
Schudson, The Good Citizen
,
at 6. Schudson writes that “today’s most honored notion of citizenship,
the ideal of the ‘informed citizen,’ arose in the Progressive Era as part of a broad-gauge attack on the power
of political parties.” Id., at 9.
Schudson, for example, argues that “civil service reform and the decline of voting day practices that
provided the ordinary citizen with monetary and social rewards for political activity also removed a
manifest level of self-interest from the citizen’s relation to politics.” Schudson, at 183. Michael McGerr
finds that the “intense partisanship” and “inclusive popular politics” of the nineteenth century were, by the
1920s, replaced by “a more constricted public life.” Michael E. McGerr, The Decline ofPopular Politics:
The American North, 1865-1928 (1986), at 9. The “transformation of ideas and institutions,” he writes,
made it increasingly difficult for many Northerners to link their political impulses with political action.”
Id. And Benjamin Barber criticizes modem American elections for having lost their pomp and ritual,
“largely in the name of the kind of efficiency symbolized by voting machines and the kind of privatism
represented by the secret ballot.” Barber, Strong Democracy (1984), at 187.
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Driving reform in voting practices during the early twentieth century -
particularly ballot reform and registration rules - was either a desire to helpfoster a
rational, literate, privatized way of voting, or a belief in limiting the franchise to only
those citizens educated, wealthy, and committed enough to stay engaged in politics and
participate under the new rules. It was probably a combination of the two, which are by
no means exclusive. As I’ve noted above, the spread of compulsory registration marked
a major practical decentralization and devolution of the power to define the franchise.
But requiring registration did something else: it shifted a significant measure of
responsibility from the state to the individual, because “it became the duty of individual
voters to secure their own eligibility.” 150 The Australian ballot, meanwhile, was
primarily aimed at partisan corruption and voter intimidation, but it was also a powerful
way to cut down on voting by those with less formal education. After all, some
Progressives believed that big-city parties and their hordes of working-class, immigrant
members were themselves “a corruption” of American democracy
.
151
In Great Britain
and Australia, voting had been primarily viva voce, and the secret ballot was introduced
to guard against what we might call “vertical” pressures on voters - “intimidation, often
subtle, of working-class voters by their employers or social superiors” 152—but in the
U.S., it primarily aimed to prevent “horizontal” pressures and other defects of the party-
dominated ticket system.
States varied in their pursuit of these goals: some permitted poll-workers or even
friends to assist voters, but others designed complex ballots which were very difficult for
150
Id., at 56.
151
Id.
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.hose with poor literacy skills u> understand.- Bu, by the 1920s, some advocates came
to regard existing registration rules as cumbersome, obscure, and expensive. Initial
vulnerabilities to fraud had been “fixed" by requiring m-person reg.stration, limiting
enrollment to only a few days a year, an official house-by-house canvass, annual purges
of the rolls, and required identification at the polls. But these systems were “exceedingly
expensive, cumbersome, and inconvenient,” and amidst “growing concern over non-
voting,” cities and states saw widespread advocacy for reform in the 1920s. 154 As a study
produced for the National Municipal League in 1927 concluded, existing registration
systems were enacted “before any consideration was given to the idea that participation
in elections should be made easy and convenient for the voter.” 155
Not just voter convenience, but cost to parties and city governments - which
together sank huge sums into registering voters and running elections - motivated
change. 156 Some reformers - including Progressives like William U’Ren of Oregon -
pushed for automatic universal registration by the state, observing that European
countries already employed such a system and that some American town officials had
long been required to compile lists of eligible voters. 157 Almost every state would
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eventually enact new laws making registration permanent, 158 but records were still
compiled, maintained, and implemented by local officials.
Indeed, even after a full generation of state-level legislation and two
Constitutional amendments relating to the suffrage, the National Municipal League in
1927 concluded that American elections were still “largely decentralized "
“There is at
present,” the report states, “ve^ little control or supervision over registration exercised
by state officers.” 15 '' Some governors and secretaries of state had “nominal” powers over
registration and elections, but local and party officials generally ran the show.' 60 While it
does not specifically address causation, the League’s report suggests that three factors
explained local control’s persistence: expertise borne of experience; state governments’
reluctance to take on what had become a significant expense; and necessity, because of
high population mobility and the tendency for local elections to accompany state and
national contests. 161 (This connection had not been general until the twentieth century,
[t]his method is practicable in foreign countries where a close check up is kept of the
comings and goings of individuals, but in this country it has always resulted in inflated and highly
inaccurate lists. On the whole, it would seem wise to place the responsibility upon the voter himself
and to require a personal registration, but our systems require a revision in order to be made more
convenient.”
Id. at 16.
158
Carter et al., at 27.
159
National Municipal League, at 52.
160 Id. The report does not advocate a systematic shift of power and knowledge to state from local
governments. This is particularly clear in the list of recommended changes at the close of the volume.
Indeed, a late mention of what would be a statewide registration list writes that it would be “possible, but
hardly feasible” to use such a system. Id. at 84.
For example, the authors write that differences within and among states make specifying a national
registration system impossible. “The registration law for any city or state should be drafted with careful
attention to the local election law and organization, as well as any peculiar local problems, and should be
prepared by a competent person who has a thorough knowledge of registration administration.” Id., at 48.
The League’s Committee on Election Administration, headed by political scientists like Charles E.
Merriam and Joseph P. Harris, appears to have been heavily populated by city and state elections officials.
See id., “Foreword” (page not numbered.)
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since partisans in many states purposefully kept elections separate lest national issues
overwhelm their ability to focus voter attention on matters closer to home. 162)
The story of American election administration and suffrage practices is distinctly
non-linear - in terms of expansion and contraction of local control, inclusive or
exclusionary effects on the electorate, the power of parties, and the nature of ballots
themselves. A snapshot of Presidential ballot development during the early twentieth
century illustrates this well, and also demonstrates again how much Americans’
experience of voting in national elections has changed. As Daniel Wirls writes in his
study of the Seventeenth Amendment, electoral structures determine who gets to vote for
what, when, and how. 163 In Presidential elections, of course, Americans technically vote
not for a Presidential candidate himself, but for delegates to the Electoral College. We
might assume this has been a mere mathematical formality for a long time, but it isn’t so.
In fact, as an important recent article points out, in the 2000 election five states still listed
electors names on the ballot, together with the names of the candidates they were
pledged to support. One state, Georgia, listed electors’ names in larger font than the
candidates. And two states permitted write-in votes for individual electors. 164
We do not know whether such phenomena affect election outcomes today. At the
very least, they must shape voters’ experience of Presidential voting by raising their
162
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awareness of the Electoral College itself; stmply by adding another layer of complexity to
•he ballot, listing delegates injects further uncertainties into our unders.andmgs of how
voters behave. But such a ballot - listing electors' names, grouped alongside that of their
candidate - was veiy rare in the early twentieth centuty. In fact, for most of U.S. history,
most American elections did not present voters with a choice between Presidential
cand,dates on their ballots. In his history of the American ballot, Spencer Albright finds
that Massachusetts (1892) and Minnesota (1901) pioneered the grouping of electors'
names.
165
Kansas in 1897 and Wisconsin in 1901 first added the names of Presidential
and Vice-President, al candidates; not until 1917 did Nebraska become the first state to
omit the electors’ names entirely by statute. 166 Of course, we can assume the vast
majority of voters knew whom they were supporting for President. But it is remarkable
to look at facsimiles of old ballots - such as that of Arkansas in 1940 - and look in vain
for the names of Presidential candidates. Instead, pride of place goes to a list marked
For Presidential Electors, followed by the names of nine Democrats and nine
Republicans. 167
It took U.S. ballots well over a century to catch up with practical changes in how
Americans selected their President; state practices remained deeply divided decades into
the twentieth century. As of 1923, virtually all states persisted in what political scientist
Leon Aylsworth called “the absurd legalism of presenting an opportunity to vote for
electors individually,” and many even instructed voters in how to split their Presidential
165
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vote among electors of different parties - behavior no, in the
.merest of e,.her the
individual voter or the state as a whole.- Aylswonh found tha, states used one office
rough types of Presidential ballot. These ranged from entirely ungrouped electors,
without corresponding candidates' names and sometimes lacking even party designate,
to the ballot we're accustomed to today, indicating only the names of the candidates and
then party. Only two states used this latter method - the “short ballot’’ - in 1923, and
only four more states would adopt it before 1932. 1® Given that most Americans had to
navigate long lists of actual electoral-college candidates, the simple statement that they
voted for this or that Presidential candidate seems too simple. At least in terms of ballots,
it is more accurate to say they voted for electors or parties, who “mediated” the voter's
choice in a way they no longer do today.
Why did the long ballot prove so difficult to kill off? Perhaps many Progressives
supported the long ballot precisely for its potential to limit the power of parties.
Aylsworth identified, somewhat obliquely, other possible reasons why so many states
used long ballots. First, state and local officials might have wanted to separate
Presidential politics from state and local balloting. As Aylsworth pointed out in
describing the spread of the short ballot, “[t]his merging of the ballots will
. . .
undoubtedly increase the influence exerted by the national upon the state and local
tickets.”
170
Meanwhile, the great costs of printing and counting long ballots - the
Presidential ticket alone often needed to measure several feet across to accommodate
dozens or scores of candidates’ names - suggest another explanation: elections must have
Leon E. Aylsworth, “The Presidential Ballot,” American Political Science Review 89 (1923), at 92.
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been a significant source of employment and patronage, and long ballots provided much
more work than short ones. Whatever the reasons, change came surpnsingly slowly: as
of 1 942, thirty-three states still did not use the modem short ballot, and over a dozen
southern and western states still listed delegates individually. 171 The Founders’ design
for the Electoral College as a deliberative group may have fallen by the wayside long
before, but in American election practices, the Electoral College was alive and well deep
into the twentieth century.
Changes to American voting practices in the Progressive era are particularly
difficult to summarize. Some weakened parties, while others, such as the Presidential
short ballot, would seem to strengthen them. Some strove to increase burdens on voters,
but the second wave of registration reform tried to ease them. In the adoption of the
secret ballot and compulsory registration, American suffrage moved closer to its
contemporary form. But the continued use of long ballots around the country meant that
through the Second World War, many Americans had not had the chance to vote directly
for a Presidential candidate on their ballots. Localities, meanwhile, retained sweeping
control over a wide variety of formal and informal suffrage qualifications.
V. The Voting Rights Act Era (and Beyond).
The trend in American elections in the twentieth century has been “the increasing
intervention of the federal government into the areas of electoral regulation traditionally
reserved to the states,”
17
' or to counties and cities. Such intervention accelerated in the
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1960s, particularly with the 1964 abolition of poll taxes in federal elections through the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and above all with the 1965 Voting Right Act (VRA) and its
progeny.
The VRA has been called ““one of the most important and successful pieces of
legislation of this century,” 173 and a full analysis of its contents and impact is outside the
scope of this essay. Here, what is essential is simply that the Act greatly expanded de
jure supervision of elections at the national level, but generally left defacto
administrative responsibility with states and localities. Shocked into action by violence
in Mississippi and Alabama in particular, the national government moved from its
decade-long policy of litigation to a direct-action strategy to protecting blacks’ voting
rights.
174
The VRA was enacted for the purpose of “ridding the country of racial
discrimination in voting” 175 and ending Southern states’ “unremitting and ingenious
defiance of the Constitution,” 170 as the Supreme Court put it in upholding the law in
1966. The Act outlawed any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting” that denied
voting rights on account of race, and specifically banned literacy tests, restrictions based
on educational achievement or understanding, and tests for ‘good moral character.’ 177 In
his address to Congress on the importance of passing the VRA, President Lyndon
Johnson conjured an image of local, procedural hurdles to voting:
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he manages to fill out an application, he is given a test The registrar k the 1judge of whether he passes this test....” 178
1 ,s sole
Certainly, the Act diminished the scope oflocal control, by setting national
legislative and litigative power not only against states, but also against localities. The
VRA’s “coverage” formula applied to any state or locality where a given percentage of
voters were un-registered or had not voted in recent elections; scholarly accounts of the
first decade of the VRA emphasize violations, litigation, and judicial responses at the
county level. 179 Advocates for voting rights instruct citizens in how to recognize and
challenge illegal voting procedures by counties, cities, and special election districts, such
as changing polling places or voter-registration procedures. 180 And one new book
analyzes the impact of the VRA by focusing on its effects on the politics of a single city,
Dallas, and concludes that one of the Act’s successes was that it “sensitizes local officials
to the need to consider the impact on minorities of changes in electoral structures and
rules.”
181
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Generally, Morgan s is a cautionary analysis, which urges us to “recognize the limitations of legislation to
effect complex political change. Id. at 1 1. Morgan also writes that the VRA “initiated a transformation
that restructured local governments, destabilized political systems, and, in some cases, exacerbated racial
tensions, though this analysis seems to focus on redistricting and apportionment questions and the idea of
“group rights” under the VRA. Id. at 62.
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Extensions and additions to the VRA in 1970 and 1982 would lead to the
abolition of literacy tests and the reduction of residency requirements to thirty days,
among many other changes Of course, numerous Supreme Court decisions have
upheld and further expanded the Act’s reach into areas previously managed by state and
local governments, in keeping with what one critic calls “the mystique of standardization,
expertise, crisis, and progress.” 1" Standardization was also a dnving force behind the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, often called the “motor-voter” bill because it
required states to make registration available in driver’s license agencies, among other
changes. Most recently, President Bush signed into law the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA), which has the potential to transform and standardize American election
practices as never before. If each step seems to move closer to eliminating local variation
in American voting, each also illustrates the limits of previous legislation. HAVA, for
example, lists dozens of areas in which state and local variation survives, and procedures
to remedy grievances under the law clearly indicate that county and municipal authorities
will continue to administer U.S. elections. 184 And while registering to vote has gotten
much easier in recent decades, records are still “maintained in the separate files of the
nearly 13,000 local election jurisdictions of the United States,” as the 2002 report of the
National Commission on Federal Election Reform observed. 185
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people who may still live in the
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As the saying goes, it sometimes seems that the one constant in the history of
American voting - in the means of voting, the atmosphere at election time, the place of
parties, the presence of registration requirements, the content of ballots, the offices
subject to direct election, the size and characteristics of the electorate, the willingness of
federal courts to scrutinize elections, and the ability of local, state, and national
governments to set qualifications and monitor the proceedings - has been change. In
fact, however, there has been another enduring characteristic: a prominent role for
county, city, or town employees. Why has the local dimension of American suffrage
survived through generations of sweeping transformations in other aspects of American
voting? This is a difficult question to answer, not least because variation has been so
fine-grained as to defy identification of clear national trends. But several hypotheses
emerge from the material. To some degree, Americans have acquired our distinctive,
hyper-federalized system of election administration as the British acquired their empire:
in a fit of absent-mindedness, or at least a fit of inertia. But more purposeful and
philosophical factors are certainly present. Arguments for keeping control of national
elections close to home have often been premised on specific conceptions of popular
sovereignty. Just as often, the famous American dread of centralized power has
contributed to a reluctance to centralize voter information or administrative
responsibility. And while some of the most egregious examples of exclusionary practices
can be found in locally-administered literacy-test and poll-tax laws, local authorities were
area, but who may have moved away, died, or be in prison. According to firms used by politicians to
contact eligible voters, the amount of “deadwood” on the typical voter list is as high as 16%. Carter et al.,
at 78 n.13.
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sometimes more eager than state and federal officials
citizens, and women to vote
.
186
to allow new immigrants, non-
This history has normative consequences for reformers today. As the U.S.
reforms electoral administration to meet modem standards of fairness, we should not fear
change - after all, virtually every aspect of American voting has changed profoundly,
usually more than once. But the important local character of the voting process should
also be preserved. Voting may be the central activity of American national citizenship,
but it has always been a way that Americans build and express our local citizenship, as
well. Reforms rectifying discriminatory, severely error-prone, or otherwise inadequate
electoral practices should proceed, but with a keen awareness that American national
elections have always been a patchwork quilt made of tiny pieces. Americans have
always voted together in our communities, and have done so for reasons partly rooted in
our fundamental political traditions.
State laws regulate the voting rights of people convicted of crime today, but in at least a few cases, even
formal control of suffrage qualifications lies with county officials. For example, a 1993 Georgia case,
Jarrard v. Clayton County Board ofRegistrars, showed that the decision as to whether an offense reveals
enough turpitude to warrant the loss of voting rights — here, repeat violation of drunk-driving law — is still
sometimes made at the county level.
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CHAPTER 3
“DOG TAGS AND DUMP STICKERS:” AMERICAN VOTING THE STATE ANDTHE PRACTICE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNLY
This chapter develops an argument about suffrage, popular sovereignty, and the
American state. I analyze the implications for popular sovereignty of our distinctive,
locally-administered way of voting, defining popular sovereignty as having both
instrumental and constitutive aspects. Many contemporary commentators assume that
local control inhibits the exercise of popular sovereignty, but I argue that its potential to
enhance self-rule is at least as great. My central thesis comes in two parts. First, I want
to show that thinking about voting practices improves our conceptions of American
popular sovereignty. Second, I argue that on balance, contrary to the current
conventional wisdom, the hyper-federalized American way of suffrage makes sense when
placed into the story of American self-rule. The chapter consists of four sections. First, I
consider the perils and promise of local voting, seen from the vantage of current events in
the U.S., and explain the language I use to analyze its connections with popular
sovereignty. Next, I explain why the connection between voting practices and popular
sovereignty deserves scrutiny, and draw on new research in comparative politics which
links legitimacy with election management in new democracies. This section also
outlines why it is still important, in the era of the VRA, Bush v. Gore, and HAVA, to
focus on the power of local officials as well as national lawmakers. Third, I analyze
election administration from the perspective of the state-building literature. Fourth, I
make the case “for” local control of election administration by connecting the American
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way of voting with the ideas of Madison and other founders, Toequeville, and
contemporary democratic theorists.
I “Please come out.”
Between the disk jockey’s tables and the food tent, Gadsden County elections
supervisor Shirley Green Knight set up her new optical-scan voting machine at a town
party in Sawdust, Florida. Gadsden is one of Florida’s poorest counties and its only
majority-black county, and it had the highest rate of d,squalif,ed ballots in the
Presidential election of 2000. Knight, who took on the job of elections supervisor in
2001
,
has spent a good deal of time in 2004 toting the optical-scan machine to “church
fellowship halls, town carnivals, high school classrooms and anywhere she can appeal to
large groups,” as the New York Times recently reported. 1 Knight’s “gently pleading
message: Your vote will count this time, so please come out.” At the Sawdust
gathering, the D.J. took the microphone between songs to remind partygoers to register. 2
Far north of Gadsden County, the town clerk of a white and wealthy town in the
Massachusetts Berkshires told a similar tale. Asked by a skeptical visitor about the
wisdom of having registration and elections run by officials in each tiny town -
Massachusetts is one of the states in which towns and cities, not counties, choose election
machinery and administer elections — Monterey town clerk Barbara Swann responded
that she and her peers take great pride in high rates of registration and turnout. Like
1 Abby Goodnough, “Reassurance for the Florida Voters Made Wary by the Electoral Chaos of 2000,” N. Y.
Times, May 24, 2004, at A 18.
Id. One county commissioner told the Times, “[e]very population has gotten the feel of that machine.
Sometimes it’s a little awkward when Shirley shows up at these events, but people say, ‘If she’s taking it
way out here then there must not be anything to hide.’” Id. Knight’s story is part of a larger movement
rising in poor black communities to register and to educate, reassure and entreat.” Id.
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Shirley Green Knight in Gadsden County, Swann said that she actively encourages
political participation. Tm on them to register when they come in for dog tags and
dump stickers,” she said. 3
These images capture both the peril and the promise of the distinctive American
way of running elections. First, consider the perils: the central reason Shirley Green
Knight is making her rounds is that the voters of Gadsden County feel that they were
effectively disenfranchised in 2000 by a badly designed ballot, too few polling places,
and other factors, some of them directly under county control.4 About 2,000 residents of
this heavily Democratic county voted in vain - a figure four times the margin by which
George W. Bush won the state of Florida. Such problems are not exclusively or
necessarily linked to local administration. But a more robust system of statewide election
administration - let alone a national system - would likely not have permitted such
inconsistencies and the use of such inadequate machinery, technology which is a key
reason why millions of votes are “lost” in each American election. 5 Knight’s travels
anticipate the 2004 election, and aim to prevent another failure. She clearly believes that
what happened in 2000 prevented her constituents from expressing and securing their
interests. Meanwhile, the Berkshire town has enough money and a sufficiently small
population to continue using paper ballots - the method which results in the lowest
3
Interview with the author, Barbara Swann, Town Clerk, Monterey, Massachusetts, April 7, 2003. As a
“participant observer,” Swann has close to two decades’ experience and the added benefit of a Ph.D. in
Anthropology.
4
Goodnough, supra. Some residents had to drive 20 miles to vote; when Knight joined county
government, she was able to increase the number of polling places.
5 CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project, “Voting: What Is, What Could Be,” (2001), at 17.
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percentage of lost votes
.
6
Such considerations suggest that local administration of
elections compromises American popular sovereignty.
On the other hand, Knight is an official - a member of the government, but one
who knows many constituents personally - literally recruiting people to register and vote,
at non-political events. The same thing occurs in rural Massachusetts. Each official feels
intensely her duty and obligation to facilitate voting by her neighbors - that is, her
constituents. This immediacy, close connection, and linkage of the political and social
realms would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve under state or federal administration.
These factors suggest that the local dimension of suffrage enhances the exercise of
popular sovereignty in the U.S.
Ultimately, the simple fact of the work these two women do - one in a poor,
mostly black, southern county, the other in a rich, mostly white, northern town - reveals
the importance of local administration in the practice of American popular sovereignty.
Taking its cue from such stories, this chapter develops an argument about suffrage,
popular sovereignty, and the American state. I address a question crystallized by Shirley
Green Knight s story: what are the implications for popular sovereignty of our
distinctive, locally-administered way of voting? First, the local dimension may inhibit or
enhance the practice of popular sovereignty in the U.S. As I have explained in previous
chapters, many contemporary commentators assume the negative conclusion: that our
fragmented, tiny-patchwork electoral system is an anachronistic flaw in American
democracy, if not a national scandal,” as the New York Times recently editorialized in a
See Stephen Knack and Martha Kropf, “Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?” PS, September 2002.
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cnticism of locally-maintained voter lists
.
7
These questions are ultimately too complex
to be reduced to “good” and “bad ” Bu, this chapter emphasizes the less prominent.
perhaps counterintuitive side of the argument: local administration and local contexts, I
argue, have always played an important role in how Americans exercise popular
sovereignty, and the local dimension has significant redemptive qualities. Through
Amencan history, many politicians, scholars, and commentators have either urged or
simply taken for granted that Americans vote under the supervision of local authorities
and in particular local contexts. Indeed, even the Times editonal noted above does not
call for any diminution of local control, aiming its recommended reforms at “states and
localities .”8
Second, the local dimension of voting shapes and defines American popular
sovereignty in both instrumental and constitutive ways. Again, the Gadsden County story
elucidates this conceptualization. The instrumental aspect of popular sovereignty refers
simply to the citizenry’s ability to choose their leaders, acting both individually and
collectively. When a person is made more likely to register, to travel to the polls (or vote
through other means), to vote her intentions on a clear and intelligible ballot, and to have
that vote accurately counted (and, if necessary, recounted), this instrumental side of
popular sovereignty is enhanced. Conversely, when any step in the serial voting process
7 See “H°w America Doesn’t Vote,” N. Y. Times (editorial), Feb. 15, 2004. The editors wrote, “[t]he lists of
eligible voters kept by localities are the gateway to democracy, and they are also a national scandal.” As
the editorial notes, “[fjederal law provides some general guidelines about keeping voter rolls, but the basic
decisions about who is eligible to vote are largely left to local officials. City and county election offices are
responsible for adding new registrants to the voter rolls, and purging voters who die, move away or are
convicted of felonies.”
The editors called for clear standards for purging voters, greater transparency, and nonpartisan
administration. Id.
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15 made m0re dlfflCUlt - or even obstructed, either purposefully or accidentally
- popular
sovereignty’s efficacy is diminished.
The ultimate demonstration of any vanable’s effect on this instrumental side of
popular sovereignty is a showing that the factor in question - here, local administration -
can affect election outcomes. As I have explained in previous chapters, strong evidence
that local variation helped decide the Presidential race in Florida in 2000 is a major
reason why election administration has captured the attention of behaviorally-oriented
political scientists, journalists, and state legislators around the country.
In the comparative study of elections, political scientists are accustomed to
discussing elections as “instruments of democracy” - tools by which citizens influence
policy and policymakers - and examining their efficacy from that perspective.9 As
Hannah Pitkin wrote, successful democracy “require[s] functioning institutions that are
designed to, and really do, secure a government responsive to public interest and
opinion. A considerable literature builds from this premise, ranging from political
philosophy into behavioral election studies and public choice. Where this work is
comparative, it tends to take a “macro” perspective — comparing plurality and
See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Elections as Instruments ofDemocracy: Majoritarian and Proportional
Visions (2000), 3. Powell writes that “elections should not only provide symbolic reassurance, but also
genuinely serve as instruments of democracy.” Id., 4. As Hannah Pitkin put it, “Our concern with
elections and electoral machinery, and particularly with whether elections are free and genuine, results
from our conviction that such machinery is necessary to ensure systematic responsiveness.” Quoted in
Powell, 255 n.l. See also Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences ofElectoral Laws, Revised Ed.
(Yale, 1971). Rae focuses on the relationship between parties and electoral laws, but does not address
election administration directly. For a critical review of the dominance of instrumental theories of voting in
American constitutional law, see Adam Winkler, “Note: Expressive Voting,” 68 N. Y.U. Law Review 330
(1993), at 341-346. As Winkler notes, the instrumental understanding depicts the vote “as a societal tool
for exercising social power and a means of pursuing informed political choices in an effort to direct
governmental institutions. Id. at 33 1. See also Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory ofDemocracy
(1957), at 36-39, explaining the basic logic of voting” by hypothesizing the utility-maximizing decisions
of individual voters, who make voting choices by calculating their “utility income” from different
government activities.”
10
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept ofRepresentation (1967), at 234.
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proportional systems, for example" - rather than examining how electoral instruments
function in practice. Today, empirically-oriented political scientists and election-law
practitioners are taking an increasingly close look at the practical consequences of
America’s fragmented system of election administration.
The constitutive element of popular sovereignty is no less important. I use this
term to try to capture the processes and practices by which Americans exert and
experience their control over the government. In my view, those practices - along with
other attributes of political life - constitute American popular sovereignty and give it a
distinctive character. As I explained in Chapter One, many contemporary commentators
laud the neighborly character of American elections as their finest feature
.
12
Critics of
early, absentee, and all-mail voting also extol the local dimension of casting ballots in the
U.S. in different ways, as do some critics of the expanding use of “direct democracy”
tools such as the referendum and recall
.
13 When a democratic citizen chooses her
representatives standing in a local institution such as a school, firehouse, or church, after
conversing with her neighbors and the other town or county officials who had helped her
register to vote, may have designed the ballot, and now instruct her on how to mark her
See, for example, Powell, id., which evaluates majoritarian and proportional systems and discusses
electoral influence, mandates, and government responsiveness; Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and
Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990 (1994), which analyzes the rules and
operation of different electoral regimes; and Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, Elections and Voters: A
Comparative Introduction (1987), which emphasizes electoral systems and voter behavior. One exception
is Yonhyok Choe, How to Manage Free and Fair Elections (Goteborg, 1997), which examines election
administration as a central component of free and fair elections in comparative perspective. And for a
historical, contextually-rich comparative approach, see the essays collected in Eduardo Posada-Carbo, ed.,
Elections Before Democracy : The History ofElections in Europe and Latin America (1996).
12
See Chapter One, notes 149-151 and accompanying text, quoting from Dennis F. Thompson, David
Shribman, and Paul Gronke.
13
Recent examples include David S. Broder, Democracy Derailed (2000); John Haskell, Direct Democracy
or Representative Government? (2001); Larry Sabato, Howard Ernst, and Bruce Larson, eds., Dangerous
Democracy? (2001), and Richard J. Ellis, Democratic Delusions (2002).
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ticket, she exercises popular sovereignty in a fundamentally different way than if she
voted on-line, on the phone, or sitting at home filling out a universal national ballot
Moreover, when she has an opportunity to work in the election process herself, either as a
volunteer helping out at a loeal polling place or by seeking local political office, she may
gain a greater sense of her “sovereignty” over the state than she would have if a federal
election-administration system limited such opportunities. That expanded sense of power
would exist whether or not she had actually changed any votes or even increased the
chances of her political allies’ votes being counted - that is, regardless of whether the
instrumental aspect of popular sovereignty was enhanced for her. And over time, the two
are likely to be connected: a greater sense of electoral satisfaction among voters will
likely lead to increased participation. This is the message of Edmund S. Morgan’s
insightful comparison of Northern and Southern elections in the late colonial and early
national periods. Except in Rhode Island, he writes, early New England elections
displayed none of the violence, none of the campaigning, none of the corruption - and
none of the excitement - to be found in the South.” Turnout in New England’s “sober
elections, he writes, “was smaller than in the aristocratic South’s drunken ones .” 14
As Morgan s pointed regional comparison reminds us, popular sovereignty has
always been one of the most important contested concepts in American political thought.
But a defining attribute of that sovereignty has not been properly understood, because
voting practices and election administration have not been addressed from the
perspectives outlined here. Closer attention to the local dimension of American voting -
14
Morgan, Inventing The People
,
at 207. New England, Morgan concludes, may indeed have been the
cradle of American democracy. But if elections and electoral campaigns “give plausibility to the fiction of
popular government, southerners knew a good deal more about engaging the public in elections than New
Englanders did.” Id., 208.
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•he goal of this dissertation - shows us that American popular sovereignty has always had
a locally-textured character, mediated by local institutions and practices. That character
distingutshes and defines American popular sovereignty in ways which are different from
the more familiar hinds of filters and limits on the popular will we have long emphasized
- those established by federalism, election districts, the electoral college, parties, and
interest groups, for example.
As voters, Americans exercise popular sovereignty through their ballots. But to a
degree unusual among democracies, American suffrage has always been administered
largely by county and municipal officials and subject to local conditions, in a variety of
ways. Even as they exercise popular sovereignty on a national scale and constitute their
own national citizenship, then, Americans experience their local political identities as
well. This local dimension ofAmerican voting shapes popular sovereignty in the U.S. in
constitutive and instrumental ways, and has the potential to both inhibit and enhance the
people’s authority over the state. These are the themes of this chapter.
My thesis has two complementary parts. First, I want to show that thinking about
voting practices improves our conceptions of American popular sovereignty. Second, I
argue that on balance, contrary to the current conventional wisdom, the hyper-federalized
American way of suffrage makes sense when placed into the story of American popular
sovereignty. The local dimension ofAmerican voting becomes much more intelligible
and defensible, and much less a scandalous accident of history, when incorporated into
the family of ideas built around popular sovereignty and the state.
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II. Sovereignty Made Real: Suffrage, Sovereignty, and American Voting,
a. Why Voting (Still) Matters
For all their flaws and foibles, elections are the most direct way in which
democratic citizens exercise authority over the state. When Judith Shklar sought to
identify the central activities and ideas which define American citizenship, she chose
“voting” and “working ."' 3 As a matter of “institutional political theory,” 16 then, the
specific practices and contexts comprising the central activity of American citizenship
catty important ideas about self-rule, equality, and popular sovereignty. Despite Downs,
and despite the alleged “vanishing voter,” voting is still the way citizens make real their
ownership of the government and membership in the polity, converting it from theory to
practice.
American voter participation is now low by historical standards
.
17
But the
importance of ballots as instruments of self-rule is undiminished, because popular
participation in so many other aspects of public life has declined at least as rapidly. As
Gianfranco Poggi observed, “[contemporary publics have fewer and fewer opportunities
and incentives for mobilizing around public issues and for experiencing the attendant
heightened feeling of widely shared involvement in and concern with public issues.”
Voting in elections, Poggi continues, “constitutes practically the only regular expression
15
See Judith Shklar, American Citizenship : The Questfor Inclusion (1991).
16 On the importance of context, Dennis F. Thompson writes, “[t]he meaning of principles such as equality
and liberty cannot be adequately understood apart from the institutions in which they are realized. Until we
examine the ways they play out in political institutions, not only can we not decide what kind of equality or
liberty we wish to promote, we cannot even determine what the principles mean.” Thompson, Just
Elections, at viii. As Thompson explains, institutional political theory seeks to examine principles in
institutional context, consider the “incompletely theoretical” ideas of lawmakers and citizens, and interpret
“midrange principles.” Id., viii-ix.
17
For a critical review of the “vanishing voter” literature, see Michael P. McDonald and Samuel L. Popkin,
“The Myth of the Vanishing Voter,” 95 American Political Science Review 963 (2001).
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of partisanship - and for that matter of active citizenship .”' 8 In Downsizing Democracy
,
Crenson and Ginsberg make a similar argument, describing a “general political
demobilization [in] the past several decades,” which has “reduced the government’s
reliance on the active and collective cooperation of the people.” 19
These insights have important implications. First, as other opportunities for
exerting public power slip away - in areas ranging from military and tax policy to the
strength of unions and the changing nature of interest groups - elections may become
more important as instruments of popular control, simply by default. Second, if Poggi is
nght to focus on the “feeling of widely shared involvement in and concern with public
issues,” then we should seek a specific, constitutive understanding of the nature of that
involvement, in terms of actual electoral practices and contexts. To put these two points
together: even given well-known concerns about the efficacy of voting in a huge, money-
driven, two-party democracy, and despite declining turnout, American suffrage practices
remain crucial to the exercise and the character of American popular sovereignty.
Of course, popular sovereignty is one of the essential “contested concepts” in
American politics. As Edmund S. Morgan brilliantly explains in Inventing the People
,
the concept itself took centuries to gain hold in Anglo-American thought, and only a long
process of fictionalization, invention, and myth-making embedded popular sovereignty in
American ideology
.
20
The sovereignty of the people was one of the four tenets of
Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects (1990), at 138.
19
Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its
Citizens and Privatized Its Public (2002), at 45.
Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing The People: The Rise ofPopular Sovereignty in England and America
(1988).
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Jefferson’s preamble to the Declaration of Independence
,
21
and the topic dogged debates
over the new Constitution, both in terms of the mechanics of ratification and the
substance of the new document
.
22
Federalism and sectional disputes repeatedly raised
thorny practical questions about the identity of the “people” and about sovereignty’s
exercise
,
23
and John C. Calhoun’s theory of “concurrent majorities” tried explicitly to
revise American ideas about sovereignty
.
24
Robert A. Dahl’s A Preface to Democratic
Theory’ is built around competing theories of sovereignty, which he labels “Madisonian”
and Populistic .”25 Gerald Leonard, like others, calls those traditions “Madisonian” and
“Jeffersonian.” 26 In his The Invention ofParty Politics', Leonard elegantly integrates
21 The others were natural law doctrine, the compact theory of the state, and the right of revolution. SeeJerman Belz, Alfred H. Kelly, and Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and
Development, vol. 1 . (1991), at 60.
See generally Gordon S. Wood, The Creation ofthe American Republic, 1 776-1787 (1969); and Jack N.
Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making ofthe Constitution (1997), at 18, 101, 105-
107. Rakove makes one particularly insightful observation regarding the special electoral mechanism used
to ratify the Constitution - the Federalist-driven choice of popularly-selected ratifying conventions rather
than existing state legislatures. This “resort to popular sovereignty,” he writes, “marked the point where
the distinction between a constitution and ordinary law became the fundamental doctrine of American
political thinking. Far from being less legal than the ether charters that had gone before it, the Constitution
established a more profound criterion of legality itself.” Id. at 130.
84*92
Danie * T ' Roc
*Sers > Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Independence (1998), at
John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government (1851).
2
Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956).
Gerald Leonard, The Invention ofParty Politics: Federalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional
Development in Jacksonian Illinois (Chapel Hill, 2002). Leonard offers an insightful picture of the ideas
through which Americans around 1 840 came to incorporate partisan behavior into their ideas of popular
sovereignty and political practice:
“The campaign of 1 840 forced Americans as never before to confront the practical questions
entailed by an abstract, national commitment to ‘popular sovereignty’ or ‘democracy.’ If the
Constitution enshrined self-government by free and equal individuals, then how were those
abstractions to be put into practice? If equality implied majority rule, if majority rule implied
compromises of individual judgment, if an individual’s freedom and equality were actually
conditioned on his or her social, economic, and political resources, if political organization could
enhance individual freedom and equality in some circumstances but fatally compromise it in others - if
all these things were true, then how was self-government by free and equal individuals to be
implemented? Was the Constitution’s formal institutional design the whole answer? Or did the
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political parties and constitutional thought into the story of American popular
sovereignty. These are just a few examples from the massive literature in history,
political science, and law exploring the topic.
Two recent projects in comparative politics exemplify a renewed interest in the
implications of electoral practices
,
rather than instrumental outcomes alone, for popular
sovereignty. In How to Manage Free and Fair Elections, Yonhyok Choe evaluates
election management regimes as part of his comparison of Swedish, British, and South
Korean elections
.
27 Choe and a colleague embarked on an ambitious global survey
project, aiming to systematically outline types and patterns of election management
around the world
.
28 As Choe writes, and as I have noted above, students of electoral
systems have tended to focus on “the rules of the game (electoral law) and the principles
of translating votes into legislative seats (electoral system), on the one hand, and their
impact on the party system, on the other,” rather than on how elections are actually
operated
.
29 Choe acknowledges that elections can be run at “national, regional, or local”
levels, but the three case studies that form the core of his study lead him to focus on the
characteristics of relatively strong national administrative bodies. Unfortunately, Choe’s
Constitution’s basic principles necessarily imply a further institutionalization of the sovereign people?
The ideologues of the Democratic and Whig parties of 1 840 claimed to have the answers ” Id at
206.
See also Laura J. Scalia, America ’s Jeffersonian Experiment, at 5. Scalia writes that “Jefferson and
Madison offered two different ways of balancing America’s allegiance to private rights and popular
sovereignty. Jefferson tipped the scales toward self-government whereas Madison tipped them toward
rights.”
“ 7 Yonhyok Choe, How to Manage Free and Fair Elections (Goteborg, 1997).
See id. at 93 for results, as of 1997. Choe told me in an e-mail that the project is currently on hold for
lack of funding.
29
Id., at 90.
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framework - a rich and well-theorized set of schemas, typologies, and sequences - has
only slight applicability in the American context, partly because it is designed primarily
for emerging democracies and partly because Choe’s specific analysis of the U.S. Federal
Election Commission’s character is limited
.
30
Nevertheless, the work offers exciting
possibilities, and demonstrates one way of analyzing election administration as a central
component of democratic governance.
Similarly, Jorgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds recently examined the effects of
election administration on the legitimacy of governments in eight sub-Saharan emerging
democracies
.
31
Studies of electoral systems, Elklit and Reynolds point out, tend to focus
on the effects of variables like executive and legislative power, seat-allocation formulas,
and federalism. But elections, Elklit and Reynolds write, “do not just happen and
legislatures are not like manna falling from heaven.” Because elections are complicated,
“the quality of election administration must be included among the factors” which
explain the level of sense of individual efficacy” and governmental legitimacy
.
32
Elklit and Reynolds study deals with legitimacy in a set of new and transitional
democracies, all of which have some type of central Electoral Management Body (EMB).
Their focus is on variables such as the internal organization of the EMB, its independence
from partisan forces, and the characteristics and motivations of its staff. While their
Choe refers to the FEC at one point as “a special independent body organized for the operation of
elections which is responsible for the conduct of elections.” Choe acknowledges that “the election
administrations at the local level (state and local government) are in charge of the operation of the electoral
process. Id. at 91. But still, this description of the FEC paints it as both more “independent” than it is - it
is bipartisan, but generally regarded as subservient to the interests of the parties and under their control -
and overstates its authority.
Jorgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds, “The Impact of Election Administration on the Legitimacy of
Emerging Democracies: A New Comparative Politics Research Agenda,” 40 Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics 86 (July, 2002).
32
Id., at 88.
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preliminary conclusions are relatively broad and intuitive - the electoral commission’s
perceived independence matters, as do logistical difficulties in voting33 - the U.S, simply
does not have a comparable body. But Elklit and Reynolds’ core hypothesis combines
ideas which I have labeled the instrumental and constitutive components of popular
sovereignty, placed in the context of democratization:
our claim is ( 1 ) that individual experiences in a number of fields related to
the conduct of elections have a direct bearing on how the sense of political efficacydeve ops m individual citizens and (2) that this is an important factor behind thedevelopment of democratic legitimacy as well as a principled commitment to
democracy....’
What may be most important about these two recent studies is that both emphasize
democratic legitimacy as a function of successful election administration, and neither
concludes that winning and losing are the overwhelming determinants of that legitimacy.
In other words, the directly instrumental component of elections is only part of what
makes democratic citizens regard them with respect - the procedural, experiential, and
constitutive aspects of voting are important, as well.
In the contemporary U.S., of course, citizens’ participation in the democratic process
is subject to federal law and the supervision of federal courts; the Constitution and the
courts are now the ultimate guarantor of a person’s voting rights. This fact marks the
obvious limits of my argument: without question, American voting has a crucial “national
dimension as well as a local dimension. But even as the federal government might be
described as “sovereign” over the voting process, local contexts remain crucial to how
33
Id., at 113-116.
34
Id.
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Americans exercise their sovereignty in the state. Next, I explore this paradox,cal bu,
logical state of affairs.
b. “Mighty Platonic Guardians?” The Courts, Suffrage, and Sovereignty.
Richard L. Hasen begins his new book about the Supreme Court and electoral
equahty with a quotation from Justice Clarence Thomas. “We would be m,ghty Platonic
guardians indeed,” Thomas wrote in a concurring opinion, “if Congress had granted us
the authority to determine the best form oflocal government for every county, city,
village, and town in America.”35 (In the case. Holder v. Hall, the Court decided that a
single-commissioner county government was not subject to vote-dilution claims under
the Voting Rights Act.) Hasen borrows “Mighty Platonic Guardians” as the title of the
opening section of his book. The necessity of enlightened “guardians” for a healthy state,
of course, comes from Plato's Republic. But the idea that the federal courts have taken
on an excessive, unhealthy amount of power over American democratic processes has
more recent lineage, as well, as in Ward E.Y. Elliott’s 1974 book The Rise ofGuardian
Democracy. Elliott, in turn, took his cue in part from critics of the Voting Rights Act
like Justice Hugo Black, who famously denounced the 1965 VRA for having converted
the states into “little more than conquered provinces.”37
This material is noted briefly in order to clarify the clear limits ofmy argument,
and how the term sovereignty is used here. In the late twentieth century, federal
Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equalityfrom Baker v. Carr to Bush v.
Gore (2003), at 1. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 913 (1994).
Ward E. Y. Elliott, The Rise ofGuardian Democracy (1974).
37
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (1966).
121
statutes and the federal courts took on a new level of supervisory authority over
American elections. As a result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its subsequent
extensions and amendments - as well as the 1993 National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA) and sections of laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) - most
of the voting process is now subject to national rules of some specificity. 38 Yet while the
Voting Rights Act defines and guarantees voting rights in statutory and judicial terms, it
did not displace local authorities from their essential administrative roles in putting
voting rights into practice. Indeed, the structure of the VRA in some ways recognized
and reaffirmed local responsibility for running elections, even as it set new bounds on
that control. The VRA’s “coverage” formula, which aimed at jurisdictions where
discrimination had been most clear, singled out six Southern states - but also “forty
counties in North Carolina, Alaska, and a handful of counties in Arizona, Hawaii, and
Idaho,” as Laughlin McDonald explains in A Voting Rights Odyssey 39
A long line of cases holds that the national government is effectively “sovereign”
over the electoral process: the Attorney General and federal courts hold the ultimate
authority to deem some practice, regulation, or policy illegal and require its alteration.
Without question, that means that what I call the “local dimension” of American suffrage
is now far more circumscribed than it was fifty or one hundred fifty years ago. The
national government guarantees individuals a bundle of voting rights, rights which people
can and do invoke to challenge the conduct of state and local authorities. But as I have
38
For excerpts from these statutes, see Carter et al., To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral
Process: Report ofthe National Commission on Federal Election Reform (2002), 282-329; and Issacharoff
et al., The Law ofDemocracy, Appendices 28-61. For a brief introduction to the Act’s operation, see
Laughlin McDonald, A Voting Rights Odyssey: Black Enfranchisement in Georgia (2003), 124-128.
39
McDonald, A Voting Rights Odyssey, at 125.
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argued above, I believe public-law scholars’ focus on this judicial element of voting
nghts - or maybe it would be more precise to say justiciable elements of voting nghts
- is part of what kept us from seeing the importance of voting practices, until Election
2000 made it unavoidable.
That election, of course, led to the 2002 enactment of HAVA, legislation which
has the potential to enact the most sweeping changes in American voting since the VRA.
Yet even HAVA - which aims to establish new standards in voting technology,
registration, provisional voting, and other areas - will not displace local administrative
responsibility. For example, in terms of registration, while virtually all states are moving
towards the statewide voter rolls required by HAVA, the vast majority have changed
more slowly than expected and have requested waivers postponing implementation of the
rolls until 2006. And as many states’ elections publications make clear, localities will
certainly retain central day-to-day responsibility for election administration. Michigan
offers a good example, particularly given that Michigan’s Qualified Voter File (QVF) is
considered an excellent model of statewide voter registration. 41 “Making sense of
Michigan’s election system can be a daunting prospect,” the Secretary of State tells
visitors to an official website, but it isn t difficult once you have a basic understanding
of the people who make it work.” Those people, the explanation continues, include the
40 As of January 2004, 41 states had requested such waivers. See Electionline.org, “What’s Changed, What
Hasn’t, and Why,” (January 2004), at 4.
41
See John Mark Hansen, Task Force on the Federal Election System, “Statewide Voter Registration
Systems” (July, 2001), at 3. “Michigan represents an attractive model,” the task force concludes,
explaining the logistics and expense of the QVF.
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staffs of “83 counties, 273 cities, 1,242 townships, 262 villages
districts.”
42
and more than 500 school
Finally, HAVA also created a new national body, the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC), which will take over some duties formerly performed by the Federal
Election Comm,ssion. The EAC’s name, however, reflects its mission, which is to advise
and assist state and local officials, not d.rectly administer or even superv.se elect,ons. In
terms of voting practices, then, the vast majonty of the people working every day as
“guardians” of American suffrage are still people like Shirley Green Knight and Barbara
Swann.
1,1
f
rom I>read
.
Weakness? American State Development and the Perils of theLocal Dimension of American Suffrage.
We can see the local dimension of American voting in the literature on the
American state. That scholarship suggests two central insights. First is an explanatory
hypothesis: local administration of elections may have endured because Americans want
it that way, fearing too much centralized control over their democratic ritual. Second is a
caution: that fear may inhibit the American citizenry’s ability to act together as a united
people, particularly in terms of the instrumental aspect of popular sovereignty.
See Get To Know Your Elections Officials,” at <http://www.michigan.gOv/sos/0, 1607, 7-1 27-
1 633 87 1 6-2 1 04 1 —,00.html>
. Accessed June 4, 2004. The explanation continues,’
“The secretary of state serves as Michigan’s chief election officer, with the Bureau of Elections
acting on the secretary’s behalf. The bureau is responsible for the integrity of an election by ensuring
election laws are followed, training and advising 2,300 local clerks, compiling official election results and
providing instructional materials. Next are the county election officials. Counties support the election
process in a number of ways. Each county has a County Elections Commission, with a chiefjudge of
probate of the county or probate court district, the county clerk and county treasurer. The commission
provides election supplies, including ballots for federal, state and county elections.” Id.
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a. Decentralized: The American “State” and American Suffrage.
"We have come to take the state for granted as an object of political practice and
political analysis,” wrote the critical sociologist Philip Abrams, “while remaining
spectacularly unclear as to what the state is.”43 Indeed, scholars in political science and
ds cognate disciplines have long wrestled with how to conceptualize “the state ” Those
conceptions have rarely included voting practices. Gianfranco Poggi does consider the
franchise in connection to the construction of the democratic state
,
44
but Poggi focuses on
the class-based restrictions of nineteenth-century European suffrage, and on parties and
campaign practices in contemporary elections
.
45
In her study of the origins of American entitlements, Laura S. Jensen urges us to
understand the state “less as a monolithic entity” and more “as an ensemble of
institutions, rules, discourses, and practices”. 46 However, classic works in the “state-
bmlding literature - books by Huntington, Skowronek, Bensel, Skocpol, and most
recently Jensen
47
- tend to focus on what the central state provides for citizens,
particularly entitlements, as well as on economic regulation. For that reason, election
43
( i :
NOt\S °n thC DlfflCulty °f Stud>'in8 the State-” Journal ofHistorical Sociology vol.T89: at 59 - Abrams concludes that the state is “the mask which prevents our seeing political
practice, and teases out definitions of the “state-system” and the “state-idea.” Id., at 82.
44
Gianfranco Poggi, The Development ofthe Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (1978)' Poggi The
State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects (1990).
See, for example, Poggi 1978 at 123, 131 (on suffrage’s formal restriction and its expansion), and MO-
142 (on modem campaigns).
46
Laura S. Jensen, “The Early American Origins of Entitlements,” 10 Studies in American Political
Development 360 (1996), at 363.
See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968); Stephen Skowronek, Building
a New American State: The Expansion ofNational Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (1982); Richard
F. Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins ofCentral State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (1990); Theda
Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins ofSocial Policy in the United States
(1992); Laura S. Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins ofAmerican Social Policy (2003).
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administration does no, map neatly onto the concepts developed by state-bu.lding
scholars: i, deals with how people choose those who dtrec, the state, rather than how
governing institutions define, regulate, protect and provide for the citizenry. But the local
dimension of American suffrage has important implications for our concept,on of the
American state. Those implications can be condensed into two words: capacity and
centralization. The first, of course, is something the American national state lacked, at
least until relatively recently; the second is something Americans have famously
opposed, even dreaded.
As Samuel P. Huntington has observed, while the expansion of political
participation took place earlier in the U.S. than in most of Europe, the modernization,
centralization, and rationalization of governmental authority happened first in Western
Europe. Indeed, the early American constitution, Huntington writes, was
-‘essentially
Tudor and
.
. . significantly medieval .”48 Elements of that “medieval” constitution in
Amenca, Huntington writes, included “the vitality of local governmental authorities .”49
In his analysis of how American political culture helps determine policy choices, Charles
Lockhart reaches similar conclusions
.
50
Lockhart notes that “the immigrants who
populated the territories which later became the United States shared ... an unusual
degree of skepticism about powerful central authority.” That skepticism helped cause the
Revolution, and the “governing principles of the revolutionary period and its immediate
aftermath
. . . honored to an extraordinary degree the limited and local government
” Sam“d P - * luntmgton, Political Order in Changing Societies ( 1 968), 96. By "constitution,” Huntingtonhere reforms to institutions, norms, and practices - the “small-c constitution” - rather than a document.
m
Id
m
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“5ton
J
,S analysis gives 3 remarkably flat account of the expansion of electoral rights in America.
Id., yj-y4. This does not detract from the applicability here of his account of American state-building.
Charles Lockhart, The Roots ofAmerican Exceptionalism: Institutions, Culture and Policies (2003).
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aspects” of the Amencan experience. While the new Constitution certainly strengthened
the central government,
“considerable government decentralization" remained the rule,
and two centuries later, Lockhart writes, “government institutions [remain] relatively
small.”51
Focusing on the nineteenth century, Stephen Skowronek describes a “highly
developed democratic politics without a concentrated governing capacity.”52 The “sense
of statelessness” foreign observers often felt, he writes, was created by “a broad diffusion
of power among the localities” and state governments. 53 Altschuler and Blumin, like
Skowronek, argue that American democratic politics took shape in the nineteenth
century, an age when small central and state governments contributed to (or intruded
into) most people’s lives in relatively remote, indirect, and minimal ways.”54 And as
Daniel T. Rodgers has pointed out, it was in the nineteenth century that the nascent
discipline of political science identified a “splendid abstraction” called “the state” -
which “spread a wonderful coherence” over the divisions, conflicts, and disintegrative
forces of nineteenth-century America. 55 Something akin to Skowronek’s “sense of
statelessness” greatly irritated one scholar who surveyed American suffrage practices in
the late 1880s. Compared to voters in Great Britain and Canada, wrote anthropologist
James H. Blodgett, Americans wasted a great deal of money and ballots in elections
51
Id., 160-161.
52
Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion ofNational Administrative
Capacities, 1877-1920 (1982), 8.
Id., 23. Skowronek writes that modem institutional politics in the U.S. remains “distinguished by
incoherence and fragmentation in governmental operations.” Id., at viii.
54
Altschuler and Blumin, Rude Republic, at 6.
55
Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Independence (1998), at 169.
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because they lacked consistent balloting rules, and hence relied on parties and local
organizations. Blodgett wrote,
growth thaTfhi™ , ,
ap CUSt°mS and laws t0 ,he “Editions of nationalat t e commuraty in choosing its servants leaves itself dependent for an
essential instrument for expressing its choice upon those with special or privateinterests, and continues to prescnbe methods fitted only to a town-meeting of a scoreor two spending a day in deliberation .”56 8
Blodgett’s objection was that in other areas of public life, “the conditions of national
growth” suggested a strong American state, but when the community chose the
“servants” who would run that state, it lacked the capacity to speak together.
b. A Question of Capacity?
Local administration of American elections today may have roots in the early
development of relatively broad suffrage among males in the U.S. The U.S. extended the
franchise to most adult white men long before the national government acquired anything
like the capacity to manage elections - indeed, before many state governments had such
capacity. Town officials were best-positioned and best able to manage elections, and
have continued to do so - even as the wealth, expertise, and power of the national
government have expanded, and as protections of voting rights have been nationalized in
law. One result is that the U.S. has a fragmented system for measuring the will of the
voters, a system quite unusual in the democratic world. In many other democracies,
meanwhile, broad suffrage was won only after state capacities enabled electoral
6
James H. Blodgett, “Suffrage and Its Mechanism in Great Britain and the United States,” The American
Anthropologist, vol. II, Jan. 1889, at 68.
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processes to be rationalized and centrally-d.rected » For those who regard fragmentation
in modem American elections as a flaw in our nat.onal democracy today - or at least a
potential weakness - this story is quite paradoxical.
Voter registration is a key element of local control now, and Walter Dean
Burnham is among those who have suggested that the hyper-federal American
registration system emerged from weak state bureaucratic capacities. Burnham
acknowledges that late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century registration rules were
probably put in place with exclusionary purposes: “to reduce as much as possible the
impact of urban immigrants on statewide elections.” But Burnham argues that it was the
weak state, and no! partisan or exclusionary goals, that best explains voter-dependent,
locally-administered registration rules. Having decided to erect this new portal to voter
participation, state legislators saw that only local officials could manage the door. Noting
that [everywhere else in the West (including neighboring Canada) it was early accepted
that it was the state’s task to compile and update electoral registers,” Burnham says that
such a task “presupposed the existence of a bureaucracy for administering such
enrollment laws or a consensus that such a bureaucracy should be created .”58
c. “A Dread and a Yearning”
See Stem Rokkan et al., Citizens, Elections, and Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study ofthe
Processes o/Development (1970). (I discuss Rokkan’s comparative developmental analysis in more detail
below, in my analysis of the advent of secret-ballot laws in the U.S.) See also Save-Soderbergh, “Broader
Lessons of the U.S. Election Drama.” As Save-Soderbergh puts it, “[i]n today’s world many aspects of the
U.S. electoral process are unique, not least because at the time of its enactment much U.S. electoral
legislation was far in advance of other nations. But in tandem with the global trend towards democracy,
electoral processes have also evolved significantly, furnishing policy makers with a wealth of new models
and practices to consider.”
58
Walter Dean Burnham, “The System of 1896: An Analysis,” in Paul Kleppner et al.. The Evolution of
American Electoral Systems (1981), 167.
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Burnham acknowledges here the lack of “consensus” on the desirability of such a
bureaucracy. This is the second piece of the state-building puzzle: thtfact of a
historically weak central state in the U.S. has long been matched by popular distaste for
such a state. Alexis de Tocqueville famously obseiwed that >]othing is more strikmg to
a European traveler in the United States than the absence of what we term the
government, or the administration.”59 Explaining that absence, Tocqueville pointed out
that “in America centralization is by no means popular, and there is no surer means of
courting the majority than by inveighing against the encroachments of the central
power.”60 The reason American administrative power “presents nothing either
centralized or hierarchical in its constitution,” he found, was that Americans exuded a
dread of the consolidation of power in the hands of the Union.”61
That dread has survived. One modem author calls Tocqueville’s remark about
courting the majority” by inveighing against central power “a passage one might find in
a memo from a political consultant today.”62 This distrust could be an important reason
why the U.S. still lacks a national election-administration bureaucracy - again, the new
Election Assistance Commission is designed to play an advisory role, not an
administrative one - as well as consistent ballot-design and vote-counting systems, and
why some states still don’t have comprehensive voter lists. Many other democracies
maintain government-generated voter lists, but Steven Schier points out that in the U.S.,
59
Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. /. (Vintage, 1990) (1835), 70.
60
Id., 404.
61
Id., 71,404.
62
Rohr, Civil Servants and Their Constitutions, 147.
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hav,ng Congress fund and create such a voter roU “goes very much against the grain of
American federalism
... and has no vocal advocates at present .”63
“At the heart of American politics,” James Morone writes, “lies a dread and a
yearning. The dread, as Tocqueville noted, is of centralized public power, particularly
tn the national government, and that aversion leads to government that is “weak and
fragmented, designed to prevent action more easily than to produce it.” But
simultaneously, Americans yearn for a direct and effective democracy
.
64
The survival of
local control over Amencan national elections may be a manifestation of this paradox. If
it has survived in part because of Amencans’ dread of national power and their contempt
for centralization and bureaucracy, local control may also diminish popular sovereignty.
If inconsistent, obscure registration rules prevent many citizens from participating; if
problems with ballot design, counting-machine error, and poll-worker support keep
would-be voters from having their voices heard; and, most seriously, if such problems
have cumulative effects which systematically skew or obstruct the will of the electorate,
then local control limits the exercise of popular sovereignty in non-trivial ways . 65
Amencans fear too much governmental power, but also yearn for “the people” to
Schier, You Call This An Election?, at 112.
64
James A. Morone, The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits ofAmerican
Government, Revised Ed. (1998), 1.
Early registration rules arose at least in part because when performed by unscrupulous partisans, local
administration of state and national elections often obstructed the will of the voters via a much simpler
route: fraud. And as the National Municipal League summarized the problem in 1927, the simple pre-
registration system of using gangs of “repeaters” to commit massive vote fraud was already being replaced
by more modem ways of stealing elections. Most common was simply padding registration list with
fictitious names and having the “corrupt precinct election board check off the names and drop the ballots
into the box, without the bother of sending ‘repeaters’ around to do this.” Committee on Election
Administration of the National Municipal League, A Model Registration System (1927), 48-49.
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function as
bom of that
‘a single, united, political entity,” as Morone puts it “ Local control may be
fear, but it may also compromise the ability of the people to act together in
American elections.
IV. The Case for Things Local: Madison,
Advocates.
Tocqueville, and Contemporary
The core of the case against local administration of elections is that the
instrumental aspect of popular sovereignty will be diminished by inadequate voting
processes
- presumably problems that an adequate national system would solve. There is
a constitutive element to the criticism, as well, heard in Blodgett’s charge that Amencans
were acting like they were in a town meeting, not choostng the government of a great and
powerful nation.
But there is another side to this coin. I choose three perspecttves from which to
explain the "redemptive” attributes of local control - the political thought of the
American founding, particularly “Madisonian” theories of majority rule; Tocqueville’s
support for localism; and the ideas of contemporary democratic theorists, particularly
Dennis Thompson.
a. “Both More Convenient and More Satisfactory:” Madisonian
Thought and Election Administration.
Madison’s name has become linked with a theory of democracy and popular
sovereignty which, as Dahl puts it, ”bring[s] off a compromise between the power of
majorities and the power of minorities,” and which emphasizes popular rule, on one hand,
66
Morone, at 5. Morone focuses here on how the search for more direct democracy ironically produces
more bureaucracy. In American elections, that bureaucracy has remained almost entirely local.
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but also institutionalizes
-.he desire to limit their sovereignty on the other.- Checks,
niters, and limits are the familiar language of this theory, as Daniel T. Rodgers’ summary
ofpost-Revolutionary Amerrcan thought illustrates. In different ways, Rodgers writes
that the majority’s power was “carefully broken up,” “divided in two,”
“buffered,” made
“indirect,”
“federalized,” and, finally,
“dismembered .”68 As Reichiey summarizes
Madisonian theory, the best protection for worthy minorities is “extension of
governmental authority over a territory so vast and a population so varied that
government will have to achieve consensus rather than a simple majority in order to
act.”
66
Despite the differences between our assumptions about popular sovereignty today
and those of the founders, these ideas still wield authonty in American thought.™
A hyper-federalized suffrage system seems naturally compatible with this
Madisonian theoiy of popular rule. As long as the “the people” can act, it’s acceptable
and even desirable that they be prevented from acting together
,
in various ways. Of
course, Madison’s chief concern was with instrumental conduct by rapacious factions,
particularly the less-propertied majority faction. But wide differences in suffrage
practices in addition to being unavoidable in “stateless” early America - would seem a
good theoretical match.
Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
,
at 4.
68
Rodgers, Contested Truths
,
at 86.
69
70
Reichiey, The Life ofthe Parties, at 27.
Dahl notes that while most Americans seem to accept Madisonian theories, “criticism of its rather shaky
mTa^neyierrte ,d:eS d°rn ” Dah1, Preface t0 Dcmocratlc Theory, at 4. And J. Allen Smith wrote in
u
3
°u°*!u
the po ltlcal f,ctIon” that the founders shared modern ideas about popular sovereignty, a fiction
which has enabled writers to evade the discussion of such vitally important questions as the extension of
the suffrage and the apportionment of representation.” Smith, 60.
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While the historical record is quite limited, I believe that assumption is correct.
We can say with confidence that the founders understood and condoned local variation in
voting practices and local control of elections, and viewed it as compatible with the frame
of government they established. Madison himself offered only one specific comment
about election administration that I can locate. But it appears that arch-nationalists such
as Alexander Hamilton and Joseph Story put forth at least tacit endorsements of the status
quo. Indeed, I have found that an assumption of local variation of election administration
was a component of what is now commonly called the “Madisonian” theory of majority
rule. And beyond administrative questions, the local political contexts in which
American voters would choose their representatives were an important part of Madison’s
conception of how the new government ought to operate.
As if the dilemmas posed to the framers by apportionment were not hard enough -
which constituencies were to be represented, on what scale - suffrage itself also raised a
number of thorny problems. In addition to eligibility questions, the framers faced issues
such as
“how, literally, were citizens to give their votes: by voicing their preference to
the sheriff, who would then record their vote in a poll book, or by secret ballot; at a
raucous public fete, with people gathered from miles around for the closest
approximation to carnival a Protestant society to produce, or in widely separated
polling places, with a decorum more suited to republican manners?”71
Jack Rakove overstates this point somewhat. The founders did know about these choices
and this variation, of course, since virtually all of them had previously been elected by
such gatherings. Thirty-nine of the fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
for example, had served in Congress at one time or another, and seven had been state
71
Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making ofthe Constitution (1997), at 204.
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governors. But they did not have to answer these questions; in fact, they quite
pointedly left them unresolved, and did not discuss them much. (Indeed, having posed
these questions, Rakove in his chapter “The Mirror of Representation” devotes no more
time to them.) I believe the founders simply took for granted that the answers to
Rakove s list of questions would come from state and local authorities.
One important explicit endorsement of state and local authority to run elections
came from Alexander Hamilton, of all people. In Federalist 59, Hamilton defended the
Constitution’s “times, places, and manner” language. The document was correct, he
wrote, to assign “the regulation of elections for the federal government in the first
instance to the local administrations; which in ordinary cases, and when no improper
views prevail, may be both more convenient and more satisfactory.”73 Only in crisis,
Hamilton argued, would it be necessary for the national government to step in and
guarantee that state governments did not destroy it. Today, one scholar calls this
arrangement the “Hamiltonian proviso:” localities and states control elections as long as
they do not impair representation at the national level. 74
In addition to Hamilton’s words, I find only one clear, direct statement of concern
with variation in election administration. It is a mixed criticism, but certainly does not
reflect a desire to nationalize election administration. Speaking in the convention,
Madison worried about manipulation of election procedures by state governments.
7
“ Gordon S. Wood, The American Revolution (2002), at 153.
73
Hamilton, Federalist 59, in Garry Wills, ed., The Federalist Papers (1982) (1787-88), at 300.
Continuing, Hamilton raised a ridiculous rhetorical specter: “Suppose an article had been introduced into
the Constitution, empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular States, would any
man have hesitated to condemn it?” Id., 301. Hamilton’s point seems to be that leaving election
management completely under state control would be an equivalent catastrophe.
74
See Thompson, Just Elections, at 135.
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Madison combined theories of representation with questions about election practices in
an argument about the House of Representatives. His greatest concern appears to have
been instrumental manipulation of election results by variations in the "mode:”
The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives tothe people and not to the Legislatures of the States, supposes that the result will he
somewhat influenced by the mode. ,..[t]he Legislatures of the States ought not to have
e uncontrouled right of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections.
ese were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that
might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot
or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into
istncts or all meet at one place
. . . these & many other points would depend on the
egislatures and might materially affect the appointments .”75
On its face, this appears to be a serious criticism of varying election procedures.
But Madison s ultimate purpose is to restrain state governments, and his tactical goal
seems to have been to place in the constitution “a controuling power” over elections with
the national government, particularly “in the last resort,” as Hamilton later put it . 76
Moreover, note that this is a “majoritarian” concern, rather than a classically Madisonian
scheme to filter, check, and divide the majority: Madison is worried about self-interested
legislators thwarting the popular will. Though it is left unsaid, one of Madison’s
premises appears to be that current electoral regimes are satisfactory - it is manipulations
and “abuses” of the system that he worries about, not its normal operation. Finally,
Madison stopped well short of arguing that the national government should write a
national electoral law - let alone actually administer elections. He simply wanted an
insurance policy written into the Constitution.
75 Max Farrand, ed., The Records ofthe Federal Convention of 1787, Revised Ed. (1966), Vol. II, 240-241
(emphasis added).
76
Id., 241; Hamilton, Federalist 59 (Wills, p. 299).
136
Madison got his way on this one. The Constitution, of course, left the “times,
places, and manners” of electing U.S. Senators and Representatives to the state
legislatures, but allowed Congress to “make or alter such regulations, except as to the
place of choosing senators.”77 In his Commentaries, Joseph Story wrote that the clause
not only encountered little opposition, but did not even appear to have drawn much
attention in the convention. 78 But the ratifying conventions were a different animal. In
what appears to be an uncited but extraordinarily close paraphrase of Hamilton’s
Federalist 59, Story interprets the provision as having placed discretionary power over
elections not with either the state legislatures or national government, but primarily with
the former and ultimately with the latter. 79 Opponents disagreed, reading the possibility
of Congressional intervention as a dangerous usurpation. They worried, Story reports,
that Congress might schedule elections at unreasonable and inconvenient times, or at
such distance from the electors as to inhibit voting, or somehow arrange the “manner” of
elections so as to guarantee victory for their allies. 80 Story regards the objections as
“untenable,” adopting the Hamiltonian argument that Congressional authority is a means
for the government to contain in itself the means of its own preservation,” particularly in
an extreme crisis. In any event, he did not expect Congress to be able to draft “an
election law, which would be applicable
. . . and convenient for all the states.”
77
U.S. Const., Art. I., § 4.
78
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution ofthe United States, (1987) (1833), at 291.
79
Id., 292. Story’s language here is an almost verbatim match with Hamilton’s in Federalist 59. See
Wills, ed., The Federalist Papers, at 300.
80
Id., 291.
81
This is the argument of Federalist 59.
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Story s commentary has two important implications. The first is that if Madison
and Hamilton accepted local and state control over election admin,stration, opponents of
the Constitutron appeared to support it fervently. Second, even one of the leadrng
advocates of nattonal power in the first generation of the U.S. - Joseph Story - believed
that in normal politics, national involvement in election details would be both
unnecessary and unwise.
Theories of decentralized election administration, then, may not have been
central to the political philosophy of the founders, but were compatible with it. But there
is another way in which the local dimension of suffrage, broadly construed, figured much
more prominently in Madisonian theory. Here the ‘‘Federalist” view appears ambivalent,
but broadly critical of local influences. There was a profound, explicit connection
between the new national government and local electoral conditions, a link near the heart
of debates over the character and powers of the national government. As Edmund S.
Morgan demonstrates, one’s conception of how elections actuallyfunctioned at the local
level - the political and social context in which the voters made their choices - was
essential to how one understood “the people” and how they would be represented.
The Federalists famously turned the ratification debate to their favor by claiming
the people as the source of sovereignty, and leaving the Anti-Federalists to defend the
less-majestic claims of the state governments. “With the adoption of the Constitution,”
Morgan writes, [Madison s] crucial invention of a sovereign American people found
realization.” National power rested not on the states, but on that sovereign people; this
broader base, and the changes it wrought in the American political imagination, would
82
Morgan, Inventing the People
,
at 285.
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ul.ima.ely make possible a drama.ic increase in central power. Bu, Mad,son’s
.heory of
representation under the new Const, tut,on rested on his assumptions about local politics.
Madison, writes Morgan,
,
“
had '"Ve
,
nt®d a sovereign people, but he had assumed an existing socialtructure in which the people would know and recognize and defer to their natural«ST dur>^ *e revolutionary war, Americans had experienced an]panted th 18 deference, as they had experienced representation, only on a local
It is easy for us to forget now that representation on a national scale was then a
very controversial notion. During ratification, that controversy was closely linked to the
new government’s power to tax, which the Antifederalists found utterly unacceptable.
Allowing remote national representatives to levy taxes, they believed, was reminiscent of
the “virtual representation” rejected in the Revolution. 84 Moreover, the Revolutionary
period had seen not only the defeat of virtual representation, but also an explosion of
government at the local level. By the end of 1774, Gordon S. Wood writes,
local associations were controlling and regulating various aspects of
American life. Committees manipulated voters, directed appointments, organized the
militia, managed trade, intervened between creditors and debtors, levied taxes issued
licenses, and supervised or closed the courts. Royal governors stood by in helpless
amazement as new informal governments gradually grew up around them.”85
83
Id., at 286.
Morgan, 280; see particularly 280 n.46, where Morgan calls the tax power “probably the most pervasive
Antifederalist objection to the Constitution” and lists citations. Pitkin has explamed that a major reason
why virtual representation did not satisfy Americans was that they already had come to understand
legislators to represent persons, not interests. “In America, representation was clearly to be of persons, and
interests became an inevitable evil, to be tamed by a well-constructed government.” At the same time,
“many of our founding fathers were far from being democrats; the representation of people does not
necessarily mean the representation of all people.” Pitkin, On Representation, at 190. Indeed, virtual
representation did not stay dead. The idea resurfaced during the Dorr War, as a justification for Rhode
Island’s limited suffrage and an argument against the legitimacy of the “People’s Convention.” See
Rodgers, Contested Truths, at 103-105.
85 Wood, The American Revolution, at 48.
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Amencans had come lo understand representatives “as the means by which the local
feelings and local circumstances of ordinary people found expression in government ”
Morgan writes, and many believed that the large constituencies of House members
removed them too far from those influences.
“Representation on a national scale ”
Morgan argues, “deprived representation of the meaning that Americans had always
attached to it.”86
In some respects, this was exactly what Madison wanted. A “spirit of locality,”
he argued, was destroying “the aggregate interests of the community.”87 Madison saw
corruption and intrigue in the towns and small districts that selected state legislators;
enlarging those units to encompass 30,000 people, he hoped, “would eliminate the local
pressures and locally oriented candidates that had made the state governments a
isgrace. But at the same time, when Anti-Federalists charged that the national
government would swallow up the smaller units, Federalists like Madison and Hamilton
assured them it would not. Their reasoning, writes Morgan, was that “the people would
be more attached to their familiar, local representatives in the state legislatures than they
would be to their more remote national representatives.”89 It is hard to know how much
of this argument was propaganda and how much a genuine faith in such ties, but it leaves
us with a good sense of the ambivalence in Madisonian thought regarding the local
dimension of suffrage. On one hand, the founders knew of local variation in election
procedures and administration, and clearly made no attempt to subject voting processes to
86
Morgan, 277, 280.
Quoted in Wood, The American Revolution
,
at 141.
Garry Wills, “Introduction,” in Wills, Ed., The Federalist Papers (1982), at xxii.
89
Id., 280.
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national control. In fact, their only explicit concerns regarded slate manipulation of “the
mode” of elections. On the other, when it came to the influences of local interests on
state and national legislators, Madisonian theory was strongly critical, in a way which felt
to opponents of the Constitution like a betrayal of the American tradition.
b. "The Strength of Free Nations:" Tocqueville on Municipal
Institutions in America.
Tocqueville pointed to the American “dread” of central power and its costs, but he
is at least as famous for singing the praises of local politics. As one recent article argues,
“the focal point of [Tocqueville’s] principal political argument” was the “participatory
vector that originated in the political life of the American township and then disseminated
its own bracing vitality to civil society as a whole.”90 Tocqueville’s approach suggests
that for all its inefficiencies, local control of election administration may have a powerful
redeeming effect which enhances, rather than diminishes, popular sovereignty.
Tocqueville opens his examination of “the form of government established in
America on the principle of the sovereignty of the people” with an admiring study of
local governance. As a political entity, he writes, the township “is so perfectly natural”
that it seems to come directly from the hand of God .”91 Municipal institutions, he
writes,
“constitute the strength of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty what
primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men
Robert T. Gannett, Jr., “Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville’s Township,” 97 American Political Science
Review 1, (2003), 7, 1. Significantly, Gannett links a close reading of Tocqueville to current debates within
political science over civic culture and democratic citizenship
91
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. /., 59, 60.
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how to use and how to enjoy it.
without municipal institutions it
A nation may establish a free government, but
cannot have the spirit of liberty.”92
In Tocqueville’s account, it would be impossible for popular sovereignty to be
weakened by the power of town government in America, because local power constitutes
that sovereignty. Indeed, the township is where power, sovereignty, and “the people”
define themselves, where citizens are trained in both the “practice” and the “spirit” of
liberty and order, learning both rights and duties. Without “power and independence," he
wrote, “a town may contain good subjects, but it can have no active citizens .”93 As
always, Tocqueville finds a tension and paradox here, noting that local power is “an
infrequent and fragile thing,” because a “highly civilized community can hardly tolerate a
local independence, is disgusted at its numerous blunders, and is apt to despair of success
before the experiment is completed ”94 Later, he acknowledges that in some cases
Americans have “overstepped the limits of sound policy” by allowing localities too much
independence
.
95
But when Tocqueville, sounding quite Madisonian, lists “causes which
MITIGATE THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY IN THE UNITED STATES,” first in line is the
absence of centralized administration.” Distinguishing centralized government from
centralized administration, he applauds the lack of the latter in the U.S.: should the
“details of
. . . application” of power join the “right of commanding,” “freedom would
92
Id., 61.
93
Id., 62, 64, 68, 67.
94
Id., 60.
95
Id., 88-89. On counties, Tocqueville was both brief and dismissive. Tocqueville saw counties as
arbitrary, with no connection to individuals or the community, any “natural sympathy.” “their object is
simply to facilitate the administration.” Lacking these connections as well as power, the county has,
“properly speaking, no political existence.” Id., 68-69.
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soon be banished from the New World.”* In Tocqueville’s America, locai practices
butld citizens, and the absence of centralization is the first barrier against tyranny. But
this feels quite different from the instrumentally-oriented Madisonian endorsement of
localism, because the constitutive dimension of local political activity is what Tocqueville
applauds most clearly. I find no direct discussion of election administration in
Tocqueville, but have no reason to doubt that his praise for towns as the best schools of
active citizens would lead him to support the American way of voting.
c. “Citizen Administrators:” The Value of Local Administration
Today.
Freedom in the New World has come a long way since 1830, and American
government today is very different from what Tocqueville described. But modem
authors such as Anthony Lukas have turned to Tocqueville’s account of local allegiances
to understand contemporary conflicts such as the battle over busing in Boston. 97 To be
sure, the image of the community has remained an essential part of American democratic
ideology - survived as the “setting” of the American yearning for popular sovereignty.
Over the centuries, Morone writes, the idea of community has “pushed beyond
geographical place altogether” and become a powerful political symbol. 98
96
Id., 271. Tocqueville calls townships and counties “so many concealed breakwaters, which check or part
the tide of popular determination.” Id., 272.
See Anthony Lukas, Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three American Families
(1985), 207. Lukas emphasizes here the tension between community and equality.
98
Morone, The Democratic Wish, 7. As Morone observes, appealing to community “is the acceptable form
in which to cast collectivist sentiment in a society of state bashers.” Id. Not coincidentally, some modem
theorists prefer the term “communitarian” to the term “republican.” See, for example, Amitai Etzioni, The
Spirit ofCommunity (1993), at 2 (outlining the “Communitarian thesis”).
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In American elections today, local control may have democratic benefits well
beyond the symbolic power of registering with city officials and voting under their
supervision in an election paid for by city taxes and held in a city building. In his
searching analysis ofwhere modem election law meets theories of popular sovereignty,”
political philosopher Dennis Thompson acknowledges that what he calls “spatial
variation” in election procedures
- particularly ballot design, counting technology, and
recount standards - may “frustrate electoral justice” if it systematically makes some
voters more powerful than others, by making voting easier and making votes more likely
to be correctly tallied
.
100
Such variation has always characterized American elections.
But Thompson also argues that local administration of national elections can have
redeeming effects, since it “is likely to give citizens more control over the electoral
process, encourage political participation, increase partisan competitiveness, and enable
districts to experiment with different procedures....” Local direction of elections will
sacrifice uniformity in national elections, and that may lead to inequalities. But at the
same time, local variation “could be seen as recognizing individual responsibility,
respecting citizens’ capacity for choice rather than denigrating their equal standing.” 101
hi an earlier book, Thompson argued that we could increase and improve the
amount of rationally self-interested political participation in America by means of “major
99
Thompson, Just Elections, Chapter Three, “Popular Sovereignty: Who Decides What Votes Count ” 123-
184.
100
Thompson, Just Elections, 1 80.
101
Id., 56. Such benefits, Thompson argues, “may be worth the sacrifice of uniformity not only because
they may outweigh the costs of unequal treatment, but because the unequal treatment is not so
objectionable. In Thompson s view, a resident of a Florida county which did not count hanging chads was
unlucky, but did not have her “civic dignity” insulted, and was not really discriminated against. Moreover,
she has the ability to change her county’s counting standard, if she can persuade her neighbors to do so
Id., 56.
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redistributions of power in a structure of relatively small political units.”102 Here,
thinking about eleeting people to the existing large units, Thompson offers a relatively
technical, procedural solution. He suggests that special election commissions “at the
same institutional level" to winch an election applies should decide how much variation
IS too much. The question of how local administration of national elections helps or
hinders the exercise of popular sovereignty in U.S. elections requires such institutionally-
onented answers, but it also demands further inquiry into how Americans understand
fairness, power, and democracy in the electoral context. Allowing county, city, and town
officials to direct and implement national elections may compromise majority rale,
particularly as the margins of victory in federal elections become ever narrower. But it
simultaneously multiplies the number of citizens exercising some responsible role in the
central acts of sovereignty. This is one message of Michael Schudson’s The Good
Citizen, which begins with an account of his own volunteer work supervising clerks in
one of California’s polling places
.
104
Schudson brought his kids along for part of the day;
he considered the work to be part of their political education. Dozens of voters thanked
him and others for our efforts on behalf of this democracy,” and many were “proud of
their neighbor for volunteering.” 105 Similarly, one of the themes of Crenson and
l0
" Thompson, The Democratic Citizen (1970), at 147.
103
In general, Thompson writes, “the authority to decide how much variation in electoral practices is just
should be lodged not necessarily in the same institutions but at the same institutional level of the bodies
that legislate and execute the laws to which those who vote in the relevant elections are bound.” Id., 181.
In other words, officials appointed by the city should assess variation in local elections; nationally-
appointed commissioners should do the same for Congressional and Presidential elections.
104
Schudson, The Good Citizen, at 1-3.
105
Id., at 1. “The labor required to run an election is substantial: with more than 25,000 precincts in
California alone, each employing three to five poll workers, the outpouring of volunteer labor is enormous
and their organization and training no mean feat.” Id.
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Ginsberg’s jeremiad Downsizing Democracy is the diminishing number of “citizen
administrators" in a vanety of areas. “Policies designed to make the na.ton’s government
and economy operate more smoothly," they write, “have diminished the space in which
citizenship can operate.”* While Crenson and Ginsberg do no. identify elect,on
administration here, their values seem to echo those ofThompson and Schudson,
Finally, there are empirical dimensions to this question - for example, involving
registration of voters. As noted above, the United States is unusual in that the
government does not compile and maintain voter lists, instead requiring citizens to
register themselves, and allowing town officials to keep the only official records in many
states. But if local officials
- particularly in small towns - actively recruit citizens for
the voter rolls - at picnics and parties, and when they come in for those “dog tags and
dump stickers” - the result may be increased participation, with the added benefit of a
greater connection between citizens and the officials who run their elections.
106
Crenson and Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy, at 45-46.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: VOTING PRACTICES IN thpJACKSONIAN CONVENTIONS AND THE AUSTRALIAN-BALLOT ERA
This chapter confronts a simple historical question raised by the U.S.’s hyper-
federalized suffrage system: where did it come from? Is it simply an accidental remnant
of an historical “fit of absentmindedness,” and a developmental path which placed
administrative control in local hands? I have argued that local voting is linked to
fundamental American ideas about popular sovereignty, centralization, and the state.
This chapter focuses on two nineteenth-century periods of profound change in U.S.
suffrage and election-administration law: the Jacksonian constitutional conventions of the
1 820s to 1 840s, and the secret-ballot reforms of the century’s end. Drawing on
constitutional-convention records for the first period and on a wide variety of
contemporary and scholarly sources for the second, I conclude that our locally-run
electoral system is no accident, but was in fact constructed by state governments during
these periods. At no point did states consider establishing statewide election-
administration bureaucracies; instead, they aimed new regulations at county and town
officials, effectively renewing their responsibility. This conclusion, however, is deeply
paradoxical. For by asserting their de jure authority over suffrage qualifications and
practices, state lawmakers now made local officials act as agents of state government.
A recent study of early-nineteenth-century constitution-making argues that it was
in the states that the ideal of popular rule “was not only debated but actually determined,”
and where “the ideological and legal development of America’s allegiance to active
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popular sovereignty” essentially took place. 1 This chapter continues my examination of
American voting practices and their relahonship with popular sovereignty, seen from the
vantage of two major nineteenth-century suffrage reforms. First, I analyze debates over
the franchise in several state constitutional conventions held between 1820 and 1844.
Second, I study the advent of the Australian ballot in the last decade of the century. In
these two periods, American suffrage underwent two of its greatest changes - the first a
carefully-theorized shift in qualifications and franchise membership, the second a
dramatic change in voting practices.
A straightforward historical question initially motivated this part of the project:
why has our hyper-federalized system endured? I wanted to study these reforms to look
for hints as to whether reasons linked to concepts of popular sovereignty, resistance to
centralization, and ideas about the state explain its survival; I looked for awareness of
local variation, administration, and the effects of local contexts on voters, and for
judgment about these aspects of the local dimension of American suffrage. I reach the
paradoxical conclusion that these powerful assertions of state authority over suffrage did
transform American voting, particularly in the later period, but also constructed our
hyper-federalized election system by directing all requirements and regulations at local
authorities, never contemplating an expanded role for state government in election
administration.
1
Laura J. Scalia, America ’s Jeffersonian Experiment: Remaking State Constitutions, 1820-1850 (1999), at
ix. Many scholars have attempted to grasp these concepts by reading the records of the federal
Constitution, but Scalia argues that that document’s “primary concern was never to empower ordinary
citizens. Id. In terms of voting and suffrage, Scalia’s focus is on formal qualifications and the aggregate,
instrumental effects of reform. See, e.g., id. at 51-62, 101-102.
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“The Remai,’ in8 Record rif™ s Experiment:”
2
The Jacksonian Conventions.
The new state constitutions drafted between 1820 and 1850 are most renowned
for expand,ng suffrage among white men, primarily by reducing or eliminating properly
qualifications. Many nineteenth-century thinkers regarded those changes as “one of the
most important, if not the most important, fact in the political history of the United
States. However, the period’s suffrage legacy is quite mixed. For example, previously,
most states simply subjected free black and immigrant men to the same property tests as
whites, but in the first half of the nineteenth century many either explicitly barred blacks
from voting or, as in New York, imposed burdensome new property tests on black men
alone. Others restricted voting by new residents by lengthening residency requirements
or by requiring that voters be citizens. And despite calls for reapportionment as old
county districts grew increasingly inadequate, through most of the nineteenth century a
disproportionate amount of power stayed in the hands of wealthy rural landowners at the
expense of growing city populations. Still, the conventions of the early nineteenth
century played an important role in American political development. In many states, the
suffrage reformers of the 1820s- 1850s argued for an “unfiltered, unbalanced, unchecked
will of the greatest number” which was new in American theories of self-rule, as Daniel
T. Rodgers writes. 4 And despite the survival of old restrictions and the advent ofnew
ones, none escaped expanding popular sovereignty in some form or another.”5
I borrow this phrase from Scalia, America 's Jeffersonian Experiment, at 8. Scalia does not cite a source.
3
J. Allen Smith, The Growth and Decadence of Constitutional Government (1930), at 61.
4
Rodgers, Contested Truths, at 83.
Scalia, at 9. Still, one regularly encounters overstated accounts of sweeping populist changes in this
period. In the Introduction to the edited bibliography State Constitutional Conventions, for example, we
find this summary:
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My interest in this period of expanding popular sovereignty boils down to two
sets of questions. First, as reformers set about to improve their election laws after almost
two generations of political experience in the U.S., how do their discussions of suffrage
practices - as distinguished from more-abstract theories of formal inclusion in the
franchise, which scholars including Chilton Williamson, Marchette Chute, Alexander
Keyssar, and Scalia, among others, have carefully analyzed - illuminate and connect to
ideas about sovereignty and self-rule? Second, what did these reformers think about the
great degree of local variation in election practices then in effect, as well as the fact of
local administrative control? Were these factors regarded as strengths or weaknesses?
Were they “problematized,” or effectively invisible, simply taken for granted as the way
Americans exercised their control over their government? In the next chapter, I examine
the connections between the local dimension of American suffrage and the exclusionary
tradition in American political thought. If this chapter focuses on how Americans vote,
that one centers on who should vote. However, in some places I find that these questions
were too intimately connected to be separated, so some of the discussions here address
both sides of the coin.
hi reading the records of the nineteenth-century state constitutional conventions.
Daniel T. Rodgers has written, “one puts to sea in an eclectic, democratic flood of talk.”
The constitutions of all the states formed after 1787 were written without reference to the
property qualification for voting, and the original thirteen states began to follow their example. During
the decade of the 1820s, the political role of the average male citizen came to approximate in fact what
the Jeffersonians had long claimed for him in theory. By 1830, only Virginia and North Carolina
retained the freehold qualification and in due time it was removed even in those states.”
See Browne, ed., State Constitutional Conventions: From Independence to the Completion ofthe
Present Union, 1776-1959 (1973), atxx. As I demonstrate below, this is misleading, because so many states
retained a taxpayer test after 1 830, usually based on the same reasoning that had previously supported the
freehold test. New York, meanwhile, had only abolished the property test for white men. Finally, while
most white men qualified to vote during this period, speaking of the “average” male citizen does not clarify
much, and one wonders what “due time” means.
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close !egal reasoning and the worst of doggerel poetry self,ndulgent reminiscences and inspired perorations.”6
I draw on “tides of words” from constitutional conventions in Massachusetts (1820-21),
Virginia (1 829- 1 830), New York (.821), North Carolina ( 1 835), and Iowa (1844), This
set reflects the cases chosen by Scalia in her study of the period,
7
as well as those
excerpted by Merrill Peterson in his important 1966 work on the Jacksonian conventions.
Democracy. Liberty, and Property* G. Alan Tam, in his vital 1998 book Understanding
State Constitutions, also studies these examples. 9 This is no coincidence, for these states
- and very few others - left some records of their convention. Each was of course
unique, but at the same time representative of broader national and regional trends.
There are not new editions of these convention records, however, and the early-
ni neteenth
-century publications follow the conventions of the era, which included very
limited indexes or none at all. This means the researcher confronts scores of pages of
hand-set, tiny-font records of debates over suffrage. (One North Carolinian prefaced a
disquisition on electoral districts by pledging to make his case “with the utmost brevity,
consistent with perspecuity.” 10 Thousands of words later, his motion failed.) For these
6
Rodgers, at 144.
See Scalia, 8-19. Scalia was able to include Ohio and Louisiana as well.
8
Merrill D. Peterson, Democracy, Liberty, and Property: The State Constitutional Conventions ofthe
1820s (1966). Peterson’s book is an edited collection of excerpts from the conventions of Massachusetts in
1820-21, New York in 1821, and Virginia in 1829-1830.
G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions (1998). See especially Chapter Four, “Nineteenth-
Century State Constitutionalism.”
10
See Proceedings and Debates ofthe Convention ofNorth-Carolina, Called to Amend the Constitution of
the State, 1835 (1836), at 358. The speaker was Mr. Gaston of Craven.
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reasons, I canno, claim that wha, is offered here is a comprehensive or systematic content
analysis, but I have found and captured revealing fragments in each state's proceedings.
In terms of the questions posed above, looking for discussions of suffrage
practices in that “flood of talk” is a frustrating experience but also an illuminating one.
There is page after page of profound debate over suffrage theory and the merits of
various formal restrictions and qualifications and restrictions. Bu, there is relatively little
specific discussion of election administration, or of local control and responsibility, set in
the context of twentieth-century scholarly concepts like centralization, bureaucratic
capacity, and the state. On the broader questions which inspire and motivate this
dissertation, however - connections between Americans' more abstract ideas about
voting rights and aggregate voting behavior and their specific voting practices - there is a
good deal of fascinating material.
For my causal inquiry into why local administration survived this period - even as
state legislators asserted their control over formal qualifications - one ideal kind of data
would be “smoking gun” debates in which delegates wrestled with the merits and
disadvantages of local administration of elections and argued over whether the state
should take over. For better or worse, such debates did not occur. Even as they engaged
in what remain some of the most searching, contentious disputes over the nature and
purpose of voting in the country’s history, American political elites did not seriously
consider removing effective control of electoral practices from local hands.
But a stronger conclusion also emerges from these conventions. I believe that the
hyper-federalized American system of election administration was essentially constructed
by state governments during this period. This was not a time of change: by and large,
152
prev.ous practices continued. But local control over suffrage practices did not simply
survive these conventions: it was effectively strengthened and endorsed by state
lawmakers, albeit in mostly-tacit ways. After exploring materials from each convention.
I explain that interpretation at the close of this section.
a- In the town where he resides:” Massachusetts, 1820-1821.
One of the most prominent questions facing Massachusetts constitution-drafters in
the fall and winter of 1820 was whether to maintain, alter, or scrap the state’s current
freehold qualification. A motion to “abolish all pecuniary qualification for electors”
passed a preliminary vote in the Massachusetts convention." Once serious debate began,
the very first comment regarded variation and “difficulties” in administration of the
current property test, which allowed those owning property worth two hundred dollars to
vote: “what property have you? Have you the tools of any trade? Yes. What else? A
pair of steers my father gave me.” 12 Inflation - “the change in the value of money” -
added to the difficulty, as another delegate said in arguing that “experience had shown
the impolicy” of the current freehold test. 13 This delegate - a Mr. Austin of Boston -
showed some sympathy for the pressures placed on the local officials who had to
interpret and apply the rules. Since hardworking laborers and seamen were supposed to
be excluded unless they owned physical property worth two hundred dollars - which
most did not - and since “an honest poor man who paid his debts” was excluded while “a
fraudulent man . . . who owed more than he was worth” was included, the freehold test
1
1
Journal ofDebates and Proceedings in the Convention ofDelegates, Chosen to Revise the Constitution
ofMassachusetts, 1820-1821 (1853), 246.
12
Id., 246.
13
Id., 252.
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“tended to throw suspicion of unfairness on the municipal authority .” 14 Later, another
delegate agreed, saying the test “had been frequently the means of raising ill blood and
producing confusion.” 15 This makes clear that while the formal rule may have been
established at the state level, local interpretation and enforcement was widely regarded as
crucial.
In another area, delegates revealed little confidence in local officials’ ability to
protect the franchise. Voters in many states were using ballots by this period, but these
debates show that they were by no means secret ballots. This is made clear in debates
over whether the property qualification should be scrapped. Seamen, a Mr. Thorndike
told the convention, “scatter a great deal of money and do not save enough to make them
voters under the constitution.” Their votes “ought not be received,” he argued, since
“[t]hey were the votes of their owners.” 16 Another delegate argued that “a rich man in a
populous town might command the votes of men without any property.” 17
It is worth reiterating a point made above, in Chapter Two: the key property and
tax records were at this time usually kept locally . 18 The motion on the floor at one point
in the Massachusetts convention proposed “that every citizen of the Commonwealth who
is subject to pay and does pay taxes in the town where he resides . . . shall have the right
14
Id., 252.
15
Id., 256. Much later in debate, a Mr. Lincoln argued that “it was necessary to make some change in the
qualification of voters to conform to the alteration adopted respecting the union of towns for the choice of
representatives.” I am unsure of the meaning of this statement - presumably, he refers either to
reapportionment or redistricting in choosing state representatives. At any rate, he seems to state explicitly
that prior to this date, qualifications varied considerably between towns. Id., at 556.
16
Ma., at 253.
17
Id., at 248.
18
See Chapter Two, 19-20.
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to vote in the election of public officers of this Commonwealth .” 19 This was made still
more clear in debates over moving to a taxpayer test, rather than a freehold qualification,
in Massachusetts. For example, one delegate argued that the tax rolls were an inaccurate
and inadequate measure of the citizenry. Surely we all know, he said, “that there are
persons in every town, who are never put into a tax bill, because the town officers know
very well that no tax could be collected from them.”20 And in a later debate, delegates
quarreled over whether the qualifying tax had to be paid in the same town “where the
vote was offered.”21 Some state taxes were levied at this time, and Daniel Webster was
among those who argued that a tax paid “to the Commonwealth” should be the
standard
.
22
But others hoped “we should not always have to pay a Commonwealth tax,”
and the final version settles on “any state or county tax,” assessed “in any town or district
of this Commonwealth .”23 (This debate was repeated in New York, where one delegate
said that defining the franchise by payment of a state tax was risky, since “[t]here might
be a time when no state tax would be necessary,” perhaps “when the great canal was
finished.” “Would gentlemen have no voters in such halcyon days?”24)
The residency requirement would also be administered by local officials, and this
too occasioned a good deal of debate, set in a close understanding of local governance.
19
Journal ofDebates and Proceedings, at 257 (emphasis added). Later, another delegate moved an
amendment requiring that “the tax be assessed in some town in the Commonwealth.” Id., 52 1
.
20
Journal ofDebates and Proceedings
,
at 256.
21
Id., 553.
22
Id., 553.
23
Id., 553, 618.
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Reports ofthe Proceedings and Debates ofthe New York Constitutional Convention of 1821 (1821)
(1970), at 286.
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Residence, opined Mr. Leland of Roxbury, “would be a question of fact to be determined
by the selectmen;” a short, six-month standard would be easiest for them, since they
could simply use “the taxes assessed in May” for proof.25 A delegate from Dracut argued
that farm workers often came into the state in spring for a six-month period and “were
taxed in May for the whole year,” and should therefore be allowed to vote. 26 But a Mr.
Saltonstall disagreed, pointing to “the evil” known in those town where “hundreds of
men” came from New Hampshire in the spring “and voting in our elections, just after
they have voted in the elections in their own state. 27
Saltonstall then used this evocative language: “Requiring a year’s residence in the
Commonwealth was reasonable, in order that we may know them and that they may
become domiciliated.”28 Whether Saltonstall’s “we” referred to those delegates who
were also local officials, or to the citizenry at large, “in order that we may know them” is
a striking illustration ofjust how personal and “local” American understandings of the
franchise were in the early nineteenth century.
b. “Those scenes of iniquity and perjury:” New York, 1821.
Even by the high standards of prolixity established by its peers, the New York
convention of 1821 was remarkable, at least in terms of the suffrage. Focusing mostly on
the property test and whether black men should be allowed to vote, the delegates
repeatedly delivered speeches which took hours, if not entire afternoons. The main
25
Journal ofDebates and Proceedings, at 554.
26
Id., 555.
27
Id., 555.
28
Id.
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debate lasted about ten days; the text runs over 1 10 pages, and in any modem book would
fill at least twice as many. 2’ Their resolution was suitably complex, a halfway step
toward universal male suffrage that allowed white men to qualify either by paying a state
or county tax, perform,
„g militia or fireman duty, or working on the highways, provided
they met residency tests - which, in turn, varied depending on which of the above
contributions earned a man the franchise. A property test survived for black men,
however. 30
As in Massachusetts, many comments about suffrage qualifications were linked to
specific characteristics of life in New York. Several speakers desenbed the growth of
population in the “western parts,” and the popularity there of buying houses by “contract”
- a kind of lease-to-own arrangement - rather than by formal deed. The “industrious and
valuable citizens” holding such contracts, however, were unjustly barred from voting
under the freehold test. 31 Another delegate’s list of reasons for an expanded suffrage
includes the establishment of a “common school fund,” and “the diffusion of education”
that it would make possible. But the key factor was that “farmers will always out number
all other portions of our population.” Granted, he argued, New York City’s population is
increasing rapidly, but “it is not to be doubted that the agricultural population will
increase in the same proportion,” keeping the city population at about one tenth of the
29 rr
See Reports ofthe Proceedings and Debates ofthe New York Constitutional Convention of 1821 ( 1821)
(1970), 178-291. In Peterson’s Democracy, Liberty’, and Property
,
for example, the excerpts regarding the
property qualification are taken from only ten to twelve pages of the 1821 Reports and Proceedings, but fill
almost thirty pages in Peterson’s book.
Const. ofN.Y., Art. II, §1, reprinted in Reports and Proceedings, at 661.
31
Reports and Proceedings, at 216.
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state’s total. The ’’mobs” of the city, even in their worst “depredations” on property,
were unlikely to “traverse our immense territory, and invade the farm, and despoil the
property of the landholders....”33
Delegates clearly understood, and occasionally remarked upon, variations within
the existing systems of election administration. The property qualification, one argued
had always been an odious feature in the constitution;” and as it would “bear away with
it a vast proportion of the peijuries, slanders, &c. that had often disgraced our elections,
he hoped it would be abolished.”34 Those “peijuries” were presumably the oaths as to
property value that electors swore to local officials. Earlier, another delegate also
criticized the existing system, and hinted that local election officials lacked any kind of
list to help them determine who was qualified: “entering them in a register,” he argued,
would make us able to test the qualification of electors, without resorting to the
multiplication of oaths, which other the present constitution had grown into a most
corrupting and alarming evil.”35
As in other states, New York’s debates reveal that even though many voters were
using ballots by the 1 820s, that did not mean votes were secret. Apparently most
elections were by ballot: discussing a constitutional provision requiring the ballot, one
delegate observed that those “now elected, viva voce, are so few, being only the road
masters and fence viewers....”36 A ballot requirement was eventually adopted, “except
32
Records, 242.
33
Id., 242.
34
Id., 284.
35
Id., 180.
36
Id., at 205.
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for such town officers, as may by law be directed to be otherwise chosen .”37
Nevertheless, convention delegates repeatedly assumed that votes were not pnvate. For
example, a Colonel Young argued against allowing black men to vote, contending that
the ballot would be “unsafe in their hands,” since “[tjheir vote would be at the call of the
richest purchaser.”35 Later, another speaker talked about the possibility of “buying, or
otherwise unduly influencing” the votes of the “manufacturing population.”39 In a clever
rhetoncal turn, one delegate named Buel exploited the lack of secret ballots to answer
two sets of critics of an expanded suffrage at once - those who feared votes would be
bought, and those who foresaw a takeover by the unpropertied rabble. “[I]f the rich
control the votes of the poor,” Buel argued, “the result cannot be unfavourable to the
security of property."40 For my purposes, what is most important about Buel’s adroitness
is the part that he does not emphasize but takes for granted: voting must have been public
if one man could buy another's vote, and local contexts therefore must have been quite
important.
It must be said, however, that throughout the New York convention records one
gets a very strong sense that the delegates understood the franchise - at least its crucial
formal definitions and qualifications - to be a state matter. The national Constitution
and, particularly, the laws and practices of other states are discussed regularly
.
41
But
See N.Y. Const. Of 1821, Art. II, §4 (reprinted in Reports and Proceedings, at 661.)
Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the New York Constitutional Convention of 1821, at 191.
Young also averred that “[t]he minds of the blacks are not competent to vote. They are too much degraded
to estimate the value, or exercise with fidelity and discretion that important right.” Id.
39
Id., 280-281.
40
Id., 243.
One interesting passage revealed that the New Yorkers knew ofNew Jersey’s experience of female
voters, made possible because of local interpretations of the word “inhabitants” in the state’s 1776
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New York - not the U.S., and not individual counties or towns - is the political unit most
speakers are concerned with. The ‘•right of suffrage.” argued one delegate, “should be
regulated only by the will of the people of this state.” and no, by the “general
government” in Washington
.
42
Indeed, one of the most impressive speeches in the convenhon was delivered by
Martin Van Buren, focusing on state-level analysis. The student of American political
development who wishes to understand how Van Buren became so influential learns a
great deal in these pages. With most of his colleagues sounding like a comb,nation of
Renatssance political philosopher and preacher. Van Buren sounds like a latter-day
political strategist and policy wonk as he anchors this oration - whtch appears to have
taken up most of a Tuesday - in census and tax data. Arguing for a taxpayer test to
replace the freehold. Van Buren points to “data, to be obtained in the comptroller’s
office,” showing that the state’s taxable personal property amounts to about a third of the
state’s total taxable wealth. That property, however, was “not now directly represented in
any branch” of the legislature because of the freehold qualification. Second, he turned to
census data to argue that keeping a freehold test for senate electors would effectively
constitution. See Chute, The First Liberty, at 289-290. In fact, the passage is particularly striking because
it reveals the vast distance between our approach to suffrage and that of the early nineteenth century A
Colonel Young argued that “[i]f that is that natural, inherent right to vote, which some gentlemen have
urged, it ought to be further extended. In New-Jersey, females were formerly allowed to vote; and on that
principle, you must admit negresses as well as negroes to participate in the right of suffrage.” Reports of
the Proceedings and Debates ofthe New York Constitutional Convention of 1821, at 191.
This delegate argued against a generic, vaguely-worded taxpayer test, since if a man paid a national tax
but no state tax, he would thereby gain the suffrage, and the national government would thereby “have the
power of conferring the right of suffrage.” Id., 202. He did not make clear whether he had a specific
national tax in mind.
160
disenfranchise 75,000 of the state’s 163,000 electors, because they owned only personal
property and not real estate. 43
At the same time, there are strong hints toward an answer to the causal question
identified above: where did the local administration of American elections come from?
Has it survived the centuries accidentally, unseen and underfoot, or is its past more
purposeful? At least one debate directly suggests the latter answer. Though the final fate
of this proposal eludes me - it passed an early vote, then disappears from view for a long
time, and did not make it into the final constitution - there is some evidence here that
local administration of elections was actively constructed by state governments in this
period. Voter registration lists, compiled locally, were proposed: the legislature would be
mandated or encouraged to require “each town and ward” to make “a register of all
citizens entitled to the right of suffrage.”44 Debate was short but intense. One delegate
urged the measure as conducive to “peace and quietness at the polls,” and to counteract
those scenes of iniquity and peijury that had been often witnessed with pain, and which
had a powerful tendency to sap the foundation of morals, and the principles ofjustice.”
Opponents, however, argued that the “tribunal” compiling such a list would effect “a
modification of the elective franchise,” something beyond the power of any official. 45
While fragmentary, these are striking and revealing claims. They tell us that
delegates were quite aware of local variations in the interpretation and application of
suffrage law; that at least some regarded that uncertainty and variation not only as a
problem, but as one which could “sap the foundation of morals;” and that the proposed
43
Id., 257. Van Buren’s speech runs from 255-265.
44
Id., 203.
45
Id, 203.
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solution was to be implemented no, by state government, bu, by local officials,
occur in 1 82 1 , but in the long run, of course, that was precisely what happened.
It did not
c. The pride of the men of the mountains ”
lowlands:” Virginia, 1829-1830.
the “metropolitan honors of the
Virginia's eastern landowning elite held disproportionate political power in the
state, and westerners sough, the 1829-1830 convention as a way of expanding their
influence. But new suffrage requirements granting the vote to those owning property
worth a lesser value tended to help easterners most; only minor changes in apportionment
mean, westerners got little that they hoped for. Only in the state's next constitutional
convention,
,ha, of
.850-1851, did western political power finally increase.*6 Merrill
Peterson estimates that when the 1830 constitution was ratified, two-thirds of the state's
white men could vote, a “modest expansion of the franchise [which] had no significant
effect on the politics and government of the Old Dominion.”47
While Peterson is unsparing in his descriptions of how white supremacy shaped
Virginia s convention, he also has fulsome praise for the overall quality of the
proceedings. “As an exhibition of political theory in the thick context of practical
political life,” he writes, “the Virginia debates of 1829-1830 are unexcelled in American
political discourse. 8 They are also unexcelled in volume, running to over 900 tiny-font
pages. Here the voluble New Yorkers met their match: Virginians apparently knew that
“all eyes were fixed upon” their convention, as the publishers of the Proceedings and
Scalia, America 's Jeffersonian Experiment, at 12-13.
47
Peterson, Democracy Liberty, and Property, at 281.
Id 285. On racism, see, for example, id. at 281, on how “the logic of democracy thus led to the doctrine
ot white supremacy....”
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Deba‘eS PU ‘ “* 3nd n°ne Wan,ed t0 waste his turn
.
49
Remarkable debates about
representatton, rights and privileges, and the philosophy of self-rule ensued, as one might
expect from a convention featunng James Mad,son, John Marshall, and Join, Randolph,
among many other luminaries.
What Peterson called the “thick context of practical political life," however, did
no, include much discussion of local electoral contexts or suffrage administration. In
fact, one striking charactenstic of the many sections of the Proceed,,
n
gs dealing with
voting is their highly theoretical cast, even compared to other conventions. One
encounters a great deal of learning and a deep frame of reference as speakers wrestle with
“whether [suffrage] is a natural, social, civil, or political right,”50 among other questions.
Delegates quote from Shakespeare and Alexander Pope; invoke “the genius of Locke,
and Sydney, and Milton;” and refer to Solon, classical Athens, the Roman republic, and
Caesar . 51 But there is relatively little about how elections were run, and about what
people actually did when they voted. Suffrage debates are set in the vivid political
context of Virginia life, and arguments about representation often hang on specific ideas
about the lives and experiences of those to be represented. (There is a splendid passage
in which John Randolph mocks the authority of Jefferson by telling the story ofhow
Jefferson designed an elegant plow, lovely to look at, and honored by the French as the
Proceed,ngs and Debates ofthe Virginia Slate Convention, of1829-1830 ( 1 830), at Hi. The volume has
no Table of Contents or Index whatsoever; in reading il I have started from the dozen or so passages
excerpted in Peterson. 6
50
Id., at 411.
See for example, id., at 363, where Mr. Nicholas refers to the “ancient republic of Athens, and some of
the other Grecian states;” at 54, on Locke; at 157, on “the days of Solon [and] those of George
Washington, and at 532, where John Randolph talked of how the framers had been able to “snatch a grace
beyond the reach of art;” Peterson, at 429 n.31, tells us this line comes from Pope’s Essay on Criticism
;
and
533, where Randolph speaks of Caesar and Brutus.
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“mould-board of least resistance" - but no good to plow with. 52) But by and large,
premises about political identity are either about class - in lengthy and repeated debates
over reducing the property test - or, most often, regional references, because debates
over representation and apportionment especially were very much about the ways of life
of eastern and western whites in Virginia. We read of the “Back-Woods vote” and the
“hardy peasantry of the mountains;”53 of the “poor men of the East;”54 of the “pride of the
men of the mountains” and the “metropolitan honors of the lowlands;” of “the growing
influence of wealth, numbers, and intelligence in the West, and a returning sense of
justice and equality in the East .”55 Somewhat less often, another defining characteristic
of political “circumstances” in the state come up: that “(n]early half the population are in
bondage
- yes, Sir, more than half in the country below the Ridge.”56
But there is relatively little about towns and counties. We know that county
governance was strong - and was a salient issue in the convention - because the county
court system in particular was controversial. Westerners apparently detested it, but
eastern elites like Randolph “considered the County Court system, and the freehold
Suffrage, as the two main pillars in the ancient edifice of our State Constitution.”57
Counties appear in voting disputes, however, most often as pawns in apportionment
52
Id., at 533.
53
Id., at 156, 158.
54
Id., at 167.
55
Id., at 665, 664.
56
Id., at 318.
57
Id., 532; one debate on the County Courts is at 526-530 and 532-535.
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baules. Debates over districts became fights over which counties would go where: by
January of 1 830, hours were spent in dueling motions movtng count.es among distncts. 58
As elsewhere, the Virginia debates show that many of the relevant taxes were
collected locally. This emerges in a d,sparaging speech against a taxpayer test, as a
delegate named Nicholas mocks the idea that a man who pays “four cents upon a horse,”
or “a poor rate and county levy” has shown any “interest in the community”59 Earlier, in
a debate over how to proportionately connect taxation and representation in the
legislature, one delegate remarked on the range and complexity of different kinds of state
and county taxes - for example, on auctions, salt, and (referring to a recent Supreme
Court ruling, presumably the 1 796 case Hylton v. US.) carriages. 60 Another debate made
clear that the apportionment of state levies was more contentious, however, particularly
in terms of slaves, which were of course some of the most valuable “property” in the
state.
61
In one key area, the Virginia convention ofl 829- 1830 made a crucial
contribution to the history of American suffrage practices. Virginia’s famous 1776 Bill
of Rights made no mention of /tow votes were to be cast. 62 But the constitution adopted
in 1830 changed that: “[i]n all elections in this Commonwealth ... the votes shall be
58
See, e.g., id. at 845-847.
59
Id., 366.
Id., 180, see Hylton v. United States, 3 Dali. 171 (1796). Hylton required the Court to determine
whether a tax levied on carriages by Congress in 1794 was a direct tax - in which case it should have been
apportioned according to each state’s population - or an indirect tax, which need not be apportioned. The
Court determined that the tax was indirect. Hylton is important not only because it dealt with the
politically-sensitive matter of taxation, but also because it was the first case in which the Court at least
implicitly acted as if it could judge the constitutionality of federal statutes.
61
Id., 169.
62
Reprinted id., at 895.
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gtven openly, or viva voce
,
and not by ballot.”" At least one delegate launched a spinted
defense of viva voce voting, which he understood as part and parcel of a system of
properly-limited suffrage. It is one of the best articulations I have seen of the theory of
public voting, and deserves quoting at length. In those states that have expanded the
suffrage, a Mr. Leigh argued,
the ballot has been substituted for the old method of voting viva voce on theavowed principle, that it is necessary to enable the voter to give his vote withm ependence, that he should be allowed to vote secretly. Now the introduction of theballot
. .
.
is a plain distinct acknowledgement, that the Right of Suffrage is extendedtoo far - extended to men who cannot be expected to give an independent vote
openly, in the face ofday - to men liable to the influence of others, and desirous to
conciliate their favour.... It is a very odd expedient for cherishing the politicalindependence of the citizen, to take away all occasion for the exercise of it....”'„64
Another delegate disagreed, but felt it necessary to concede that he too preferred “the
VlVa VOCe mode of voting, but I am not prepared ... to pronounce an anathema upon the
other. We should, at least, pause and reflect well before we condemn a practice adopted
by many of our sister republics,” he argued. But, he hastened to add, “there [is] no
affinity between the question of the extension of Suffrage and the mode of voting.”65 A
decade earlier, remember, New York had required ballots in all state elections, but among
Virginians there does not seem to have been serious interest in using paper — or in
enabling voters to shield their votes from the ears and eyes of their neighbors.
d. “The love which gentlemen have for the people and the people’s rights:”
North Carolina, 1835.
63
Reprinted id., at 900.
64
Id., at 406.
65
Id. at 4 17.
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As in Virginia, Western calls for more political influence sparked the 1 835 North
Carolina constitutional convent,on,“ but again, westerners generally did not get what
they wanted. North Carolina’s political system, like that of its northern neighbor, was
dommated by a d.sproportionately influential eastern slavehold.ng population. Easterners
came out of the 1835 convention with their power largely intact, although new systems of
representation did slightly increase western power. 67 I find in the convention’s records
little direct discussion of election administration, but the proceedings do help us
understand the character of nineteenth-century ideas about popular sovereignty, offering
several telling glimpses into ideas about representation, taxation, and voting itself.
In one discussion of electoral reform we find a clear echo of Madison’s concern
for the local intrigues possible in small election districts. But this time, a delegate named
Gaston came to a different conclusion, arguing that breaking large counties into single-
member districts would be preferable. “When in a county, there are a number of
candidates, they form combinations and enter into intrigues” - “’You run me in your end
of the county, and I will press your claims in my neighborhood.’”68 Enabling the
legislature to divide counties into districts would “afford[] the best opportunity of having
a full expression of the public voice” - not only because those in the west would increase
their representation, but also because thousands of voters who might lose an election in a
large county and thereby have no representation would improve their chances at selecting
66
For example, see Proceedings and Debates ofthe Convention ofNorth-Carolina, Called to Amend the
Constitution ofthe State, 1835 (1836), at 359, where one delegate “presumed every gentleman on that floor
would admit, that if the counties in the East had equalled, in size and population, those of the West, no
Convention would ever have been demanded.” See also Laura J. Scalia, America ’s Jeffersonian
Experiment, at 13.
67
Id. For more background on North Carolina’s 1835 convention, see Chapter Four.
68
Proceedings and Debates ofthe Convention ofNorth-Carolina, Called to Amend the Constitution ofthe
State, 1835 (1836), at 359.
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a leg, slater. »’ While there is nothing expliei, here about specifically local admin,station
Of elections, it is an important statement of the instrumental dimension ofpopular
sovereignty and the existence of local interests. Meanwhile, the speech seems to show
that while state governments were perfectly comfortable in breaking up the slate into
small electoral units - here, telling counties and townships how to choose their
representatives - they had no visible interest in interfering in how those localities actually
ran elections.
A more constitutive side of the debate emerges in the comments of opponents.
Smaller districts would “amay neighbor against neighbor,” bringing about some of the
evil consequences” of Borough Elections - “the warmth of feeling and strife
engendered.” Another opponent compared the results to “the feuds of the Montagues and
Capulets,” “angry passions” setting “friend against friend .”70 These delegates debated
representation with a sharp concern for the impact of elections on political life as
experienced in local conditions.
The local nature of taxation also appeared in debates over districting. Faced with
the question of how often to redistrict, delegates revealed that population and taxation
worked together in determining apportionment - with the latter appearing to determine
composition of the state Senate. Debate centered not on whether ten years or twenty was
the best interval for reapportionment, but over which types of taxation should determine
districts. One delegate argued that the average of a county’s tax contribution should
determine its Senatorial representation, rather than its taxes in a given year. Otherwise,
69
Id., 358.
A third said that of the then-twenty-four states in the Union, only Louisiana - where “the country [being]
so cut up by swamps” made it necessary - used such small districts. Id., 362-363.
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“a few wealthy men in a small county, in order to obtain a Senator, might join together
and put up a Billiard Table or two ....”71 A colleague took the remark quite seriously,
agreeing that more “permanent” sources of revenue like the “land-tax and poll-tax" ought
to determine Senatorial representation, rather than what was raised “from Billiard Tables
[and] Natural Curiosities.” Another delegate made a striking comment regarding local
property, taxation, and representation. His county's voters wanted reapportionment soon,
since they were about to gain a great deal of property: “the land in [my] county,” he
noted, “is at present principally owned by Indians,” but in a few years it would “become
the property of the citizens,” who expected as a result to win more power in the state
Senate
.
72
Representation and the nature of elections also surfaced in debates over a motion
proposing shifting from legislative to popular selection of the Governor. One delegate
worried that voters at large would be very unlikely to have any real acquaintance with the
candidates, whereas Assemblymen were presumably able to greet and question them
personally. He noted the repulsive specter of a popular election in neighboring
Tennessee, where “two Candidates were traveling through the State on an electioneering
campaign, at expense and trouble to themselves, and to the great annoyance of the
People.” Another opponent imagined campaigns infecting the politics of the state with
partisanship at every level: “we shall soon have our Grand Central Committees, District
Committees, County Committees, and Captain’s Company Committees,” each of which
would bring the “freemen of the State
. . . into a general array against each other.”
Id., 158.
72
Id., 158-159.
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Eventually, however, “the love which gentlemen have for the people and the people’s
nghts” won out, and the motion for popular election passed. 73
A final glimpse into ideas about voting practices comes in debate over whether to
compel the Assembly to vote viva voce when choosing militia officers and justices of the
peace. Some speakers restncted their analysis to voting in the legislature, but others
clearly did not. For example, one delegate “believed the vote by ballot was introduced,
when voters were kept from voting publicly for fear of the merchant’s books, for they
were in debt," but that had no bearing on the legislature. Another argued that voting by
ballot “was productive of prevarication and deception,” since one could not ascertain
another’s vote with certainty. But others supported voice votes in the Assembly, even if
they “did not wish to see this practice introduced into our elections generally,” as one
man put it. The motion succeeded by a two-to-one margin. 74
e. “Clear and apparent as a sunbeam:” Iowa, 1844.
We have limited data from the Iowa conventions of 1844 and 1846. The first was
necessary to get Iowa into the Union, but the proposed constitution was defeated by
popular vote in 1845, mostly because Congress had reduced the territory’s size in
offering it statehood. The latter convention was quite short and made only minor
changes prior to re-submitting the constitution to popular vote, which this time
succeeded. As the Iowa political scientist Benjamin F. Shambaugh explains in
73
Id., at 332, 340.
74
Id., at 181, 180, 179, 181.
See Benjamin F. Shambaugh, ed., Fragments of The Debates ofthe Iowa Constitutional Conventions of
1844 and 1846 ( 1900), at 260-266, 276-313, reprinting various opinion pieces explaining why the 1844
Constitution failed. For discussion of the two conventions more generally, see Scalia, America 's
Jeffersonian Experiment, at 17.
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introducing his edited colieet.on of press commentaries on the conventions, convention
part, c,pants kept no official records, and no “Madison's Journal" has come to light, 76
That means we are essenttally at the mercy of two add.tional
“filters" - the Iowa press
decided what was newsworthy at the time, and Shambaugh extracted only what he found
significant from their coverage. Still, most of the excerpts are long and detailed -
remarkably so, considering that they were first published in newspapers. Stylistically,
they are indistinguishable from the more official records of other states.
Shambaugh chooses selections from the Iowa Standard and the Iowa Capital
Reporter for both the 1844 and 1846 conventions. Clearly, voting was an important topic
in 1 844: one of the appointed standing committees dealt with “Suffrage and Citizenship,”
and three days later a delegate introduced a resolution “that provision be made so that in
all elections in the State oflowa, the will of the majority shall control.”77 A few days
later, the report of the Suffrage and Citizenship committee was taken up. That report
itself is not reprinted, but discussion yielded a number of interesting fragments with
regard to suffrage practices and local administration.
First, one delegate moved to require that all elections be held viva voce. This
failed; the convention instead endorsed the report’s recommendation that all elections
shall be by ballot.” (Interestingly, the convention apparently struggled to agree on
whether the General Assembly itself should vote by ballot or voice, as well. 78) Next, a
76
Shambaugh, at Hi. Unfortunately, the volume has neither a detailed Table of Contents nor an Index, so a
student of the Iowa conventions is left to read and skim about four hundred pages.
77
Shambaugh, ed., at 9, 20. The resolution was “laid over.” (The material cited in notes 7-12 are from the
Iowa Standard.)
Id., at 214. Here a newspaper editorial complains that in one place the document stipulates that
Assembly members vote viva voce, while another passage has them voting by ballot.
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delegate named O'Brien proposed that any “foreigners” who had lived in iowa for three
years and declared the intention to become citizens be permitted to vote - only for state
Representattves and County officers™ his county, O'Brien explained, un-na,ura,ized
men had been subject to a poll tax
,
80
and had therefore asked for the vote. White male
immigrants in Illinois, he pointed out, could vote after six months with an oath, and the
same should suffice in Iowa. But opponents worried about the national Const.tution,
which stipulated that those who voted for the more numerous branch of the state
legislature must be allowed to vote for President and V,ce-President as well, and the
motion failed. Nevertheless, two years later one newspaper praised the convention
simply for debating the measure, calling it "progress [for] the principle of universal
suffrage .”82
The date of elections came up next. After short debate, the General Elections
were moved from August - harvest time - to October, despite the arguments of those
who called October a “time of sickness.”83 Weeks later, an intriguing glimpse into the
conduct of elections emerged in discussion of“County Organization.” The relevant
committee had urged that sheriffs be limited to two terms, and some objected along
familiar let-the-people-vote lines. But one advocate of the restriction “thought that the
patronage and influence of the Sheriff might become such as to interfere with the
79
Id., 44.
Tha t is, a “head tax,” or a tax not linked to property value. In Iowa, as in other states, discussion of the
advisability of “poll taxes” was frequently not linked at all to voting.
81
Id., 44-47.
82
Id., 341-342.
83
Id., 56.
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eedom of elections. The delegate did not elaborate - the two-term restriction
but he could well have meant that election administration
,
and not just voters’
choices
,
would be distorted.
Finally, one comment in an 1845 speech to the Territorial Legislature on re-
submitting the constitution for popular ratification (after it failed the firs, time) reveals
unequivocally that such a vote would be locally administered. Rhetorically,
representative Wilson asks “have we a right to order polls to be opened in the different
counties, townships and precincts, and compel the judges of said elect,on there to receive
votes Tor' and ‘against the constitution.'!?]" Yes, he replies: “we have not only the right
but ... it is perfectly clear and apparent as a sunbeam ,”85
I take some license in using this phrase - which is italicized in the official record
- as the title of this section. Context makes clear that Wilson was focusing not on a
controversy over whether the state could order localities to hold elections, but on the
question of re-submitting the constitution for popular ratification. Nevertheless, his
specific description of how the vote would be held is meaningful. Wilson repeats it later,
saying the question before the assembly comes down to “shall this Legislature give them
the opportunity’ ofvoting on this change, by causing polls to be opened in each township
or precinct throughout the TerritoryVu
Clearly, the Iowa delegates were quite aware of and concerned about the national
aspect of suffrage - that their state’s formal franchise qualifications should not violate
Id. 153. A later critic of the constitution focused on the county and township officers who would not be
elected, but made no reference to the conduct of elections themselves. Id. at 358.
85
Id., at 299. Emphasis in original.
Id., 306. Emphasis in original. The territorial Governor’s official proclamation of Iowa’s entry into the
Union referred to the general election held ... in all the organized counties....” Id., at 371.
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national standards. This is not sutpnstng, given that the punxtse of Iowa's convention
was to write a constitution so that the tetri,ory could become a State. Second, one gets a
strong sense from these pages that issues like the state’s borders, banking system,
separate of powers, and the salaries of vanous officials were far more important than
both formal questtons of defining the franchise and practtcal questions of how votes were
to be cast. But whether or no, it was Wilson’s explicit point, there is also a third truth,
audible in his “clear and apparent” language: the infrastructure of voting was local, and
that fact was as plain and unobjectionable as sunlight to lawmakers.
f. Conclusion.
There is a broader way in which the “clear as a sunbeam” passage is important.
Few though they may be, I believe that such explicit references to election practices in
these convention records mark the ways that local administrative control over elections in
the U.S. was in a sense constructed in this period. To be sure, the first lesson one gets
from these materials is that the early nineteenth-century conventions are fundamentally
about state control over franchise qualifications. (Indeed, these conventions, like others
in American history, occasionally created new suffrage standards for their own
ratification, as Roger Hoar explained in his 1917 study Constitutional Conventions*1)
Delegates clearly believed that as authors of the state constitution they, along with their
state legislatures, were defining the franchise, and they took that duty seriously.
87
Roger Sherman Hoar, Constitutional Conventions: Their Nature, Powers, and Limitations (1987) (1917),
at 205-213. Hoar lists cases between 1780 and 1868 in which conventions alone, conventions and the
egislature together, and the legislature alone either expanded or restricted the eligible voter pool for
ratification. Id., 206-207. His conclusion is that in the absence of specific restrictions, a convention’s
general authority includes “the date of the election, the election officials,
. . . and even the choice of the
particular electorate who shall be employed by the convention to represent the will of the people.” Id., 213.
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encounter a good deal of evidence of a powerful local dimension lo
suffrage, in various ways - from desenpt.ons of political identity and interest rooted m
specific cultural and economic conditions to blunt statements ofhow votes were
purchased in one’s own town. We can be sure the constitution^ understood that
elections were administered a, the county and municipal levels, no, only because so many
of the delegates were politicians themselves, bu, because they tell us so. In some places,
they worry on, loud about whether local officials bear too much interpretive and
enforcement responsibility.
Bu, they did no, take that responsibility away, and aside from debates over paper
or voice voting, I find not a single instance where they seriously considered doing so. In
fact, in the very act of drafting new standards and rules for who could vote and how votes
were to be cast, the Jacksonian conventions gave new life to local administration.
Certainly municipalities had run elections before. Bu, one way to read these records is as
a serious of interactions between state and local governments. Consider: when delegates
in Massachusetts and North Carolina acknowledged the importance of towns and
counties in assessing taxes and determining residency; when New Yorkers allowed
service as a fireman or highway worker to qualify a man to vote; when New Yorkers and
Virginians alike acknowledged the impact of local pressures on voters, then compelled
votes to be cast on ballots or by voice, respectively; when the Iowans discussed “causing
polls to be opened in each township or precinct;” and when New Yorkers considering
requiring each town and ward” to compile a list of qualified voters, we clearly see a
dialogue between state lawmakers and the local officials who they knew would interpret
and implement voting rules.
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Even as they declared stale control over formal franchise qualifications, then,
constitution-drafters renewed and reasserted local responsibdity for running the voting
process. A modem scholar who hopes to find the language of “centralization,”
“bureaucratic capacity,” and “the state” stated explicitly in these debates over the practice
of Amencan popular soveretgnty will be disappointed. But here we see the local
dimension of suffrage as no ace,dent, bu, rather as a creation - and a conscious creation,
albeit a somewhat-tacit one - of state governments themselves.
"
American Suffrage"
1” AUS 'ralian Ba"°‘ a"d TranSformati°" »f
In The People s Welfare, William J. Novak describes prevailing ideas about
“well-regulated governance” in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America. 88 “In
contrast to the modem ideal of the state as centralized bureaucracy,” Novak writes, “the
well-regulated society emphasized local control and autonomy.”89 While acknowledging
the limits of such sharp lines, Novak marks the end of that regime at 1877, at which point
he argues that the “modem ideal” - the centralized “liberal state” - took over. Novak
does not incorporate voting into his analysis, but I believe the history of American
suffrage practices - in Chapter Two and in the above discussion of the Jacksonian
conventions - confirms his account of the earlier period. Next, I analyze a refomi which
spread with truly remarkable speed among the states of the U.S. in the second and third
decades of Lukas’ “modem” era: the Australian ballot. The Australian-ballot reforms
88
William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (1996)
generally, and particularly at 237-238.
89
Id., at 237.
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divide U.S. political history neatly in half: about one hundred ten years preceded them,
and about the same number have passed since. Appropnately, the reforms and the
arguments of supporters and opponents suggest a great deal about election practices
before and after.
I certainly do not seek to write a full history of the advent of the collection of
reforms sometimes called “penal-colony reform,” “kangaroo voting,”90 and, most often,
the “Australian ballot.” Eldon Cobb Evans, in 1917, and L.E. Fredman, in 1968, have
already done so in fascinating and comprehensive books. 91 Political scientists such as
Jerrold Rusk, meanwhile, have analyzed the effects of ballot reform on voter behavior. 92
The purpose of this section is to explore the advent of the secret, publicly-produced ballot
from the perspective of local administrative responsibility, and as a study in changing
American ideas about how popular sovereignty would be exercised. A second purpose is
to examine how state lawmakers understood suffrage practices, particularly their local
dimension, and to see how and to what degree local administrative responsibility
survived this penod. For if the Jacksonian era saw important shifts in who was permitted
to vote, the Australian ballot actually wrought a greater transformation in American
voting practices.
Critics tended to use the “penal-colony” and “kangaroo” tags. See Eldon Cobb Evans, A History ofthe
Australian Ballot System in the United States (1917), at 24. For explanation of the spread of the set of
reforms which became known as the Australian ballot, see above, Chapter Two, 36-38.
91
Evans, A History ofthe Australian Ballot System in the United States (1917); L.E. Fredman, The
Australian Ballot: The Story ofan American Reform (1968).
92
See Jerrold Rusk, “Effect of the Australian Ballot on Split-Ticket Voting, 1896-1908,” 64 American
Political Science Review 1220 (1970).
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Slates did not even begin to keep good records of legislative proceedings until the
end of the nineteenth cental and acquiring those records front the penod in question
has proven outs.de the scope of the present project. Instead, I draw on a range of
pamphlets and secondary materials in an effort to learn how reformers and state
lawmakers thought about suffrage practices.
In the language I’ve used above, Australian-ballot reformers believed they were
enhancing the exercise of American popular sovereignty in both instrumental and
constitutive ways, both better measuring the will of the voters and elevating the character
of their voting practices. 1 reach three central conclusions with regard to the Australian
ballot’s effects on the local dimension of suffrage. First, reform was clearly designed to
limit the impact of local contexts
- particularly when those contexts contained cash and
coercion - on voters’ choices. Second, these refomis marked a major expansion of the
state role in election administration, with a corresponding diminution in the range of
discretionary and interpretive authority in local hands. This change was greater than I
had understood. Local officials still ran elections, but did so as agents of state
government, to a degree that was almost entirely new in American voting. Third,
however, state lawmakers stopped far short of eliminating local responsibility. State
governments obviously decreed new rules for running elections, in a way that was
fundamentally new. But those rules are aimed at county and municipal governments,
with state officials themselves taking on relatively little practical responsibility.
Therefore, the Australian-ballot reforms ultimately serve as another paradoxical example
93
See Scalia, America 's Jeffersonian Experiment
,
at 173 n. 18.
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Of state lawmakers constructing our local system of elec,ton administration - by asserting
state control over suffrage practices.
a. “A Closet of Prayer:” The Individualization of American Suffrage.
In a 1996 poem, “My Ancestress and the Secret Ballot,” Australian Les Murray
contrasted the violence of nineteenth-centu^ Scottish elections with the peaceful suffrage
of the Australian colonies. In Scotland, “a corpse stains the dus, on voting day;” i„ New
South Wales, “[t]he polling booth will be a closet of prayer ”94 As Mark McKenna
wntes, the unmistakable religious overtones of Murray's language capture important
elements of the ballot-reform movement.
In the previous chapter, I described the instrumental and constitutive implications
of voting practices for popular sovereignty. The bulk of Murray’s poem is about the
more instrumental side of the secret ballot: his ancestor in Scotland was killed “for the
way he was known to vote,” and the poem explains to the dead man’s poverty-stricken
wife how confidential voting will eventually help build the welfare state. But the phrase
“closet of prayer” captures the constitutive transformation ballot reformers sought to
bring about, as well. The phrase’s physical aspect - Americans would now vote in little
closets” - and the silent, reflective, solitary activity it defines were both largely new in
American voting. Secrecy and a common ballot “will encourage the intelligent sentiment
to assert itself,” argued one reformer, because it “protects the voter from intimidation.”95
Quoted m Mark McKenna, “Building ‘a closet of prayer’ in the New World: the story of the Australian
Ballot, London Papers in Australian Studies, No. 6 (2002), at 2-3. For a summary of nineteenth-century
voting reforms in various countries, see generally John H. Wigmore, The Australian Ballot System As
Embodied in the Legislation of Various Countries (1889).
Abram Flexner, The New Ballot Law ofLouisville, Kentucky at work and compared with the
Massachusetts Law (1889), at 10, 9.
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A. the same tune that i, sough, ,o make voting pnva.e, the Austraiian ba„o, tned ,o bring
the individual voter into closer contact with his government and pu, him in more direct
control of the state. For that reason, the Australian ballot should be understood as both a
privatizing and a centralizing influence in American suffrage.
In his comparative analysis of the standardization of voting practices in
democracies, Stein Rokkan argues that in order for a country’s elections to be cons.dered
“essential instruments of legitimation,” “local variations in the arrangements for the
elicitation and recording of choices had to be minimized.” In country after country, he
wntes, the “history of the democratization of the suffrage was paralleled” by
increasing standardization of administrative procedures in all phases of the
electoral process: the establishment of registers; the determination of voting rights-the maintenance of order at the polling stations; the casting of the vote; the recording
of the act in the register; the counting of choices; the calculation of outcomes .”96
Such things are a matter of degree, but in the United States, that level of standardization
in election administration simply had not occurred. Variation in registration rules and
practices, qualifications of voters, ballot design, and counting procedures varied at both
state and local levels through the nineteenth century - indeed, in some ways, into the
twenty-first. On the purposes of Australian-ballot reform, however, Rokkan’s analysis i<
insightful. Rokkan s conclusions in terms of popular sovereignty and localism are
unequivocal: the secret ballot was aimed at reducing the effects of local contexts on
voters, and at enabling the central state to “enter into direct communication”97 with each
voter.
Stein Rokkan et al., Citizens, Elections, and Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study ofthe
Processes ofDevelopment (1970), at 152.
97
Id., at 35.
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As is clear in Jacksonian debates over voter coercion in states like New York and
Virgmia, nineteenth-century American suffrage theory contained some profound
uncertainties. Amencans knew that many voters were subject to unacceptable pressure
under public-voting systems, but they simultaneously believed that “the vote ought to be
open, that each voter ought to be prepared to defend his decision in his day-to-day
environments. Eventually, Rokkan argues, the virtues of openness lost out to the need
for legitimacy, dignity, and an increased “ritual significance” in voting procedures. (The
Australian poet would agree with that language.) Rokkan also describes well an attempt
to diminish what I have called the locally-mediated character of elections, writing that
secrecy represented
a further extension of the tendency for the centralizing nation state to enter intodirect communication with each individual subject and to undeimine all intermedia™powers the essential effect of the secrecy institution is to accentuate the equality of
each voter by isolating him from the hierarchical influences in the local community
I hrough the secrecy provisions the power of the local aristocracy, the notables and
the clergy is further reduced and
. . . the tendencies toward centralization
correspondingly strengthened.”99
As he later puts it,
“the underlying purpose of the introduction of the ballot system was to take the act of
voting out of the regular give and take of day-to-day life and enhance its dignity and
ritual significance by isolating it from the sordid pressures and temptations of an
unequal and divided society.” 100
In secret, the voter becomes “independent of his immediate environment” and acts
exclusively in the abstract role of a citizen.” 101 As one contemporary supporter wrote,
98
Id., at 152.
99
Id., at 35.
100
Id., at 153.
101
Id, at 154; 35.
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it makes every voter directly responsible to himself for his individual actions.” 102
Crenson and Ginsberg agree, concluding that the new ideal “emphasized the solitary and
independent citizen,” rather than collective participation. 103 This analysis fits the secret-
ballot reform into the pattern Lukas articulates in The People 's Welfare. Lukas argues
that in the nineteenth century, the “preferred social unit of governance” was the “self-
governed community,” but in the twentieth, that preferred unit became the
individual. In the closed voting booth, wrote one reform supporter, “[i]t is each
citizen’s business to decide according to the dictates of his own conscience how he shall
vote.”
105
A colorful image of the privacy rules comes in a small book called Hill's Political
History ofthe United Slates, published in 1 894. 106 According to Hill’s research, 34 states
already employed some version of the Australian ballot - a testament to the astonishing
speed with which the reform spread, given that it had been only six years since it was first
I
2
Massachusetts GevemOT Oliver Ames, quoted in William H. Glasson, “The Australian Voting System:
°.
f tS Hls*°ry and PrmclPles “ why North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia Should Adopt
It,” South Atlantic Quarterly (1909), at 6.
Crenson and Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy (2002), at 46.
104
Lukas, The People’s Welfare, at 238, Figure 2.
105
Glasson, at 9.
Thos. E. Hill, Hill s Political History ofthe United States (1894). Apparently written for a popular
audience, Hill s book promises to offer “A Condensed Summary of the Important Political Events in
United States History, from the Founding of the Government to the Present Time.” The volume does
indeed cover a broad, if highly eclectic, list of topics. After the discussion of election law discussed below,
for example, the book proceeds directly to explain the “Cause of the Financial Panic, 1893.” Id., 125. Hill
also offers one of the most colorful lists I’ve read of nineteenth-century suffrage exclusions. “In several
states, he writes, the voter is denied the privilege of suffrage if he is a pauper, a convict, an Indian, a
lunatic, a Chinaman, a duelist, a deserter, a better on elections, a briber, a non-taxpayer, or is unable to
read.” Id., 123.
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introduced in Kentucky and Massachusetts.- Hill offers the text of a representative law;
unfortunately, he does not reveal what jurisdiction the statute comes from, but its
instructions to voters are worth quoting here nonetheless;
will I
W1, ‘ n0t bC
v
a"OWed t0 °“upy * voting booth with another voter Ifvou11 declare upon oath that you cannot read the English language, or that by reason ofphysical disability you are unable to mark your ballot, upon request you wdl beas isted by two of the election officers, appointed for that purpose opposingpolitical parties.... Intoxication will not be regarded as physical disability an/ifyouare intoxicated you will receive no assistance in marking your ballot.” 10
^’ V
Reformers might have hoped voters would be praying inside those booths. But at
least some knew they had to be ready for drunks, too. “No election shall be held in a
room in which spirituous or malt liquors are commonly sold," North Dakota’s 1891 law
sternly instructed election inspectors. 109
b. “Systematic Organization for the Purchase of Votes:” Coercion,
Corruption, and Local Pressures on Voters.
Hill s source s reference to intoxication at the polls reminds us that booze played
a major role in the chaotic, often violent elections of the period. Indeed, individuals in
the nineteenth-century U.S. were often subjected to intolerable pressure at the polls. The
fundamental instrumental aspect of popular sovereignty, reformers argued, was thwarted
when men literally feared for their lives on the streets during elections, and when bribery
Hill, at 122. Ten states did not use the Australian system: Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky (this is
either ironic or a mistake on Hill’s part, given that the state had required Louisville to use the secret ballot
previously), Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
108
Hill, at 123-124. Interestingly, the law goes on to guarantee voters two hours off from work without
penalty or loss of pay in order to vote, provided they asked their employer on the previous day, and took
their hours at their employer’s convenience. Id.
“The Australian Ballot Act and other acts constituting the Election Laws of North Dakota,” Bismarck
(1891), at 16.
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was a fact of life. ‘Knives were drawn and freely used, revolvers discharged with a
perfect recklessness
.... The police had they interfered would have stood a chance of
being annihilated,” reported one observer of a California election
.
110
Virtually every source agrees that the Australian ballot was designed to protect
voters
- perhaps not from knives and revolvers, but from the possibility of coercion and
bribery at the polls. “[N]o one acquainted with the conduct of recent elections,” wrote
one observer.
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‘h® p0l ' s ecome a recognized factor in the machinery of parties- [andlum er0 voters who demand money compensation for their ballots hasgrown greater with each recurring election ....” 111
writes Evans, to imagine a system more open to corruption” than that of the
U.s. after the Civil War. Where printed ballots were used, they were usually different
sizes and colors, so it was a matter of simple observation either to bribe or force someone
to vote a certain way. Both occurred all over the U.S., in both rural and urban areas, for
decades." 2 In Cambridge, Massachusetts, for example, mill owners stationed clerks at
the polls; workers were told that their continued employment depended on how they
voted . 1 13 Parties, meanwhile, had corrupted the process by demanding huge contributions
from would-be candidates, in order to finance both the above-board aspects of elections -
such as printing and distributing ballots - and the paying of bribes. And parties often
' 10 Quoted in Fredman, at 20.
1 1
1
Quoted in Evans, at 1 1
.
112
See Evans, at 10-13.
' 13
Glasson, “The Australian Voting System,” (1909), at 5. Evans, 10-14 is excellent on corruption as is
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duped voters with poor reading skills by distributing ballots bearing the tnsignia of their
rivals, but a different slate of names.
The secret, state-produced ballot was intended to cure these ills. “(SJafeguarding
the suffrage and getting a true expression of the will of the voters” was the goal, wrote
one Southern advocate;" 4
“protecting the ballot and securing a fair expression of the
public opinion,” said a supporter of Kentucky’s first-in-the-nation law. Having just
observed Louisvdle's 1 888 elections, Abram Flexner argued that secrecy enables a man
to vote “as he really prefers." 1 1
5
The reforms, wrote a th.rd contemporary, were
introduced for the purpose of enabling the voter to express his opinion by the ballot
without the interference of others.” 116
Critics, meanwhile, continued the argument seen above in Virginia in 1829, that
secrecy was no guarantee of virtue and that public voting was a better bet. As one
Englishman put it in arguing against the Australian system, “[njothing was supposed to
prevent misconduct and robbery at night so effectually as gas lamps.” 117 And one
opponent of reform argued that there would be more corruption under the new system,
since it would be easier, safer, and would require less money to corrupt [ballot clerks
and inspectors] than to bribe so many electors.” 118 But reformers successfully showed
that the gas lamps of public voting had led to massive, widespread, and damaging
114
Glasson, at 10.
Abram Flexner, The New Ballot Law ofLouisville, Kentucky at work and compared with the
Massachusetts Law (1889), at 9; 5.
116
Thos. E. Hill, Hill's Political Histoiy ofthe United States (1894), at 121.
1 1
7
Quoted in Evans, at 2 1 -22 n.4
118
Evans, 21.
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corruption in Amencan elections. The Australian ballot tried to rectify these problems,
by the simple means of placing voters in a pnvate context and not a public one.
c. “It is objected that the
Paying for Elections.
necessary machinery involves added expense:”
I have previously hypothesized that cost and bureaucratic capacity were
disincentives for state governments to take over election administration from localities,
and I read passages about election costs with interest. But what emerges clearly in the
Austrahan-ballot debates is that counties and towns had not been paying many of the
major costs of elections: political parties and their candidates did. Certainly parties had
funded the printing and distnbution of ballots. But it went much further, as one account
of the expenses borne by a candidate in 1882 showed: “about $25,000 for manning the
polls and supplying booths, $10,000 for printing the tickets, and $8,000 for their
distribution, besides other expenses of the campaign.” 119 Before the Australian ballot,
reformers later said, the party boss’s motto was “vote as you please as long as I count.” 120
Reformers saw parties’ control as a major source of corruption, not least since
parties often demanded “assessments” or contributions from would-be candidates, raising
cash for paying voters - and also severely restricting the pool of those who could afford
to compete.
121
Neither party consistently supported the reforms - not surprising, given
that their core purpose was to abolish the specific practices and the broader political
1 19
Evans, 14.
Quoted in Fredman, The Australian Ballot, at 93. The “as long as I count” approach had been ruined by
the Australian ballot, but bosses switched to “vote as you please as long as I choose the candidates,” so
reformers were now pushing for direct primaries.
121 On this function of parties, see, for example, Fredman, 27-28; Evans, 22 n.3; Glasson, “The Australian
Voting System,” 6-8.
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culture of elections that the parttes had built. One contemporary scholar tallied rough
records of ballot-refonn votes in state legislatures in the late 1880s and found that in most
states, no party lines were clearly apparent, though Democrats were slightly more likely
to favor reform. 122 But the system became so popular, as one prominent defender of the
Australian ballot wrote, that “even the party workers have to profess to like it, whether
they do or not." 122 The same author noted, however, that while “the system undoubtedly
favors independent voting, it has by no means broken up parties." 124
It ts not clear precisely how the new laws typically distributed the burden of
paying election-administration costs - or if they did so with any precision. It appears
most likely that the state bore the cost of printing ballots themselves, but everything else
was up to counties and municipalities. Evidence is inconclusive: many references to
costs under the new system discuss “the state” paying, but this is often meant to contrast
with the previous, party-funded regime. Opponents like New York’s Governor Hill
argued that “the distribution of all ballots by the state would be an enormous expense to
the state,” while supporters like Richard Henry Dana of Boston contended that “the self-
See John H. Wigmore, The Australian Ballot System As Embodied in the Legislation of Various
Countrtes, Second Ed. (1889), at 205, Appendix VI. Wigmore writes since "in seventeen Slates no party
lines were clearly apparent,” and concludes that “[t]he whole record shows how irrational it is to cany
national party lines into local reforms ” Id. Wigmore offers a more comprehensive (but somewhat tedious)
summary of votes in many state legislatures as well. See id., 22-49. Interestingly, Wigmore concludes that
tclugan may have been the first state lo formally consider adopting the Australian ballot, though the 1 885
bill failed. Id., 23.
123
" R,chard Henry Dana ’ The Australian Ballot System ofMassachusetts: Some Fallacious Questions
Answered (191 1), at 22.
‘- 4
Dana, The Australian Ballot System o/Massachusetts, at 8. As I’ve noted above, scholars such as
Argersinger and Disch have described the ironic fact that these anti-party ballot reforms ultimately
redounded to the benefit of the major parties. Previously, to act as a party was to qualify as one, as Disch
put it, but now only those parties which navigated state-designed processes could get on the single ballot.
Argersinger writes that ballot rules effected “the expansion of the role of the state in the political process,”
an expansion which in turn “permitted the politicians in power to use state authority to promote self-serving
conditions to order.” Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party, at 146.
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respecl in voting under the new system is alone worth all the extra expense to the
state.”
125
Another contemporary advocate spoke of “ballots printed a. public expense
The Massachusetts law of 1888 implies that state government carried the cos, of ballots,
declaring that “State Ballots will be printed by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and
city ballots by the city clerk.’" 27 Bu, in an introduction to its 1891 law, North Dakota
stated in no uncertain terms that “county auditors and commissioners are reminded of the
fact that all election machinery is a county charge and must be provided at the county’s
expense.” 128
And an 1889 survey of voting practices concluded that that while states and territories
required that ballot boxes themselves have certain characteristics - Colorado stipulated
use of ‘a circular box of glass enclosed in a wooden frame, with a lid fastened with three
unlike locks” - it was up to towns, cites, counties, and school districts to pay for and
furnish them. 129
d. “See that the tables, guard-rail, booths and ballot-boxes are properly
placed: Local Officials as Agents of State Government.
Lacking more comprehensive legislative and historical materials, I cannot state
this with confidence as a general rule. But in many states, Australian-ballot reforms
125
Evans, at 25, 23.
Glasson, The Australian Voting System,” at 3. It was also Glasson who wrote, “[i]t is objected to the
system that the necessary machinery involves added expense.” Id., at 10.
127
Reprinted in Flexner, The New Ballot Law ofLouisville, Kentucky at work and compared with the
Massachusetts Law ( 1889), at 1 1
.
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“The Australian Ballot Act and other acts constituting the Election Laws of North Dakota ” Bismarck
(1891), at 3.
129
James H. Blodgett, “Suffrage and Its Mechanism in Great Britain and the United States,” The American
Anthropologist, Jan. 1889, at 70, 71.
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fundamentally altered the relationship between state and local election officials. Locally-
employed clerks, judges, and supervisors still performed most election-administration
functions - more than before, in some places, where they took the place of patty staff.
But they now did that work essenttally as ofstate government, in many ways, to a
degree that represented a significant departure from previous American election
practices. The advent of registration rules in this same period mudd.es this p.cture: as I
have noted above, registration rules brought about a devolution of effective control over
the franch.se from states down to the counties and municipalities that ran registration
systems.
But one cannot read the Ohio election law of 1892, for example, without being
struck by the depth and specificity with which state power now penetrated into local
voting contexts. Precinct election officers, for example, receive very specific instruction
in which state-written oath they are to swear; how to call in all election judges at least
three days before the election and supply them with the “sealed packages of ballots, poll-
books, tally sheets, and all other necessaiy papers;” what time to open the polls and how
to arrange rails, tables, booths and ballot boxes; how to interview voters and assist them;
and which ballots to reject during counting. 130 North Dakota’s 1891 law instructed
county officials that “the form of ballots under the Australian Election Law [must] be
uniform throughout the State, and to this end the department will recommend a form and
supply county auditors with samples of same prior to the general election of 1892.” The
law has forty-one different sections, ranging from “Ballots, how printed” through
GUy Ward Mallon, The Ohio Election Law: A Manualfor the Guidance ofElectors and Election
Officers ( 1892), at 7; 9; 10; and 11-12.
189
‘Election booths, how built” to “In case of spoiled ballot .” 131 In Massachusetts, the law
defined state and city officials obligations to inform and instruct voters of upcoming
elections, required delivery of certain numbers of ballots at certain times, stipulated how
to arrange “voting shelves or compartments.” and even included a figure drawing
demonstrating how to lay out the room
.
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Interestingly, E.C. Evans’ summary of arguments against the Australian ballot
makes no mention of the diminution of local control. In fact, some argued that the
“clerks” at elections would gain power: voters would no longer be able to acquire,
prepare, and bring ballots to the polls, but instead would have to get them from those
clerks, giving them “an absolute control of the result of any and every election, for only
such ballots as these clerks choose to deliver to voters can be cast or counted .” 133 Flexner
tells us that in Louisville, local officials apparently had enough leeway to corrupt the
voting in one precinct: the “clerk of the election repeatedly left his place to manipulate
the hired bands without, and the policemen made no effort to enforce the secrecy which
the law requires .” 134 Flexner’s point is that the law could only be thwarted by dishonesty,
because it was neither difficult to comprehend nor to administer. But the story does show
that the hands on the ballot boxes were still those of local, and not state, officials.
Indeed, even election laws whose most striking feature is their assertion of close
and detailed rules for all aspects of elections are still full of references to locally-based
* The Australian Ballot Act and other acts constituting the Election Laws of North Dakota,” ( 1 89 1 ), at 3,
Massachusetts Statute 1888, c. 436, As Amended by Stat. 1889, c. 413; reprinted in Wigmore at 54-65 -
66; 73.
133
Evans, at 25-26. For summary of the arguments for and against — Evans here lists five for and seven
against - see id., 21-26.
134
Flexner, at 6.
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administration. In “each and every county of the state” there would be a board of
supervisors, stated Ohio's 1892 law; counties with big eit.es would have a board of
elections;
“municipalities where registration is not required, and
. . . townships” could be
divided into additional precincts as needed. 135 States set new rules for virtually every
aspect of elections, but no state bureaucracy carried them out: the laws told county clerks
and municipal supervisors what to do.
State lawmakers were eager to remove local variation and local influences and
establish direct, unmediated connections with voters; they had come to understand that
h°W people voted was essenti al to achieving that goal. But they still did not create a state
election bureaucracy to achieve that goal. Years later, one student of the Australian-
ballot reforms concluded that the best way to correct the many ills in American elections
- including those utterly uncured by the secret, publicly-produced ballot - would be to
create “an electoral office under the civil service.” 136 Tum-of-the-century reformers
certainly stopped far short of that point.
e. Conclusion.
I wanted to know how local control of elections survived the spread of Australian-
ballot reforms among the states. But I am not sure it did survive. It may well be that it
was in the last ten years of the nineteenth century — not in the more famous periods of
suffrage reform, such as the Jacksonian era, or the later impositions of the VRA and then
the NVRA - that the balance of power in American voting moved from localities to state
135 Guy Ward Mallon, The Ohio Election Law: A Manualfor the Guidance ofElectors and Election
Officers (mi), at 17, 28-29.
136
Fredman, The Australian Ballot, at 130.
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governments. True, in practice, a hyper-federalized system remained, since state
governments chose not to set up full election-administration bureaus - beyond new
regulation of party activity and the design and production of ballots, there is again no
evidence that they even considered doing so. County, city, town, precinct, and ward
officials retained major responsibilities throughout the electoral process. But the records
and analyses I've read leave little doubt that the nature of that responsibility was
transformed. Previously, the only substantive state direction of the suffrage dealt with
qualifications, and even these were often contingent on local factors such as property and
tax records and residency. The kinds of instruction Ohio, North Dakota, and
Massachusetts lawmakers gave to county clerks feel worlds beyond this. The Australian
ballot did not radically alter American voting behavior, and it certainly did not achieve
anything like the substantive, instrumental transformations reformers hoped for . 137
Nonetheless, it effected a significant change in the character of American suffrage.
But the paradox of our hyper-federalized suffrage system endured. Reformers
decided that "ballots should be taken from the political organizations and put into the
hands of the responsible agents of the State .” 138 And state legislators did so: they
constructed a new, public, decentralized election-administration bureaucracy - in the
country s county, city, and town governments.
See Fredman, 1 19-130. Fredman notes that fraud survived, major parties retained a great deal of power,
the “long ballot” confused many voters, registration rules contributed to disenfranchisement, and “frequent'
allegations of miscounting, repeating and other abuses” persisted. This is not to mention racist
disenfranchisement in the South.
138
Glasson, “The Australian Voting System,” at 8.
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CHAPTER 5
‘ANYTHING WITH THE APPEARANCE OF A MAN:” INCLUSION EXCLUSIONAND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. ELECTIONS
This chapter assesses the role local administrative authority over elections has
played in the American story of exclusion, inequality, and discrimination in voting. In an
introductory section, I return to the importance of examining practices, and not just
formal rights and theories, in analyzing inclusion and exclusion in the American context.
I also consider why many citizens and students of American voting may be biased against
things local in terms of suffrage, and survey current controversies over fairness in
American voting which involve local authorities. The second section examines two dark
chapters in the history of local administration: the post-Reconstruction backlash in the
South, and Progressive-era reforms such as new personal-registration rules. I argue that
these discriminatory efforts were driven not by local administration, however, but by a
reaction among national elites against universal male suffrage. The final section
discusses the history of lax enforcement of suffrage qualifications and the work of
political parties to bring in new voters, and concludes that on balance, local
administration of U.S. elections has helped push American suffrage towards greater
inclusion, not just towards contraction and discrimination.
A conventional narrative of American citizenship tells a story of ever-expanding
inclusion. The U.S. was founded with a belief in the sovereignty of “the people,” in this
account, and our understandings of who constitutes “the people” have grown steadily and
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inexorably
.
1
Recently, however, scholars have devoted more attention to the powerful
tradition of exclusion in American law - to statutes, judicial decisions, and practices
which have carefully, rationally, and effectively limited the scope of “the people”
throughout U.S. history, particularly along class and ascriptive lines
.
2
American election
laws have always been permeated by the desire to close some people out of the political
community, and progress towards universal suffrage has been neither steady nor swift
.
3
Indeed, it may be because there has been so much controversy and change in formal
franchise qualifications that scholars have focused on that aspect of American suffrage.
State and national constitutions and statutes have received most scrutiny, because most de
jure restrictions and expansions of the suffrage fall under their authority. Meanwhile, as
I ve noted above, scholars have focused more on the symbolic messages conveyed by
exclusion and inclusion, rather than on the institutions and practices of suffrage itself. 4
Not all dejure restrictions on voting by adult Americans have been eliminated -
people convicted of serious crimes are at least temporarily barred from voting in most
states, as are the institutionalized mentally ill; there is new energy in movements to allow
U.S. residents who are not citizens to vote. But where American suffrage debates once
turned on formal barriers such as property ownership, taxpayer status, literacy, race, sex,
1
For elaboration and criticism of this view, see Rogers M. Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and
Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,” 87 American. Political Science Review 549 (1993); and Smith,
Civic Ideals : Conflicting Visions ofCitizenship in U.S. History (1997).
See, for example, Smith, Civic Ideals
;
Michael Lind, The Next American Nation (1995); Desmond King,
Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the U.S. Federal Government (1997); Eric Foner, The Story
ofAmerican Freedom (1998); Philip Klinkner with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and
Decline ofracial Equality in America (1999); Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the
Twentieth Century (2001).
3 See Keyssar, The Right to Vote, passim, particularly the tables in the Appendices, which offer
overwhelming evidence of the depth and breadth of the exclusionary tradition in American suffrage law.
4
See Chapter One, p. 28-29.
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and age, most analogous disputes in the last generation have been over institutional
inequal, ties and discrimination among those permitted to part.cipate. Public debates and
court cases dealing with apportmnment, the shape and, particularly, the racial content of
electoral districts, campaign finance, registration rules, procedural reforms aimed at
bringing non-voters to the polls, and ballot access often revolve around conceptions of
fairness and equality. 5
What role has local administrative authority over elections played in the
American story of exclusion, inequality, and discrimination? I do not believe this
question has been confronted directly before. Electoral practices have been “always on
the periphery of suffrage reform”6 - present, but rarely taking center stage. I argued in
Chapter Three that we cannot accurately grasp American ideas about popular sovereignty
without understanding how the U.S. votes. Here, I show that questions about inclusion
and exclusion, equality and discrimination - about who votes - are also intrinsically
connected to the history of local election administration in the U.S. However, I argue
that widespread assumptions about that connection are incorrect. In the wake of the
election of 2000, and for a combination of reasons, localism seems to have a bad
reputation among scholars and much of the public. The record is mixed and complex, but
we have a good deal of evidence of a powerful alternative history: the hyper-federalized
American suffrage system has in some ways been an engine of inclusion. This tradition
is as old as the country itself: despite property, citizenship, and residency rules, Thomas
The literature on each of these topics is massive, particularly in the law-school community. For analysis
and bibliographies, see generally Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging
Equalityfrom Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore (2003); Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H.
Pildes, The Law ofDemocracy: Legal Structure ofthe Political Process, Rev’d Second Ed. (2002); Daniel
Hays Lowenstein and Richard L. Hasen, Election Law: Cases and Materials, 2 nd ed. (2001).
(>
Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage: From Property to Democracy, at 272.
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Hutchinson wrote,
“[ajnything with the appearance of a man” was able to vote in Boston
around 1772. 7
This chapter is organized into three main parts. In the first section, I return to the
importance of examining institutional practices, not just ideas and formal rules, in
analyzing inclusion and exclusion in the American context. Here I also consider why
many scholars - and students of American voting generally- may have a bias against
things local when it comes to suffrage, and survey a few current controversies over
fairness and inclusion in American voting which involve local authorities. The second
main piece examines two dark chapters in the history of the local dimension: the post-
Reconstruction backlash against universal male suffrage, and Progressive-era reforms.
The final section develops my argument that on balance, local administration ofU.S.
elections has helped push American suffrage towards greater inclusion, not just towards
contraction and discrimination.
I. “Implicit messages are no less significant:” Institutional Practices
of Democratic Exclusion.
as Components
A fundamental premise of this dissertation is that studies of American suffrage
should examine the institutions, processes, and practices of voting, not just supporting
political philosophies and aggregate outcomes. This is particularly true in the context of
defining the extent of the franchise. The “ballot box and all that goes with it,” says
William H. Riker, is “the essential democratic institution,” and the “first care of the
democratic conscience
. . . ought to be the widest possible extension of the suffrage.”8 It
Dinkin, Voting in Provincial America, at 47.
8
William H. Riker, Democracy in the United States (1965), at 25; 35.
196
has taken a long time, but we now understand that this “extension” must go beyond
formal permission to participate. Systemic inequality and discrimination may be just
mild-mannered cousins ofdejure exclusion, but they are members of the same family
and can be just as cruel. A lack of democratic respect can show itself “not only ,n the
laws that deny some individuals the right to vote, bu, also in the practices that discourage
the exercse of that right,” as Thompson puts it, for “implicit messages are no less a
significant part of institutional meanings .”9
The disrespectful
“messages” that the strong send to the weak, of course, are not
the only damage done to excluded individuals. They also lose the chance to influence
election outcomes. A number of authorities have demonstrated at least a passing
understanding of these dangers, and of the connection between electoral institutions,
inequality, and exclusion. Douglas Rae examines parties rather than administration in his
assessment of the “proximal consequences of electoral laws,” but his conclusion is quite
relevant here. Rae writes that formal exclusion aside, “[t]he prejudice of electoral laws
.
.
. in favor of strong elective parties and against weak ones is a very nearly universal fact
of political life.” (Rae frames this statement in a broad context: amidst a rigorous
scientific study, he opens this section by citing a remarkable authority - the word of
Christ, as presented by Matthew. 10) When Walter Dean Burnham wrote shaiplyof
Americans who still believe “that voting is not a right but a privilege for which
Thompson, Just Elections, al 28. Exclusion and inequality, he argues, "persist[] not only in the laws that
eny some individuals the right to vote, but also in the practices that discourage the exercise of that right.”
1 he message the electoral process sends,” therefore, “is not yet one of equal respect.” Id., at 27.
For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath notfrom him shall be taken away even that he hath.” Matthew 13:12. “The proximal effects of electoral laws
upon political parties,” Rae writes, “comport with the most literal understanding of Christ’s prophecy.”
Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences ofElectoral Laws, Revised Ed. (1971), at 134.
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individuals must demonstrate their worthiness,” he was talking no, about the literacy tes,
or felony
^enfranchisement, bu, regts,ration rules." Scholars such as Chilton
Williamson, J. Allen Smith, and Stein Rokkan have also connected exclusion and
discrimination with institutions and procedures facilitating or obstructing voting - our
goal should be not just democracy, but “democracy made easy,” as Williamson
concluded his book
.
12
a. “The mystique of standardization:” Localism’s Bad Rap, andCurrent Controversies.
Since the Progressive era, a clear trend in American voting has been “the
increasing intervention of the federal government into the areas of electoral regulation
traditionally reserved to the states .” 13 That intervention - which has also diminished the
scope of local control - has helped bring about more uniformity in electoral processes, as
well as the near-elimination aidejure exclusions. Particularly in the last forty years, the
list of federal statutes and judicial decisions regulating the suffrage in the interest of
fairness, equality, and inclusion is long and impressive. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment
n , mo" Tr
mha
,
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- Style(1987), 109. The rales of the voting game, Burnham writes, “have explicit or implicit political purposesand assumptions, and he calls personal-registration rales a “class-linked political choice.” Id. The
^
urkean idea that voting is a privilege, Burnham continues, has not existed outside the U.S. for a centurvbut endures here, “and the result is a remarkably opaque but very persistent straggle over the franchise -
’
perhaps what one would expect from a political system in some ways so archaic and undeveloped that
Samuel P. Huntington has aptly labeled it a Tudor polity.’” Id
See Williamson, American Suffrage, at 299. Williamson here quotes Alexander H. Stephens
commenting on the Jacksonian diminishment of property tests; Williamson writes that Stephens’ words
were taken from Jefferson without proper acknowledgment,” but does not give a citation to Jefferson.
Smith writes that “[s]ound public policy points ... in the direction of making the exercise of this right
purely voluntary by removing every influence which now militates against free choice.” Smith, Growth
and Decadence of Constitutional Government, at 55-56. In his comparative study of elections, Rokkan lists
the standardization of voting procedures” as one of the six elements of suffrage expansion. Rokkan,
Citizens, Elections, Parties, at 148.
13
Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party, at 65.
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abolished poll taxes in federal elections in 1964; a year later, the Voting Rights Act put in
Place numerous new requirements, transforming registration and election-supervision
regimes around the country; and a year after that, in 1966, the Supreme Court struck
down taxes on voting in state and local elections in the four states where they had
survived. 14 The VRA was extended in 1 970, and literacy tests abolished; the Twenty-
Srxth Amendment extending voting rights to eighteen-year-olds was ratified in 1971; and
in 1 972, the Court ruled in Dunn v. Blumstein that residency tests longer than 30 days for
any election were impermissible. 15 Major updates to the VRA came in 1982, including
the requirement of bilingual ballots in jurisdictions where the Census determined a need
for them. The NVRA of 1993 told states how and where to register voters at state
agencies, “right down to the layout of the registration form.” 16
In Bush v. Gore
,
the Supreme Court held that standards of equal protection apply
to “more than the initial allocation of the franchise:” “[e]qual protection applies as well to
the manner of its exercise.” 17 The Court’s connection of equal-protection analysis to
election-administration procedures has not effected a sweeping transformation in
14
See Harper v. Virginia State Board ofElections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 404 U.S. 330 (1972). For discussion of these and other developments, see generally
Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law (2003).
Carter et al., To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process: Report ofthe National
Commission on Federal Election Reform (2002), at 22.
Recent scholarship has shown that the NVRA did not bring about the massive increases in turnout
its supporters hoped for. Millions of citizens did register, but aggregate registration actually declined by a
percentage point between 1992 and 1996, from 78% to 77%. Raymond E. Wolfmger and Jonathan
Hoffman, “Registering and Voting With Motor Voter,” 34 PS 85 (2001), at 85. However, turnout in 1996
among those who registered at DMV offices was seventy percent - lower than the overall turnout rate in
that election of 83%, but far higher than predicted by those who thought the relatively cost-free registration
process offered by motor-voter would bring in non-voters. Id., at 89. Meanwhile, Wolfmger and
Hoffman's data shows that those who used motor voter were disproportionately white and well-off, as
predicted. Id., at 90.
17
Opinion per curiam, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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American election practtces. (After all, the Court hedged its bets with the now-infamous
warning that their judgment was “limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities”) However,
the decision and the election of 2000 led to the enactment of the Help Amenca Vote Act,
or HAVA, in 2002. HAVA established a new federal agency, the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC), designed to distribute federal money to states and localities and
advise them on electoral “best practices.” Though the EAC itself cannot issue mandates,
HAVA has the potential to effect a new penetration of federal and state authority into
local election administration. A recent survey of state election directors’ websites
indicates that virtually every state is drafting HAVA-implementing legislation. That
legislation sets up “State-Based Administrative Procedures to Remedy Grievances” -
complaints in areas such as voting systems’ accessibility, counting and recounting
standards, provisional voting, and registration, and which are typically lodged against
county elections staff. 18
It has been thirty years since Ward Elliott criticized “the mystique of
standardization, expertise, crisis, and progress” which he argued had already “played a
predominant role in intellectuals’ reformist thoughts in the modem era.” 19 While I do not
share Elliott’s disdain for the Warren Court’s approach to election law, I do believe he
has captured an important truth: many Americans now assume that local control is a toxin
to be avoided, particularly when it comes to inclusion and fairness. Briefly, I think there
are three reasons for this. The first we could call a “Florida bias” - after the Presidential
18
See, for example, <http://www.state.sc.us/scsec/t3comp_form.htm>, the South Carolina Secretary of
State s posted document listing HAVA Title III, Section 402 complaint procedures. Accessed April 1
2004.
19
Elliott, The Rise ofGuardian Democracy (1974), at vii.
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election of 2000, which lie up senous problems in a number of counties in the Sunshtne
State. Those events remain highly “available” as we talk about American suffrage M
Second is a Jim Crow bias. The face of local election administration, for many people,
remains that of the Southern officials who implemented profoundly racist policies in the
long period between Reconstruction and the V.R.A. These were laws like the literacy or
••understanding” test, which “[left] the voting fate of a citizen to the passing whim or
impulse of an individual registrar,” as a unanimous Supreme Court said in Louisiana v.
U.S 2 ' (I discuss these policies in more detail below.) Third is a “Progressive bias ” I
believe many Americans have a working prejudice in favor of national standardization
and normalization, part of the “political piety”22 we've inherited from Progressive
thinkers like Herbert Croly, who argued that democracy required “an increasing
nationalization of the American people in ideas, in institutions, and in spirit.”25 Other
Progressives, such as Louis D. Brandeis and Woodrow Wilson, disagreed, particularly on
economic matters;24 but in terms of voting, Croly’s preference seems to have won out.
20
What psychologists call “the availability heuristic” evaluates the probability of events “by the ease with
which relevant issues come to mind.” See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic
for Judging Frequency and Probability,” 5 Cognitive Psychology 207 (1973). I’ve taken this concept’s
applicability to politics from Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction and
Democracy (1992).
21
Louisiana v. U.S., 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
22
Schudson, The Good Citizen, at 137. Schudson uses this phrase in a comment about election practices
more generally: The late-nineteenth-century decline in campaign parades, barbecues, and brass bands
came as part of a self-conscious effort to remove emotion from the political scene. Our political piety is
inherited from these Gilded Age and Progressive Era reforms.” Id.
23
Herbert Croly, The Promise ofAmerican Life (1965) (1909), at 271.
On Brandeis, see Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and the Progressive Tradition (1981). On
Decentralist and Nationalist” strands in Progressive political economy, see Michael Sandel,
Democracy ’s Discontent: America in Search ofa Public Philosophy (1996), at 2 1 1 -22 1
.
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As I will show, this is ironic - doubly so, for the suffrage !egacy of the Progressive era
writ large is not necessarily one of either nationalization or greater inclusion.
Wnting for the Court in IVest Virginia Board ofEducaiion , Barneue, Justice
Jackson worrted that “small and local authonty may fee, less sense of responsibility to
Ihe Constitution.”25 Jackson was talking about freedom of expression, bu, his words are
an ap, summaty of scholarly and public assumptions about local authority and fatmess in
election administration, as well. Localtsm in Amencan suffrage has a checkered past, bu,
as I explain below, there is a great deal in the record that is positive.
Standardization may have acquired a “mystique” a long time ago. But the
election of 2000 laid bare how much remains un-standardized, and there is today a new
interest in variation in election practices
- par, of what I've called the “redtscovery of
psephology.” Charges of systematic unfairness and inequality catch the attention of the
media, the public, and scholars most often. Some critics conclude that our hyper-
federaltzed system disenfranchises, even if local officials do not act in bad faith. This
possibility surfaces in discussions of issues like the great variety of ballots in use, voter
assistance, the availability of bilingual ballots, and even the place where ballots are
counted.
As Niemi and Hermson put it in “Beyond the Butterfly,”
[a]t the very least, the variety of ballot forms and instructions makes the act
of voting relatively demanding - especially for first-time voters, those not fluent inbnghsh, the elderly, the visually impaired, and those who simply have moved from
one state (or even locality) to another.”26
West Virginia Board ofEducation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
26
Niemi and Hermson, “Beyond the Butterfly,” at 318.
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Editor Jennifer Hochschild seemed to find this discnminatoiy dimension to be the most
important aspect of the article. Niemi and Heimson, Hochschild summanzed,
‘‘dissect a
surprisingly simple and effective way of ensuring that some voters remain political
losers ” Variations in balloting procedures, she wrote, “almost always [act] to the
detriment of those with the least education and resources and the most need of gaining
political influence.”27 While this language stops short of charging state and local officials
with discriminatory puiposes, to call it a “way of ensuring that some voters remain
P tical losers comes close. Similarly, the New York Times opined that “[t]he sad state
of voting rolls may be due to underfunding and mismanagement, bu, i, can create an
appearance of ulterior motives.
One of the key jobs of poll workers is to assist voters- the aged, disabled, blind,
those with poor language or reading skills, and others for whom casting a ballot is
difficult for one reason or another. (Commenting on the complexity of California ballots,
Michael Schudson observed that “voting is not only an act of civic engagement but of
cognitive challenge.”29) In the wake of the 2000 election, Judge Richard A. Posner noted
the view that no serious harm is done to democracy when those who can’t read well
enough to follow directions inadvertently spoil their ballots. As Posner put it, “some
conservatives may think it rather an excess of democracy for illiterates to hold the
electoral balance of power.”30 This is a highly specious theory in more ways than one:
Jennifer Hochschild, “Introduction and Comments,” 1 Perspectives on Politics 247 (2003), at 247-248.
28 How America Doesn’t Vote,” (unsigned editorial), N. Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2004.
29 o
Schudson, The Good Citizen
,
at 3.
Richard A. Posner, “Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and theEnsuing Litigation. Supreme Court Review (2000), at 58.
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many voters who are no, “illiterate” cas, invalid votes, either beeause of poor
ins,motions, misteading hallo, layout, or machine failure, and such voters do no, hold the
“balance of power” any more than others do. Posner reports this approach towards
literacy - he does no, endorse it, bu, he does no, reject it, either. A, any rate, i, is a
sinking argument to make in the twenty-firs, centuty. I, may be a long way from the old
formal exclusion of those citizens who lacked the ngh, amount of property, the right
pigmentation, or the right gender. Bu, like the old literacy test, the question of whether
or how much to assist illiterate voters implicates local officials
.
31
And while state and
federal law governs many voting-place practices, that still leaves room for local officials
to interpret and enforce the law in misleading and potentially-exciusionary ways - as
some Florida counties apparently do by posting signs stating “Photo and Signature
Identification Required” outside polling places
.
32
Without framing the issue in terms of literacy or fairness, the new chair of the
federal Election Assistance Commission recently called the “shortage of election day poll
workers” an “emerging crisis.” How to rectify that shortage? In one of his first major
public addresses, DeForest B. Soaries offered a classic American solution: he asked
“corporate America to support people working on polls,” by giving time off as they do
the bck of nrnv f h
'"''"“S'' meanwhlle
.
my help justify a practice that appears quite common -lack p o ision of adequate voter education materials. As the Florida fight made clear, when ballotdesign varies across counties, it is more difficult for state officials to provide such materials HoweverFlonda also suggested, at least to some observers, that state officials understood that difficulty well and didthing about it. For critics of Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, that inaction reeked of partisanpurpose. See the exchange between Hams and Civil Rights Commission Chaiiperson Mary Frances Berryon voter education during the Commission's hearings on the 2000 election m Florida, reprinted inThompson, Just Elections, at 60.
32
See “A Bad Sign for Voters” (unsigned editorial), St. Petersburg Times, July 22, 2004 (page number
unknown). Voters are not actually “required” to bring such identification, since if they do not have it they
may sign a statement affirming their identity and still vote. The St. Petersburg Times referred to such signs
as misleading, and “an inaccurate interpretation of the law.” Id.
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for juo, duty. Chiding critics of electronic voting machines, Soanes said “[t]he greatest
threat to voting in this country has less to do with source code and more to do with
Hndmg people who don't mind getting up at 4 o’clock in the morning and getting to the
firehouse on time.”33
The Voting Rights Act requires that some of those firehouses be staffed with
people speaking languages other than English, at least in some counties and towns. The
nation’s H ISpanic population rose by almost sixty percent in the 1990s, and many
counties recently learned that the 2000 census showed them to be in need of bilingual
ballots. In Washington State, election workers were "deluged with complaints” from
voters who objected to seeing Spanish and Chinese on their ballots. In Pennsylvania, one
county initially refused to print bilingual ballots, then agreed to do so after a federal judge
found that poll workers had discriminated against Hispanics. “It’s been a very emotional
issue,” said County Commissioner Tim Reiver. “An awful lot of people think this is a
bad idea.” Some opponents made their case more explicit. “Bilingual ballots are un-
American,” Jim Lubinskas of the organization U.S. English Inc. told a reporter. “To
become a ‘naturalized’ citizen, you are required to speak English, so it would seem that
to vote, you would need a workable knowledge of the English language as well.”34 In
national politics, the dispute over English-only ended a few years ago: both Presidential
candidates in 2000 carefully peppered their remarks with simple phrases in Spanish, at
least for some audiences. And at least some states have used bilingual ballots for over
half a century: New Mexican voters could choose the “Boleto Prohibicionista” slate.
33
“Time Off Urged for Voting Help,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2004.
34
See “Bilingual Ballots Increasingly Requested,” the Associated Press, March 28, 2003.
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among others, on the state ballot employed in .940 « But i, appears tha, in American
suffrage, this fight is no, over, and the front lines are in county and city govemntents and
local polling stations across the country. Of course, there are federal statutory, judicial,
and executive-branch dtmensions to this conflrc, as well. This is clear in a recent
agreement between Suffolk County, New York, and the US. Justice Department,
requiring the county to pu, in place Spanish-language voting materials and hire b,lingua,
poll workers under the terms of the Voting Rights Act. 36
Among other things. Bush v. Gore was a case about how and where to count and
re-coun, ballots. Judge Posner is among those who have argued tha, electoral democracy
would be better served by more localism when i, comes to counting ballots. As I've
explained above,” Posner has urged that ballots be “counted at the precinct level to
enable as many spoiled ballots as possible to be revoted."38 Posner goes further, calling
punchcard voting technology “a de facto literacy test” for people who are “poorly
educated.” Indeed, Posner argues that the same is true of other ballot types, “when the
votes are counted at the county rather than the precinct level.”39
Judge Posner here refers to the place ballots are counted as a “de facto literacy
test,” and argues that the exclusion be removed simply by tallying votes in precincts.
,
e 7nT, a"°'• a ‘ 59> Where a facsiraile of a state ball0 ‘ fro™ that year is reproducedfeatures the Boleto Republteano,” “Boleto Democrats and five other ways to vote a stratgh, patT
Ticket”
8 ° Proh 'blcioms,a” and “Boleto Agrtcuhor-Obrero,” for the Farmer-Ub™
See Robert E. Kessler, “Suffolk Settles Voting Rights Case,” Newsday, June 30, 2004.
37
See Chapter One, at 25.
38
Posner, Breaking the Deadlock
,
at 259; emphasis added. Posner’s regression analysis of the sources of
spoiled ballots identifies “county-counted” as one of the leading indicators of mcreased ballot spoilage.
39
Id. at 259.
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Posner is nothing if not an iconoclast, and this endorsement of the loci
suffrage flies in the face of prevailing biases in favor of larger govemi
guarantors of fa,mess. At the same time, his pointed analogy reminds
darkest days in American voting history.
al dimension of
erning units as
us of some of the
Against Universal
Jim Crow policies and the Progressive emphasis on national harmonization, I
suffrage. Progressives are often linked with the 1920 ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment formally enfranchising women. But Mugwump reformers
- proto-
Progressives - helped push the Australian ballot thirty years earlier, and locally-
administered personal-registration laws may be Progressivism’s greatest legacy in
American voting practices. Whether registration’s purposes were fundamentally
exclusionary remains uncertain, but many scholars have condemned the practice’s
discriminatory effects. This section analyzes the connections between these reforms, the
local dimension of American voting, and the exclusionary, discriminatory tradition in
American thought. I conclude that neither the racist policies of the Jim Crow South nor
the systemic discrimination wrought by personal-registration requirements can be
accurately blamed on local control itself: state-level actors, racism, and declining faith in
universal suffrage among national elites must shoulder the bulk of the blame.
argue, have contributed to biases against local electoral authority today. In terms of the
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a. “* do not exPect an impartial administration
Reconstruction White Backlash.
of this clause:” The Post-
An archetypal use of local control for invidtous exclusionary putposes was the
literacy test in the post-Reconstruction South. The "great difficulty” a genuine, uniform
literacy test would have presented, as one authority puts it, would have been "that it
would also operate on more than a million illiterate whites.”40 The solution, of course,
was to rely on local officials to allow whites, but not blacks, to pass the test. As a
Virginia delegate said of the literacy test in that state’s convention in 1902, “I do not
expect an impartial administration of this clause.”41
Literacy or “understanding” tests were copied from policies “Know-Nothings”
used to disenfranchise immigrants in Massachusetts and Connecticut a generation
earlier.
42
In the South, of course, such tests were only part of a larger package of
measures designed to “eliminate the darkey as a political factor,” as Carter Glass told
fellow Virginians.43 Morgan Kousser has written that “cross-fertilization and
40
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Quoted in Kirk Harold Porter, A History ofSuffrage in the United States ( 1 97 1 ) ( 1 9 1 8) at 2 1
8
Mississippi version” of the test, Riker writes,
“The
“adapted to local circumstances, required that electors be able to read from the state
constitution or to understand it or to interpret it reasonably. The alternatives were, of course, intended
to allow registration of wholly illiterate whites while the test itself was to be administered to exclude
all Negroes, whether literate or not.”
Riker, Democracy in the United States, at 53 (emphasis added). Keyssar writes that “[m]any of
the disfranchising laws were designed expressly to be administered in a discriminatory fashion, permitting
whites to vote while barring blacks. Small errors in registration procedures or marking ballots might or
might not be ignored at the whim of election officials; taxes might be paid easily or only with difficulty tax
receipts might or might not be issued.” Keyssar, The Right to Vote, at 1 12.
42
Riker, at 53.
This plan of popular suffrage, said Glass, will “eliminate the darkey as a political factor in this State in
less than five years, so that in no single county of the Commonwealth will there be the least concern felt for
the complete supremacy of the white race in the affairs of government.” See Paul Lewinson, Race, Class,
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coordination” between Southern states in adopting refonns
‘‘amounted to a public
conspiracy.”44 Southern lawmakers “frequently admitted, indeed boasted, that such
measures as complex registration rules, literacy and property tests, poll taxes, white
pnmaries, and grandfather clauses were designed to produce an electorate confined to a
white race that declared itself supreme.- Laughlin McDonald’s list of “the traditional
‘expedients’ to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by blacks” adds “onerous residency
requirements
. . . voter challenges and purges
.
.
.
[and] the use of discrim,natory
redistricting and apportionment schemes....”4 '’ Contusing elect,on announcements and
the deceptive use of mult,pie ballot boxes for multiple-office elections were also widely
employed to keep black votes from counting
.
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Commenting on the d.scriminatory use of
registration rules, Joseph Harris observes that
j‘
‘ f 0f“T0n knowledSe that ,he registration systems of the Southernstates are designed to disenfranchise the Negro.... [T]he applicant for registration
must prove his qualifications to vote ‘to the satisfaction of the registration officer’-a
and Party: A History ofNegro Suffrage and White Politics in the South ( 1 932), at 84-86 Glass told the
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'ha '
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Shaping ofSouthern Politics
,
at 59. Descnbmg the evolution of whitemethods of disenfranehsing blacks, Ben Tillman of South Carolina said, “[w]e took the government awav
ZlTtH ?
CS ' W7h0t them - • With that system • • • we 8ot tired ourselves. So we called a
tw“men toZnsV T ^ °f the COl0red pe°ple wh°m we could ” Tlllman™dehis stat ment the U.S. Senate. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History ofAmerican Law (1985) at 507Give me a convention, and I will fix it so that the people shall rule and the Negro shall never be heard
T; .
“d R°^ T°°^S °f the new Georgia constitution m 1890. See Rockefeller Foundation The
mo
AfockfllerFoundation Conference (1981), at 9. A Tennessee newspaper editorialized in89, [i]t is certain that many years will elapse before the bulk of the Negroes will awaken to an interest in
elections, if relegated to their proper sphere, the com and cotton fields, by some election law....” Id. at 15.
ee generally Michael Perman, Strugglefor Mastery: Disenfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908 (2001).
44
Kousser, The Shaping ofSouthern Politics, at 39.
45
Smith, Civic Ideals, at 383.
And where these technically legal measures failed to work or were thought insufficient, the state was
more than willing to resort to fraud and violence in order to smother black political participation and
safeguard white supremacy.
(2003), at 2-3.
McDonald, A Voting Rights Odyssey: Black Enfranchisement in Georgia
47
See Seymour and Frary, How the World Votes, at 243.
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What is sinking about such measures is not only that so many of them were locally-
administered, bu, that relatively few were formal, dejure eliminations of whole classes of
people from the franchise. Southern white elites focused on voting practices and
informal barriers, constructing an intricate “maze dependent on local administration,
through which any blacks bold enough to try to vote would have to pass. As Kousser
wntes, the Southern states rarely employed any means which constituted an “absolute,
unequivocal provision which [banned] a discrete category of persons from the ballot
box.” Instead, laws focused on increasing the economic and social costs of voting, and
on policies which "allowed administrators to discriminate between voters with roughly
the same legal qualifications .”50
This all took place, of course, in the shadow of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Because it was too formal, too far removed from suffrage practices, and too little
supported by Northerners, the Amendment’s guarantee of voting rights to blacks turned
out to be hollow. Congress had rejected an alternative text putting in place an affirmative
suffrage right for males above twenty-one, rather than banning discrimination in voting
“on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” as the Amendment
eventually did .
51
Resurgent Southern whites skirted that language easily and soon.
48
Harris, Registration of Voters in The United States, at 312.
49
Riker, at 53.
50
Kousser, at n.4, p. 2-3.
51
Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, at 357, citing the Congressional Globe, January 29-30, 1869. Bensel argues
that each of the three post-war Congresses - the Thirty-Ninth, the Fortieth, and the Forty-First - focused on
one particular way of implementing national policy toward the South. The Thirty-Ninth attempted direct
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Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the nation’s fundamental law had a, least begun to
recognize African Americans as equal citizens. But as Kenneth Karst wntes in his
history of American ci.tzenship law, the problem facing blacks for the next century
would be “that local law and custom consigned them to a place outside the social
boundaries defining membership in the local community.”52 Racial exclusion and local
control were linked outs.de the deep South, as well. An Ohio law passed in 1841 gives
us a relatively rare glimpse into the workings of rae.al suffrage restrictions. The Ohio
statute required election officers to contest the eligibility of anyone with a “visible
admixture of African blood;” the challenged voter had to provide witnesses and answer
questions, and could be barred from the polls at the discretion of the poll-worker. This
practice survived for a quarter-century before state courts struck it down. 53
What role did local administration play in this quintessential^ exclusionary
period? Town and county officials implemented these measures, and did so in a
discriminatory manner; ultimately, national legislative, judicial, and executive-branch
action was necessary to confront the problem. But the fact of local administration did not
bring about restricted suffrage in this period. Primary responsibility for post-
Reconstruction restrictions on voting by African Americans cannot rest with the local
officials who implemented them. After all, these were state laws, motivated by a
tradition of ascriptive discrimination that reached across the region, and, indeed, the
nation. But even state government, Southern prejudice, and American racism itself are
reorganization of the southern political economy, and the Forty-First was to force changes in the South by
putting conditions on readmission to the Union. It was the Fortieth which attempted to use suffrage
regulation to control the South. Id., at 353.
Kenneth Karst, Belonging To America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (1989), at 3.
53
Harris, 311. The case was Monroe v. Collins
,
17 Oh. St. 665 (1867).
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no. sufficient explanafion. For a powerful naitona, trend during this period turned
against universal suffrage.
“Among elite thinkers, a retreat from the previous consensus in favor ofmanhood
suffrage was among the most remarkable developments of the late nineteenth century,”*
wmes Eric Foner. By the turn of the century, Kousser observes, the U.S. saw “a
recrudescence of antidemocratic theorizing on the question of who was entitled to
vote .”55 Daniel T. Rodgers notes that the new discipline of political science displayed
“an extraordinary fertility of imagination” in developing new arguments demonstrating
“.ha, suffrage was no, a right, bu, a gift of the state ”55 Writing of the “consensus on
literacy” as threshold test for competency in voting, Michael Schudson concludes that
“the concept of universal suffrage had lost hegemony.”57
Tins retreat challenges the conventional narrative of always-increasing mclusion
in American suffrage - one reason why the “recrudescence of antidemocratic theorizing”
is not as well understood as other episodes. But another reason is the relatively
procedural, rather than formal, nature of the new restrictions. Americans are good at
Eric Foner, The Story ofAmerican Freedom (1998), at 119.
Kousser, The Shaping ofSouthern Politics (1974) at 250-25
1
56
Rodgers, Contested Truths
,
at 174.
Tf °ood C^en: A History ofAmerican Civic Life (1998), at 1 84. See also Michael E.
A l’ ffff °fPopl,,ar Politics: The American North, 1865-1928 (1986), in which McGerrdescribes liberal reformers’ hostditv iiniumoitili y to universal suffrage after the Civil War.’
Hirschman writes in The Rhetoric ofReaction that
Mat 214. AlbertO.
[f
]
r°m the last third of the nineteenth century to the First World War and beyond, a vast anddiffuse literature - embracing philosophy, psychology, politics, and belles lettres - amassed every
conceivable argument for disparaging the ‘masses,’ the majority, parliamentary rule, and democratic
government. Even though it made few proposals for alternative institutions, much of this literature
implicitly or explicitly warned of the dire dangers threatening society as a result of the trend to
democratization.”
Hirschman, The Rhetoric ofReaction (1991), at 5. See also id. at 19-26 (discussing that literature).
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talking about rights, but relatively few people had their “right to vote” legally,
formally, and completely removed dunng this penod. But a great many, North and
South, saw the difficulty of exercising that right increase exponentially, by design. Local
administration was used to discriminatory effect during this period, and no doubt a great
many county clerks acted zealously in preventing Southern blacks from voting. But in
the context of a powerful, carefully-theorized, national movement away from universal
suffrage, it is not accurate to lay all the blame at the feet of local administration.
b. “To elevate and purify the suffrage:” Progressive-era Reforms in the
North.
Bucking a classic American preference, many Progressives sought centralization
in various policy areas. But tum-of-the-century voting reforms such as registration rules
did not centralize administrative authority. Recall the crucial conclusion of the 2002
report of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform: compulsory registration
effected a new decentralization of power to determine the eligibility of voters, devolving
from state governments down to the local and county governments that managed this
process and maintained the rolls.”58 Meanwhile, Progressives’ opposition to corruption
and their belief that enlightened policies were harmonized at the national or state level
did not add up to a preference for more people to be involved in elections,
notwithstanding the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. “In the North,” writes
Rodgers, Progressives and other “professional students of political science” “rallied to the
idea of . . . educational tests and higher registration laws to elevate and purify the
58
Carter et al., To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process (2002), at 27.
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suffrage.”59 Robert Wiebe notes that what he calls “exclusionary rules” spread well
beyond the post-Reconstruction South, and “[b]y the 1920s a dozen states
.
.
. adopted
literacy tests, all but three states tightened their provisions governing registration, and
about half of America's counties required personal registration before voting ”60 Indeed,
ifwe eonstder compulsory literacy and personal-registration rules to be the Progressives’
key contribution to American voting, theirs may be a legacy oflocally-enforced,
exclusionary practices. This section assesses those reforms.
Literacy
0U ^ inte,,igent sentiment to assert itself:” Secrecy and
I have argued above that the advent of the Australian ballot represented an
attempt to privatize American voting by diminishing the impact of polling-place
pressures on voters. As with other reforms of this period, scholars are divided as to the
secret, state-produced ballot’s place in the exclusionary tradition. Commenting on New
York s 1894 constitutional implementation of secrecy and voting machines, G. Alan Tan-
notes that both required literacy; registration requirements and a ninety-day waiting
penod for naturalized citizens, Tarr writes, were also part of a nationwide “late-century
movement to restrict the franchise.”61 In his history of the Australian ballot, E.C. Evans
refers to the reforms as part of a process of “gradual disenfranchisement,”62 and Kousser
lists the Australian ballot as one of the “restrictive measures” employed by Southern
59
Rodgers, Contested Truths
,
at 174. Rodgers also mentions “radically shortening the number of elective
offices [and] schemes of proportional voting so as to weight independent votes more heavily....” Id.
60
Wiebe, Self-Rule: A Cultural History ofAmerican Democracy, at 135.
61
G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions { 1998), at 108.
6
" Evans, A History ofthe Australian Ballot System in the United States, at 25.
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Democrats around the turn of the century" North and South^ meanwhi ,e ^
major part.es were able to move “under the mild cover of procedural reform” to
hamstring smaller part.es by making sure the new state-controlled ballot would ban
“fusion” candidacies
.
64
Rokkan agrees that the “primary motive” for the private ballot was to enable
voters “to escape sanct.ons from superiors ” But he also notes “that the provisions for
secrecy could cu, the voter off from his peers as well as his superiors:’ Voter sol.dartty
within the working class would presumably d.minish once those voters had no way of
confirming that they had voted alike - even absent coercion or fraud." But some lower-
class voters apparently felt liberated from pressure by “superrors:” one western Maryland
newspaper remarked that the new secret ballot elect,on marked “the first time a poor and
timid man could go up and vote as the equal of the greatest.”" And part of why we know
that critics of refonn argued that the Australian ballot was unfatrly keeping less-educated
voters from participating is that advocates like Richard Henry Dana tried so hard to refute
them. In his 191
1 pamphlet articulating the benefits of Massachusetts’ ballot system.
Dana argued that the percentage of registered voters going to the polls was higher in
63
Kousser, The Right to Vote, at 39.
ReZwltu l9Sm 7"
,he Ba
"°u
: FUS!°" PO,UiCS and Amifusion *5 American Historical/A wevv 287 (1980), at 288. Argersmger shows that anti-fusion politics “involved a conscious effort to
s lape the political arena by disrupting opposition parties, revising traditional campaign and votmg
practices, and ensuring Republican hegemony - all under the mild cover of procedural reform.”
65
Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties, at 35.
’ Quoted in Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party, at 142.
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“manufacturing ct.es” such as Holyoke, Lowell, Cambndge, and Lawrence than
towns. 67
in rural
Other contemporary advocates, however, suggest that at the very least, some
reformers wanted to keep less-educated people from the polls. Abram Flexner argued
that secrecy “will encourage the intelligent sentiment to assert itself and will give it the
opportunity to exercise its just weight ” Whether this premise is exclusionary depends on
how Flexner is using “sentiment:” his phrase “the intelligent sentiment” could refer
either to thoughts within one person, or to a section of society. Context suggests the
latter interpretation: Flexner soon contrasts “the intelligent sentiment” with “the
purchasable element.”68 A Southern advocate, meanwhile, connected ballot reform’s
exclusionary potential with racism in blunt language. “The South’s reluctance to adopt
the Australian ballot,” wrote William Henry Glasson in 1909, “was doubtless due to the
embarrassing problem of negro suffrage.” Illiterate whites, as well as blacks, would have
been excluded by secrecy. Glasson condemns the use of violence and intimidation to
keep blacks from voting, methods which he regarded as “exceedingly harmful to white
integrity.” By 1909, both difficulties had been solved:
Happily, through the adoption of the constitutional amendments in the
Southern States, the ignorant negro vote has been excluded by legal methods which
have proved effective, and the political supremacy of the white race has been assured.
Richard Henry Dana, The Australian Ballot System ofMassachusetts : Some Fallacious Questions
Answered
,
(191 1), at 6-8. Moreover, Dana contended that registration rates had not declined. He claimed
that “in the six Boston wards representing the least education,” the number of registered voters was higher
in the first four years under the new ballot law than the previous four. Id.
Abram Flexner, The New Ballot Law ofLouisvdle, Kentucky at work and compared with the
Massachusetts Law (1889), at 10.
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In addition to being still more reveal,ng evidence of the frankness with which Southern
whites pursued electoral “supremacy,” Glasson’s point about the Australian ballot is that
it did no, need to be implemented in an exclusionary way. Lawmakers could decide
whether they wanted illiterates to be able to vote or no,. Glasson explains that if
Southern leaders chose “to continue the ballot in the hand of the illiterate white man, a
form of the Australian ballot can be provided, similar to that used in New York
State....”
70
I believe Glasson was referring to New York’s 1896 statutory provision of
assistance to any voter who would take an oath of illiteracy. The secret ballot often
functioned as a defacto literacy test, 71 but many ballots included party symbols, or
vignettes, to help voters who could not read well. However, in the same period, many
states implemented new formal exclusions, to be administered at the polls: dejure
literacy tests, typically requiring voters to read and explain an excerpt from the state
constitution or another official document. By my count, twenty-one states put in place
some form of literacy or “understanding” test between 1870 and 1924. Only nine other
states, meanwhile, mandated that assistance be available to illiterates, and two of those
statutes appear to have been subsequently overturned by constitutionally-enacted literacy
requirements. (One such apparent casualty was the 1896 New York law admired by
*’ W ' ll 'am H Glasson, “The Australian Voting System: A Sketch of Its History and Principles - Why
orth Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia Should Adopt It,” South Atlantic Quarterly (1909), at 11-12.
70
Id.
Even where literacy was not prescribed, the Australian ballot made it practically a requirement ”
Schudson, at 183.
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Glasson: the statute would presumably have been negated by the constitutional literacy
requirement, enacted in ,921. The other was California, where an ,89, statute appears
overridden by a 19, 1 constitutional requirement.) In other words, about three times as
many states excluded those with poor reading skills as sough, to include them. The
twenty-one literacy-,es, states spanned the nation, from Maine to Mississipp, to
California. Of course, literacy or “understanding” tests were administered by local
officials, who were given a considerable amount of leeway under the literacy laws.
Twelve exempted many voters from the new requirements - usually including all those
already qualified, people with physical dtsabilities, and, in the South, veterans and
property owners. 72 Presumably, one function of literacy tests would have been simply to
deter those with poor reading skills from even showing up. But such exemptions
emphasize how much practical authority local officials must have had to determine which
residents of their communities belonged to the franchise.
d. Corruption (As Defined by Progressives): Mandatory Personal
Registration.
Progressive-era registration rules represent a significant piece in the puzzle
connecting local election administration to traditions of exclusion and inequality in
American suffrage law. Part of that importance lies in its contemporary relevance: of all
the major reforms of the period, only personal registration remains both on the books and
controversial: patently-exclusionary measures like literacy tests, poll taxes, and white
I derive this count from state-by-state information available in Keyssar, The Right to Vote, at Table A. 13,
Literacy Requirements for Suffrage: 1870-1924.” Reichley does not list states, but similarly observes that
between 1900 and 1926, eleven non-Southern states put literacy tests in place. Reichley, The Life ofthe
Parties, at 209.
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Primanes are gone, while secrecy is now democratic dogma. Second, although
registration processes are subject to numerous state and federal laws, registering voters
and maintaining the rolls was is still predominantly a county and municipal
responsibility. Registration rules remain so vanable and fine-grained, therefore, that i, is
extremely difficult to summarize state-by-sta.e policies - the reason Keyssar gives for his
failure to tabulate registration rules in his otherwise-comprehensive appendices. 73
Meanwhile, our best estimates of personal-registration's
,um
-of-,he-cen,ury spread focus
not on states, but at the county level. Reichley calculates that around 1 900, about 30
percent of counties outside the South required some kind of personal registration, while
about 24 percent had state-compiled lists. But by 1 920, the corresponding figures were
45 percent and 22 percent of counties, respectively. 74
Two recent books strongly criticize Progressive ideas about the suffrage, and both
focus on personal registration. Pnor to about 1880, most registration laws had mandated
creation of voter lists by town and county officials, but under personal-registration rules,
it became the duty of individual voters to secure their own eligibility,” as Crenson and
Ginsberg write in Downsizing Democracy
,
75
Michael Schudson argues in The Good
Citizen that the Progressive model of citizenship “helped free people from parties, but it
also provided new means to exclude some people from voting altogether.”76 Again, this
Keyssar explains that the decision not to include registration in the tables “was made for reasons of
feasibility: state voter registration laws for the last century generally have been complex, lengthy and
subject to frequent changes. A preliminary attempt to produce such a tabular presentation yielded anincomplete document more than fifty pages long.” Keyssar, at 325.
74
Reichley, The Life ofthe Parties, at 208.
Crenson and Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy, at 56.
Schudson, The Good Citizen, at 183. Other scholars challenge this critical interpretation of new burdens
on voters. Paul Kleppner, for example, acknowledges that literacy tests, registration requirements and
other “new procedural barriers to the exercise of the franchise” were “aimed at limiting the activities of
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was a national movement, one which employed local registration officials as its key
agent. In the South, of course, black voters were targeted for excluston; in the North, i,
was often workers and new immigrants whom “the new registrat.on boards hoped to bar
from urban elections. Another study concludes that registration rules “were enacted
' m °rder ‘° deCreaSe V°tin8
' frau<iu,ent voting, but also voting by transients,
illiterates, blacks, immigrants, and poor-whites .”78
Words like “hoped to bar” and “in order to” remain controversial, however.
Reviewing primary documents and scholarly assessments, Alexander Keyssar says that
historical evidence “does no, offer definitive answers” to the fundamental question about
registration and balloting reforms.- which of the central motivations was primary - a
genuine desire to fight fraud, or a less-noble interest in shrinking democracy? Keyssar’s
own conclusion is that fraud was real - but much less prevalent than reformers said it
was, and as likely to be found in rural areas as in the immigrant-dominated cities that
were the primary targets of registration requirements.
“[WJidespread convictions” about
the fallen state of American politics, he writes, “were spawned by germs of fact, cultured
in a medium of class and ethnic (or racial) prejudice and apprehension .”79
Others reach similar conclusions. Progressives, Crenson and Ginsberg argue,
regarded mass mobilization as an impediment to effective government,” and fully
intended to narrow government’s “receptivity to popular activism.” Registration was one
to
urarugrant8 . But kleppner argues that such burdens were fundamentally different from the legal “right
ote, which had been won and guaranteed in previous battles. Paul Kleppner, “Defining Citizenship
mmigratton and the Struggle for Voting Rights in Antebellum America,” in Donald W. Rogers ed
?
Votingand the Spirit ofAmerican Democracy ( 1 992), at 45.
b , g
77
Rodgers, Contested Truths
,
at 174.
78
Kevin P. Phillips and Paul H. Blackman, Electoral Reform and Voter Participation (1975), at 5.
79
Keyssar, The Right to Vote, at 159, 159-162, 162.
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means to that end. I, aimed to prevent “corruption,” us Progressives defined rHe term.
fraud, but also machine politics in the cities, built on masses of mostly-poor immigrant
and ethnic voters. To be sure, late-nineteenth-century party politics were corrupt by any
definition. But Progressives also believed that big-eity parties and their working-class,
mm,grant members were themselves “a corruption of the democracy envisioned by the
founders. Tum-of-the-century personal-registration procedures carried strong class
biases, particularly since municipal offices were only open during business hours, and
wage-workers could ill afford to miss time on the clock
.
80
Reichley, meanwhile,
contends that “the inclination of some Progressives to limit the electorate” was motivated
by both partisanship and philosophy. Urban immigrants and their “machines” were likely
to vote against Progressives, and such people did not fit the ideal of the well-informed,
independent voter
.
81
Registration administered by city and county officials was viewed as a restrictive,
discriminatory practice long before the Progressive era. Registration rules proposed for
Crenson and Ginsberg at 55-56. More generally, they note, erecting any hurdle to political participationprivileges the wealthy and better-educated, who are more likely to have the resources necessar^ to
tTem
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Te^ments ' Id' Thls account of Progressive-era ideas about votmg continues aestablished in the authors treatment of suffrage expansion in the early U.S. When government
re led closely on the active support and cooperation of the people—as “citizen administrators, citizen
so diers, citizen taxpayers”—electoral victory signified far more than popularity. It was proof of the
capacity to govern. “The federal government’s early and extensive reliance on its people,” write Crenson
and Ginsberg, was a factor in its early realization of full white manhood suffrage.” By contrast leaderstoday try to achieve their policy objectives “without mobilizing voters,” by means of litigation,
’
administrative procedures, or privatization. Id., at 47, 48.
Reichley, The Life ofthe Parties, at 208-209. Progressive reforms, he writes, aimed to get rid of this
corruption, happily paying the price in “some contraction of democracy.” Reichley, at 207. Interestingly,
while Reichley generally shares Crenson and Ginsberg’s conclusions about the Progressives and
registration, he gives a very different assessment of the relationship between Progressivism ideas about the
suffrage and those of the founders. Where Crenson and Ginsberg charge Progressives with abandoning the
framers view of “popular participation as an indispensable source of authority and stability for the new
government they were creating,” Reichley argues that “many Progressives shared the view of most of the
Founders that republican government would be unworkable without well-informed, independent voters
who cast their ballots for what is best for the nation as a whole.” See Downsizing Democracy, at 53; The
Life ofthe Parties, at 208-209.
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Philadelphia in the 1830s were nominally designed to prevent the
-gross frauds” which
the city had seen in recent elections, but in the state’s constitutional convention of 1837,
regtstration was vigorously opposed as a partisan, discriminatory measure, tilled against
the poor and city dwellers. Floor speakers argued that “the law was passed as a party
measure, designed to cut down the vote of Philadelphia, that it fostered rather than
prevented fraud, and that it took away the right of suffrage from the poor and secured it
for the rich.”
82
Scornful critics attacked a system under which assessors visited houses
during the day to count voters. Working men were at their jobs, and were excluded from
the rolls; not so for the rich, for whom “the gold and silver door plate with name was
enough” to secure a place on the rolls. Finally, opponents introduced an amendment
making election laws uniform throughout the state, “knowing full well that a registration
law applicable to rural sections as well as to Philadelphia would be bitterly opposed by
the rural members, and could not be enacted.” The amendment failed. 83
Particularly in the North, rural-dominated state legislatures imposed cumbersome
registration requirements on cities in order to depress immigrant voting. 84 As late as
1927, eleven states in the Midwest, Plains, and West still had on the books registration
laws applying only to cities. The most common justification for excusing rural areas
from registration was that so many of the voters “are personally acquainted with one
another,’ as a report by the National League of Cities put it. But as the report
acknowledged, some of the worst cases of voting frauds appear occasionally in rural
82
~ Joseph Harris, Registration of Voters in The United States { 1929), 67-68.
83
Id., at 68.
84
See William E. Gienapp, “Politics Seem to Enter into Everything,” in Stephen E. Maizlish and John J.
Kushma, eds., Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840-1860 {mi), at 24. Gienapp says this
happened in the 1850s in Portland, Maine, as in “several other northern cities.”
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sections.” The fact that it took decades for this to be obvious suggests that nrore than
common sense and the desire to save money went into the decision to apply the
procedure only to cities.
If the purposes of personal-registration rules remain contested, their results seem
more clear. While acknowledging that the laws' impact varied with the ability of parties
to register their members, Keyssar concludes that “it can be said with certainty that
registration laws reduced fraudulent voting and that they kept large numbers (probably
millions) of eligible voters from the polls.” One third or more of a national drop in
turnout during this period was probably attributable to registration rules. 86 Some officials
celebrated decreases in the size of the franch.se, A Pittsburgh registration commission
noted privately in 1907 that “the figures speak for themselves as to the good results
obtained under the operation of the Personal Registration Act.” Those “good results:” the
number of men registered to vote had fallen by over half. 87
In their acclaimed Why Americans Still Don 't Vote, Frances Fox Piven and
Richard Cloward also conclude that legal and procedural changes around the turn of the
century “obstructed the actual ability of many people to vote.”88 Another author attacks
85
fi^r^wr1331 LeagUe ’ Committee on Election Administration, A Model Registration System
v
1 yZ / ), at 51, 62.
Keyssar, at 1 58. Crenson and Ginsberg also conclude that together with ballot-design reform, voter
registration “disenfranchised millions of immigrants and working-class voters.” Crenson and Ginsberg, at
Turnout dropped virtually everywhere, meaning that in order for the elimination of fraud to
explain the entire decrease, “the [pre-registration] turnouts in virtually every’ county for every election must
reflect substantial fraud.” Gienapp, “Politics Seem to Enter into Everything,” at 24.
87
See Keyssar, at 158-159.
88
Cloward and Fox Piven, Why Americans Still Don ’t Vote And Why Politicians Want it That Way (2000),
at 45-46. Fox Piven and Cloward argue that elites purposefully put such obstructions in place because they
feared the increasing ability of lower-income voters to affect government policy. The apparent paradox of
greater formal inclusion and increasing barriers to participation - and severely diminished turnout among
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«he voter-registration system as “an institutional bias ... at work in our political system"
against the urban poor . 89 Fox Piven and Cloward identify “residual procedural
obstructions embedded in the voting process” as a key problem with American suffrage
today
.
90
Political scientists, of course, have conducted a generation of empirical research
on registration’s effects in the U.S., with virtually all studies concluding that registration
requirements are responsible for some systematic reduction of turnout. Fox Piven and
Cloward contend that obstacles to participation like personal-registration rules survive
precisely because they are a powerful way to limit and control the electorate: registration
rules and other burdensome elements of the American electoral process, they argue, have
roots in ruling elites’ desire to close some citizens out of politics by making it more
poor whi tes
,
blacks, and immigrants - was, in their view, largely a product of changes in “the potentialimportance of the vote. Large chunks of the electorate were “demobilized” in what amounted to
something like a democratic counterrevolution” because of the increasing power of lower-strata voters to
shape elections and policy. Id Michael McGerr, meanwhile, writes that Northern registration rules “made
voting a bit more difficult in some areas,” but did not alone account for the decline in turnout. He views
changes in political culture as the more fundamental problem. McGerr, The Decline ofPopular Politics at
1. Robert Wiebe concludes that what he calls “the mechanics of exclusion” made only “a contribution” to
shrinking turnout: “the sinking of the lower class” was its ultimate cause. Wiebe, Self-Rule
,
at 136.
89
Penn Kimball, The Disconnected (f 912), at 2. Writing prior to the decades of organizing and advocacy
that improved many registration systems and helped lead to the NVRA of 1993 - Kimball argued that “the
failure of the American political system to engage millions of potential voters is the product of the
institutional structure by which persons can qualify to vote. That structure discriminates most particularly
against the poor.’ Id., at 2-3. Kimball argues that the problem ran deeper than the fragmentation of the
process and the low number of ways to register, problems which have been substantially addressed in
legislation since. Kimball contended that we would not see significant improvement in participation “until
the federal government takes the initiative to qualify eligible voters rather than place the onus upon
individuals thwarted by outmoded state and local regulations.” Kimball, 2-3. See also 4-5, where Kimball
writes, [wjhatever its original intent, voter registration operates as an effective system of political
control.. ,.[T]hose who neither register nor vote are drawn disproportionately from the ranks of the nation’s
poor, from ethnic minority groups, from disadvantaged residents of our largest urban centers.” Indeed,
Kimball argues that the American system of leaving it up to voters to figure out how to register themselves
to vote belies the very notion that voting is a right, and not a privilege: “[t]he assumption that voting is a
privilege to be selectively earned has left the most fundamental act of citizenship at the mercy of a whole
series of discretionary obstacles.” Id., at 7.
Fox Piven and Cloward, at 16. Phillips and Blackman argue that alienation, boredom, and inertia explain
more of the gap between American turnout rates and those of other industrialized democracies than do
registration rules. Phillips and Blackman, Electoral Reform and Voter Participation, at 2. This
comparative analysis is not incompatible with the conclusions of Fox Piven and Cloward.
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difficult for them to participate. Moreover, they tackle Walter Dean Burnham's
bureaucratic-capacity explanation head-on - remember, Burnham had contended that the
U.S. simply lacked the resources to compile registration rolls, but Fox Piven and Cloward
argue that “increasingly elaborate bureaucratic machinery did exist” as the electorate
broadened in the late nineteenth century. But that machinery “was used to impede
VO''"8 rather lhan facilitate suffrage through centralized, streamlined administration of
elections.'’
1
Finally, an international note suggests that others have caught on to
registration’s exclusionary potential: in Egypt, men are automatically registered, but
women must ask to be added to the rolls. 92
Between about 1880 and 1925, state constitution-writers and statute-drafters in
South and North alike used local institutions to restrict the franchise. In different ways
and with different purposes, the secret ballot, literacy tests, and personal-registration rules
made it difficult or even impossible for many American men who had previously been
able to vote to do so. Without question, this is a dark stain on the local dimension of
American suffrage. But ultimately, it is hard to blame local administrative institutions for
this period of procedural disenfranchisement. At a practical level, one could point fingers
at the judicial branch, for failing to aggressively apply the Fifteenth Amendment, or at the
Id., 293 n.82. Emphasis added. An intriguing perspective on these questions surfaced in Congressional
debate over the NVRA, as legislators weighed whether to require the military to automatically register
soldiers to vote. See Thompson, Just Elections, at 33. Thompson argues that automatic registration is
often mis-characterized in American political debates as a step which would diminish the moral autonomy
and responsibility of the individual voter. If any such diminishment does occur, he argues, it is easily
outweighed by the increase in autonomy that comes from “removing a structural obstacle to voting.” Id., at
32. As he writes, preserving the opportunity not to register can be understood as “less important than
enhancing the opportunity to choose whom to vote for.” Id., at 193. Congress decided not to pass
automatic registration for soldiers; Thompson argues that selective automatic registration is wrong not
because it decreases the moral autonomy of those registered, but because it is inequitable: if it’s an
advantage, it should be provided to all citizens. Id., at 33.
9
‘ Yonhyok Choe, How to Manage Free and Fair Elections (Goteborg, 1997), at 24 n.6.
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bar, for giving them few chances to do so. State ,egis,a,ors obvious,y conrc in for their
share ofresponsibly. Bu, the most dear culprit is the powerful nationa, ntoventen,
against universal manhood suffrage. Local officials acted to res.net the franchtse-
probably in ways whtch were dtscnminatoiy and unfair, along class, ethnic, and racial
lines. But in doing so, they were no. challenging the wishes of state or na.tonal elites.
They were implementing a national ideology.
III. V
^
n tS
/
Negr®es
’
Al,ens
’
Jews, and Common Sailors Were Admitted toVote. The InCustve Tradition in American Election Administration
Across American history, local election officials have participated in partisan
fraud, racist exclusions, systematic discnmina.ion against the poor and new tmmigrants,
and money-grubbing comtption. That much is well understood, and I began this project
expecting to demonstrate that the local dimension of American suffrage has been a force
for exclusion and inequality. But there is another side to the stay, one showing that m
different ways, our hyper-federalized suffrage system has helped expand the polity.
Evidence is understandably fragmentary, given that most authors have focused on statutes
and constitutions rather than practices, and on national and state action rather than local
administration. But inclusive practices with a local face are a recurring theme in
American suffrage. Sometimes, local institutions have been more inclusive than the law;
in other instances, statutes have permitted county and municipal officials to expand the
franchise; and local elections themselves have played a key role in securing broader
voting rights for some groups, particularly women. This kind of inclusive practice is
older than the country itself. Referring to recent elections in North Carolina, a speaker in
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Parliament in 1706 complained that “all sorts of people,
Jews and Common sailors were admitted to vote.”93
even servants, Negroes, Aliens,
lik'd
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V and *» degree respected ori Kea. Property, Sex, and Citizenship.
American colonial suffrage practices and citizenship policies alike were always
more mclusive than their English predecessors. English law stated unequivocally that
aliens were no, to vote, bu, differences between categories of subjects blurred in the New
World,94 particularly at the polls. A letter sent back to London in 1664 by Massachusetts
Governor Endicott seems to indicate that the Americans believed in qualifications
- jus,
not the formal ones, perhaps:
...such as vote in elections should be orthodox in religion, virtuous (and not
vicious) in conversation and all those that according to the orders and the customs ofhe colony, here established, agreeable to the liberties of the charter, having provedthemselves to be such in the places where they live, have from time to time been
admitted in our elections.”95
Kettner, The Development ofAmerican Citizenship, at 122. Maryland and Pennsylvania had similar
experiences, Kettner writes. Kettner finds that in the eighteenth-century American colonies some tension
existed between the local desire to make it relatively easy for aliens to gain the status and privileges of
Jffr™l
hiP and
,
L°n
,
don S mteres
^
,n a more restricted access. Even before the U.S. existed, citizenship andff age were already a matter of difference and dispute between centralized and local control and
administration.
., u\ 76 GeorJgian suffrage law permitted propertied aliens to vote: “every free White Man and noo er who has attained to the Age of Twenty One Years and hath been Resident in the Province Six Months
and is legal y possessed in his own Right of Fifty Acres of Land” was allowed to vote m local elections.
Kettner, at 102-103. As Kettner explains, however, English officials believe that “all colomal acts making
aliens subjects were purely local ‘fictions,’ limited in their effect to the specific province concerned.”
Meanwhile, London had its own procedure for bringing new colonial subjects into the empire, a legal
adnussion procedure administered in the colonies, with records sent to England. As Kettner writes, “[i]n
essence, Parliament had delegated its authority to bring strangers into the community of allegiance to the
local courts, maintaining only a loose supervisory function by requiring that the names of those adopted as
subjects be sent yearly to the Board of Trade.” Between 1740 and 1773, almost seven thousand people
received subjectship under London’s procedure, almost 92 percent of them in Pennsylvania. Kettner, at
94
See Kettner, at 9.
Quoted in Richard C. Simmons, Studies in the Massachusetts Franchise, 1631-169
1
(1989), at 67.
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Wha, is striking about this list - orthodox, virtuous, agreeable, “in the places where they
I've - is that as exclusionary and moralistic as they sound to modem ears, these criteria
are mostly informal, and judgments would virtually all have been local. That is not to say
that anything was petmissible, of course: in the same year, Edward Hutchinson was fined
ten pounds for voting in the Boston elect,ons, since he was a merchant, not a freeman.*
In fact, the Massachusetts franchise was restricted in this period by colonial law. Until
1647, the only requirement for political participation in a typical Massachusetts town was
church membership. In that year, a new law made men under 24 ineligible; subsequent
acts imposed the first property test (1658) and raised the size of the minimum taxable
estate required for a vote in town meeting (1670). But these laws usually grandfathered
in all current voters, and do not appear to have diminished participation much. 97
Similarly, the Connecticut General Court required in 1679 that only those adult white
men with fifty shillings of assessed property could participate in town meetings. This
requirement stayed on the books for at least a century, but it “was never enforced after
the 1 720s and became a dead letter."98 It became customary in most colonies, if not all,
“to allow all adult males, when known to the community and to any degree respected or
liked, to vote.”
99
Local authorities could let free blacks vote in some places, even in the South. As
W.E.B. DuBois points out, “so far as the letter of the law was concerned, there was not a
single Southern colony in which a black man who owned the requisite amount of
96
Id.
Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town: The First Hundred Years (1985) (1970), at 47-48.
98
Bruce C. Daniels, The Connecticut Town: Growth and Development, 1635-1790 (1979), at 67.
99
Williamson, American Suffrage
,
at 49.
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property, and complied with other conditions, did not at some penod have the legal right
to vote.” That right was eliminated in Virginia in 1 723, when the assembly declared that
“no free Negro, mulatto or Ind.an ‘shall hereafter have any vote at the elections of
burgesses or any election whatsoever.”’ But in North Carolina, a piece of legislation
passed in 1 734 laid aside a former bar against black voters; it was not reenacted until
1835. 100
“Anything with the appearance of a man” could vote in Boston around 1772,
wrote Thomas Hutchinson. Thomas Paine agreed, noting that as long as a man owned a
few household utensils and a chest of tools, he would generally be willing to swear that
he met the property qualification; John Adams wrote in 1776 that Massachusetts officials
had never been “rigid” in enforcing suffrage requirements. 101 During the late colonial
penod, many areas employed residency tests, but others did not, and men who owned
property in more than one county were commonly allowed to vote in each of them. Thus
the idea of scheduling elections on a single day became a source of controversy in New
York in 1752. Local officials were not always angels of inclusion and equality, to be
sure: particularly when partisan passions were raised, decisions as to who was permitted
to vote could be blatantly unfair. 103
100
W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880 (1977) (1935), at 6.
101
Dinkin, Voting in Provincial America
,
at 47, 100.
102
Dinkin, at 35, 123.
103 An Anglican stood for office in Puritan Boston, the people cried that “popery had come upon them like a
scarlet whore,” and the election moderator carefully accepted virtually all voters who weighed in against
the Anglican candidate, while rejecting many of those who were for him. Dinkin, Voting in Provincial
America, at 47. Williamson writes that “[unqualified persons could vote if they would vote as election
officials or other partisans told them to.” Williamson, American Suffrage, at 49.
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Independence did not change much. Summarizing a fierce dispute over the
property test for state elections in the 1780 Massachusetts constitution, Williamson wntes
that such a test might not have had any practical impact. “A strong possibility exists,”
Williamson wrote, “that the constitution did not change a situation in which adult male
taxpayers were voting in both town and colony elect,ons with the support of opinion at
large.” 104 New Jersey’s 1776 constitution established a suffrage qualification, but the
standard soon came in for criticism when it became clear that the rule was not keeping
many men from voting. Those “who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money” were
permitted to vote, and apparently any number of men were willing to swear that they
were in fact “worth” that amount. As one challenged voter said, he “valued himself a
great deal more than that.” Clearly, decisions as to the qualifications of voters were
being made at the local level; one critic said that in his own county he knew of two
hundred laborers who voted despite not paying taxes. 105
In South Carolina, numerous unqualified citizens were allowed to vote, “rather
from want of information of the Constitution and Existing Law of the State, than from
audacity, or intentionally violating the same,” as one author put it in 1796. Pennsylvania
abolished the freehold qualification in 1788 partly because it was so spottily enforced.
And into the nineteenth century, officials in eastern Virginia worked to break “the pre-
Revolutionary habit of ignoring the suffrage laws.” 106 In New York, proponents of
expanded suffrage in 1820 argued that to extend the franchise “would leave us just where
104
Williamson, at 103. Elsewhere, local elections helped broaden the franchise in cities from New Haven
to Charleston. Id., at 123.
105
Chute, The First Liberty, at 289.
10(1
Williamson, American Suffrage, at 152-153, 134, 171, 230.
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we are now; since every man who can be trusted with a deed, is made a freeholder long
enough to vote in elections” Meanwhile, evidence showed that in some towns “all adult
male residents on tax lists were being permitted to vote.”' 07 At the Massachusetts
constitutional convention of 1 820- 1 82 1 , debate clearly indicated that uneven local
enforcement of the property test erred on the side of inclusion. The property test was “in
this town, for a long time, a dead letter,” one delegate noted. 108 Age and resrdence
qualifications, another observed, “were commonly allowed upon the assertion of the
voter himself.”' 00 For thrs reason, Wtlliamson concludes that even before the new
constitution abolished the property test in favor of a taxpayer qualification, Massachusetts
politics displayed “not a theory but a condition bordering on universal suffrage.”" 0
Of course, “universal” only went so far: the female halfof the adult population
was still excluded, in some states, for another century. But women voted in some
elections long before 1 920: the history of female suffrage clearly shows that local control
otloca! voting nghts helped lead to women’s suffrage nationally. There were definitely
cases in which women were allowed to vote in state and national elections, as well. For
example, the suffrage rule in the New Jersey constitution of 1 776 - soon famous for
allowing men to estimate their personal “worth” - also referred only to “inhabitants.”
Some local officials allowed female inhabitants owning sufficient property to vote - that
is, widows and spinsters, since by law married women owned nothing. This apparently
107
Id., 198-199.
108
Journal ofthe Debates and Proceedings in the Convention ofDelegates, Chosen to Revise the
Constitution ofMassachusetts, 1820-1821, (1853), at 249.
109
Id., 254.
110
Williamson, at 177. “[T]he country was more democratic than its institutions,” he writes. Id., at 181.
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led to conflict between rural areas and towns, stnee the county people thought it was
easier for partisans to drum up the female vote in the cities." 1
But local elections themselves were the key. In the late nineteenth centuty, many
state courts allowed legislatures to deviate from constitutional suffrage limitations in
spectal elections. In some cases, this led to restrictions, as when only taxpayers or
property owners could vote on a bond question. But it also freed up localities in many
states to allow women to vote." 2 A signiftcant number of counties, cities, and towns
adopted partial suffrage, permitting women to vote in “municipal elections, on liquor
licensing matters, or for local school boards and on issues affecting education.” This
development, Keyssar writes, was uniquely Amencan, “made possible by the complex
architecture of voting laws .” 1 13
Presumably, women were then understood to have legitimate expertise and
interests in such local issues that they lacked in state and national politics
.
114
Not
counting the many states and territories which fully enfranchised women prior to the
Nineteenth Amendment
,
115
fourteen states permitted women to vote in municipal
1 1
1
Chute, The First Liberty
,
at 289-290.
112 Keyssar
’
at 167
- In his 1916 history of municipal home rule, Howard Lee McBain noted this variation
regarding suffrage qualifications, and actually faulted suffragettes for failing to capitalize on it. Finding no
evidence that either pro- or anti-women’s suffrage advocates had brought their fight to the cities, McBain
comments that “it would seem
. . . that the protagonists in the cause of woman’s suffrage have been
somewhat derelict in their failure to institute campaigns for an extension of the voting right through the
medium of freeholders’ charters or amendments in the cities” of states where charters had such authority.
Howard Lee McBain, The Law and the Practice ofMunicipal Home Rule (1916), at 582-583.
Keyssar, at 186. Emphasis added. “In most states, the suffrage requirements for ‘nonconstitutional’
elections did not have to be identical to those for offices named m state constitutions; they also could be
altered by legislation rather than the cumbersome and difficult process of constitutional amendment.” Id.
114
See Dinan, Keeping the People’s Liberties, at 107.
115
Twenty territories and states did so between 1869 (Wyoming) and South Dakota (1918). See Keyssar,
The Right To Vote, Table A.20.
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elect,ons or on tax and bond issues prior to 1920, and thirty allowed women to vote in
elections dealing with schools.- Constitutional-,aw scholars inquiring into voting nghts
for women dunng this penod focus on the 1 875 case Minor v. Happersett, with its
emphatic declaration that “if the courts can consider any question settled,” it is that “[tjhe
Constitution, when it conferred citizenshtp, did not necessanly confer the right of
suffrage. But not long after that decision was handed down, women in twenty-five
states were voting, at least on local matters such as schools and taxation." 8 Women’s
expenence of voting in local elections - and men’s perception that female voters had not
wrecked the schools, the liquor stores, or the cities - was essential to the formal, national
broadening of female suffrage early in the twentieth century.
The case of non-citizens represents another instance in which state law permitted
local officials to act in ways which were effectively more inclusive than national
citizenship law. Initially, remember, property ownership, not citizenship status,
determined eligibility to vote among men; deep into the nineteenth century, long after the
abolition of the property qualification, this remained the case. New Hampshire required
voters to be citizens in 1814, and half a dozen other states excluded non-citizens from the
franchise in the next two decades. New states such as Vermont, Tennessee, and Ohio did
not exclude non-citizens from suffrage until 1828, 1834, and 1852, respectively."’
" 6
Id., Table A. 18; and Table A. 17.
" 7
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 162, 177(1875).
1 18
See Hill, Hill s Political History ofthe United States ( 1 894), at 1 2 1 , listing states as of 1 894. The states
included Connecticut, Kansas, New York, Wyoming (where women already had full suffrage rights,
including in Presidential elections), Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Ohio.
Paul Kleppner, “Defining Citizenship: Immigration and the Struggle for Voting Rights in Antebellum
America,” in Donald W. Rogers, ed., Voting and the Spirit ofAmerican Democracy (1992), at 45.
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Westerners did no, immediately follow suit, and most states pennitted aliens to vote well
tnto the nineteenth century- a, leas, twenty-two did so in 1875, and i, was no, until 1926
that no states allowed aliens to vote 12^
Another group of Americans not formally defined as citizens well into the
nineteenth centuty - Indtans - also sometimes benefited from local admims,ration of the
suffrage. When Massachusetts lawmakers decided in the 1 840s to explore making
indigenous people full citizens, they discovered that the legal status of Indians varied
from town to town. The town clerk of Pembroke reported that Ind.ans “enjoy the
political rights of citizens;" on Martha’s Vineyard, two Chappaquiddick Indians who
owned taxable property and lived “on the ‘white side of the line'” had “the same political
rights as other citizens, & frequently vote; ...they are always at the polls at our fall
elections.” 121
With regard to non-citizens, then, state law in many placesformally left decisions
as to suffrage qualifications up to local officials. The survival of non-citizen voting in
some states for a full century after independence demonstrates at least a tacit confidence
among state lawmakers in the ability of county and city personnel to regulate the
suffrage. What is further intriguing about the fact of aliens allowed to vote is that they
had not been recognized as full citizens - formally defined as members of the American
polity - by the national state. Nonetheless, they exercised one of the central political
See Leon E. Aylsworth, “The Passing of Alien Suffrage,” 25 American Political Science Review 1 14,
See Ann Marie Plane and Gregory Button, “The Massachusetts Indian Enfranchisement Act: Ethnic
Contest in Historical Context, 1849-1869,” 40 Ethnohistory 587 (1993), at 590-591.
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powers of members of the republic - under suffrage practices controlled by local
officials.
122
Today, non-citizens generally cannot vote, but localities may be leading a
reconsideration of that situation. The Amherst, Massachusetts town meeting has twice
discussed permitting resident aliens to vote in local elections. Chicago and New York
have long allowed non-citizens to vote in school board elections, and some Maryland
communities already permit resident aliens to vote in local elections. 123 Most recently,
San Francisco has considered allowing non-citizens to vote in school board elections. 124
These decisions apply only to participation in local elections, but the example of
women’s suffrage shows that once included locally, a group becomes less threatening to
state and national lawmakers and therefore more likely to win full voting rights.
b. "Cause young republicans to be qualified for the oath:” Parties the
Franchise, and Participation.
As delegates to the 1830 Virginia convention debated the suffrage, one speaker
reminded his fellows that “all our metaphysical reasoning and our practical rules, all our
122
As federal courts wrestled with citizenship puzzles prior to the Civil War, suffrage practices took on a
ascinating connection with citizenship law. Courts struggled to decide how a person could show theirammo manendi—intent to remain in the new state to which they moved. Residence alone was not enough.
It appears that the exercise of the rights of citizenship
- particularly the suffrage right - was one way of
effectively securing one’s citizenship, because it evinced the intent to remain. As Supreme Court Justice
McLean wrote, “citizenship may depend upon the intention of the individual,” and that intention was best
r
^
Vea
J.f
d by actl0ns: “An exercise of the right of suffrage is conclusive on the subject; but acquiring a right
of suffrage, accompanied by acts which show a permanent location, unexplained, may be sufficient.”
Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163, 185 (U.S., 1848). Cited in Kettner, The Development ofAmerican
Citizenship, at ???.
'“ 3
See Jeff Donn, “Mass. Town considers granting vote to non-citizens,” LEXIS AP wire, Oct. 22, 1998;
John Mcllhenny, “Amherst tries to allow its aliens to vote,” LEXIS AP wire, Sept. 4, 2001.
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See Jessie Mangaliman, “San Francisco Considers School Board Voting Rights for Non-Citizens,” San
Jose Mercury News, June 21, 2004. For discussion of various issues connected to voting by non-citizens,
see Jamin B. Raskin, “Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage,” 141 University ofPennsylvania Law Review 1391 (1993).
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scholastic learning and political wisdom, are bu, the arms employed in a contest....”'”
Another delegate put it even more starkly: “in the history of the human kind, of all
nations and of all ages, from the earhest trad,,ion to our own times and country, there has
never been a single mstance of any society of men, of men acting in masses great or
small, who forgot self-interest
... for a moment.” 126
American political actors have pushed to contract or expand the legal franchise,
and to decrease or increase the eligible people likely to tun, out to vote, for different
reasons. In some cases, both reaction and expansion of the polity have been justified
by idealism - specific beliefs about the healthy polity and w.se policy. But partisan self-
interest - the effort to gain or maintain control over government - has almost always
been present, if often unacknowledged, in American contests over inclusion, equality,
and electoral fairness. Indeed, some place parties at the center of suffrage expansion:
“The newly enfranchised had about as much to do with the extension of the suffrage
as e consuming public has had to do with the expanding market for toothpaste The
parties, assisted by some excited minorities, were the entrepreneurs, took the
initiative, and got the law of the franchise liberalized.” 127
1 25 Quoted in Peterson, Democracy, Liberty, and Property, at 285.
Proceedings and Debates ofthe Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830 (1830), at 167.
E. E. Schattschneider, quoted in Elliott, The Rise ofGuardian Democracy (1974), at 34. Unfortunately
Elliott does not offer a citation. Elliott continues:
“The main force behind virtually every democratic reform from the earliest days of the
Republic to the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt was partisan advantage. Reforms which were thought to
favor the party or parties in power passed.... All parties thought for various reasons to profit by
dropping property qualifications; the Republicans sought to consolidate the power they won in the
Civil War by enfranchising blacks; Yankee Protestants hoped to curtail the power of urban ethnic and
religious minorities by enfranchising women.”
Id.
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In Practice, American suffrage has often been more democrat,c than the law directed -
and the presence of partisan officials in positions of local administrat.ve control has been
a key reason. This part of the story reminds us that the processes of “inclusron” are not
always pretty, and do not always fit democratic ideals of fairness. Particularly in the
nineteenth century, local control of elections helped parties to expand the number of
people voting by stretching and violating limits on the franchise. Parties have always
acted locally in order to increase turnout, as well. 128
Of course, modem parties organize locally, not just at the state and national
levels. In fact, the penetration of partisan organization and voter recruitment into
counties and towns occurred almost immediately, well before the institutionalization of
national party politics in the Jacksonian era. Partisans quickly understood that they
would win elections by bringing voters to the polls - literally. One of the pioneers of
Federalist politics, Ebeneezer Foote of Newburgh, New York, organized carriages to
bring friendly voters to the polls as early as 1795. 129 A Republican circular of June 25,
1 804, urged Virginian sympathizers to “use every possible exertion to advance the
Republican-Ticket in elections to be “held in the several counties” of the state. 130
Of course, boosting turnout is not the same thing as moving the boundaries of the franchise: the latter
carries deeper philosophical, symbolic, and legal meanings. But ceteris paribus, a democracy where many
people vote is healthier than one where few do. From a theoretical perspective, meanwhile, I have
throughout this work attempted to merge discussion of rights and practices, rather than separating them.
For example, I have previously analyzed institutional barriers, such as registration requirements and the
lack of assistance to illiterates, that impede voting without actually prohibiting it. The counterpart to such
obstacles are institutions and practices that help bring people to the polls who are already legally qualified
to vote, but who would not otherwise participate. We have seen above that local elections officials have
the potential to enhance the instrumental and constitutive dimensions of popular sovereignty by
encouraging people to turn out. Parties have the potential to do the same.
Williamson, at 159. Another wealthy Federalist paid the traveling expenses of supporters where
necessary to get them to the polls. Id., at 160.
130
Reprinted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of U.S. Political Parties, vol. I (1973), at 299.
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“Written tickets containing the names of the Electors,” the Republicans urged, “should be
dispersed over each County, and active and intelligent Citizens in every neighborhood
should be prevailed on to attend the election, and to bring as many of their fellow-citizens
as possible to give their suffrages ”' 31 In Connecticut, Republican county managers were
mstructed to appoint town and district staff. The local partisans would be responsible for
copying from town lists the names of “all male inhabitants, who are taxed,” calculate the
total numbers of “freemen” - obviously, those who could vote - then ascertain how many
freemen were “decided federalists,” “decided republicans,” and how many “doubtful.”
And these Republicans pressed at the margins of qualification: town managers also had to
list those “republicans who are not freemen, but who may be qualified at the next
proxies,” and each district manager had the duty “to exert himself to cause young
republicans to be qualified for the oath .” 132
This began a long penod in which “party organizations [became] the chief
vehicles for the collective mobilization of the public .” 133 Of course, suffrage practices
from designing and distributing ballots to staffing polling places enabled major parties to
assert their control over elections - and keep turnout high. The causes of those high
levels of nineteenth-century participation, and of subsequent declines, are controversial.
Turnout numbers, as Altschuler and Blumin point out, are relatively easy to obtain and
132
Id., at 302.
Crenson and Ginsberg, at 46. Crenson and Ginsberg here mark the Progressive era as the end of that
period, arguing that Progressive reforms and Progressive ideals alike “emphasized the solitary and
independent citizen, the self-mobilizing citizen,” and tried to “dispense with” parties as mobilizing forces
Id., 45-46.
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“reassuringly quantifiable ” and have therefore been “overburdened” by scholars
.
134
Wha, is clear, however, is that parties worked extremely hard to bring voters to the polls
who otherwise would have stayed home, and that shoe-leather work like making lists,
visiting voters, and delivering them bodily to the polls predominated. Moreover,
Altschuler and Blumm show that what they call the “cultural dimension of political
engagement" was intimately bound up with local connections and the geographical shape
of nineteenth-century social life. Particularly in rural America, “this world of farms and
villages along good country roads may have been the ideal human landscapefor
maximizing voterparticipation .” 135 Many of the parties’ interactions with voters were
transactional,” with bribes and booze common currencies. But the transactions had a
richer character, as well, since the party served as the political instrument of the citizen
who wanted to do his political duty and pursue his interests, but could not or would not
invest a great deal of time and attention in politics
.
136
As we have seen, local authorities have frequently interpreted suffrage law in
permissive and inclusive ways. In some cases, they did so because of personal
estimations of would-be voters’ worthiness; in others, it may have been a theoretical
disagreement with state legislators, or simply contempt for their authority. But in many
instances, it has clearly been raw partisanship. This trend started early, with parties
getting around property and residency rules in the earliest U.S. elections. Both
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans sought to bring new supporters into politics, and
Altschuler and Blumin, Rude Republic
,
at 269. Altschuler and Blumin argue that the numbers alone do
not tell us that a broader decline in participatory democracy occurred, as many scholars have assumed. For
further discussion, see Chapter One, n.5.
135
Id. at 6; 72. Emphasis added.
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Id., 81-82.
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both did so “secretly and informally, by allowing unqualified persons io vote” Due to
the “excesses of partisanship,” in an 1802 election in Trenton, New Jersey “men under
age voted, as [did] some Philadelphians, Negroes, slaves, aliens, married women, and
persons not worth 50 pounds."'” New residency requirements could also be surmounted:
through the mid-nineteenth centuiy, parties “herded would-be new voters, a number of
whom d,d not meet the legal residency requirements, before politically sympathetic
judges.” 138
Determined parties sometimes got around poll taxes, too, simply by paying the
fees themselves when they concluded that men would not vote at all if forced to pay the
tax. This could be a significant factor in elections: in 1888, the Philadelphia Democratic
Committee paid twenty-two thousand dollars in poll taxes, equal to the fees of almost
halfthe city’s Democratic voters in that year’s election. 139 Registration rules, meanwhile,
were implemented not just out of a desire to help “intelligent” voters, or rural people at
the expense of city dwellers, or the rich at the expense of the poor. They were also, from
a very early age, tools in partisan conflict, such that partisan motives for registration laws
were often indistinguishable” from arguments about fraud and corruption. 140 In 1810,
Massachusetts Federalists sought to cut down the Republican vote - while avoiding a
frontal attack on formal suffrage rights, which would have been very unpopular - by
requiring local tax collectors to compile lists of taxpayers to function as a voter-
137
Williamson, at 160, 180.
Gienapp, Politics Seem to Enter into Everything,” at 27. See also Argersinger, Structure, Process and
Party
>
at D3- Argersinger shows that despite their titles, Maryland’s election “judges” were partisans,
appointed by partisans and acting as partisans, ignoring wherever possible requirements that they act in a
bipartisan fashion.
139
Altschuler and Blumin, at 262.
140
Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party
,
at 46.
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registration list. The list would limit only town elections, but
move would certainly affect state elections as well, since they
as everyone knew, such a
were usually held
together. New York Whigs passed a voter Registry Act in 1 840, but applied the
requirement only to New York City, w„h the clear purpose of preventing Democrats in
the city from voting. The law was so blatantly partisan that it was soon repealed.
Connecticut Whigs passed a registration bill in 1839, setting up a registry board for the
purpose; Democrats smelled a rat, and soon wrote their own law placing control of
registration in the hands of town selectmen and clerks - which the Whigs presumed was
designed to help Democrats cheat. 142 In Maryland in the 1870s and 1880s, registration
rules were sometimes totally subverted by local registrars, who allowed repeat voting by
allies.
143
Today, claims of outright fraud are relatively rare, and parties focus on getting
their partisans out to vote. Many people believe higher turnout overall will help
Democrats, but there is little evidence to that effect, and most political science shows
otherwise. 144 (The conventional wisdom survives in part because of statements like this
gem, from an anonymous “Republican operative” back in 1981 : “I don’t want everyone
to vote. Our leverage in the electorate goes up ... as the voting populace goes down.” 145 )
Meanwhile, one of the intriguing questions about American politics today is why neither
party supports some of the relatively simple, macro-level changes in election practices
Williamson, at 177. The act was soon repealed under intense Republican pressure.
142
Id., at 276, 277.
143
Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party, at 124.
144
See research cited in Thompson, Just Elections, at 208.
145 Quoted in Crenson and Ginsberg, at 258 n.106.
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likely to boost turnout and voters' sense of efficacy, like weekend or holiday voting or
automatic registration. The parties' relative silence on these topics suggests their
reluctance to “activat[e] the politically inert.” 146 More targeted get-out-the-vote drives,
however, remain as popular as ever, and in the Presidential year of 2004 parties are trying
new strategies - like paying local groups a $3 bounty for each new voter registered, as
the Missouri Republican Party is now doing. 147 Meanwhile, some counties subsidize
parries’ efforts, using paid election-day staff to post frequently-updated lists of those who
have voted in a given precinct. 148
The role of partisanship in helping flex American suffrage law at the local level is
complex. 149 Both naivete and cynicism can cloud the picture. It would be wrong to
chant, Animal Farm-style, “more voters good, fewer voters bad,” since it is not at all
clear how democracy is strengthened when only some people not formally qualified are
permitted to vote, while others remain excluded. However, I think we should also resist
the opposite conclusion. The act of bringing new voters to the polls is not tainted merely
because it is done to seek partisan victory, and at the very least, it appears that parties
helped prepare the U.S. for the end of the property test rule by breaking it.
146
Crenson and Ginsberg, at 49-50.
147
See David A. Lieb, “Political Groups Using Incentives to Encourage Voter Registration,” Associated
Press, June 27, 2004.
148
See Schudson, The Good Citizen, at 2. No party staff checked the list at Schudson’s California polling
place that day in 1996. As Schudson points out, “the county hired hundreds of clerks to subsidize political
parties and other voluntary political organizations. But at our precinct, as at increasing numbers of
precincts, when parties choose to subsidize television stations rather than citizenship, this is wasted money
and labor.” Id.
Reichley acknowledges that parties “have all too often in American history been instruments of
corruption, preservers of prejudice, burdens on effective government, and disrupters of social harmony.”
Reichley, at 30. But parties are also conventionally regarded as having “saved the Constitution from itself’
by enabling cooperation between Congress and the Executive branch, despite the hostility to parties among
the Constitution’s authors. See generally Richard Hofstadter, The Idea ofa Party System (1969).
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Meanwhile, the examples discussed here of the major U.S. parties’ close, self-
interested interaction with election administration at the local level suggest that the
parttes have played a role in constructing the hyper-federalized American suffrage
system. A systematic examination of this question is beyond the scope of this project.
But certainly our parties have a long history ofworking with local institutions and in
local contexts to bring in new voters, by hook or by crook. That the dominant actors in
American politics have long worked within the hyper-federalized system may explain its
survival.
IV. Suffrage Qualifications: Law and Practice.
The relationship between local election administration and the enduring American
struggle over exclusion and inequality is multi-dimensional and, indeed, multi-
directional. Consider a few of the types of relationships we have seen. Most simply, in
the early days of American suffrage, local assemblies and officials allowed men who did
not meet colonial standards to vote - but likely excluded others, based on moral
judgments such as whether or not those men had “proved themselves” to be virtuous and
religiously orthodox. Nineteenth-century county and city officials continued this
tradition, flouting state law on property, registration, residency, and other factors in the
direction of inclusion when it suited them, often for partisan reasons. In the South, a
different phenomenon occurred, as state lawmakers purposefully left substantial
discretion with the local officials administering the law, with the explicit expectation that
those officials would systematically keep blacks from the polls. An analogous
development occurred in the North, where personal-registration rules sought to keep new
immigrants and others with relatively low political information and motivation from the
243
polls. Registration rules increased municipalities’ control of the portals of the franchise
in some ways, but decreased them in others - when rural-dommated state leg.slatures
apphed new rules only to cities, as a way of diminishing their political power. In some
states, two generations of women may have participated in local elections prior to
achieving national voting nghts. The case of aliens is still another phenomenon, as some
state lawmakers left formal control of new immigrants' voting rights in the hands of local
officials ,nto the twentieth century. Together, these examples indicate that local
administration has in some ways helped make U.S. suffrage practices more inclusive than
U.S. suffrage law.
Today, many students of American voting worry that local control of registration
and elections may create fragmented, complex voting structures which have systematic
discriminatory effects—even if “universal suffrage” is on the books and in the courts, and
even where many of the officials implementing them have no desire for them to do so . 150
Meanwhile, a new twist on this story recently emerged in Florida, when county officials
openly challenged state government by refusing to purge their voter lists using a new,
state-generated list of disqualified convicted felons.
150
As Keyssar writes,
the history of suffrage should lead us to expect recurrent skirmishing once universal suffrage has
been achieved. The effects of a restricted suffrage can be replicated, or at least approximated, by
cleverly unequal districting or by complex registration requirements. Even if one person, one vote
principles are applied to districting, regulations governing the access of parties to the ballot can
influence the outcome of elections; so too can the design of electoral systems....” Id., 323.
Similarly, Palma J. Strand recently observed that “[tjhere are ... antidemocratic government practices
that are so deeply ingrained that we hardly think of them at all.” Strand’s example is gerrymandered,
single-member, winner-take-all districts, and the electoral college. Palma J. Strand, “Forced to Bowl
Alone?” The Nation, Feb. 10, 2003, 25-29.
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CHAPTER 6
CONVICTS AND COUNTY CLERKS: THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICANCRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Most studies of U.S. policies barring people convicted of crime from voting -
known as “criminal disenfranchisement” or “felony disenfranchisement” laws - have
focused on constitutional interpretation, judicial rulings, and philosophical
underpinnings. In this chapter, I evaluate disenfranchisement as a practice in the United
States, with particular attention to the work of local officials in implementing the policy.
Following a review of the most recent legal decisions and scholarly literature regarding
the disenfranchisement of people convicted of crime, the first section discusses the
possibility that local officials may apply the policy in a way less restrictive than the laws
on the books suggest. The second section places the rise of U.S. disenfranchisement law
in historical context, arguing that the policy was put in place during a time when
American voting was a radically different practice than it is now, and when
disenfranchisement’s punitive purposes were more clear and coherent. The third section
draws on material from an ongoing survey of state disenfranchisement procedures, and
shows that a great deal of responsibility for implementing disenfranchisement policies
rests with local officials - particularly the restoration of voting rights to former offenders.
This chapter examines the local dimension of the last surviving formal restriction
of the voting rights of adult U.S. citizens. That restriction, of course, consists of state
laws barring citizens convicted of crime - usually all felonies - from voting. “Criminal
disenfranchisement or “felony disenfranchisement” law has come under a good deal of
scrutiny from legal scholars and reform advocates in the last decade, as the number of
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Americans under criminal-justice supervision has soared and as the policy comes to
appear increastngly at odds with modem voting-rights jurisprudence. But not until the
election of 2000 did criminal disenfranchisement force its way onto the front burner of
American political debate. We still do no. fully understand important aspects of what
happened in Florida, but the state’s struggles in 2000 brought national attention to felon
disenfranchisement for two reasons. First, while only 537 votes deeded the Prestdenlial
election in the Sunshine State, about half a million «o„-incarcerated Floridians - that is,
one thousand times the margin by which George W. Bush defeated A1 Gore - were
legally prevented from voting because of a felony conviction. 1 Second, a flawed attempt
to purge” voter rolls prior to the election apparently led the state to bar many non-felons
from the polls. 2
Since 2000, state governments in Connecticut, New Mexico, Nevada, Maryland,
and Alabama have all liberalized their disenfranchisement policies in different ways,
'The most sophisticated analysis estimates that 613,514 ex-felons are disenfranchised in Florida SeeChristopher Uggen and Jeff Manza, “Democratic Contraction? The Political Consequences of Felon
^enfranchisement Laws in the United States,” 67 American Sociological Review 111, 191 (2002). TheSentencing Project and Human Rights Watch estimated in 1998 that Florida disenfranchised over 400 000
non-incarcerated citizens. See Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Human Rights Watch & The Sentencing
Project, Losing the Vote: The Impact ofFelony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States (1998), at 7-
The kindest version of the story is this: county clerks needed to clean up their voting rolls, eliminating
citizens who had died, moved, or been convicted of a felony. State officials hired a Georgia company
called ChoicePoint to do the research. ChoicePoint claims its job was to generate a rough tally of all those
who might need purging from the rolls, which county officials would verify, voter by voter. But Florida
county officials apparently thought they were getting the final list, and promptly disqualified everyone on
it. In the process, many live, local, non-felonious citizens lost the right to vote - apparently including a
disproportionate number of blacks. See Bob Herbert, “Keep Them Out,” N. Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2000, at A3 1
;
Sasha Abramsky, “A Growing Gap in American Democracy,” N. Y. Times, July 27, 2002, at A1 1;
“Alpharetta firm accused in Fla. Voting rights suit,” Atlanta Constitution, Jan. 11, 2001, at A3; “Black
Voters in Florida deserve some real answers,” USA Today, January 11, 2001, at A14. A muckraking
journalist’s account ofhow Florida “fixed the vote” is in Greg Palast, The Best Democracy Money Can Buy
(2002), p. 6-43. In July of 2004, the New York Times commented that the purge “removed an untold
number of eligible voters from the rolls.” See “Felons and the Right to Vote,” (unsigned editorial) N. Y
Times, July 11, 2004, at A 12.
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though none abolished the practice. 3 Within the federal courts, meanwhile, there appears
to be some disagreement as to the legitimacy of the policy. Most recently, the Second
Circuit summarily dismissed a Voting Rights Act challenge to New York’s felon
disenfranchisement law - but recognized that “this is a difficult question that can
ultimately be resolved only by a determination of the United States Supreme Court.”4
(The Supreme Court has not yet taken the bait, and has not addressed criminal
disenfranchisement since an oblique reference in the 1996 decision Romer v. Evans 5)
The Eleventh Circuit has just decided to review en banc a panel ruling allowing a
challenge to Florida’s indefinite-disenfranchisement law to go forward. 6 And in the
summer of 2003, a Ninth Circuit panel held that discrimination in the criminal-justice
favor Td probationers to vote; New Mexico scrapped its indefinite-disenfranchisement law inof a policy allowing re-enfranchisement after completion of the sentence; Nevada eliminated a five-year waiting period for most former felons; and Maryland allowed some offenders to apply for restorationof voting rights upon completion of their sentence, while nonviolent recidivists have to wait three years
and those convicted of violent crime are still indefinitely disenfranchised. See Jeff Manza and ChristopherUggen, Punishment and Democracy: Disenfranchisement of Nonincarcerated Felons in the United States ”
erspectives on Politics 491, 499 (2004). Alabama now allows most former felons to apply to the Board
of Pardons and Paroles to get their right to vote restored, an easier process than was previously required
?noff
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’
S Ex-Felons Start t0 Regam Voting Rights,” The Birmingham News, April 162004 (page number unknown).
See Jahl Abdul Muntaqim v. Phillip Coombe et al, U.S. Ct. Apps. 2d Cir., Docket No 01-7260 April 23
2004. The Second Circuit determined that since the V.R.A. was “silent” on the topic of felon
disenfranchisement, the Act cannot be applied to question the policy’s validity. Id. at 2.
This decision adopted the reasoning of the 1996 case Baker v. Pataki, in which the Second Circuit
held that felony disenfranchisement does not violate the Voting Rights Act, focusing on what is known as
the plain statement rule: if a law would have the effect of altering the fundamental constitutional balance
between federal and state governments, Congress needs to have made a “plain statement” of its intent in
that regard, and it made no such statement. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.2d 919, 922. (2d. Cir. 1996).
5
The Romer Court criticized the 1890 decision Davis v. Beason - which upheld state laws denying
polygamists the ballot - observing that “[t]o the extent Davis held that persons advocating a certain practice
may be denied the right to vote, it is no longer good law.” Perhaps sensing that its decision might be
employed by critics of felony disenfranchisement, the Romer Court hastened to add that “[t]o the extent
Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote, its holding is not implicated by our
decision and is unexceptionable.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
6
See Johnson v. Bush, F. 3d (1
1
th
Cir. 2003) (2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25829). The decision to re-
hear the case came on July 20, 2004.
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system may interact with disenfranchisement law in a way that dentes minorities an equal
chance to participate in elections - and therefore violates the V.R.A.
Dl!'enfranchisement, the Ninth Ctrcuit ruled, could be “shifting racial inequality from the
surrounding social circumstances into the political process.”7 The high courts of other
nations, however, have consistently rejected the policy. Since 2001, constitutional courts
in Canada and South Africa, as well as the European Court of Human Rights, have struck
down criminal disenfranchisement statutes. 8 Many countries, including most European
nations,9 now permit most or all inmates to vote, and no other democracy bars so many
formerly incarcerated citizens from the polls.
Cunent scholarship examines felony disenfranchisement from a variety of
perspectives. Empirical social science tends to focus on the policy’s effects on aggregate
political behavior. In a forthcoming article, sociologists Jeff Manza and Christopher
Uggen contend that state laws disenfranchising non-incarcerated felons have been a boon
for Republican candidates in both Senatorial and Presidential contests. 10 Thomas J.
2003 46
^tQte °f Washin8ton ' U S - Ct - APPS- 9 th Cir., July 25, 2003. Docket No. 01-35032, July 25,
8
See Sauve v. Canada (ChiefElectoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68 (2002); Minister ofHome Affairs v. Nicro
et al, CCT 03/04 (2004); and The Case ofHirst v. The United Kingdom (No. 2), European Court of Human
Rights, Fourth Section, March 30, 2004.
As the European Court ot Human Rights observed in March 2004, in Europe “there are some 18 countries
in which no restrictions are imposed on prisoners’ rights to vote; in some 13 countries prisoners are not
able to vote, due to operation of law or lack of enabling provisions; and between these extremes
. . . loss of
voting rights is tailored to specific offences or categories of offences or discretion is left to the sentencing
court.” The Case ofHirst v. The United Kingdom (No. 2), at 14.
10
See Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen, “Punishment and Democracy” at 497, concluding that “felon
disenfranchisement has provided a small but clear advantage to Republican candidates in every presidential
and senatorial election from 1972 to 2000.’ This detailed and timely article also addresses legal, historical,
and racial dimensions of disenfranchisement. The authors first published their findings regarding the
electoral impact of American disenfranchisement law in Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza, “Democratic
Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States,” 67 American
Sociological Review 111
,
794 (2002), which demonstrates that felon disenfranchisement and high
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M.les, however, concludes in another recent article that “meager parttcipation by ex-
felons where they are eligible [suggests that] disenfranchisement will no. systematically
affect election outcomes.”' 1 Within the legal academy, recent disenfranchisement
criticism has scrutinized topics such as the meaning of the “social contract” in suffrage
law, 12 the connection between disenfranchisement and the terms of Rawlsian liberalism, 13
and the “essentially punitive” nature of indefinite disenfranchisement. 14
Research and debate over disenfranchisement have been dominated by evaluation
of federal and state constitutions and statutes, and by arguments about democratic theory
and the purposes of punishment. This chapter examines disenfranchisement as a practice,
with particular attention to the role county and town officials play in implementing the
policy. Only recently have scholars and reform advocates begun to attend to this aspect
of the policy, despite some prominent hints as to its importance. In Richardson v.
Ramirez (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court quoted a California report showing that “a
incarceration rates “may have altered the outcome of as many as seven recent U.S. Senate
least one presidential election,” all in favor of Republicans.
elections and at
11
Thomas J. Miles, “Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout ” 33
(2004).
Journal ofLegal Studies 85, 120
1
2
Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social Contract Breached ” 89
Virginia Law Review 109 (2003).
Jesse Furman, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of
Rawlsian Justice,” 106 Yale Law Journal 1 197 (1997).
14
Pamela S. Karlan, “Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon
Disenfranchisement,” Research Paper No. 75, Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection (2004), at 3. Karlan argues that
disenfranchisement “taints our politics.” Id. at 28. Very few authors have defended the policy in scholarly
publications. See Roger Clegg, “Who Should Vote?,” 6 Texas Review ofLaw and Policy 1 60 (200 1 ).degg grounds his case for indefinite disenfranchisement on the belief that voting is “privilege” reserved
for “trustworthy, good citizens.” Id. at 172. See also Christopher P. Manfredi, “Judicial review and
criminal disenfranchisement in the United States and Canada,” 60 The Review ofPolitics 277 (1998).
Manfredi offers a principled defense of criminal disenfranchisement based on “the relationship among
citizenship, civic virtue, and punishment. Id. at 111 . For review of leading scholarly examinations of
criminal disenfranchisement prior to 2002, see Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death: " The Ideological Paradox of
Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wisconsin Law Review 1045 (2002).
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person convicted of almost any given felony would find that he is eligible to vote in some
Califomta counties and ineligible to vote in others.” 15 A decade later, in Hunter v.
Underwood (1985), the Court observed that Alabama Boards of Registrars often had to
sift through case law to decide for themselves whether an infraction revealed
disenfranchisable “moral turpitude.” 16 Hunter threw out the infamous Section 182 of
Alabama's constitution, but it didn’t do away with local discretton. A 1993 Georgia ease,
Jarmrd v. Clayton County Board ofRegistrars, suggests that the decision as to whether
an offense reveals enough “tuipitude” to warrant the loss of voting rights - in this case,
repeat violation of drunk driving laws - was still sometimesformally made at the county
level. And particularly in the states where disenfranchisement continues after the
sentence for those who have not been formally pardoned or otherwise restored to full
citizenship, it is county and town officials who are at the point of exclusion - which can
involve them in difficult interpretations of state law, as a Nebraska case from 2002 makes
clear.
18
15
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 34 n.2 (1974).
16
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226 (1985).
17
Jarrard v. Clayton County Registrars, 425 S.E. 2d 874 (Ga. 1993). Of course, the case also shows that
such decisions are subject to judicial appeal. Here, the Georgia court held that Jarrard’s record of being
convicted at least three times of drunk driving “revealed his callous and repeated disregard for the safety
and welfare of other people, as well as for the laws of his state,’’ and that therefore “we cannot but conclude
that the crime is one involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 875.
See Ways v. Shively, 646 N.W. 2d 621 (2002). John Ways, Jr., sought a writ forcing Dave Shively,
election commissioner of Lancaster County, Nebraska, to permit Ways to register to vote. Ways, like all
others discharged from the Nebraska State Penitentiary, received a certificate stating that “all his/her civil
rights, as provided by law” were restored. Id. at 624. But the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that this
did not entail restoration of voting rights.
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I. “I Have No Desire to Move Forward Ouicklv” ^ »
Potential of Local Administration of Disenfranchtml"
nC 'USiVe
Events in Plot,da in the summer of 2004 have provided a fascinating glimpse into
the mechanics of disenfranchisement. As a case study, Florida may be sui generis -
because of the extraordinarily high salience of the policy after the state government's
mistakes in 2000, as well as the state’s unusual method of deciding which former
offenders will win restoration to the franchise. (I explain this in more detail below.)
Nonetheless, Florida illustrates that at least in some instances, county officials will
openly flout the instructions of state lawmakers and bureaucrats, applying felon
disenfranchisement in a more inclusive way than the law itself directs.
Florida is one of fourteen states that bar some offenders from voting even after
they have completed all aspects of their sentences. 19 That means hundreds of thousands
of Floridians not under any form of criminal supervision are ineligible to vote - a real
headache for the county officials in charge of voter registration and the polls. Accurate
purges of voter rolls, conducted to remove those who have not voted in many years,
have moved away, or have died, becomes more difficult. In early summer of 2004, the
Florida Secretary of State’s office made available to county officials a list of nearly
48,000 potential felons.” All county officials were required to do before deleting
1
9
For an up-to-date list, see Manza and Uggen, “Punishment and Democracy,” at 494 (2004). Some other
sources give lower numbers, because some of these states only indefinitely disenfranchise recidivists
violent offenders, or those convicted before a certain year, or require offenders to wait years after
completing their sentences to register. Seven states disenfranchise some felons after their sentences are
complete; seven disenfranchise all felons indefinitely. There are also wide differences between states’
restoration procedures, ranging from a relatively simple bureaucratic procedure to requirement of a full
pardon. The states which indefinitely disenfranchise all felons are Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Virginia, and Wyoming. See also Abby Goodnough, “Disenfranchised Florida Felons
Struggle to Regain Their Rights,” New York Times, Sunday, March 28, 2004, p. 1, at 19, where maps show
the disenfranchisement policies of all states.
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someone from the rolls was to send a letter to the person notifying them of their
impending removal and allowing them to challenge the designation. But a number of
county officials said they planned to do far more, and would rather leave a “potential
felon on the active voter roll than risk deleting someone who was actually still eligible.
The problem was that the list was not entirely accurate. After the state initially
rejected their requests, media organizations sued for access to the names, and the state
relented. Newspapers quickly compared the roll to another list - those who have recently
had their right to vote restored by the state Office of Executive Clemency. In early July,
they published their findings: more than two thousand Floridians appeared on both lists,
meaning that one state agency listed them as fully eligible, but another considered them
ripe for purging
.
20
Such confusions highlight the difficulty of disenfranchising people
convicted of crime accurately, given the poor technical quality of American voter lists.
At the heart of the state’s task of identifying potential felons, after all, is the job of
determining whether the same John Smith convicted of embezzlement, say, is the same
John Smith registered to vote in Palm Beach County. And surprising as it is, neither the
state’s list of potential felons nor its restoration roll includes positive identifiers like
Social Security numbers . 21
Months before media reports about the list’s flaws were published, many county
elections officials said they planned to leave the state’s “potential felons” on the rolls
unless they had very strong reason to do otherwise. “I have no desire to move forward
quickly,” Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections Deborah Clark told a reporter in May.
20
See Bob Mahlburg and John Maines, “State Officials Defend List of Felon Voters,” Orlando Sentinel,
July 3, 2004 (page number unknown). See also Marc Caputo, “Questions Over Felon ‘Purge List’ Threaten
Florida Governor,” Miami Herald, July 4, 2004 (page number unknown).
21
Mahlburg and Maines, “State Officials Defend List of Felon Voters.”
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I m really erring on the [side of] the right to vote, there being something considerable
before denying that right,” sa,d Hillsborough County official Buddy Johnson. “The
matching process is not as empirical as it seems.” A Citrus County official said she
planned to tell voters “we do not know if the list is accurate."22 “[T]he supervisors are
going to go very slow in doing their research,” said Orange County Supervisor of
Elections Bill Cowles. 23 Later, when the state ordered felons who had registered before
all their restoration paperwork cleared to re-register, county officials balked. “We want
to make sure people aren’t disenfranchised,” said Dade County Elections Supervisor
Constance Kaplan. 24
By the end of July, the state had thrown out the list entirely - but not because of a
few thousand mistakes or the foot-dragging of county officials. The reason reveals how
America’s last major restriction of citizens’ voting rights is embedded in particular
bureaucratic practices and a peculiarly American racial context. For it was race that got
Florida’s 2004 “potential felon” list thrown out. The state employed race as one of the
identifying characteristics used to match people convicted of crime with registered voters,
but did so in a badly flawed way. If a voter’s first name, last name, and date of birth
matched those of a convicted felon, the person was listed for purging - unless the race
was different. But the felon database did not list “Hispanic” as a race, so anyone who
described himself as an Hispanic was omitted from the purge list. The results were
dramatic: only 61 of the 48,000 people on the list were Hispanic, while 22,000 were
22 Matthew Waite, “Officials Wary of Felon Purge,” St. Petersburg Times
,
May 19, 2004 (page number
unknown).
23
Mahlburg and Maines, “State Officials Defend List of Felon Voters.”
24
“Florida Reverses, Says It Won’t Strip 2,500 Ex-Felons of Voting Rights,” Associated Press, July 8,
2004.
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Afncan American
.
25
Secretaiy of State Glenda Hood scrapped the list after these
devastating facts were made public by the media; controversy continues as to whether the
state knew of such problems when it published the list, as well as whether Hispanics were
not included stmply by accident or for more sinister reasons
.
26 Some Democrats have
been qutck to note that while Florida’s African American voters are heavily Democratic,
many of the state’s Hispanics vote Republican. Back in the county elections offices,
however, there was simply relief that the purge list was dead. “I think that most
supervisors are going to be pleased,” said the Orange County supervisor. “Again, we
were the ones that said we were going to move very cautiously.” Another called it “an
unwise policy from day one,” while a Dade official said “we would just rather
. . . focus
our energy on getting everybody to vote.”27
This story is not complete without an introduction to how rights restoration works
in Florida, because that process - the source of the clemency list used to identify some
flaws in the “potential felon” roll - is also complicated and unique. Like all the
indefinite-disenfranchisement states, Florida does offer former offenders some means by
which people convicted of crime can win their rights back. In Florida, some have their
rights restored relatively promptly, after filling out a short form. But many others must
wait for a special hearing in Tallahassee. Four times a year, Governor Jeb Bush and three
colleagues sit as a clemency board to consider these offenders’ restoration applications.
25
Ford Fessenden, “Florida List for Purge of Voters Proves Flawed,” New York Times
,
July 10, 2004 (page
number unknown).
26
See “State Knew of Problems with Felons List Since 1998,” Associated Press, July 20, 2004; David
Kidwell, “Election Officials Knew of List Errors,” Bradenton Herald, August 2, 2004.
27
Coralie Carlson, “Elections Supervisors Relieved to Disregard Felon Voter List,” Naples Daily News
July 12, 2004.
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Governor Bush and the other board members have recommendations from the state
Parole Commission regarding each former offender, but they do not always follow them.
The special clemency board sometimes makes explicitly moral judgments about the
individuals before them, and talks with them: Bush asked one man, “How’s the anger
situation going?” The question is not rhetorical - it is entirely up to Bush and his
colleagues whether each person’s rights will be restored, and these conversations may
well matter a great deal. He tells another, “I’m praying that you’re not going to start
drinking again.” This is not the “local” dimension of voting rights in the U.S. - it’s even
more micro, the personal dimension of suffrage, reminiscent of colonial times. Not only
do a few members of the government decide whether or not an individual citizen gets to
vote, sit on a jury, hold public office, and be eligible for licensed professions, but they
make such judgments based on individualized, explicitly moral evaluations. 28
Florida’s experience in 2004 shows us that some local officials feel quite
intensely their obligation to protect each person’s voting rights, and that when push
comes to shove, they may be willing to ignore or even flout state instructions they fear
may wrongly exclude even a single voter. And other evidence also suggests that local
officials err on the side of including possible felons. In researching whether
disenfranchisement affects electoral outcomes, Thomas J. Miles uncovered almost a
dozen newspaper stories showing that “at least in some jurisdictions, ineligible ex-felons
have little trouble registering to vote and casting ballots.”29 The Miami Herald's
exhaustive analysis of the 2000 election concluded that more than 1,200 felons cast
28
See Abby Goodnough, “Disenfranchised Florida Felons Struggle to Regain Their Rights,” New York
Times
,
Sunday, March 28, 2004, p. 1, 19.
29
Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout (2004), at 1 16-1 17 n. 50-52.
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ballots in Florida,”' And since 1940, fewer than 40 people have been conv.cted for
voting illegally in Florida, whether because they were un-restored felons, non-citizens, or
non-residents. 31
But other evidence suggests that local officials do not always play such inclusive
roles. The Brennan Center for Justice conducted a telephone survey of all ofNew York’s
counties, and determined that over half the local boards were asking former offenders for
documents proving they had completed their sentences - in violation of state law. A
study of Minnesota counties revealed confusion as to restoration rules and voters’ status.
And an Idaho newspaper concluded that almost a third of Idaho’s counties did not know
the state’s disenfranchisement law, and some were not letting eligible former offenders
vote.
32
In 1996, the Department of Justice described American disenfranchisement law as
a national crazy-quilt of disqualifications and restoration procedures.”33 The D.O.J. had
state law in mind. But while we do not yet have a systematic, empirical assessment of
whether local officials act in a more or less exclusionary way than state law directs them
30
'Telons lose bid to alter vote ban,” Miami Herald, July 19, 2002, at IB. See also Manza and Uggen,
Punishment and Democracy” (2004), at 495. Manza and Uggen note that “it is possible that some felons
are slipping through the cracks, improperly registering and voting because of poor bookkeeping practices in
state voter registration systems. In fact, follow-up canvasses of a few hotly contested elections with
recounts - including the Florida recounts of the 2000 Presidential election - reveal evidence of such
activity. See also id. at 503 n.44, listing articles reporting examples.
31
Jennifer Liberto, “Voter Fraud Penalties Minimal,” St. Petersburg Times, July 19, 2004.
See Brennan Center for Justice, “Resource Guide for State Felony Disenfranchisement Studies,” Fall
2003, at 4-5. Copy on file with the author. See also “Felons and the Right to Vote,” New York Times, July
1 1, 2004, p. A 12, which noted the Brennan Center’s finding that “local elections offices often did not
understand the law, and some demanded that felons produce documents that do not exist.”
33
Department of Justice, Office of the Pardon Attorney, Civil Disabilities ofConvicted Felons: A State-by-
State Survey ( 1 996), at 1
.
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to, we have enough evidence to conclude that in some important respects, the pieces of
that metaphorical crazy-quilt are actually counties and towns.
II. Private Voting, Public Punishment: The Practice of Disenfranchisement inAmerican History.
Particularly in the last decade, political scientists, historians, and legal scholars
have engaged in an exploration of disenfranchisement’s theoretical underpinnings. But
we still know relatively little about disenfranchisement as a set of institutional
procedures. This section makes two points about the practice of disenfranchisement from
a historical perspective. First, most states put in place disenfranchisement laws during
the nineteenth century, a time when what Americans actually did when they voted was
radically different from what it is now. This is an under-appreciated aspect of the
policy’s history. Second, the implementation of the earliest North American
disenfranchisement laws made it quite clear that the sanction was a punishment
,
whereas
modem American law and practice is decidedly unclear on that point.
a. Private Voting: Nineteenth-century Suffrage Practices and
Disenfranchisement.
Many critics of disenfranchisement have argued that the policy is a relic of an age
when citizens, legislators, and courts simply had different theories of voting rights than
they do now. (In fact, the practice of barring people convicted of crime from political life
goes back to medieval times, when serious criminals were sometimes declared to be
outside the law’s protections entirely, or subject to “civil death.”34) Most U.S. laws were
See Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, “Note: Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right to Vote: Background
and Developments,” 1 1 American Criminal Law Review 695, 724 (1973).
257
put in place in the nineteenth century, when a great many adults were barred from voting.
That era’s prevailing theory of voting rights is aptly summed up in a judicial decision
from 1873, in which a New York federal court held that if they wished, state
governments could declare
that no person should vote until he had reached the age of thirty years, or
after he had reached the age of fifty, or that no person having gray hair, or who had
not the use of all his limbs, should be entitled to vote....”35
For its part, the late-nineteenth-century U.S. Supreme Court accepted laws barring
bigamists from voting, even endorsing the frank legislative purpose of “withdrawing] all
political influence” from those who might want to change existing laws. 36 Of course, the
twentieth-century Court has explicitly repudiated that approach, holding that “‘[f]encing
out from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is
constitutionally impermissible.”37 The Court has repeatedly declared the right to vote to
be fundamental,” and reviewed restrictions on the franchise under its most exacting
standard, “strict scrutiny.”
38
Numerous critics have pointed out that disenfranchising
U.S. v. Anthony
,
24 F. Cas. 829 (No. 14459) (C.C.N.C. N.Y. 1873).
36 Murphy v. Ramsey, 1 14 U.S. 15, 43 (1885).
37
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
38
See, for example, Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533, 555, 561-562 (1964 ) (holding that the right to vote is
“the essence of a democratic society,” “a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society,” and that
because the right to vote is “a fundamental right . .
.
preservative of all rights,” any “alleged infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized”); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (holding that the “individual’s constitutional right to
cast an equally weighted vote” is among the list of “fundamental rights” which cannot be limited); Harper
v. Board ofElections 383 U.S. 663, (1966) (calling the right to vote “precious” and “fundamental”);
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-627, 632 (1969) (holding that statutes
distributing the franchise “constitute the foundation of our representative society” and therefore in any
review of a state law restricting suffrage “the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to
promote a compelling state interest”); Dunn v. Blumstein, 404 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), (holding that
durational residence laws are unconstitutional unless a state can demonstrate not only that a “substantial
and compelling reason” exists for a “a challenged statute [which] grants the right to vote to some citizens
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convicts because they have violated a “social contract,” or because they are regarded as
untrustworthy or as threats to the “purity of the ballot box”39 falls well short of the
practicality of that high standard, since none of these arguments even allege that the state
has a specific practical purpose it cannot fulfill without barring offenders from the polls . 40
But amidst this argumentation about political thought and constitutional
standards, there has been far less focus on the practice of voting during the era when
most states’ disenfranchisement laws were put in place as a component of those laws’
history. Disenfranchisement law took hold in the mid- and late-nineteenth century, an era
when voting was a very different activity than it is now: balloting was public, not private;
voters were subject to mild and severe forms of coercion, including open bribery and
violence; there were primitive registration systems or none at all; fraud was the norm; and
the ballots and even the voting booths themselves were often supplied by partisans, rather
than the state.
Consider, for example, the Australian ballot. By 1888, when the secret, state-
produced ballot began its rapid spread across the country, thirty-three states had
and denies the franchise to others,” but also that such laws are drawn with “precision,” “tailored” to achieve
compelling objectives.
This phrase was used in the often-cited Alabama decision Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884),
and re-appears regularly in the disenfranchisement debate.
40
Because of what amounts to a constitutional quirk, the Supreme Court has held that disenfranchising
convicts has an explicit constitutional warrant and therefore does not need to meet the “strict scrutiny” or
“compelling state interest” standard. See Richardson v. Ramirez
,
418 U.S. 24 (1974), in which the Court
held that because the “express language” of the obscure and generally ignored Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment apparently permits states to bar convicts from voting, the Equal Protection Clause
in Section One “could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement that was
expressly allowed by the following section. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 25. The second section of the
Fourteenth Amendment refers to voters disenfranchised for “participation in rebellion, or other crime.”
U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV, §2. But it does so in explaining that states which disenfranchise for any
other reason will lose a proportionate slice of their Congressional representation. The formula was written
to allow recalcitrant Southern whites to disenfranchise black men, but punish them politically if they did so,
and was never enforced. Despite the sentence’s invidious purposes and utter incompatibility with modem
suffrage principles, the Richardson Court breathed new life into a phrase lying deep within that sentence.
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implemented their first felon disenfranchisement law. 41 (Connecticut’s 1818 statute
appears to have been the first post-independence law; some states had disenfranchised
only for specific crimes before they initiated blanket disenfranchisement of felons or the
incarcerated.) In a time of public voting - occasionally viva voce voting - it is easy to
imagine legislators’ concern that people convicted of crime might corrupt the electoral
process by committing fraud. Eldon Cobb Evans implies that such an awareness played a
role in the rise of the secret, state-produced ballot in Australia. Nineteenth-century
Australia, he writes, “included many gold-seekers, bent upon gain, and a large class of
criminals. In this environment the vices of the viva voce method nourished even more
than in England.”42
In the U.S., one obscure Kentucky case from 1887 - coincidentally or not, the
year before Louisville began using the secret ballot - brings together voting practices and
criminal disenfranchisement. The case, Anderson v. Winfree
,
43
involved an election for
county judge which had been conducted viva voce, with clerks keeping records of how
each of six thousand men voted. Initially, it was decided by thirty votes; a recount
eliminated illegal votes for both men, whittling the difference down to fifteen; and a
judicial recount further narrowed the margin of victory to three. The case consisted
almost entirely of whether two voters, Warner Duguid and Jack Smith, should have been
ineligible because they had served time for grand larceny, a crime not named in
41
This count is derived from data in Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen, and Jeff Manza, “Ballot
Manipulation and the Menace of Negro Domination’: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the
United States, 1850-2002,” 109 American Journal ofSociology 559, 565-566 (Table 2: “Origins of and
Changes to State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws”) (2003).
42
E.C. Evans, A History ofthe A ustralian Ballot System in the United States ( 1 9 1 7), at 1 7.
43
Anderson v. Winfree
,
85 Ky. 597; 4 S.W. 35
1 (1887).
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Kentucky’s infraction-specific disenfranchisement law 44 The court engaged in an
intriguing analysis of how viva voce and secret voting differed in terms of the court’s
ability to ascertain how each man voted. The judges confined their analysis of criminal
disenfranchisement law to interpretation of concepts such as “infamous crime,” and did
not speculate as to whether the men were to be kept from voting lest they corrupt the
process. Nevertheless, the status of three other voters in the case made clear the
possibilities: men identified only as “Carter, Croft, and Glover” had been recorded as
voting for boil, candidates, and the judges had to assay various records and witnesses to
ascertain the truth
.
45
We do not know how important such contexts were to the legislators who wrote
the laws. As one leading scholar has lamented, “studies of state legislatures’ reform
and/or repeal of criminal disenfranchisement laws do not exist.”46 Another hypothesizes
that the policy may have been implemented in response to the elimination of the property
test, since “abolishing property tests revealed that they had served a number of
indispensable functions, such as holding down the voting strength of free blacks, women,
infants, criminals, mental incompetents, un-propertied immigrants, and transients .”47
One intriguing recent article analyzes juxtaposes criminal-justice data and legislative
histories and concludes that the racial composition of state prisons is firmly associated
with the adoption of state felon disenfranchisement laws,” with increasing nonwhite
44
Anderson v. Winfree, at 352.
45
Anderson v. Winfree
,
at 353-354; 353.
46 Andrew Shapiro, “Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New
Strategy,” 103 Yale Law Journal 540, 564 n.146 (1993).
47 Ward E. Y. Elliott, The Rise ofGuardian Democracy (1974), at 43.
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inmate populations linked to bans on felon voting
.
48
Meanwhile, my own research into
the proceedings of early-nmeteenth-century constitutional conventions turned up only a
pair of references to criminal disenfranchisement. While they offer revealing glimpses
into the political thought of the period, neither alludes to specific voting practices
.
49
My sense is that as a causal matter, the core reasons nineteenth-century
lawmakers adopted criminal disenfranchisement emerged from their assumptions about
the wisdom of limiting the privilege of voting only to those who were most qualified.
However, I believe it is also true that the way disenfranchisement made sense to
Angela Behrens Christopher Uggen, and Jeff Manza, “Ballot Manipulation and the ‘Menace of Neero
omination : Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-2002 ” 109 Ameri,Journal ofSociology 559, 596 (2003).
49 A Mr Hoyt of Deerfield voiced skepticism towards a blanket ban on offenders, telling his fellow
Massachusetts conventioneers that a property test
lean
would deprive many persons of the privilege of voting, who were possessed of but little
property, whom the assessors in their discretion usually omit to assess. In regard to persons under
guardianship, he said there were some who pay taxes and ought to have a right to vote; for
instance, a man put under guardianship for intemperance, who becomes temperate, but yet requires
a rod to be held over him to keep him from relapsing.”
See Journal ofthe Debates and Proceedings in the Convention ofDelegates, Chosen to Revise the
Constitution ofMassachusetts, 1820-1821 (1853), at 555.
New York, meanwhile, was not in the category of states passing felony disenfranchisement laws
while voting by voice. The constitution of 1821 declared in Article II, §2 that “Laws may be passed,
excluding from the right of suffrage, persons who may have been, or may be convicted of infamous
'
crimes.” But Article II, §4 states that “All elections by the citizens, shall be by ballot, except for such town
officers, as may by law be directed to be otherwise chosen.” See Reports ofthe Proceedings and Debates
ofthe New York Constitutional Convention of 1821 (1970) (1821), at 661.
Finally, one North Carolina delegate in 1835 opposed criminal disenfranchisement for whites, but
supported the restriction for blacks. During debate over whether free blacks who met the property test
should be allowed to vote, a delegate named Gaston rejected the argument that
“wherever a man is convicted of perjury, forgery, conspiracy, or larceny, he ceases to be a
freeman, and loses the right of voting. Such was not his conception of the law. When a man has been
thus convicted, he is no longer a competent witness, but he is still a freeman, and of course, has a right
to vote.”
Gaston attempted to dissolve opposition to voting by black freemen by raising the property
qualification for them, and also by adding this phrase: “nor shall any free negro, mulatto, or person of
mixed blood, as aforesaid, be permitted to vote at any election, who shall have been convicted of an
infamous offense.” See Proceedings and Debates ofthe Convention ofNorth-Carolina, Called to Amend
the Constitution ofthe State, 1835 (1836), at 357, 352.
262
nineteenth-century Amencans had a great deal to do with the way their elections were
conducted. To be sure, disenfranchisement is not exclusively linked to nineteenth-
century voting practices: a lot of legislative and judicial activity has taken place since
1888, and in fact Utah and Massachusetts have both put inmate disenfranchisement in
place for the first time in the last five years. Meanwhile, the policy has roots in North
America that go back well before 1821: colonial Amencans disenfranchised some
offenders, as well. But these seventeenth-century policies reveal another striking
difference between early disenfranchisement practices and its use today.
b. Public Punishment: Early American Disenfranchisement.
In Anderson v. Winfree, the Kentucky court declared that “[i]t is the perpetration
and conviction of the infamous crime, and not the degree of punishment, that renders the
perpetrator infamous,” and therefore disenfranchised. 50 The truth, however, is that by
1887 American criminal disenfranchisement law had already broken free of its early
American roots as a punishment. As the legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has
written, the texts of the law must be made socially real: enacted, implemented,
imposed.”' 1 In colonial America, disenfranchisement was made socially real when
enacted as punishment, because it was usually inflicted during public sentencing. That
gave the practice a public dimension lacking from today’s policies, which separate the
offender from the franchise silently and automatically: disenfranchisement is now
technically a “collateral consequence” of conviction, rather than part of one’s sentence.
50
Anderson v. Winfree
,
4 S.W. 351, 353 (1887).
51
Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawa 'i: The Cultural Power ofLaw (2000), at 218.
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English colonists in North America transplanted much of the mother country’s
common law regarding the civil disabilities of convicts, and supplemented it with statutes
regarding suffrage. As towns were incorporated, new citizens required approval by town
meetings, usually based on religious conformity and property ownership. 52 Plymouth
would not admit as a freeman “any opposer of the good and wholsome laws of this
colonie,” and in one town a would-be freeman needed the testimony of his neighbors that
he was of “sober and peaceable conversation.”53 Plymouth in 1651 provided that any
person judged to be ‘grosly scandalouse as lyers drunkards Swearers & C. shall lose
theire freedome of this Corporation.”54 In Massachusetts, disenfranchisement was
authonzed as an additional penalty for conviction of fornication or any “shameful 1 and
vitious crime.”55 Many colonial laws addressed directly the question of how long the loss
of the ballot would last, and this too was sometimes up to judicial discretion. Under
Connecticut law anyone “fyned or whipped for any scandalous infraction” could be
restored to his rights when “the courte shall manifest their satisfaction.”56 In both
Massachusetts and Connecticut, the decision to restore voting rights was left to the court,
but in pre-Revolutionary Rhode Island, anyone convicted of bribing an election official
" Albert E. McKinley, The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America, (1905), 384-
385.
53
Cortland Bishop, History ofElections in the American Colonies ( 1 893), at 54.
54
Bradley Chapin, Criminal Justice in Colonial America, 1 606-1660 ( 1983), at 54.
55
Bishop, at 56.
56
See Blue Laws ofConnecticut: The Code of 1650; Being a Compilation of the Earliest Laws and Orders
ofthe General Court ofConnecticut (1822), at 98. This 1650 statute merits quoting in full: “It is ordered
by this Courte and decreed, that if any person within these Libberties have been or shall be fyned or
wlupped for any scandalous offence, hee shall not bee admitted after such time to have any voate in Towne
or Commonwealth, nor to serve in the Jury, untill the courte shall manifest theire satisfaction.” Id.
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was “forever thereafter
.
. . excluded from betng a Freeman, or voting, or beanng an
public Office, whatsoever, in this Colony.”57
These examples indicate that disenfranchisement has a long history in the U.S.,
but they also illuminate important differences between the practice of colonial and
contemporary disenfranchisement. Originally, the removal of criminals from the suffrage
had a visible, public dimension: either entire communities of freemen made the
determination, or it was a discrete element in punishment implemented only after the
deliberation of a court. Moreover, crimes subject to the penalty of disenfranchisement
were either linked to voting itself, as in Rhode Island, or defined as egregious violations
of the moral code. Modem disenfranchisement laws - automatic, invisible in the
criminal justice process, considered “collateral” rather than explicitly punitive, and
applied to broad categories of crimes with little or no common character - do not share
these characteristics
.
58
Of course, another great difference between colonial and modem American
suffrage is the prominent role state and federal courts now play in safeguarding
individuals’ voting rights. Under that protection, however, lies a great deal of variation
in voting practices generally, as we have seen in registration practices, ballot design,
polling locations, provision of voter assistance, and counting and recounting standards,
among other areas. In the case of people convicted of crime, the practical point of
exclusion is not now in the sentencing court or the community, nor even in state
57
McKinley, at 459.
58 By contrast, modem German disenfranchisement law appears quite similar to the American colonial
model. In Germany, post-sentence disenfranchisement is never automatic, may only be applied by the
sentencing judge for certain serious infractions, and can last only two to five years following incarceration.
See Nora V. Demleitner, “Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative,” 84 Minnesota Law Review 753, 760-761 (2000).
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constitutions and statutes where the ,aws themselves reside. Disenfranchisement is now
made “socially real" in two places: state bureaucracies, and local elections offices.
HI. “I need to be able to tell the clerks what to do:” Contemporary
Disenfranchisement Practices in the United States.
“There is a stunning lack of information and transparency surrounding felon
disenfranchisement across the country,” the New York Times recently editorialized
.
59
This spring, I began a survey of state and selected county elections officials in order to
learn more about how disenfranchisement and rights-restoration work in the United
States. The survey, which is continuing, has been conducted by mail, e-mail, and
phone; thirty states’ elections offices have responded, mostly on paper, and I am now
beginning a telephone survey of counties in several states. (The mail component of the
survey is attached as an Appendix.) In this section, I discuss some preliminary
findings
.
01
Data are still coming in, and the material can be fascinatingly and
frustratingly difficult to organize, because state practices are so diverse that natural and
conventional categories do not always work. Something unexpected and unique appears
in almost each piece of mail and each conversation.
This section consists of three sub-sections. The first discusses background and
context, and gives the flavor of some survey results. The second outlines the modal
59
“Felons and the Right to Vote,” New York Times, July 1 1, 2004, p. A 12.
This research is funded in part by a grant from the Sentencing Project. All survey materials are available
on request from the author. I am grateful to the Sentencing Project, and also to the many state and local
officials who have taken the time to answer my questions, particularly during the run-up to a Presidential
election.
Unless otherwise noted, sources for all material in this section is from paper surveys, e-mails, or phone
interviews between the author and a given state’s Secretary of State’s office or other elections official.
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procedures a, .he “from end” of disenfranchisement:
.he steps by which s.a.es initially
remove a convicted person from the rolls. The third gives some sense of the great
diversity in state practices at the restoration stage, which has become a controversial
aspect of disenfranchisement today.
a. “Kind of a case by case basis:” General Characteristics.
A few prefatory and contextual points should be made here. First, about three-
quarters of disenfranchised offenders are not in prison. These citizens are either
sentenced to probation instead of prison, out on parole, or - as with about thirty-five
percent of the disenfranchised - have completed their sentences entirely
.
62
Meanwhile,
well over half of U.S. states disenfranchise at least some offenders who are not
incarcerated
.
63
Therefore, the most serious practical “problem,” for most local elections
clerks, is that whether or not they are legally eligible to cast ballots, the vast majority of
would-be voters in question are out in society, not behind bars.
Meanwhile, “felony disenfranchisement” is not as accurate a term as “criminal
disenfranchisement,” because several states do not use felony as the cut-off point. Five
states responding to my survey noted directly or implicitly that they may legally
disenfranchise some misdemeanants - Indiana, South Carolina, Mississippi, Illinois, and
Montana — and a recent study of state laws concluded that almost twice as many states
nationally may do so . 64 Another complication is how to classify states. Studies
Manza and Uggen, “Punishment and Democracy,” at 495.
63 Manza and Uggen, at 494. Their count is that thirty-four states do so.
64
Montana law says that incarcerated felons may not vote, but the state elections office told me that the
voter registration form requires the prospective voter to swear that he “is not incarcerated.” About six
years ago, one authority concluded that the laws of Alaska, Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland,
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comparing disenfranch,semen! law in the U.S. with similar policies in other countries run
into a simple problem: there is no national policy, and state laws range from the most
inclusive or lenient standard (incarcerated criminals retain voting rights in Maine and
Vermont) to the most restrictive (some convicts can never have their rights restored in
several states, barring an outright pardon or reversal of their conviction). But even these
descriptions omit important distinctions.
Fascinating and revealing details emerge within state bureaucracies themselves.
Consider, for example, the practices of Oregon and Pennsylvania. Oregon’s
disenfranchisement policies challenge the assumption that one is disenfranchised for
committing a felony, or for being convicted of a felony, or even for being incarcerated
for a felony. For Oregon disenfranchises only felons under Department of Corrections
(DOC) supervision. Most felons wind up there, but since 1997, those convicted of a
felony in Oregon and sentenced to less than 12 months’ custody go to the county jails.
Therefore, “they do not enter DOC custody and will not lose their voting privileges,” as a
staffer at the Oregon Secretary of State’s office explained. “Felons may generally vote
except when in DOC custody,” she wrote, without giving an indication of how often this
happens. Meanwhile, it is legal for even DOC inmates to register to vote. 65 In
Pennsylvania, this is not the case. As a member of the Secretary of State’s office
explained, Pennsylvania law does not explicitly bar convicts from voting. Instead, “it
implicitly does so by precluding an individual who is confined in a penal institution from
Mississippi, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Washington stated that “infamous crimes,” crimes involving
“moral turpitude,” or offenses from a specific list bring about loss of the vote. See Virginia E. Hench, “The
Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters,” 48 Case Western Reserve
Law Review 727, 795-797 (1998)
Oregon publishes and distributes relatively comprehensive voter-assistance flyers for released prisoners,
and instructs the DOC in what information to communicate to those leaving DOC custody.
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being deemed a res,den, of the d, strict where the institution is located and from being
deemed a ‘qualified absentee elector.'” In other words, as a matter oflaw, Pennsylvania
disenfranchises incarcerated felons by barring them from registering, no, from voting.
Tennessee may take the prize as the state where formal disenfranchisement law is
most chronologically complex. Tennessee is often described simply as a state which used
to disenfranchise indefinitely, but since 1986 no longer does so. This account does not
capture the policy, under which, as a state webpage explains, “[t]he manner in which a
person may restore a lost voting right depends on the crime committed and the year in
which the conviction occurred.” In fact, Tennessee now hasfive different laws, covering
five different penods between 1973 and the present" Nevada, meanwhile, is categorized
as a state which recently changed its laws to automatically re-enfranchise most offenders,
but so far that is not what is happening. State law now says that those honorably
discharged before and after July 1 , 2003 may be in different categories, and may need to
show county clerks different kinds of evidence of their good standing. But some
recidivists, those convicted of violent crimes, and those convicted of federal felonies are
not eligible, and many the county clerks seem unsure which documents to accept as proof
of eligibility from any of these offenders. As a Deputy Secretary of State told me with
some frustration, “right now, it’s kind of a case by case basis,” adding, “I need some legal
research, so I can tell the clerks what to do.”67 Meanwhile, at least a few other states’
responses left some uncertainty as to which offenders are formally excluded. Advocacy
See <www.state.tn.us/sos/election/webconl ,htm>.
Interview with Rhonda White, July 21, 2004. White also told me, “I spoke with an older woman with an
old, old federal conviction, for putting bad information on a mortgage application. The [Clark County]
clerk told her the DA told him the new state law did not affect federal convictions. [Meaning she was still
totally ineligible, barring Presidential pardon.] This was one of two people who had been turned away by
Clark County, and ‘they’re pretty hot.’”
269
reports usually list Louisiana as a state which only bars tncarcerated felons from voting,68
but the Secretary of State’s office indicated that no, until “completion of probation” does
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections notify convicts that most of their rights
have been restored. California formally disenfranchises those on parole as well as in
prison, but the voter registration card requires only that they swear “they are not in prison
for a felony conviction.” And in a remnant from the post-Reconstruction era, Mississippi
sttll employs an extraordinarily long, colorful list of specified crimes bringing about the
sanction - Bigamy, Forgery, Receiving Stolen Property, and “Unlawful Taking of Motor
Vehicle” are still on the list, but as recently as 2001, the state Attorney General ruled that
burglars would no longer be disenfranchised.
Disenfranchisement as a practice is properly understood as hyper-federalized.
Formally, the 1 993 Georgia case Jarrard appears to be the exception that proves the rule:
state government, not local authorities, generally determines which offenders are legally
barred from voting. But at the same time, in practice it is overwhelmingly county
officials (town staff in most of the Northeast, parish officials in Louisiana) deciding how
to handle voter-registration applications and requests for absentee ballots, and they who
must decide whether and how to investigate each voter’s status - usually with little or no
state or federal supervision.
This is most clear with regard to determining voter eligibility. Flow do county
officials figure this out? States as diverse as Louisiana, Wyoming, and Massachusetts
clearly explained state law, but told me that they simply do not know what the parish,
county, and municipal authorities, respectively, are doing to check. Remember, even
68
See, for example, http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief7publ046.pdf>.
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local officials in states barring only incarcerated felons should have some way of
checking voters’ status, since imprisoned pre-trial detainees always remain eligible, and
most or all misdemeanants usually do. In that category, officials in Massachusetts,
Hawaii, Oregon, New Hampshire, and North Dakota responded that it’s up to local
officials whether and how to investigate voter status when they receive an absentee-ballot
request with a return address that may be a prison. “This is a small state, so people often
know who has been in jail,” wrote a New Hampshire official. “County election officials
would exercise due diligence to verify eligibility,” wrote a Hawaii staffer. North Dakota
is in a class of its own: since the state has no voter registration, physical appearance at the
polls is the only proof of eligibility required; the official I spoke to had never heard of an
absentee-ballot request from a state prison in fourteen years of service. In states barring
people from voting after incarceration - such as Colorado, Connecticut, North Carolina,
and Oklahoma - local officials bear even more responsibility, since not only absentee
ballots but the most routine walk-in voter-registration requests may come from people
still under supervision, and the state criminal-justice bureaucracy may not have notified
local officials of their status. In Colorado, felons in prison and on parole are not eligible,
but probationers and former inmates are; proof of eligibility “is decided at the county
level by the county clerk. How? “I don’t have the answer to that question,” a staffer at
the Secretary of State’s office wrote.
Whether or not one approves of the laws in principle, and whether or not they
operate fairly and consistently in practice, one fact emerges clearly in this research: in the
United States, state and county officials appear to be spending a good deal of time and
effort to disenfranchise people convicted of crime. That work begins with a conviction.
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b. Disenfranchisement.
Most states responding to the survey have a relatively straightforward process by
which the people at the “front lines” of American voting - county clerks - are informed
of criminal convictions. With variations, it goes something like this. At monthly or
quarterly intervals, county, state, and federal courts, the Department of Corrections,
shenffs (in Indiana), or the State Police (Virginia), notify state elections officials of
criminal convictions. In states with comprehensive, functional voter databases,
convictions are checked against voter rolls, and counties notified; in other states, the
information goes straight to local officials. Sometimes county clerks of court also convey
conviction information directly to their own elections boards. Finally, the county boards
check conviction lists against their own voter rolls, and purge registrations as appropriate.
“Since registration records are maintained at the various county election board offices,”
an Oklahoma official explained, “it is the Secretary of each county election board office
who actually processes the cancellation.” California, Minnesota, Montana, North
Carolina, and Virginia, among others, are good examples of this type of process.
There are quite a few exceptions, however. Among states disfranchising only the
incarcerated, a few indicated that they had no systematic reporting system. Michigan,
North Dakota, and Oregon all did so, with Michigan indicating that it is simply “not
necessary,” and others indicating that local officials could investigate odd-looking
absentee-ballot requests as they wished. Kansas may be the only state disfranchising
former inmates which lacks any reporting system, and they will begin using one in 2005.
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c. Restoration.
Rights restoration, however, is a different story. Restoration processes have
aroused greater controversy among advocacy groups - and, recently, county officials in
Florida and Nevada - than has initial disenfranchisement. Presumably, this is because of
the belief that barring an eligible person who wants to vote is worse than wronglyfailing
to purge a person who may someday try to vote. Certainly, the former is far more likely
to lead to a lawsuit. In this area, local officials exercise a great deal of discretion and
responsibility, because very few states have any kind of centralized procedure to inform
county staff of the end of a person’s incarceration or sentence - and many lack even a
simple way for them to check. Minnesota explains that restoration information is
centralized with the “state court administrator,” but offers no information about how the
process occurs. Delaware has some of the country’s most restrictive policies, but also has
one of the most technologically and bureaucratically coherent policies: county officials
must check every registration applicant against a statewide criminal-justice database, and
follow the appropriate steps if a record appears. Virtually no other states described such
a centralized procedure, despite my asking about it specifically.
Conventionally, states are divided into three or more groups: those automatically
restoring rights after prison; those doing so after incarceration and probation, or after
incarceration, probation, and parole; and those who never do so automatically. But these
categories do not capture the range of restoration practices in place. For example, one
can argue that only one state has truly “automatic” restoration: with no registration
requirement, all one has to do after leaving prison in North Dakota is walk to the polling
place. Meanwhile, some states with relatively lenient or inclusive policies - such as
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Nevada - now have particularly burdensome or obscure standards of proof. And at least
on paper, indefinite-disenfranchisement states like Kentucky and Wyoming make
restoration sound like a simple matter of filing a form with the nght office.
One possible dividing line is between states which require only that the would-be
voter swear that she is not ineligible because of a criminal conviction, and those requiring
some documentary proof. Many states with different terms of disenfranchisement require
only an oath. Among incarceration-only states, Indianans must swear the same affidavit
as everyone else, saying “I am not currently in prison following conviction.” In
Montana, the former inmate “swears on the voter registration card that he or she is not
incarcerated.” Oklahoma, a full-sentence disenfranchisement state, uses only a universal
oath: [t]he applicant need not provide ‘proof that he/she is again eligible for
registration, but must sign a sworn oath, which states in part
. . . If I have been convicted
of a felony, a period of time equal to the sentence has expired, or I have been
pardoned. Similarly, in Missouri, where the offender is disenfranchised during all
aspects of the sentence, one must simply swear to a county official that he is no longer
under sentence. And in Utah and Illinois, there appears to be no oath requirement at all.
In my survey, at least eleven states indicated some documentary requirement.
The list cuts across conventional categories: it includes Hawaii, which bars only
incarcerated felons from voting; Connecticut, which excludes only those incarcerated and
on parole; Arkansas, which adds probationers to the list; and Virginia and Iowa, which
indefinitely disenfranchise felons. In Connecticut, the would-be voter “must present
proof of release [from the DOC] from confinement and/or discharge of parole.”
Oklahoma’s written survey response continues, “[vjoter registration applications are not ‘investigated’ to
determine whether the applicant has provided correct information....”
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Interestingly, in North Carolina and Idaho - both full-sentence states - there is neither an
oath nor a documentary requirement. In North Carolina, “the county board of elections
will assume the allegation of citizenship is correct.... We do not cross check the current
DOC database with SEIMS [the statewide voter database]” In Idaho, the norm is for
local officials to “[t]ake the individual’s word when they sign the registration card, under
oath, that they have no ‘legal disqualifications.’”
Another variable is whether or not those completing sentences are informed of
their restored rights. This too cuts across categories: most incarceration-only states do
nothing, while several post-incarceration states are relatively active. In Indiana, the
state DOC is now required to give prisoner notification” of rights restoration after
incarceration; Oklahoma’s DOC “may provide some information,” but there is no
statutory mandate that it do so; Oregon distributes a short flyer; and Montana’s Secretary
of State “works with advocates for prisoners to release infonnation to the media.” North
Carolina and Nevada both have such advocacy groups’ materials on file, and sent them to
me, Connecticut takes no state action, but is aware of voters’ rights groups which do.
Survey results also cast doubt on the list of states conventionally defined as
employing “lifetime” or “permanent” disenfranchisement. (I prefer the more neutral term
“indefinite,” since what such policies mean is that the “default” in terms of a convicted
person’s voting rights is disqualification, while eligibility can be restored via some
means.) For example, Delaware, Maryland, and Tennessee are usually not now listed on
the indefinite-disenfranchisement roll, since they have shifted to automatic eligibility for
most former offenders or a waiting period - three years in Maryland, five in Delaware.
But at the same time, some offenders in each of these states - those convicted of murder,
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rape, and, in Delaware, other “sexual crimes” - are never eligible to have their rights
restored. Tennessee’s state law reads more like an indefinite-disenfranchisement state
than an automatic-restoration one. Those convicted of murder, rape, treason or vote fraud
are never eligible, and even those who are eligible must complete their maximum
sentence and obtain “a judgment from circuit court
. . . that restores full rights of
citizenship.”
This is a time of potentially sweeping change in many states’ election procedures,
and my survey inquires about whether state officials expect any changes in
disenfranchisement or restoration policies. Almost none mentioned HAVA, although the
statewide voter rolls that statute requires will almost certainly affect each state’s
practices. Only New Hampshire noted that “we expect to comply with better notification
through HAVA changes, and funding.” The survey question did not raise HAVA
specifically, and followed several questions about criminal disenfranchisement;
presumably, those responding simply did not connect these two topics, although the link
will certainly be important in some states.
Finally, as noted above, some sources indicate that scores and even hundreds of
former felons may be voting illegally. But there is also evidence that at least as many
offenders who are eligible may not try to vote because they believe they are barred from
voting. As a staffer from Missouri told me, “we get felons calling all the time” who don’t
know they are eligible to vote. As Manza and Uggen put it, “many former offenders who
are actually eligible to vote may be inadvertently taking themselves out of the political
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process because they misunderstand the details of the laws governing voting rights in
their state .”
70
IV. A Troubled Practice.
The New York Times recently editorialized that “even if it were acceptable as
policy, denying felons the vote has been a disaster because of the chaotic and partisan
way it has been earned out .”71 In this dissertation, I have viewed such statements with
skepticism, at least in terms of what looks like “chaos” to observers seduced by “the
mystique of standardization.” In this case, however, the neo-Progressives at the Times
appear to have it right. Our fragmented system of enforcing criminal disenfranchisement
law should concern those on “both sides” of the disenfranchisement debate - those who
worry most about fraudulently-cast votes by ineligible offenders, and those concerned
about illegal vote denial or overly burdensome requirements preventing participation.
This is particularly true given that the vast majority of the disenfranchised are no longer
incarcerated (or, in the case of probationers, never were). The states which seem likely to
have the least error-prone policies are those where only inmates are disenfranchised, and
where local officials are able to investigate any absentee-ballot requests from addresses
they recognize as those of prisons. By contrast, almost none of the states where former
inmates are barred from voting appear to have in place systems which both facilitate
voting by everyone eligible and prevent the ineligible from registering. Whether because
70 Manza and Uggen, “Punishment and Democracy,” at 495.
1
“Felons and the Right to Vote,” New York Times, July 1 1, 2004, p. A 12. A noteworthy detail: as in its
previous editorial criticism of criminal disenfranchisement, the Times many times assaults “felon
disenfranchisement” and the practice of “denying felons the vote,” but the editors do not make explicit
whether they believe all laws should be repealed, or only those barring non-incarcerated offenders from
voting.
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of lack of available information, benign ignorance, or other motives, it appears certain
that local officials in some states are asking for documentary proofwhich is legally
unnecessary or nonexistent, while others are failing to investigate the status of non-
mcarcerated voters who may in fact remain ineligible under state law. The ongoing
experiences of Florida and Nevada indicate that different towns, counties, and parishes in
the same state, meanwhile, may be employing different procedures, particularly in terms
of restoration. The lack of high-quality voter databases, together with the complexities of
disenfranchisement law, may make consistent enforcement impossible.
If American felony disenfranchisement practices were more like their colonial
predecessors, local variation might make more sense. If the town or county were
responsible for deciding who was included in the polity, leaving significant discretion in
restoring rights with local officials would be justifiable. Such case-by-case variation
might also be warranted ifjudges administered disenfranchisement as an additional
penalty, although that would require judges, not county clerks, to handle restoration. But
such localism is far from modem policy - and never appears in arguments for barring
offenders from the polls. In fact, defenders of disenfranchisement invariably turn to
super-national theories, like the demands of the original “social contract” or moral
imperatives of punishment. Arguments of “national” scope include Constitutional
defenses of disenfranchisement and arguments holding that the policy does not run afoul
of the Voting Rights Act. And of course, federalist arguments play an important role,
given that formal disenfranchisement law is set by state constitutions and statutes. But no
defense of disenfranchisement even acknowledges local variation in its application.
Critics of U.S. law have observed that a person convicted of crime can gain or lose the
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right to vote simply by crossing a state line. In prachce, they may have the same
experience crossing the county line.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
I have tried to show that crucial, constitutive elements of American suffrage have
always been and remain highly localized. What does this tell us about American political
development? Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek have defined “development” as “a
durable shift in authority relations among political institutions,” meaning “a change in the
direction of controls, enforceable at law, among the discrete agencies of governance that
comprise a political order.” 1 In a strictly legal or formal sense, one could argue that
American suffrage developed most sharply away from local control at any of a few
different points: with the Jacksonian conventions, when statewide qualifications were
articulated; in 1868 and 1870, with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; or with
the Voting Rights Act of 1 965.
But the framework I have developed here leads to two quite different conclusions.
First, an appreciation of voting rights as practices suggests that American suffrage took
its biggest developmental step towards its modem form between 1888 and 1892, when
most states put secret-ballot laws in place. A second conclusion, however, is that
American suffrage has never truly “developed” in a way that fits Orren and Skowronek’s
definition. Certainly, in terms of legally-enforceable “authority relations,” the state and
federal governments control what counties and municipalities do. Nonetheless, all along
the serial election process — in voter registration, ballot design and election-technology
selection, poll supervision and voter support, counting and re-counting procedures, and
Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “What is Political Development?”, paper presented at the Annual
Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Aug. -Sept. 2001, at 4.
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paying for it all - local officials in most U.S. states still play essential roles. As I’ve
argued above, even the Australian ballot laws unequivocally left local officials in charge
of the.r implementation, and subsequent personal-registration Riles effectively brought
about “a new decentralization of power to determine the eligibility of voters,” as the
National Commission on Federal Election Refonn put it. 2 And just as reports of Mark
Twain’s death were greatly exaggerated, scholars in each generation seem to believe that
at last, the suffrage debate in the U.S. really is over, the right to vote nationalized
and guaranteed to all. Most recently, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the National
Voter Registration Act of 1993 each appeared to complete the nationalization of
Amencan voting - until the election of 2000 laid bare the depth and importance of local
variation that endures. “He lives in one world of theory and in another world of
practice,” wrote Albert Shaw of “the American” in 1887. 3 By emphasizing what
Americans actually do when we vote, I have tried to bring theory and practice closer
together.
The fundamental premise of this dissertation is that practices matter, and I believe
I have demonstrated that to be true in numerous ways. But scholars and reformers alike
should remember that procedures alone will not make a democracy strong, or self-
government fully effective. The great English conservative Edmund Burke made this
point sharply, mocking those who criticized virtual representation and other aspects of
England’s late-eighteenth-century voting system:
To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process
,
at 27.
3
See William J. Novak, The People's Welfare, at 237, quoting Albert Shaw, “The American State and the
American Man, Contemporary Review 1 (1887). Novak writes, “Shaw chalked up this contradiction
[American rhetoric of laissez-faire amid a ‘profusion’ of state regulatory legislation] to an unequaled
capacity in the American ‘for the entertainment of legal fictions and kindred delusions. He lives in one
world of theory and in another world of practice.’”
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This is like the unhappy persons who live, if they can be said to live in the
statical chair
- who are ever feeling their pulse, and who do not judge of health by the
apt. ude of the body to perform its functions, but by their ideas ofwhat ought to bethe true balance between the several secretions .”4
(The “statical chair” was a device invented by the Venetian physician Sanctorious for
weighing people and determining the amount of “insensible perspiration” lost by the
body, such as after certain foods were eaten. 5 ) They may lack Burke’s vivid metaphor,
but leading voting-rights lawyers sometimes acknowledge that for reformers whose
ultimate objective is policy change, focusing on procedures may not pay off much.
Writing recently of successful challenges to vote dilution, Lani Guinier asked rhetorically
[h]ave we focused exclusively on the electoral process without any sustained
exploration of the governance process?”6 The two ought to be intimately connected, of
course - not least in terms of turnout, which increases when voters believe their votes
will have some effect on law-making. Indeed, political scientist Mark N. Franklin’s
comparison of turnout in twenty-nine countries demonstrates that when it comes to
predicting increased rates of voting, the salience of an election - that is, its perceived
importance and impact on policy — simply dwarfs the effects of more procedural
variables like compulsory, Sunday, and postal voting rules . 7 And Franklin reaches the
remarkable and provocative conclusion that the linkage between “election outcome” and
4 Edmund Burke, “Speech on the State of the Representation;” cited in Pitkin, The Concept of
Representation
,
at 155.
5
Pitkin, at 283.
6
Lani Guinier, “Development of the Franchise: 1982 Voting Rights Amendments,” in Karen McGill
Arrington and William L. Taylor, eds., Voting Rights in America: Continuing the Questfor Full
Participation (1992), at 107.
7
See Mark N. Franklin, “Electoral Participation,” in Lawrence LeDuc et al., eds., Comparing Democracies
(1996), at 227 . Two different models conclude that the effect of electoral salience is up to four times
greater than the next strongest predictor - compulsory voting - and five or six times as great as allowing
voters to cast ballots by mail and on Sunday. Id.
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“policy outputs” in the U.S. is so uniquely tenuous that he subsequently analyzes the
same data with the U.S. removed. 8 Even a procedural^ “perfect” election, then, might
not by itselfmove American government significantly closer to the democratic ideal,
particularly given deep problems in turnout levels across socioeconomic groups,
dissatisfaction with the major parties, and low levels of voter information.
This caveat aside, the local dimension of suffrage has been a crucial part of U.S.
voting history and remains central to the exercise of popular sovereignty and the
American story of inclusion and exclusion in citizenship practices. Certainly, local
variation in American voting continues to interest journalists, advocates, and the public.
In July of 2004, the National Museum of American History opened an exhibit titled “The
Machinery of Democracy,” explaining that “voting methods in the United States ... are
as varied as the individual states and their local election districts.” How and by whom
votes are counted, the curators commented, “are issues as important as who votes.”9 The
Washington Post recently ran an intriguing story on voting by elderly people with
dementia and other degenerative brain illnesses; because there is virtually no case law
covering voting by non-institutionalized people with such illnesses, “poll workers and
nursing home operators are deciding which patients are competent to vote.” 10 And an
investigation by the Kansas City Star found that lacking good voter rolls, county officials
Switzerland also won this dubious honor. Id., at 223-224. As Franklin explains, “[i]n these two
countries, public policy outputs evidently rest on many imponderables apart from the outcome of legislative
elections, reducing the stakes of such elections (and hence the benefits of voting) compared to what they
would be where the linkage was tighter.” Id. at 224.
9
See <http://www.americanhistory.si.edu/vote/index.html> (accessed Sept. 14, 2004; see also
<http://www.americanhistory.si.edu/vote/patchwork.html>, where the exhibit describes and illustrates the
“patchwork” of American voting practices. An interactive map allows viewers to check how their county
votes.
10
Shankar Vedantam, “Dementia and the Voter,” Washington Post, Sept. 14, 2004, p. Al.
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have mistakenly allowed hundreds of Missouri residents to vote more than once in
di fferent counties in recent years
.
1
1
Some of those contacted by the paper's reporters -
who tracked down the repeaters’ names in county poll books - ruefully acknowledged
their fraudulent intentions, but others claimed to have voted twice accidentally, and a few
even defended the practice
.
13
These stories, like many others, treat local variation as a
national headache.
Throughout this dissertation, I have tried to counter what sometimes seems a
reflexive distrust of things local, emphasizing the historically-grounded, constitutive, and
potentially redemptive elements of the U.S.’s hyper-federalized suffrage system. Of
course, nothing is gained by being Panglossian about serious inconsistencies and flaws:
we should have better voter databases in order to prevent double voting, and states should
try to clarify their policies on voting by those with illnesses that seriously limit mental
function. (Still, given the enormous difficulty of drafting and enforcing such a policy, a
system in which local poll workers enforce the rules while erring heavily on the side of
inclusion may well beat any other option. 13 ) While error-prone voting machines should
obviously be eliminated, the fact that different localities use different machinery is not in
itself a bad thing. The implementation ofHAVA will go a long way toward fixing many
problems
.
14
11
See Greg Reeves, On Person, One Vote? Not Always, Kansas City Star, Sep. 5, 2004, p.l. The problem.
Reeves wrote, is that “[flhousands of people who have moved are registered to vote in two places, and a
hodgepodge of databases makes it difficult to track them down and remove them.”
12
Id. “I own property and pay taxes in both places. I feel I have the right,” said Leslie McIntosh, who
voted in Kansas City, Kansas, as well as Kansas City, Missouri.
13 Many states have laws on the books terminating the voting rights of people whose mental illness places
them under the legal care of a guardian, the Post reports, but “those laws are often arcane - and unevenly
enforced.” See Vedantam, “Dementia and the Voter.”
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As I have explained above, my historical survey of American suffrage practices
suggests that the space in which citizenship operates in U S. elections has always been
local space . 15 Nineteenth- and twentieth-century statutes and judicial opinions have
greatly reduced the amount of legal room in which counties and cities work, but physical
places (schools, firehouses, churches, town halls) and locally-defined practices remain
crucial to the character of American voting rights and the constitution of American
popular sovereignty. Lawmakers and reformers today should try hard to sustain this local
dimension of suffrage, particularly where it involves practices which draw voters out into
their communities. For example, weekend or holiday elections might not boost overall
turnout (some would rather travel than vote), but would be worth doing simply to
improve the experience of participation by increasing the number of polling-place
workers and giving voters more time - which should decrease lost-vole percentages and
increase voters sense of efficacy. Absentee balloting is here to stay, of course, but in my
view little would be gained and much lost by measures such as voting on-line and by
phone, which further distance voters from each other. And of course, to focus on
possible state and national reforms alone would miss the point: local officials themselves
should take advantage of their influential positions, doing all they can to recruit both
voters and polling-place volunteers and to enhance the voting experience. We may not
be able to bring back the barrels of rum toddy that politicians of George Washington’s
generation used to liven up election day, but when Americans vote together in their
In Missouri, officials asked about double voting looked forward to HAVA implementation, which they
noted would link the state elections office with the Departments of Revenue, Health, and Corrections, as
well as “all 1 16 local election jurisdictions.” Reeves, id.
I paraphrase Crenson and Ginsberg here; they wrote of how centralization and bureaucracy have reduced
“the space in which citizenship can operate.” See Downsizing Democracy, at 45-46.
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communities, they are best able to feel the celebratory and communal nature ofthe
national civic ritual.
APPENDIX
SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES, SPRING 2004
Ple
£
Se r?P°nd as much detail as you can, either on this sheet or separately Ifyour office does not know the answer to any question, or the answer is “not
apphcable for some reason, please simply indicate that fact. You are invited to
attach adddional materials, including state publications or directions to documents
published on the web.
Thank you.
I. Disqualification.
As you know, state laws differ. In some states, virtually no one convicted of
crime forfeits voting rights, or only those who break election law do; others disqualify
only those convicted of listed offenses, those who’ve committed “infamous” crimes,
or those revealing “moral turpitude;” others disqualify those convicted of crimes
defined as felonies.
In your state, what person or officeformally determines that an
individual is disqualified from voting because of a criminal conviction?
2. How is that determination made?
Is the fact of a person’s ineligibility communicated to state, county, and
municipal elections officials? If so, how and when does this occur?
II. Restoration.
Again, state laws differ as to how and when people convicted of crime regain
eligibility to vote.
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1 . Wha t person or officeformally determines that
eligibility to vote has been restored?
a disqualified person’s
2. In the absence of some action to inquire about eligibility by a formerly-
disqualified person, does any state or local official communicate with
that person to explain the restoration process, or to inform them that
they have been restored to eligibility? Or must the individual in
question initiate the process?
3. In practice, are eligibility determinations made at the state level, or do
county, city, or town elections officials sometimes determine whether a
formerly-disqualified voter is now eligible?
What conditions must be met in order for a disqualified voter to become
eligible? For example, are there particular procedures, or particular
kinds ofproof, that a formerly-disqualified person must obtain or
provide in order to have eligibility restored?
5. How do the appropriate state, county, or municipal officials determine
whether those conditions have been met?
Recent or future changes.
Have there been recent changes in criminal disfranchisement law or
or other
n
mea
U
ns?
ate
’ ‘hr°Ugh COnsti,ul 'onal
-
stalu “>ry, regulatory,
2 . Do you anticipate changes in the near future - again, either
of state or federal law or administrative decisions?
as the result
Again, thank you for your time. Should you have questions, please contact me
via e-mail (aewald@polsci.umass.edu) or phone (413-528-8482). Please return
either in enclosed envelope or separately, to:
Alec Ewald
Dept, of Political Science, Thompson Hall
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Amherst, MA 01003-9277
289
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Difficul,y of s,ud^ng ,he Sla,e
”
1 Journai
Abramsky, Sasha. A Growing Gap in American Democracy.” New York Times, July
11, 2002, p. All. 3
Ackerman, Bruce. Bush v. Gore: The Question ofLegitimacy. New Haven- Yale
University Press, 2002.
Albright, Spencer D. The American Ballot.
on Public Affairs, 1942.
Washington, D.C.: The American Council
“Alpharetta Firm Accused in Fla. Voting Rights Suit." Atlanta Constitution Jan 1
1
2001, p. A3.
Altschuler, Glenn C. and Stuart M. Blumin. Rude Republic: Americans and Their
Politics in the Nineteenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Amy, Douglas J. Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Representation Elections
Could Revitalize American Democracy, Second Ed. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002.
Argersinger, Peter H. A Place on the Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85
American Historical Review 287 (1980).
Argersinger, Peter H. Structure, Process, and Party: Essays in American Political
History. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992.
Aylsworth, Leon E. “The Presidential Ballot.” 1 7 American Political Science Review 89
(1923).
Aylsworth, Leon E. The Passing of Alien Suffrage.” 25 American Political Science
Review 1 14 (1931).
Ball, Howard, Dale Krane, and Thomas P. Lauth. Compromised Compliance:
Implementation ofthe 1965 Voting Rights Act. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1982.
Banks, Christopher P. and John C. Green, eds. Superintending Democracy: The Courts
and the Political Process. Akron: Univ. of Akron Press, 2001
.
Barber, Benjamin R. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politicsfor a New Age.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
290
Behrens, Angela, Christopher Uggen, and Jeff Manza. “Ballot Manipulation and theMenace of Negro Domination’: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement ine m ed States, 1850-2002,” 109 American Journal ofSociology 559 (2003).
Be'z, Herman, Alfred H Kelly, and Winfred A. Harbtson. The American Constitution:
s Ungins and Development, vol. 1 . New York: Norton, 1991
Bensel Richard F. Yankee Leviathan. The Origins ofCentral State Authority in America,1859-1877. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Bensel, Richard F. “The American Ballot Box: Law, Identity, and the Polling Place in
(Spring 20(B)
CentUry ”
' 7 AmeriCan PoU>ical 1
Bilingual Ballots Increasingly Requested.” Associated Press, March 28, 2003.
Bishop, Cortlandt F. History ofElections in the American Colonies. New York-
Columbia College, 1893.
“Black Voters in Florida Deserve Some Real Answers.” USA Today Jan. 11 2001 atA 1 A ^ ’ ’
Blodgett, James H. “Suffrage and Its Mechanism in Great Britain and the United States.”
The American Anthropologist
,
Jan. 1 889.
Blue Laws ofConnecticut: The Code of 1 650; Being a Compilation ofthe Earliest Laws
and Orders ofthe General Court of Connecticut. Cincinnati: U.P. James, 1822.
Brady, Henry E. et al. “Law and Data: The Butterfly Ballot Episode,” 34 PS 59 (2001).
Brennan Center for Justice. Resource Guide for State Felony Disenfranchisement
Studies.” Unpublished paper, on file with the author. Fall 2003.
Brigham, John. The Constitution ofInterests : Beyond the Politics ofRights. New York:
N.Y.U. Press, 1996.
Browne, Cynthia E., Ed. State Constitutional Conventions. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1973.
Burnham, Walter Dean. “The System of 1896: An Analysis.” In Paul Kleppner et al.,
The Evolution ofAmerican Electoral Systems. Wesport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1981.
Burnham, Walter Dean. “The Turnout Problem.” In A. James Reichley, ed., Elections
American Style. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987.
291
Bybee, Keith. Mistaken Identity: The Supreme Court and the Politics ofMinorityRepresentation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Campbell, Angus Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes The
,
™/
0
"Ca" °'er' nn Arbor: Survey Search Center, University of Michigan,
Caputo, Marc. “Questions Over Felon ‘Purge List’ Threaten Florida Governor.” MiamiHerald
,
July 4, 2004 (page number unknown).
Carlson. Coralie. '•Elections Supervisors Relieved to Disregard Felon Voter List.” NaplesDaily News, July 12, 2004. 7
Carter, Jimmy, Gerald R. Ford, Lloyd N. Cutler, and Robert H. Michel, Co-Chairs; PhthpZehkow Executive Director. To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral
rocess
- Report ofthe National Commission on Federal Election Reform.
Washington: Brookings Institution, 2002.
Chapin, Bradley. Criminal Justice in Colonial America, 1606-1660 Athens Ga •
University of Georgia, 1983.
Choe, Yonhyok. How to Manage Free and Fair Elections: A Comparison ofKorea,
p)()
(
-j
Cn
'
andthe United kingdom. Goteborg, Sweden: Goteborg University,
Chute, Marchette. The First Liberty: A History> ofthe Right to Vote in America, 1619-
1850. New York: E.F. Dutton, 1969.
Clegg, Roger. “Who Should Vote?” 6 Texas Review ofLaw and Policy 160 (2001).
The Constitution Project, Forum on Election Reform. Recommendationsfor
Congressional Action. Washington, D.C.: The Constitution Project, August 2001.
Crenson, Matthew A. and Benjamin Ginsberg. Downsizing Democracy: How America
Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2002.
Crigler, Ann N., Marion R. Just, and Edward J. McCaffery, eds. Rethinking the Vote:
The Politics and Prospects ofAmerican Election Reform. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
Croly, Herbert. The Promise ofAmerican Life. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965 (1909).
Crowder, Carla. State s Ex-Felons Start to Regain Voting Rights.” The Birmingham
News, April 16, 2004 (page number unknown).
292
Dah1, R°
9
b
5
e" A ' A Preface ,0 D^ra,ic Theory. Chtcago: University of Chicago Press.
Dana, Richard Henry. The Australian Ballot System ofMassachusetts: Some FallaciousQuestions Answered. New York: City Club ofNew York, 1911,
Daniels, Bruce C. The Connecticut Town: Growth and Development, 1635-1790
Middletown: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1979.
Demleitner Nora V “Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: The GermanModel of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative.” 84 Minnesota Law
Review 753 (2000).
Dennison George M. The Dorr War: Republicanism on Trial, 1831-1861 LexingtonKY: University of Kentucky, 1976.
’
Dennison, George M. “The Dorr War and the Triumph of Institutionalism.” 15 Social
Science Journal 39 (1978).
Dinan, John J. Keeping the People's Liberties: Legislators, Citizens, and Judges as
Guardians ofRights. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1998.
Dinkin, Robert J. Voting in Provincial America: A Study ofElections in the Thirteen
Colonies, 1689-1776. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977.
Dinkin, Robert J. Voting in Revolutionary America: A Study ofElections in the Original
Thirteen States, 1776-1789. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982.
Dinkin, Robert J., ed. Election Day: A Documentary History. Westport: Greenwood
Press, 2002.
Disch, Lisa Jane. The Tyranny ofthe Two-Party System. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002.
DuBois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880. New York' Atheneum
1977 (1935).
Dworkin, Ronald. A Badly Flawed Election. New York: The New Press, 2001.
Elklit, Jorgen and Andrew Reynolds. “The Impact of Election Administration on the
Legitimacy of Emerging Democracies: A New Comparative Politics Research
Agenda.” 40 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 86 (2002).
Elliott, Ward E. Y. The Rise ofGuardian Democracy: The Supreme Court 's Role in
Voting Rights Disputes, 1845-1969. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
293
Evans, Eldon Cobb. A History ofthe Australian Bulb, System in the United StatesChicago. University of Chicago Press, 1917.
Farre11
,
Davit! M. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. New York: Palgrave,
Fellner, Jamie and Marc Mauer. Losing the Vote: The Impact ofFelony
wTITtCT6"' Lam ‘he Uni‘ed States ' Washi i>glon. Human RightsWatch & The Sentencing Project, 1998.
Felons and the Right to Vote.” New York Times
,
July 11, 2004, p. A12
Felons lose bid to alter vote ban.” Miami Herald
,
July 19, 2002, at B1
.
Fessenden, Ford. “Florida List for Purge of Voters Proves Flawed.” New York Times
July 10, 2004 (page number unknown).
Fife Brian L. and Geralyn M. Miller. Political Culture and Voting Systems in the Untted
200
2^ ^n ^Xaminatlon
°f^xe 2000 Presidential Election. Westport, CT: Praeger,
Fishkin, James S. The Voice ofthe People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.
Flathman, Richard E. The Practice ofRights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1976.
Flexner, Abram. The New Ballot Law ofLouisville, Kentucky at work and compared with
the Massachusetts Law. Cambridge: Wm. H. Wheeler, 1889.
“Florida Reverses, Says It Won’t Strip 2,500 Ex-Felons of Voting Rights.” The
Associated Press, July 8, 2004.
Foner, Eric. The Story ofAmerican Freedom. New York: Norton, 1998.
Fox Piven, Frances, and Richard A. Cloward. Why Americans Still Don 7 Vote And Why
Politicians Want It That Way. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000.
Franklin, Mark N. Electoral Participation, in Lawrence LeDuc et al., eds., Comparing
Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage, 1996.
Franklin, Mark N. “The Dynamics of Electoral Participation,” in LeDuc, Lawrence et al.,
eds. Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study ofElections and
Voting. London: Sage, 2002.
294
Fredman, L.E. The Australian Ballot: The Story of
Michigan State University Press, 1968.
an American Reform. Lansing:
Friedman, Lawrence M. A History> ofAmerican Law, Second Ed
Touchstone, 1985.
New York:
Frug, Gerald E. The City as a Legal Concept,” 93 Harvard Law Review 1057 (1980).
Furman, Jesse. “Political liberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the
mbivalences of Rawlsian Justice.” 106 Yale Law Journal 1 197 ( 1997).
Gannett Robert T
,
Jr. “Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville’s Township.” 97 American
Political Science Review 1, February 2003.
Gerstle Gary. American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century Princeton-
Princeton University Press, 2001
.
Gettleman, Marvin E. The Dorr Rebellion: A Study in American Radicalism
,
1833-1849.
Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger, 1980.
Gienapp, William E. “Politics Seem to Enter into Everything.” In Stephen E. Maizlish
and John J. Kushma, eds., Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840-1860.
College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1982.
Gillman, Howard. The Votes That Counted: How the Court Decided the 2000
Presidential Election. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2001.
Glasson, William H. The Australian Voting System: A Sketch ofIts History> and
Principles - Why North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia Should Adopt It
South Atlantic Quarterly, April, 1909.
Goldberg, Robert Goldberg. “Election Fraud: An American Vice.” In A. James Reichley,
ed., Elections American Style. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987.
Goodnough, Abby. “Disenfranchised Florida Felons Struggle to Regain Their Rights.”
New York Times, Sunday, March 28, 2004, p. AT
Greene, Abner Greene. Understanding the 2000 Election: A Guide to the Legal Battles
That Decided the Presidency. New York: New York University Press, 2001
.
Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley, and Richard G. Niemi. Minority Representation and
the Questfor Voting Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Guinier, Lani. “Development of the Franchise: 1982 Voting Rights Amendments.” In
295
Karen McGill Arrington and William L. Taylor, eds., Voting Right
Continuing the Questfor Full Participation. Washington,
Political and Economic Studies, 1992.
s in America:
D.C.: Joint Center for
Hamilton, Charles V. The Bench and the Ballot: Southern Federal Judges and Black
l oters. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973
Hams, Joseph P. Registration of Voters in The United States. Washington DC'
Brookings, 1929. 5
’
Hasen, Richard L. The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equalityfrom Baker
v. Carr to Bush v. Gore. New York: New York University Press, 2003.
Haskell, John. Direct Democracy or Representative Government? Dispelling the
Populist Myth. Boulder: Westview, 2001.
Herbert, Bob. Keep Them Out.” New York Times
,
Dec. 7, 2000, p. A31,
Herzog, Don. Happy Slaves: A Critique ofConsent Theory’. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1989.
Hill, Thos. E. Hill’s Political History ofthe United States. Chicago: Hill Standard Book
Company, 1894.
Hirschman, Albert O. The Rhetoric ofReaction. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
1991.
J
Hoar, Roger Sherman. Constitutional Conventions: Their Nature, Powers, and
Limitations. Littleton, Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1987 (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1917).
Hochschild, Jennifer. “Introduction and Comments.” 1 Perspectives on Politics 247
(2003).
Hofstadter, Richard. The Idea ofa Party System. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1969.
Holmes, Stephen and Cass R. Sunstein. The Cost ofRights: Why Liberty Depends on
Taxes. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999.
“How America Doesn’t Vote,” unsigned editorial, The New York Times
,
Feb. 15, 2004.
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968.
296
Hyman Harold M. “Luther v. Borden ” In Kermit L. Hall, ed„ The Oxford Companionto the Supreme Court. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
7
Issacharoff, Samuel, Pamela S. Karlan, and Riehard H. Pildes. The Law ofDemocracy:
egcil Structure ofthe Political Process, Rev 'd Second Ed New York-
Foundation Press, 2002.
Issacharoff, Samuel Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes. When Elections Go Bad-
1he Law ofDemocracy and the Presidential Election of2000, Rev 'd Ed New
York: Foundation Press, 2001.
Itzkowitz, Howard and Lauren Oldak. “Note: Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right to Vote:
ackground and Developments,” 1 1 American Criminal Law Review 695 (1973).
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Jensen, Laura S. “The Early American Origins of Entitlements.” 10 Studies in American
Political Development 360 (1996).
Jensen, Laura S. Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins ofAmerican Social Policy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Johnson-Pams, Afi S. “Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social Contract
Breached.” 89 Virginia Law Review 109 (2003).
Journal ofthe Debates and Proceedings in the Convention ofDelegates, Chosen to
Revise the Constitution ofMassachusetts, 1820-1821. Boston: The Daily
Advertiser, 1853.
Karlan, Pamela S. “Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate
over Felon Disenfranchisement.” Research Paper No. 75, Stanford Public Law
and Legal Theory Working Paper Series (2004).
Karst, Kenneth L. Belonging To America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
Kessler, Robert E. “Suffolk Settles Voting Rights Case.” Newsday, June 30, 2004.
Kettner, James H. The Development ofAmerican Citizenship, 1608-1870. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1978.
Keyssar, Alexander. The Right to Vote: The Contested History ofDemocracy in the
United States. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
297
Kidwell David. “Election Officials Knew of List Errors” Bradenton Herald
August 2, 2004.
Kimball, Penn. The Disconnected. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
Kleppner, Paul. “Defining Citizenship: Immigration and the Struggle for Voting Rights
in Antebellum America.” In Donald W. Rogers, ed., Voting and the Spirit of
American Democracy. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992.
Kleppner, Paul. The Third Electoral System. 1853-1892: Parties. Voters, and Political
Cultures. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1979.
Kleppner, Paul et al., eds. The Evolution ofAmerican Electoral Systems. Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1981.
Knack, Stephen and Martha Kropf. “Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?” 35 PS
September 2002.
Kousser, J. Morgan. The Shaping ofSouthern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the
Establishment ofthe One-Party South. 1880-1910. New Haven: Yale, 1974.
Lawson, Steven F. Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976.
Leonard, Gerald. The Invention ofParty Politics: Federalism, Popular Sovereignty, and
Constitutional Development in Jacksonian Illinois. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2002.
Lewinson, Paul. Race, Class, and Party: A History ofNegro Suffrage and White Politics
in the South. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1932.
Liberto, Jennifer. “Voter Fraud Penalties Minimal.” St. Petersburg Times, July 19, 2004
(page number unknown).
Lieb, David A. “Political Groups Using Incentives to Encourage Voter Registration.”
Associated Press, June 27, 2004.
Lockndge, Kenneth A. A New England Town: The First Hundred Years, Expanded Ed.
New York: Norton, 1985 (1970).
Lockhart, Charles. The Roots ofAmerican Exceptionalism: Institutions, Culture and
Policies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Lowenstein, Daniel Hays and Richard L. Hasen. Election Law: Cases and Materials, 2
nd
ed. Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2001.
298
Lukas, J Anthony. Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three
American Families. New York: Vintage, 1986 (1985).
Mahlburg, Bob and John Maines. “State Officials Defend List
Sentinel
,
July 3, 2004 (page number unknown).
of Felon Voters.” Orlando
“Making Votes Count,” (unsigned editorial). The New York Times. January 18, 2004.
Mallon, Guy Ward The Ohio Election Law: A Manualfor the Guidance ofElectors and
Election Officers. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1892.
Manfredi, Christopher P. “Judicial review and criminal disenfranchisement in the United
States and Canada.” 60 The Review ofPolitics 277 (1998).
Mangaliman, Jessie. “San Francisco Considers School Board Voting Rights for Non-
Citizens.” San Jose Mercury News, June 21, 2004.
Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen. “Punishment and Democracy: Disenfranchisement
of Nonincarcerated Felons in the United States.” 2 Perspectives on Politics 491
(2004).
McBain, Floward Lee. The Law and The Practice ofMunicipal Home Rule. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1916.
McDonald, Laughlin. A Voting Rights Odyssey: Black Enfranchisement in Georgia.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
McDonald, Michael P. and Samuel L. Popkin. “The Myth of the Vanishing Voter.” 95
American Political Science Review 963 (2001).
McGerr, Michael E. The Decline ofPopular Politics: The American North, 1865-1928.
New York: Oxford, 1986.
McGovney, Dudley O. The American Suffrage Medley: The Needfor a National Uniform
Suffrage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
McKenna, Mark. “Building ‘a closet of Prayer’ in the New World: the story of the
Australian Ballot.” London Papers in Australian Studies, No. 6 (2002).
McKinley, Albert Edward. The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in
America. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1905.
Merry, Sally Engle. Colonizing Hawa 'i: The Cultural Power ofLaw. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000.
299
Miles, Thomas J. “Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter
Studies 85 (2004).
Turnout.” 33 Journal ofLegal
Miller, Perry, ed. The American Puritans:
University Press, 1982 (1956).
Their Prose and Poetry. New York: Columbia
Morgan, Edmund S.
and America.
Inventing the People: The Rise ofPopular Sovereignty in EnglandNew York: W.W. Norton, 1988.
Morgan, Ruth P. Governance by Decree: The Impact ofthe
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Voting Rights Act in Dallas.
Morone James A. The Democratic W,sh: Popular Participation and the Limits ofAmerican Government, Revised Ed. New Haven: Yale, 1998
National Municipal League, Committee on Election Administration. A Model
Registration System. New York: National Municipal League, 1927.
Niemi, Richard and Paul Hermson. “Beyond the Butterfly: The Complexity of U.S.
Ballots.” 1 Perspectives on Politics 317 (2003).
Novak, William J. The People ’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century
America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996.
Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. Civil Disabilities of
Convicted Felons: A State-by
-State Survey. Washington: U.S. Department of
Justice, 1996.
O Gorman, Frank. Voters, Patrons, and Parties: the Unreformed Electorate of
Hanoverian England, 1734-1832. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989.
Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. “What is Political Development?” Paper
presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association,
San Francisco, Aug.-Sept. 2001.
Palast, Greg. The Best Democracy Money Can Buy. London: Pluto Press, 2002.
Patterson, Thomas E. The Vanishing Voter: Public Involvement in an Age of
Uncertainty. New York: Knopf, 2002.
Perman, Michael. Strugglefor Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
Petersen, Svend. A Statistical History ofthe American Presidential Elections. Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1981 (1968).
300
Peterson, Merrill D., ed. Democracy, Liberty, and Property-
Conventions ofthe 1820s. New York: Bobbs-Merrill
The State Constitutional
,
1966.
Phillips, Barbara Y. How to Use Section 5 ofthe Voting Rights Act.
Joint Center for Political Studies, 1983.
Washington, D.C.:
Phillips Kevin P. and Paul H. Blackman. Electoral Reform and Voter Participation
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975.
Pitkin, Hanna F The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1967.
Pitkin, Hanna F., ed. Representation. New York: Atherton, 1969.
Plane, Ann Mane and Gregory Button. “The Massachusetts Indian Enfranchisement Act-
Ethnic Contest in Histoncal Context, 1849-1869.” 40 Ethnohistory 587 (1993).
Poggi, Gianfranco. The Development ofthe Modern State: A Sociological Introduction
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978.
Poggi, Gianfranco. The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects. Stanford'
Stanford University Press, 1990.
Porter, Kirk Harold. A History ofSuffrage in the United States. New York' AMS Press
1971 (1918).
Posada-Carbo, Eduardo. Elections Before Democracy: The History ofElections in
Europe and Latin America. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.
Posner, Richard A. “Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election
Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation.” Supreme Court Review (2000).
Posner, Richard A. Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the Constitution, and the
Courts. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001
.
Porter, Kirk Harold. A History ofSuffrage in the United States. Ph.D. dissertation, Dept,
of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1918. Reprinted New York: AMS
Press, Inc., 1971.
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Elections as Instruments ofDemocracy: Majoritarian and
Proportional Visions. New Haven: Yale, 2000.
Proceedings and Debates ofthe Convention ofNorth-Carolina, Called to Amend the
Constitution ofthe State
,
1835. Raleigh: Joseph Gales and Son, 1836.
301
Proceedings and Debates ofthe Virginia Stale Convention
Samuel Shepherd & Co., 1830.
of 1829-1830. Richmond:
Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences ofElectoral Laws
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
,
Revised Ed. New
Ideas in ,he Makmg °f,he
Raskin.Jamin B. "Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage.” 141 University ofPennsylvania Law
Review 1391 (1993).
Raskin, Jamin. A Right to Vote.” The American Prospect, Aug. 27, 2001
.
Reeves, Greg. ‘One Person, One Vote? Not Always.” Kansas City Star, Sep. 5, 2004,
Reichley, A. James. The Life ofthe Parties: A History ofAmerican Political Parties
New York: Free Press, 1992.
Reports ofthe Proceedings and Debates ofthe New York Constitutional Convention of
1821. New York: Da Capo Press, 1970 (Albany: E. and E. Hosford, 1821).
Riker, William H. Democracy in the United States, Second Ed. New York' MacMillan
1965.
Rockefeller Foundation. The Right to Vote: A Rockefeller Foundation Conference. New
York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1981.
Rodgers, Daniel T. Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since
Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998 (1987).
Rohr, John A. Civil Servants and Their Constitutions. Lawrence: Kansas University
Press, 2002.
Rokkan, Stein et al. Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study
ofthe Processes ofDevelopment. New York: David McKay Co., 1970.
Rosenberg, Gerald. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change
?
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Sandel, Michael. Democracy ’s Discontent: America in Search ofa Public Philosophy.
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1996.
302
ovl ) ruu, ui ivi.j JI . 9
New York: Chelsea House, 1973.
Schudson Michael. The Good Citizen: A History ofAmerican Civic Life. New York'The Free Press, 1998.
Schworm Peter “Activist Challenges the Use ofChurches as Polling Places ” Boston
Globe, Mar. 31, 2003.
Seymour, Charles and Donald Paige Frary. How the World Votes: The Story of
Democratic Development in Elections, vols. I and II. Springfield Mass.: C.A\ 1 1 K /-v 1 1 A 1 O ^
Shambaugh, Benjamin F„ Ed. Fragments of The Debates ofthe Iowa Constitutional
Conventions of 1844 and 1846. Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa,
Shapiro, Andrew. “Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights
Act: A New Strategy.” 103 Yale Law Journal 540 (1993).
Shienbaum, Kim Ezra. Beyond the Electoral Connection: A Reassessment ofthe Role of
Voting in Contemporary’ American Politics. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1984.
Shklar, Judith. American Citizenship: The Questfor Inclusion. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991.
Simmons, Richard C. Studies in the Massachusetts Franchise, 1631-1691. New York:
Garland, 1989.
Skowronek, Stephen. Building a New American State: The Expansion ofNational
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1982.
Smith, J. Allen. The Growth and Decadence of Constitutional Government. New York:
Henry Holt, 1930.
Nichols, 1918.
303
Smith, Rogers M. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions ofCitizenship in US History NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1997.
n ry.
“State Knew of Problems with Felons List Since 1998.” The Associated Press, July 20,
Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution ofthe United States. Durham- CarolinaAcademic Press, 1987 (1833).
Strand, Palma J. “Forced to Bowl Alone?” The Nation
,
Feb. 10, 2003, p. 25-29.
Stromer-Galley,Wer “Voting and the Public Sphere: Conversations on Internet
Swann, Barbara, Town Clerk, Monterey, Massachusetts. Intemew with the author, April
Tarr, G ^Alan. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
The Australian Ballot Act and other acts constituting the Election Laws of North
Dakota.” Bismarck, N.D.: Tribune, State Printers and Binders, 1891.
Thompson, Dennis F. The Democratic Citizen : Social Science and Democratic Theory’ in
the Twentieth Century. London: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Thompson, Dennis F. Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United
States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
Thompson, Dennis F. “Election Time: Normative Implications of Temporal Properties of
the Election Process in the United States.” 98 American Political Science Review
51 (2004).
Time Off Urged for Voting Help.” Los Angeles Times
,
May 20, 2004.
De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America, Vol. I. New York' Vintage 1990
(1835).
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability.” 5 Cognitive Psychology
>
207 (1973).
Uggen, Christopher and Jeff Manza. “Democratic Contraction? The Political
Consequences of Felon Disfranchisement Laws in the United States.” 67
American Sociological Review 111 (2002).
304
Urofsky Melvin I. Louis D. Brandeis and the Progressive TraditionBrown and Co., 1981.
Boston: Little,
Vedantam, Shankar. “Dementia and the Voter.” Washington Post, Sept. 14, 2004, at Al.
Watte, Matthew. “Officials Wary of Felon Purge.” St. Petersburg Times
,
May 19 2004(page number unknown). * y ’ UU
Wiebe, Robert. Self-Rule: A Cultural History ofAmerican Democracy. Chicago-
University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Wigmore, John H. The Australian Ballot System As Embodied in the Legislation of
1 anous Countries
,
Second Ed. Boston: Boston Book Company, 1 889.
Williamson, Chilton. American Suffrage: From Property to Democracy, 1760-1860
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
Wills, Garry, ed. The Federalist Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
Winkler, Adam. “Note: Expressive Voting.” 68 N.Y.U. Law Review 330, 1993.
Wirls, Daniel. “Regionalism, Rotten Boroughs, Race, and Realignment: The Seventeenth
Amendment and the Politics of Representation.” 13 Studies in American Political
Development 1 (1999).
Wo 1 finger, Raymond E and Steven J. Rosenstone. “The Effect of Registration Laws on
Voter Turnout.” 72 American Political Science Review 1 (1978).
Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Jonathan Hoffman. “Registering and Voting With Motor
Voter.” 34 PS 85 (2001).
Wood, Gordon S. The Creation ofthe American Republic, 1776-1787. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1969.
Wood, Gordon S. The American Revolution. New York: Random House, 2002.
305


